IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
DOYLE HART v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County
No. 95-7588 J. Steven Stafford, Judge
No. W1997-00188-SC-R11-CO - Decided June 22, 2000
FOR PUBLICATION
We granted review in this habeas corpus case to determine whether two counts of the indictment
under which Doyle Hart, the appellant, was convicted are void for failing to provide him with
sufficient notice of the crimes charged. After thoroughly reviewing the applicable law, we find that
Count 1 is not void for failing to allege a culpable mental state. Additionally, Count 2 is valid
because the appellant was provided with sufficient notice of the manner in which he committed the
offense for which he was charged and because Count 2 complies with the requirements of Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982). As such, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’s denial of the
appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief.
Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission from Appellate Court to Supreme Court; Judgment
of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Affirmed
BIRCH , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA , HOLDER ,
and BARKER, JJ., joined.
Joseph S. Ozment, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Doyle Hart.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Elizabeth
Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, and C. Phillip Bivens, District Attorney General, for the appellee,
State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I
We granted review of this habeas corpus petition to determine whether two specific counts
of the indictment under which Doyle Hart, the appellant, was convicted are fatally defective for
failing to provide him sufficient notice of the crimes charged.
After thoroughly reviewing the applicable law, we find that Count 1 is not void for failing
to allege a culpable mental state. Additionally, Count 2 is valid because the appellant was provided
with sufficient notice of the manner in which he committed the offense for which he was charged
and because Count 2 complies with the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982). As
such, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’s denial of the appellant’s petition for habeas corpus
relief.
II
This appeal arises from the petition for habeas corpus relief filed by the appellant. He was
indicted in February 1991 for two counts each of aggravated rape and incest;1 he was convicted by
1
The indictments charged the appellant as follows:
Count 1
THE GRAND JURORS of GIBSON County, Tennessee, duly
empaneled and sworn, upon their oath, present that [the appellant] on
divers dates, during a period of time beginning on the 1st day of
November, 1989, the exact dates to the Grand Jurors unknown, in
Gibson County, Tennessee, and prior to the issuance of this
indictment then and there unlawfully and feloniously did have
unlawful sexual penetration of [the victim], a female child under the
age of 13 years, contrary to the Statute and against the peace and
dignity of the State of Tennessee;
Count 2
And the Grand Jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid, present
further that on the days and dates aforesaid, and in the aforesaid
County, and within said jurisdiction, the aforesaid [appellant] did
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [the victim], his
wife’s daughter, contrary to the Statute and against the peace and
dignity of the State of Tennessee;
Count 3
And the Grand Jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid, present
further that on divers dates, during a period of time beginning
November 1, 1989 and ending on the 3rd day of October, 1990, and
in the aforesaid County, and within said jurisdiction, and before the
findings of this indictment, the aforesaid [appellant] did unlawfully
sexually penetrate [the victim], a person less than thirteen (13) years
of age, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-502, all of which is against the
peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee;
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a jury of Count 1 (aggravated rape) and Count 2 (incest) and sentenced by the trial court to an
effective sentence of fifteen years. The judgments were affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
See State v. Hart, No. 02-C-01-9209-CC-00202, 1993 WL 305777 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11,
1993) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 29, 1993). Subsequently, the appellant filed a petition for
habeas corpus relief on January 23, 1997. The trial court dismissed the petition; the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
III
At the outset, we note that we are reviewing a petition for habeas corpus relief and whether
to grant the petition is a question of law that we review de novo. We are guided by the overarching
rule that habeas corpus relief is available to a defendant only when the judgment is void on its face
or the prisoner’s sentence has expired. See Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992). “A void
judgment is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court did not have the statutory
authority to render such judgment.” Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998). A valid
indictment is an “essential jurisdictional element” to any prosecution; consequently, this Court has
held that a defective indictment may deprive a court of jurisdiction. Id. So long as an indictment
performs its essential constitutional and statutory purposes, a defect or omission in the language of
the indictment will not render the judgment void. See id.
In 1997, this Court established the criteria to determine whether an indictment performs its
essential constitutional and statutory purposes. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 726-27 (Tenn.
1997). In Hill, we held that
for offenses which neither expressly require nor plainly dispense with
the requirement for a culpable mental state, an indictment which fails
to allege such mental state will be sufficient to support prosecution
and conviction for that offense so long as
(1) the language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the
constitutional requirements of notice to the accused of the charge
against which the accused must defend, adequate basis for entry of a
proper judgment, and protection from double jeopardy;
Count 4
And the Grand Jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid, present
further that on the date aforesaid, and in the aforesaid County, and
within said jurisdiction, and before the finding of this indictment, the
aforesaid [appellant] did unlawfully sexually penetrate [the victim],
a person he knew to be his stepdaughter, in violation of T.C.A. 39-15-
302, all of which is against the peace and dignity of the State of
Tennessee.
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(2) the form of the indictment meets the requirements of Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-13-202; and
(3) the mental state can be logically inferred from the conduct
alleged.
Id.
IV
We now consider whether, in light of Hill, Count 1 is fatally defective for failing to provide
the appellant with sufficient notice of the crime charged in omitting the requisite mental state. As
regards Count 1, Hill is squarely on point and strongly supports the proposition that the appellant
received constitutionally sufficient notice. In Hill, the indictment charging the defendant with
aggravated rape stated:
[the defendant] did unlawfully sexually penetrate [the victim] a
person less than thirteen (13) years of age, in violation of Tennessee
Code Annotated 39-13-502, all of which is against the peace and
dignity of the State of Tennessee.
Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 727. For purposes of comparison, Count 1 in this case states that
[the defendant] unlawfully and feloniously did have unlawful sexual
penetration of [the victim], a female child under the age of 13 years,
contrary to the Statute and against the peace and dignity of the State
of Tennessee . . . .
Neither the Hill indictment nor Count 1 allege any culpable mental state; the only difference between
the two is that in Hill the applicable statute was numerically referenced, whereas in this case, Count
1 references “the Statute.”
Hill clearly held that an indictment need not specify a culpable mental state as long as “the
language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of notice to the
accused of the charge against which the accused must defend.” Id. at 726. Thus, an indictment is
not rendered void for failing to allege a specific mental state as long as it reasonably identifies the
nature of the criminal conduct alleged by the State in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202
and the requisite mental state can be inferred from the alleged conduct.
In reviewing Count 1 in this case, we note its striking similarity to the indictment we
reviewed in Hill. See id. at 727. As such, we find that the analysis we applied in Hill applies
equally in this case. See id. at 726-29 (“Obviously, the act for which the defendant is indicted,
‘unlawfully sexual penetrat[ing]’ a person under the age of thirteen, is committable only if the
principal actor’s mens rea is intentional, knowing, or reckless. Thus, the required mental state may
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be inferred from the nature of the criminal conduct alleged.”). Thus, we find that Count 1 now under
review is not void for failing to allege a culpable mental state.
Having concluded that Count 1 is valid, our review now shifts to a consideration of whether,
in light of Hill, Count 2 is fatally defective for failing to provide the appellant with sufficient notice
of the crime charged. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). As regards Count 2, the issue
is closer. Hill still applies to excuse Count 2's failure to allege a culpable mental state, but there is
an additional factor. Count 2 states that
the aforesaid [appellant] did unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of [the victim], his wife’s daughter, contrary to the Statute
and against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee . . . .
It appears from its language that Count 2 was an attempt to charge the appellant with the
crime of incest under a then recently repealed version of Tennessee’s incest statute. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-4-306(a)(1) (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1989) (providing that “[n]o man shall
marry or have carnal knowledge of his . . . wife’s daughter.”) However, when the offense charged
in Count 2 was committed, the crime of incest was punished by a newly enacted incest statute, which
provided that
(a) A person commits incest who engages in sexual penetration as
defined in § 39-13-501, with a person he or she knows to be, without
regard to legitimacy:
(1) The person’s parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, uncle, aunt,
nephew, niece, stepparent, stepchild, adoptive parent [or] adoptive
child . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-302(a), (a)(1) (Supp. 1989). Thus, instead of properly tracking the new
statute’s language and charging that the appellant had engaged in “sexual penetration” of the victim,
Count 2 alleged that the appellant had “carnal knowledge” of the victim. The appellant argues that
Count 2's failure to use the statutory term “sexual penetration” instead of the term actually used--
“carnal knowledge”--rendered notice of the charge against him under Count 2 insufficient and, for
habeas corpus purposes, Count 2 of the indictment void.
In our analysis of the appellant’s argument, we note that sexual penetration, as defined in
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501, means “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or
any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital
or anal openings of the victim’s, the [appellant’s], or any other person’s body, but emission of semen
is not required. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-501(7) (Supp. 1989). In comparison, though the term
“carnal knowledge” was not statutorily defined in 1989, case law provided that
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[t]here is ‘carnal knowledge’ or ‘sexual penetration’ in a legal sense
if there is the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the female
by the sexual organ of the male. It is not necessary that the vagina be
entered or that the hymen be ruptured; the entering of the vulva or
labia is sufficient.
Walker v. State, 273 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tenn. 1954) (citations omitted).
A comparison of the two definitions shows that though “sexual penetration” can encompass
various types of penetration, the term “carnal knowledge” refers to only one type of penetration.
Though the indictment incorrectly charged the appellant with carnal knowledge of his stepchild, acts
amounting to “carnal knowledge” are included in the definition of “sexual penetration.” As a result,
the appellant was provided with specific notice of the manner in which he had committed the offense
for which he was charged.
In addition, we find that Count 2 complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982), which
provides that
[t]he indictment must state the facts constituting the offense in
ordinary and concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in such
a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended, and with that degree of certainty which will enable
the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982). In this case, Count 2 supplied the appellant with plain,
understandable notice that he was charged with the crime of incest involving his stepchild, in
violation of Tennessee law, during a specified period of time. As such, this Court finds Count 2
valid.
V
After thoroughly reviewing the applicable law, we find that Count 1 is not void for failing
to allege a culpable mental state. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). Additionally,
Count 2 is valid because the appellant was provided with sufficient notice of the manner in which
he committed the offense for which he was charged and because Count 2 complies with the
requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1982). As such, we affirm the Court of Criminal
Appeals’s denial of the appellant’s petition for habeas corpus relief.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant.
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