IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
(HEARD AT DAYTON)
LISA MARTIN, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
DELORES J. COLEMAN v. ROBERT C. COLEMAN
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cumberland County
No. J-2094 John A. Turnbull, Judge
No. E1998-00739-SC-R11-CV - Decided May 16, 2000
We granted this appeal to determine whether an implied partnership may be imposed upon the
retirement benefits of one party to a relationship in which unmarried parties held themselves out as
husband and wife. We hold that the lower courts erred in dividing the retirement benefits as property
of an implied partnership.1
Rule 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed; Case Remanded.
HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA, BIRCH, and
BARKER, JJ, joined.
David R. Swafford, Pikeville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert C. Coleman.
Proctor Upchurch, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Delores J. Coleman.
OPINION
Robert and Delores Coleman began a relationship that resulted in the birth of a daughter,
Lisa, in 1966. After Mr. Coleman obtained a divorce from Evelyn Coleman in 1968, Robert and
Delores Coleman were married. On January 27, 1978, Delores Coleman was granted a divorce from
Robert Coleman. Shortly thereafter, however, Robert and Delores Coleman reunited. They never
remarried, but they continued to live together for sixteen years.
Delores Coleman did not work outside the home. Robert Coleman, an engineer, was the
1
Oral argument was heard in this case on March 28, 2000, in Dayton, Rhea County,
Tennessee, as part of this Court’s S.C.A.L.E.S. (Supreme Court Advancing Legal Education for
Students) project.
1
family’s sole provider. Mr. Coleman was employed by a manufacturing company that was later
purchased by Johnson Controls. Mr. Coleman retired in 1991. Mr. Coleman had a pension plan and
a 401(k) plan through his employer. Delores Coleman made no direct financial contribution to either
of these retirement accounts.
During their sixteen-year relationship subsequent to their divorce, the parties held themselves
out to the public as husband and wife. They filed joint tax returns, maintained health insurance as
husband and wife, and conducted their affairs as though they were married. They jointly acquired
assets and had reciprocal wills prepared referring to each other as “husband” and “wife.” The parties
both testified that they were aware that they were not married.
In 1992 Robert Coleman purchased a used car business. The couple’s jointly-titled house
was used as collateral to finance the purchase. Delores Coleman testified that she believed she and
Mr. Coleman were partners in the business. Mr. Coleman testified that he intended to develop the
business into a successful enterprise and to turn it over to the Colemans’ daughter. The only work
performed by Delores Coleman in the used car business occurred during one two-day period. She
was not authorized to write checks on the business account and did not otherwise participate in the
business. Near the time of their separation in 1994, Mr. Coleman financed the purchase of the lot
on which the car business was located. The purchase was made in his name only although Delores
Coleman signed the loan documents.
When the couple separated in 1994, Robert Coleman filed suit in Cumberland County circuit
court seeking to have the couple’s jointly-held accounts and home conveyed to him in his name. In
the alternative, he sought to have the property partitioned. Ms. Coleman filed a complaint for
divorce, alleging a marriage by estoppel and seeking a division of the parties’ marital assets. The
two actions were consolidated for trial.
The trial court held that “equity ought to require this relationship to be considered marriage
by estoppel” but acknowledged that such a finding would be contrary to case law. Instead, the court
found that an implied partnership existed between the parties for the duration of the Colemans’
cohabitation and held that Mr. Coleman was estopped from denying that a partnership extended to
“all of the assets.” As a partnership, the parties’ assets would be divided equally, regardless of the
source of monetary contribution. The trial court further held that there was ample testimony to
establish a business relationship between the parties. The trial court dissolved the partnership as of
June 20, 1997, and stated:
With reference to the pension or retirement benefits, the record is
clear that these benefits were accumulated during the period of the
parties’ implied partnership and during the period when, as a matter
of equity, the defendant is estopped to deny plaintiff’s partnership
rights in the retirement benefits and/or pension. Plaintiff indirectly
contributed to the retirement and/or pension with Johnson Control by
providing all of those amenities and benefits customarily provided by
2
a wife, although she made no direct monetary contribution to those
funds. It is the ruling of the court that equity demands that Mrs.
Delores J. Coleman be and she is hereby granted Fifty Percent (50%)
ownership in the pension and/or retirement benefits due Robert L.
Coleman as a result of his employment with Johnson Control.
The final order of the trial court did not list the valuations of all the property divided by the court.2
The court stated at the conclusion of the trial that its intention was to divide the assets equally.
In the Court of Appeals, Mr. Coleman conceded his acceptance of the trial court’s
identification and valuation of the partnership assets and the adjustments made by the trial court,
with the exception of the inclusion of his pension and 401(k).3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s holding that an implied partnership existed and that Ms. Coleman was entitled to a
portion of Mr. Coleman’s retirement benefits. The court remanded the case, however, finding that
the record was unclear as to the amount of retirement benefits that accrued while the parties were
living together.4
ANALYSIS
For purposes of this appeal, Mr. Coleman concedes that the used car business was implied
partnership property. He objects only to the lower courts’ inclusion of his retirement benefits in the
division of “partnership” assets. Since this case was tried by the court sitting without a jury, we
review the case de novo upon the record with a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact
by the trial court. Unless the evidence preponderates against the findings, we must affirm absent an
error of law. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).
In Tennessee, marriage is controlled by statute, and common-law marriages are not
recognized. Crawford v. Crawford, 198 Tenn. 9,14, 277 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tenn. 1955); Rambeau
v. Farris, 186 Tenn. 503, 506, 212 S.W.2d 359, 360 (1948); Bass v. Bass, 774 S.W.2d 170 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987). Our courts have recognized marriage by estoppel when parties have believed in the
validity of their marriage and have evidenced that belief by cohabitation. Rambeau, 212 S.W.2d at
2
The trial court made explicit findings on the record as to both the valuation of property and
the division of assets and liabilities. The court also made certain adjustments for amounts received
or expended by the parties. The order entered by the trial court, however, does not reflect the trial
court’s findings in their entirety.
3
In its ruling from the bench, the trial court valued the 401(k) at $20,000 and the pension at
$130,737. The order entered by the court, however, reflected the award of the pension as an asset
but did not include the court’s finding as to the value of the pension.
4
The 1978 divorce decree did not award Ms. Coleman any interest in Mr. Coleman’s pension
or 401(k) plan.
3
361. The doctrine of marriage by estoppel is applied in exceptional cases. It does not apply in cases
where the parties knowingly live together in an unmarried state and are privileged to discontinue that
relationship at will. Crawford, 277 S.W.2d at 392. It was uncontroverted that both Delores and
Robert Coleman knew they were not married. The trial court correctly held that it could not find a
marriage by estoppel. Stating that equity must be served, however, the trial court used the doctrine
of implied partnership to divide all of the property acquired during the relationship.
In Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tenn. 1991), we defined a partnership as an association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit. See Rowlett v. Guthrie, 867
S.W.2d 732, 735-36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (declining to find an implied partnership extending to
parties who cohabited in a home owned by one party and out of which the other party operated a
barbeque business); Johnson v. Graves, 15 Tenn. App. 466 (1932) (finding implied partnership
extending to a barber shop and boarding house but not to a certificate of deposit in the name of one
party; the partners had lived together for twenty years but each partner was married); see also Tenn.
Code Ann. § 61-1-105(a). In determining whether a partnership exists, all of the relevant facts,
actions, and conduct of the parties must be considered. Bass, 814 S.W.2d at 41. No one fact or
circumstance is conclusive. Id.; Roberts v. Lebanon Appliance Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 793, 795
(Tenn. 1989). The existence of a partnership may be implied when it appears that the parties have
entered into a business relationship for profit, combining their property, labor, skill, experience, or
money. Bass, 814 S.W.2d at 41; Rowlett, 867 S.W.2d at 736. It is not necessary that the parties
have an understanding of the legal effect of their acts. Roberts, 779 S.W.2d at 795-96.
In Bass we upheld the trial court’s ruling that William and Linda Bass were implied partners.
Bass 814 S.W.2d at 41, 44. Although the parties cohabited during their ten-year business
relationship and even were married briefly, it was through their combined efforts that their
businesses prospered. Id. at 44. The two worked jointly at a restaurant and video amusement game
venture. Proceeds from these ventures were used to purchase a convenience store and used car lot.
Id. at 43. We noted that Linda Bass invested time, money, labor, and energy into producing a
profitable and productive enterprise. Id. at 44. Accordingly, we held that Linda Bass was entitled
to one-half ownership of all partnership assets, including assets purchased with partnership assets.
That the parties cohabited for eleven years and were married at one point was not a factor in our
decision. We stressed that the ordinary laws pertaining to partnership, not the laws of domestic
relations, apply in a situation in which a business partnership can be implied from the facts and
circumstances, a meretricious relationship notwithstanding. Id.
In this case, we are asked by the estate of Delores Coleman5 to extend our holding in Bass
to find that an implied partnership extends to the retirement benefits accumulated by Robert
Coleman. The parties’ only business relationship involved a used car business. Ms. Coleman’s
participation in the used car business was minimal at best. The estate does not contend that the used
5
Delores Coleman died on December 26, 1998, while this case was pending before the Court
of Appeals. Her daughter, Lisa Martin, the administratrix of the estate of Delores J. Coleman, has
been substituted as a party.
4
car business produced or contributed to Mr. Coleman’s pension or 401(k). In apparent recognition
of this fact, the trial court held that Ms. Coleman “indirectly contributed to the retirement and/or
pension with Johnson Control by providing all of those amenities and benefits customarily provided
by a wife, although she made no direct monetary contribution to those funds.” (Emphasis added).
While Ms. Coleman’s contribution as a homemaker could be considered in dividing marital
property pursuant to Tenn Code Ann § 36-4-121(c)(5), the parties were not married.6 A marriage
would have created a form of “partnership” entitling each party to the benefits of the statute
regulating the dissolution of marriage. To hold that these retirement benefits are available as
partnership assets would require this Court to expand the concept of implied partnership beyond the
business relationship now conceded by the parties. In essence, we would be required to hold that
unmarried couples may create an implied partnership simply by their continued cohabitation. We
decline to do so.
Mr. Coleman concedes that the remaining assets should be divided equally between the
parties. We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court for an equal division of the remaining
property, without consideration of the value of Mr. Coleman’s retirement benefits. The Court of
Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. The costs of this appeal are taxed against Lisa Martin, Administratrix of the Estate
of Delores Coleman, for which execution may issue if necessary.
6
Marital property includes “the value of vested pension, retirement or other fringe benefit
rights accrued during the period of the marriage.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B).
5