IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
February 22, 2000
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
MICHAEL C. GLEAVES, ) FOR PUBLICATION
)
Appellant, ) FILED: February 22, 2000
)
v. ) DAVIDSON COUNTY
)
CHECKER CAB TRANSIT ) HON. HAMILTON V. GAYDEN, JR.,
CORPORATION, INC., ) JUDGE
)
Appellee. ) NO. M1997-00183-SC-R11-CV
For Appellant: For Appellee:
WILLIAM D. LEADER, JR. STEVEN D. PARMAN
JULIE C. MURPHY MATTHEW A. BOYD
Nashville, TN Nashville, TN
OPINION
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED;
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REINSTATED. BIRCH, J.
I
We granted this appeal in order to determine whether §
6.72.210 of the Code of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville
and Davidson County1 (Metro. Code) and the required Taxicab
Liability Insurance Agreement2 (Agreement) impose liability upon
Checker Cab Transit Corporation, Inc. (Checker) for injuries to a
third party caused by the negligence of one of Checker’s contract
drivers who was “off-duty” at the time of the incident. Because we
find that the ordinance and the Agreement impose liability on the
1
A. All taxicab companies shall be required to file a
liability insurance agreement with the taxicab and wrecker
licensing board for each taxicab operated under their franchise.
A copy of such agreement is on file, attached to Ordinance 81-530,
codified in this section.
B. These agreements shall place the vehicles operated under
their franchise in the taxicab company’s complete possession and
control, and the taxicab company shall assume complete liability
for each and every vehicle for which it enters into this agreement.
2
TAXICAB LIABILITY INSURANCE AGREEMENT
CHECKER CAB TRANSIT CORPORATION Taxicab Company, a
CORPORATION, duly licenced by the Taxicab and Wrecker Licensing
Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, hereby acknowledges, by the signature below of an officer,
partner, or the sole proprietor of the corporation, that the
vehicle(s) described herein is (are) operated under the name,
emblem, color, design and insignia of the above-named company and
said company agrees to the following: MOSLEY. ROBERT J.
1. That the vehicle serial number, year, model, and trade
name are: 1990 CHEVROLET CAPRICE 1G18N54E7A150305 and the same are
operated with the permission of and under the control of the above-
named company, partnership or sole proprietorship.
2. That these vehicles shall be insured either by liability
insurance or indemnity bond with minimum limits of not less than
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) for bodily injury or death
of any one (1) person in any one (1) accident and not less than
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for bodily injury or death of any
two (2) or more persons in any one (1) accident and not less than
ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for property damage resulting from
any one (1) accident, or the amount of insurance or bond as
required by the State of Tennessee, whichever is greater.
3. That the above-named taxicab company, partnership or sole
proprietorship shall assume complete liability for each vehicle
being operated under its name, color, emblem, design and insignia
and shall be liable for any personal injuries or property damage to
third parties as the result of the negligent use of these vehicles.
2
taxicab company regardless of the status (on-duty/off-duty) of the
driver, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
judgment entered by the trial court is reinstated.
II
On the day in question, the record shows that Robert J.
Mosley (a driver for Checker) began work at about 5:30 a.m. and
reported “off-duty” by radio at approximately 9:20 p.m. Shortly
after reporting “off-duty,” and while en route home, Mosley’s high
speed attracted the attention of City of Lakewood police officers.
A high speed chase ensued. The chase ended at about 10:05 p.m.
when Mosley collided with a vehicle operated by Michael C. Gleaves.
Gleaves sustained serious injuries.
Gleaves filed a lawsuit against Checker, Mosley, the City
of Lakewood, and a City of Lakewood police officer. He sought
damages under the theories of negligent hiring and supervision,
respondeat superior, § 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
and under § 6.72.210 of the Metro. Code. Checker moved for summary
judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Checker on the common law claims but denied summary judgment to
Checker on the issue of liability under the ordinance. Instead,
the court granted, sua sponte, summary judgment in favor of
Gleaves, ruling that § 6.72.210 imposed liability on Checker for
Mosley’s negligence. The question of Mosley’s negligence was
submitted to a jury, and it determined that Mosley was 70 percent
at fault and the City of Lakewood was 30 percent at fault.
Applying § 6.72.210, the trial court held Checker liable in
accordance with the jury’s apportionment of fault.
3
Checker appealed the trial court’s ruling on the issue of
liability under § 6.72.210, and Gleaves appealed the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment to the defendant on his common law
claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment
against Checker and dismissed Gleaves’s complaint but affirmed the
trial court’s judgment in all other aspects. The sole issue on
appeal is whether § 6.72.210 imposes liability upon Checker for
Mosley’s negligence while “off-duty.”3
The Metropolitan Council of Nashville and Davidson County
(Metropolitan Council) closely regulates the taxicab business. In
order to operate a taxicab service within Davidson County, a
taxicab company must first obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the taxicab licensing board. Metro.
Gov’t. of Nashville and Davidson Co., Tenn. Code ch. 6.72, §
6.72.020.4 Mosley was operating his taxicab under the authority of
a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued to Checker
Cab Transportation Corporation, Inc.
The taxicab company must also “file a liability insurance
agreement with the taxicab and wrecker licensing board for each
3
The Court of Appeals precluded Gleaves from obtaining a new
trial as to his common law claims under the rationale of Samuelson
v. McMurtry, 962 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1998). Based on Samuelson, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that because Gleaves had not appealed the
judgment against the City of Lakewood he was precluded from
obtaining a new trial because the City of Lakewood “would be forced
to expend resources defending itself again in a new trial and it
would encounter the possibility that a jury would assess more
damages to it.” Because this issue was not addressed by either
party at oral argument or in the briefs submitted to this Court, we
shall not address it.
4
No person shall operate or permit a taxicab or motor vehicle
owned or controlled by him, and as defined in Section 6.72.010 as
amended, upon the streets and roads of the metropolitan government
area without having first obtained a certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the taxicab licensing board.
4
taxicab operated under [its] franchise.” Metro. Gov’t. of
Nashville and Davidson Co., Tenn. Code ch. 6.72, § 6.72.210(A).
The liability insurance agreement places “the vehicles operated
under [the company’s] franchise in the taxicab company’s complete
possession and control” and the company must “assume complete
liability for each and every vehicle for which it enters” the
agreement. Id. at ch. 6.72, § 6.72.210(B). A liability insurance
agreement between Checker and its operators makes Checker
“complete[ly] liable for each vehicle being operated under its
name, color, emblem, design and insignia,” and Checker is liable
“for any personal injuries or property damage to third parties as
the result of the negligent use of these vehicles.” Agreement,
supra n.2. Mosley and Checker had entered into the above-described
agreement, and it had been filed.
For the sake of clarity, it is helpful to describe the
relationship between Checker and its drivers. Checker is
essentially a dispatch service. Typically, a customer telephones
Checker, requests a taxicab, and a dispatcher contacts a driver by
radio and directs him or her to the customer. Checker owns none of
the taxicabs which it dispatches. Instead, the owner of the
vehicle is personally responsible for the vehicle’s maintenance,
not Checker. Moreover, Checker does not share directly in any of
the fare income. The only financial obligation an owner has to
Checker is payment of a weekly fee for the use of a meter, a radio,
a top light, Checker’s dispatch service, Checker’s distinctive
paint scheme, Checker’s emblem, Checker’s insignia, and the right
to drive under Checker’s certificate of public convenience and
necessity.
5
III
The construction of the pertinent ordinances controls the
resolution of this case. Gleaves essentially insists that §
6.72.210 imposes complete liability on Checker for the negligence
of the driver of any vehicle for which Checker has filed a
liability insurance agreement. This result is dictated, contends
Gleaves, by the clear and unambiguous language of the ordinance.
Checker, on the other hand, contends that a taxicab operates under
a company’s franchise only when it is actively seeking or
transporting passengers and that the ordinance imposes liability
only when a taxicab is operated under the taxicab company’s
franchise. Thus, according to Checker, no liability should be
imposed upon Checker for a driver’s negligence while “off-duty.”
As the Court of Appeals aptly noted, “[a] cursory review of the
selected provisions [of the ordinances] could lead to either
conclusion.”
IV
“Construction of a statute is a question of law which we
review de novo, with no presumption of correctness.” Myint v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998). The rules of
statutory interpretation are used when interpreting an ordinance.
See Tennessee Mfg. Housing Ass’n. v. Metro. Gov’t. of Nashville,
798 S.W.2d 254, 260 (Tenn. App. 1990); see also Carroll Blake
Constr. Co. v. Boyle, 140 Tenn. 166, 181, 203 S.W. 945, 948 (1918).
A “basic rule of statutory construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature.”
6
Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State Dep’t. of Revenue, 865
S.W.2d 1,2 (Tenn. 1993). In determining legislative intent and
purpose, a court must not “unduly restrict[] or expand[] a
statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.” Worely v. Weigels,
Inc., 919 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tenn. 1996)(quoting Owens v. State, 908
S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)). Rather, a court ascertains a
statute’s purpose from the plain and ordinary meaning of its
language, see Westland West Community Ass’n. v. Knox County, 948
S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tenn. 1997), “without forced or subtle
construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the
language.” Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc., 865 S.W.2d at 2.
When, however, a statute is without contradiction or
ambiguity, there is no need to force its interpretation or
construction, and courts are not at liberty to depart from the
words of the statute. Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d
10, 16 (Tenn. 1997). Moreover, if “the language contained within
the four corners of a statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, the
duty of the courts is simple and obvious, ‘to say sic lex scripta,
and obey it.’” Id. (quoting Miller v. Childress, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.)
320, 321-22 (1841)). Therefore, “[i]f the words of a statute
plainly mean one thing they cannot be given another meaning by
judicial construction.” Henry v. White, 194 Tenn. 192, 198, 250
S.W.2d 70,72 (1952).
Finally, it is not for the courts to alter or amend a
statute. See Town of Mount Carmel v. City of Kingsport, 217 Tenn.
298, 306, 397 S.W.2d 379, 382 (1965); see also Richardson v.
Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn. 1995);
Manahan v. State, 188 Tenn. 394, 397, 219 S.W.2d 900,901 (1949).
7
Moreover, a court must not question the “reasonableness of [a]
statute or substitut[e] [its] own policy judgments for those of the
legislature.” BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Greer, 972 S.W.2d 663,
673 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Instead, courts must “presume that the
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute
what it says there.” Id. Accordingly, courts must construe a
statute as it is written. See Jackson v. Jackson, 186 Tenn. 337,
342, 210 S.W.2d 332, 334 (1948).
V
The language of the ordinance is plain, clear, and
unambiguous. It requires that all certified taxicab companies
“assume complete liability” for each vehicle for which it enters
into a liability insurance agreement. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville
and Davidson Co., Tenn. Code ch. 6.72, § 6.72.210(B) (1991)
(emphasis added). The natural and ordinary meaning of complete5 is
“entire” or “total.” Therefore, the ordinance requires that a
taxicab company assume complete and total liability for every
vehicle for which it files a liability insurance agreement. The
ordinance does not distinguish between cases when a driver is “on-
duty” and actively transporting or seeking passengers or “off-
duty.” To read the ordinance as distinguishing between “on-duty”
and “off-duty” would improperly dilute the meaning of the language
and unduly restrict the ordinance’s intended scope.
Similarly, the liability insurance agreement does not
limit a taxicab company’s liability for the negligence of its
5
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language 465 (1971).
8
drivers. The agreement requires taxicab companies to “assume
complete liability for each vehicle being operated under its name,
color, emblem, design and insignia.” Agreement, supra n.2.
(emphasis added). Additionally, the agreement makes taxicab
companies “liable for any personal injuries or property damage to
third parties as the result of the negligent use of” the vehicles.
Id. Reading the ordinance and the required liability insurance
agreement in pari materia, it appears that the Metropolitan Council
intended an expansive scope of liability for taxicab companies.
Not only must these companies assume “complete liability” for each
of their vehicles, but also they must assume liability for any
personal injury or property damage negligently caused by their
drivers.
Chapter 6.72 of the Metro. Code further suggests that the
Metropolitan Council intended to impose an expanded scope of
liability on taxicab companies. Under § 6.72.020 “[n]o person
shall operate or permit a taxicab or motor vehicle owned or
controlled by him . . . upon the streets and roads of the
metropolitan government area without having first obtained a
certificate of public convenience and necessity.” Metro. Gov’t. of
Nashville and Davidson Co., Tenn. Code ch. 6.72, § 6.72.020 (1991).
The requirement that a certificate be obtained before a taxicab can
operate in the metropolitan area is not limited to when a driver is
“on-duty,” the taxicab is actually carrying fare-paying passengers,
or when an “on-duty” driver is actively seeking fare-paying
passengers. A certificate is required at all times. Furthermore,
§ 6.72.010 defines a taxicab as a “vehicle regularly engaged in the
business of carrying passengers for hire.” Metro. Gov’t. of
Nashville and Davidson Co., Tenn. Code ch. 6.72, § 6.72.010
9
(1991).6 The ordinance does not limit the definition of a taxicab
to a vehicle which is seeking passengers or a vehicle that always
carries passengers for hire. Rather, a vehicle is a taxicab if it
is “regularly engaged” in carrying passengers for hire, regardless
of the vehicle’s activities at a given moment. As the Court of
Appeals noted, “a vehicle ‘regularly engaged in the business of
carrying passengers for hire’ is a ‘taxicab’ twenty-four hours per
day, whether or not passengers are being carried or solicited.”
Chapter 6.72 of the Metro. Code suggests, therefore, that
the Metropolitan Council intended to regulate the taxicab industry
at all times regardless of the activities of a taxicab at a given
moment. Read in light of the whole Chapter, we believe that the
Metropolitan Council intended, under § 6.72.210, to make taxicab
companies liable for the negligence of their drivers regardless of
whether the driver is “on-duty” or “off-duty.”
VI
When presented with a clear and unambiguous ordinance so
that “there is no room for interpretation” this Court is “not at
liberty to depart from the words of the [ordinance].” Hawks, 960
S.W.2d at 16. Both Metro. Code § 6.72.210 and the required Taxicab
Liability Insurance Agreement clearly and unambiguously impose
liability on a taxicab company for the negligent acts of its
drivers regardless of whether the driver is “on-duty” or “off-
duty,” carrying passengers, actively searching for a passenger to
6
“Taxicab” means a motor vehicle regularly engaged in the
business of carrying passengers for hire, donation, gratuity or any
other form of remuneration, having a seating capacity of less than
ten persons and not operated on a fixed route.
10
carry, or otherwise. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s decision. If the
Metropolitan Council did not intend for the ordinance to create the
extent of liability that we have found here today it is up to the
Council, not this Court, to clarify the scope of liability under
the ordinance. It is not for this Court to substitute its own
“policy judgments for those of the legislature.” BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. v. Greer, 972 S.W.2d at 673.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to Checker Cab Transit
Corporation, Inc.
______________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
CONCUR:
Anderson, C.J.
Drowota, Holder, Barker, JJ.
11