IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
FOR PUBLICATION
July 19, 1999
Filed: July 19, 1999
JAMES N. RAMSEY, District ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Attorney General, Seventh ) Appellate Court Clerk
Judicial District, )
)
Appellee, ) ROANE CHANCERY
)
)
)
Vs. ) HON. FRANK V. WILLIAMS, III,
) CHANCELLOR
)
)
)
TOWN OF OLIVER SPRINGS, A ) NO. 03-S-01-9807-CH-00073
Municipal Corporation under the )
Law of Tennessee, et al., )
)
Appellants. )
For Appellants: For Appellee:
James M. Webster John Knox Walkup
Oak Ridge, Tennessee Attorney General & Reporter
Michael E. Moore
Solicitor General
Gordon W. Smith
Associate Solicitor General
Nashville, Tennessee
OPINION
COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED ANDERSON, C.J.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the City Court for the Town of
Oliver Springs, which sits in Roane County, Tennessee, may properly adjudicate a
criminal case in which the offense was committed in Anderson County.
The District Attorney General for Anderson County brought this declaratory
judgment action against the Town of Oliver Springs seeking a judgment that the town’s
policy and practice of prosecuting Anderson County cases in Roane County is illegal.
Portions of the Town of Oliver Springs are located in three different counties, Anderson,
Roane, and Morgan, but Oliver Springs’ city court is physically located in Roane
County.
The Chancellor held that the city court was authorized to adjudicate such cases
pursuant to 1994 Tenn. Priv. Acts, ch. 137, § 1, provided that a defendant waives the
constitutional right to be tried in the county where the offense is committed. The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that a defendant does not have an unqualified right to
waive venue and that the Town of Oliver Springs’ application of the Private Act impeded
the District Attorney General’s duty to prosecute crimes committed in Anderson County.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Town of Oliver Springs’ policy and
practice pursuant to the Private Act is unconstitutional as applied in this case because it
impedes the District Attorney General’s constitutional and statutory obligation to
prosecute offenses committed in Anderson County. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5. We
therefore do not reach the issue of a defendant’s right to waive venue under Tenn.
Const. art. I, § 9. The Court of Appeals’ judgment is therefore affirmed, but upon the
single ground stated herein.
BACKGROUND
After the declaratory judgment action was filed, a hearing was held before the
Chancellor in which the parties stipulated to the following:
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That the Town of Oliver Springs includes portions of
Anderson, Roane and Morgan Counties.
That the physical location of the City Court for Oliver Springs
is in Roane County.
That the duly elected Judge of the City Court for Oliver
Springs is Defendant Joseph Van Hook. That the duly
elected District Attorney General for Anderson County,
which is the Seventh Judicial District, is Plaintiff James N.
Ramsey.
That Defendant Grant Lowe is Police Chief for the Town of
Oliver Springs and Chief Lowe brings persons charged in
the Anderson County portion of Oliver Springs before Judge
Joe Van Hook sitting as a Court in Roane County.
That Joseph Van Hook as Judge of the City Court for Oliver
Springs has presided as a Judge with General Sessions
Court for [sic] criminal jurisdiction sitting in Roane County
over criminal charges which arose in the Anderson County
portion of Oliver Springs over the objection of the Plaintiff
District Attorney for Anderson County.
That waivers of venue have not been obtained from all of the
Defendants charged with committing crimes in Anderson
County who appeared before Court. That the Court now
requires a “waiver of venue” before accepting guilty pleas.
That the Defendants, absent a ruling from a Court of
competent jurisdiction, intend pursuant to 1994 Tenn.
Private Acts, Ch. 127 [sic] to continue exercising the criminal
jurisdiction for a Sessions Court in the City Court of Oliver
Springs located in Roane County over charges of crimes
committed in Anderson County.
In the hearing, James Ramsey, the District Attorney General for the Seventh
Judicial District, objected to the prosecution of offenses committed in Anderson County
in the City Court sitting in Roane County. He argued that offenses committed in
Anderson County must be prosecuted in Anderson County, and that the policy and
practice followed by the Town of Oliver Springs impeded his ability to discharge the
responsibilities of his office. The District Attorney General also argued that a defendant
does not have an unqualified right to waive venue.
The Town of Oliver Springs responded by relying upon 1994 Tenn. Priv. Acts ch.
137, § 1, which states in part:
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(d) The City Judge shall be vested with concurrent jurisdiction with
courts of general sessions for violations of criminal laws, and shall try all
offenses against the peace and dignity of the town of Oliver Springs.
(e) The City Judge shall also have jurisdiction in and over all cases
arising under the state laws and ordinances of the town of Oliver Springs
and all cases relative to the violation of such laws and ordinances and
offenses against the state or the town of Oliver Springs.
Id. Oliver Springs defended its practice under the Private Act and argued that a
defendant may properly waive the right to venue under Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. The
Chancellor agreed and upheld the practice of trying Anderson County cases in the city
court in Roane County under the Private Act.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals observed that the Private Act was constitutional
on its face. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that a defendant does not have
an absolute right to waive venue1 and that prosecuting Anderson County cases in the
city court located in Roane County impinged upon the District Attorney General’s
obligation to discharge the function of his office by prosecuting offenses committed in
his district.
We granted the Town of Oliver Springs’ application for permission to appeal.
ANALYSIS
A District Attorney General is an elected constitutional officer whose function is
to prosecute criminal cases in his or her circuit or district. E.g., State v. Superior Oil,
Inc., 875 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tenn. 1994). The Tennessee Constitution states in part:
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The cour t obs erve d tha t only tw o pro vision s add ress the w aiver of ve nue , Ten n. R. C rim .
P. 21 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-214 (1997). Rule 21(a) allows a change of venue “upon motion of the
defend ant, or upo n the cou rt’s own m otion with the conse nt of the de fendan t, if it appears to the cour t that,
due to undue excitement against the defendant in the county where the offense was committed or any
other cause, a fair trial probably could not be had.” Id. Section 40-35-214 authorizes a change in venue
upon the written consent of the defendant for the purpose of allowing him or her to plead guilty in one
proceeding to charges pending in more than one county. The statute provides, however, that the
defendant’s waiver is “subject to the approval of the district attorney general and the court having criminal
jurisdiction for each county.” Id.
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An Attorney for the State for any circuit or district, for which a Judge
having criminal jurisdiction shall be provided by law, shall be elected by
the qualified voters of such circuit or district . . . . In all cases where the
Attorney for any district fails or refuses to attend and prosecute according
to law, the Court shall have the power to appoint an Attorney pro tempore.
Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5.
The legislature has codified many of the District Attorney General’s duties and
responsibilities. Foremost among them is that “[e]ach district attorney general . . .
[s]hall prosecute in the courts of the district all violations of the state criminal statutes
and perform all prosecutorial functions attendant thereto, including prosecuting cases in
a municipal court where the municipality provides sufficient personnel to the district
attorney general for that purpose.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-7-103(1) (Supp. 1998). The
District Attorney General’s discretion to seek a warrant, presentment, information, or
indictment within its district is extremely broad and subject only to certain constitutional
restraints. Superior Oil, 875 S.W.2d at 660; Dearborne v. State, 575 S.W.2d 259, 262
(Tenn. 1978); Quillen v. Crockett, 928 S.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
The District Attorney General and only the District Attorney General can make
the decision whether to proceed with a prosecution for an offense committed within his
or her district. As we observed in Superior Oil:
[T]here are no statutory criteria governing the exercise of the prosecutorial
discretion traditionally vested in the officer in determining whether, when,
and against whom to institute criminal proceedings. Indeed, it has been
often recognized that “prosecutorial discretion in the charging process is
very broad.” So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that
the accused committed an offense, the decision whether to prosecute,
and what charge to bring before a grand jury generally rests entirely within
the discretion of the prosecution . . . .
Id. at 660 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in Dearborne, the office of
District Attorney General was described as follows:
[The District Attorney General] is answerable to no superior and has
virtually unbridled discretion in determining whether to prosecute and for
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what offense. No court may interfere with [the] discretion to prosecute,
and in the formulation of this decision, he or she is answerable to no one.
In a very real sense this is the most powerful office in Tennessee today.
Its responsibilities are awesome; the potential for abuse is frightening.
Id. at 262 (quoting Pace v. State, 566 S.W.2d 861, 867 (Tenn. 1978) (Henry, C.J.,
concurring)). Were it otherwise, prosecutorial discretion would rest not with the District
Attorney General, but with police officers who may arrest with or without a warrant
depending on the circumstances. This is, in fact, precisely the harm created by the
policy and practice employed by the Town of Oliver Springs.
In Superior Oil, we commented on the broad prosecutorial discretion inherent in
the constitutional office of District Attorney General in addressing the constitutionality of
the Water Quality Control Act of 1977. The Act required that a District Attorney General
or a grand jury obtain the permission of the Water Quality Control Board or the
Commissioner of the Department of Health and Environment before issuing a warrant,
presentment or indictment charging a violation of the Act. We concluded:
The effect of . . . requiring that the district attorney general obtain written
authorization from either the Board or the Commissioner before issuing a
warrant or seeking an indictment for a criminal violation of the Water
Quality Control Act of 1977, is to partially divest the district attorney
general of the broad prosecutorial discretion and awesome responsibility
inherent in the constitutional office. Although the General Assembly may
enact laws prescribing or affecting the “procedures for the preparation of
indictments or presentments,” it cannot enact laws which impede the
inherent discretion and responsibilities of the office of district attorney
general without violating Article VI, § 5 of the Tennessee Constitution.
Superior Oil, Inc., 875 S.W.2d at 661 (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Accordingly, we held that this portion of the Act was unconstitutional.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Private Act, as applied by the Town
of Oliver Springs, violated Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5. The Private Act, while facially valid,
served as the basis upon which the Town of Oliver Springs prosecuted offenses
committed in Anderson County in a city court located in Roane County. When the Act
was applied in this manner, i.e., allowing the Oliver Springs Police Chief to take
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defendants who have allegedly committed crimes in Anderson County before the city
court in Roane County, Oliver Springs’ policy and practice impeded the constitutional
and statutory obligation of the District Attorney General for Anderson County to
discharge the duties of his office. We agree with the intermediate court that such an
impediment violates Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5. We therefore do not reach the waiver
issue and affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment on the grounds stated.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Town of Oliver Springs’ application of 1994 Private Act, ch.
137, § 1, which permits offenses committed in Anderson County to be heard in the city
court located in Roane County, violates Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5. We affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals on that ground. Costs of the appeal shall be paid by
the appellants, for which execution shall issue if necessary.
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RILEY ANDERSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
Concur:
Drowota, Birch, Holder and Barker, JJ.
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