IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) FOR PUBLICATION
FILED
)
Appellee, ) FILED: June 7, 1999 June 7, 1999
)
v. ) GIBSON COUNTYCecil Crowson, Jr.
) Appellate Court Clerk
RONNIE WILLIAM (BILLY) ) HON. DICK JERMAN, JUDGE
TAYLOR, )
) No. 02SO1-9704-CC-00028
Appellant. )
) (Burglary and Theft)
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Tom W. Crider John Knox Walkup
District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter
Trenton, Tennessee
Michael E. Moore
Solicitor General
Michael J. Fahey, II
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, Tennessee
OPINION
AFFIRMED IN PART; BARKER, J.
REVERSED IN PART
We granted this appeal by Ronnie William (Billy) Taylor, the appellant, in order
to address issues pertinent to the sentences he received in the trial court. In our
review, however, we notice as plain error an invalid conviction that was imposed upon
appellant for an offense that was not charged in the indictment.1 Accordingly, for the
reasons outlined below, we vacate the invalid burglary conviction and affirm the trial
court’s judgment as modified. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
This case has a long and tortured procedural history. On January 16, 1990, the
appellant was indicted in case number 14075 for one count of Class D burglary and
two counts of misdemeanor theft. Two months later, on March 16, 1990, appellant
was indicted in a second case, number 14125, for Class D burglary and misdemeanor
theft. On March 28, 1990, appellant pled guilty in both cases.
In case number 14075, although indicted for one burglary and two thefts,
appellant received two (2) concurrent two-year sentences for two burglary convictions
and a concurrent eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence for a single misdemeanor
theft conviction. These sentences were to be served concurrent to the sentences in
14125. For case number 14125, appellant was sentenced to serve two (2) years for
the burglary conviction and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for the
misdemeanor theft conviction, concurrent with each other and the sentences in 14075.
Thus, the total effective sentence for both cases was two (2) years to be served in the
Community Corrections program, as a Range I offender.
1
While the appellant was indicted for misdemeanor theft, the judgment order reflects that he
was convicted and sentenced for Class D burglary. As will be discussed, this is an invalid conviction.
2
Thereafter, on July 16, 1990, the appellant was indicted in case number 14180
for two counts of Class D theft. That same day, the trial court issued an order
revoking the appellant’s community corrections sentences in case numbers 14075 and
14125. The court ordered that the appellant be confined in the state penitentiary for
four (4) years. The order was styled with both case numbers, but it did not specify
whether the sentence was four years on each of the felony counts or a combination of
concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling four years. Four days later, on July 20,
1990, the trial court issued a second order in “case number 14075 Burglary-2 counts.”
The order stated that the appellant was re-sentenced to serve four (4) years for each
count, concurrent with each other, with confinement designated in the state
penitentiary.
On September 26, 1990, the appellant pled guilty to the charges in case
number 14180. He received a sentence of two (2) years for each count, concurrent
to each other, but consecutive to cases 14075 and 14125. The trial court suspended
these sentences and granted the appellant immediate probation.2
While he was in the Department of Correction for case numbers 14075 and
14125, the appellant attended and completed the boot camp program.3 On March 17,
1991, the appellant was released from the boot camp program and placed on
supervised probation for the remainder of his sentence. On September 9, 1994, a
probation violation warrant was issued alleging that appellant had failed to make any
2
Altho ugh appe llant w as gr ante d pro batio n on t hes e cha rges , he re ma ined in carc erate d on h is
convictions in 14075 and 14125.
3
The “Spe cial A lterna tive In carc eratio n Un it Prog ram ” (kn own as “b oot c am p”) is a pro gram in
which eligible defendants are placed in a special incarceration unit in lieu of confinement in a regular
state pena l facility. In suc h a un it, the d efen dan t is req uired to pa rticipa te for a per iod of ninet y (90) d ays
in an intens ive regim en of wo rk, exe rcise, m ilitary-type discipline an d available tre atme nt progra ms. If
the defendant successfully completes the program, the defendant is released on probation for the
balance of his or her original sentence. Should the defendant fail to comply with the terms and
conditions of supervision, the release may be revoked by the original trial judge pursuant to Tenn. Code
Ann. § 4 0-35-31 1. See Tenn . Code A nn. §§ 40 -20-201 to -207.
3
restitution or pay any fees. As a result, on September 19, 1994, the trial court revoked
the probation in all three cases and re-sentenced the appellant to six (6) years in the
Community Corrections program.
Shortly after entering the Community Corrections program for the second time,
the appellant again violated the conditions of his sentence. A revocation warrant was
issued on October 13, 1994, based on new charges for assault, resisting arrest,
disorderly conduct and public intoxication. On January 17, 1995, the trial court again
revoked appellant’s community corrections sentences and re-sentenced him to serve
consecutive sentences of four (4) years in case 14075, four (4) years in case 14125
and two (2) years in case 14180. The total effective sentence was ten (10) years in
the Department of Correction.
On February 27, 1995, appellant filed a motion for arrest of judgment alleging
that the sentences in cases 14075 and 14125 had expired prior to the institution of
probation revocation proceedings in September of 1994. Additionally, he filed a
motion for correction and reduction of sentence in case number 14180, claiming that
because the sentences in the prior cases had expired, the trial court had the authority
only to sentence him to a maximum of six (6) years. The trial court denied both
motions.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The
intermediate court concluded that the record was not sufficient to determine whether
the prior sentences had actually expired, and therefore, presumed that the trial court’s
judgment was correct. The appellant now requests this Court to reverse the
intermediate court’s decision and find that his revocation was improper.
4
I.
Although not raised as an issue by the parties, there is clearly an invalid
conviction in case number 14075. Ordinarily, this Court will not consider issues that
are not raised by the parties. State v. Walton, 958 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. 1997);
State v. Ogle, 666 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tenn. 1984). However, if the error is plain on the
face of the record, it is a proper consideration for an appellate court whether properly
assigned or not. Walton, 958 S.W.2d at 727; Ogle, 666 S.W.2d at 60. An error
affecting the substantial rights of the accused may be noticed at any time where
necessary to do substantial justice. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Walton, 958 S.W.2d at
727.
In case number 14075, the appellant was indicted for one count of burglary
(Count I) and two counts of misdemeanor theft (Count II & III). However, the record
reflects that he was convicted and sentenced for two counts of burglary and one count
of misdemeanor theft. There is a substantial difference in the sentencing ranges for
the two offenses. For a Range I offender, the sentence for Class D burglary is not
less than two (2) years nor more than four (4) years, while the sentence for
misdemeanor theft is not greater than eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days.
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-111 (1990) & 40-35-112 (1990). The trial court sentenced
appellant to a two-year sentence on the invalid burglary conviction.
Because the law requires that a conviction be premised upon a lawful charging
instrument, and there is none for the second burglary conviction, we are obliged to
notice the deficiency as plain error. The judgment order on Count II of 14075 is, when
considered with the indictment, void. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of
burglary in Count II, case number 14075 are, therefore, vacated and dismissed. This
5
cause is remanded to the trial court with direction for it to enter a judgment of
conviction and sentence for misdemeanor theft, the offense to which the appellant
pled guilty.4
II.
Appellant primarily contends that the sentences in cases 14075 and 14125 had
expired prior to the institution of the revocation proceedings and, therefore, the
revocation was improper. He argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in its
conclusion that the trial court’s judgment was correct on the basis that the record was
insufficient to determine whether the sentence had actually expired. We find that the
record is sufficient to determine the issue and we affirm the trial court’s judgment as
modified herein.
When an accused seeks appellate review of an issue in this court, it is the duty
of the accused to prepare a record which conveys a fair, accurate and complete
account of what transpired with respect to the issues which form the basis of the
appeal. Tenn. R. App. 24(b); State v. Bennett, 798 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1990) cert. denied, 500 U.S. 915, 111 S.Ct. 2009, 114 L.Ed.2d 98 (1991).
While we acknowledge that the record is far less than ideal, it provides a sufficient
amount of information to determine this issue.
The time a defendant spends on probation is not counted toward the
completion of his or her sentence unless a defendant successfully completes the
entire term of probation. If a defendant violates the terms of his or her probation
4
Because the invalid sentence was to be served concurrent to the other counts in 14075 and
the sentences in 14125, the rem oval of this invalid conviction does not reduce a ppellant’s total effective
sentence.
6
within the maximum time ordered by the trial court, the court can revoke the probation
and reinstate the entire original sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310 (1990)
& 40-35-311(d) (1990); State v. Duke, 902 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
It is clear from the record that appellant’s sentence had not expired prior to the
institution of the revocation proceedings. A four-year sentence will expire after service
of 1460 days. There is evidence in the record to support 549 days of sentencing
credits. Furthermore, appellant failed to complete a four-year term of probation. He
did successfully complete a term of three years and 186 days of probation. However,
he had not completed an entire four-year term of probation prior to the revocation
proceedings. Clearly, the appellant has neither served all of his time nor successfully
completed this term of probation.
Therefore, the appellant’s sentence had not expired because he had neither
served the entire four years nor successfully completed a four-year term of probation.
This issue has no merit.
III.
Nevertheless, in our review of the record, we agree with the appellant that the
trial court erred when it increased his sentence to ten years at the final revocation
hearing. While the revocation was proper, the trial court had no authority to increase
the appellant’s original sentence.
We begin our analysis of this issue by recognizing the distinction between the
revocation of a community corrections sentence and a probation revocation. When a
trial court revokes a community corrections sentence under the Tennessee
Community Corrections Act of 1985, it has the authority to “resentence the defendant
7
to any appropriate sentencing alternative, including incarceration, for any period of
time up to the maximum sentence provided for the offense committed, less any time
actually served in any community-based alternative to incarceration.” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-36-106(e)(3) (1990); State v. Bowling, 958 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1997). However, when a trial court determines that a probation violation has
occurred, it can only cause execution of the original judgment as it was originally
entered. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310 & 40-35-311(d) (emphasis added).
In July 1990, when appellant first violated the conditions of his sentence, the
trial court revoked his community corrections sentences in case numbers 14075 &
14125. The trial court re-sentenced him to four (4) years in the Department of
Correction on each count, concurrent with one another. Once he was transferred to
the Department of Correction, the trial court lost jurisdiction. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-35-212(d) (1990); Bowling, 958 S.W.2d at 363. Thereafter, the Department of
Correction placed him in the boot camp program and then on March 17, 1991, placed
him on probation for the remainder of his sentence. When the Department of
Correction placed the appellant on probation, the trial court regained jurisdiction to
revoke his probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-206 (1997).
In September 1994, a probation violation warrant was issued against the
appellant for the second time. The trial court revoked appellant’s sentence and
properly ordered that he serve a six-year sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
311(d)5.
5
This code section provides:
If the trial judge should find that the defendant has violated the conditions
of probation and suspension by a preponderance of the evidence, the
trial judge shall have the right by order duly entered upon the minutes of
the court, to revoke the probation and suspension of sentence and cause
the defe ndant to c omm ence th e exec ution of the judgm ent as or iginally
entered . . . .
(Emphas is added).
8
When the appellant violated the conditions of his sentence for a third time, the
trial court increased his sentence to ten (10) years in the Department of Correction.
Specifically, the trial court re-sentenced him to four years in case 14075, four years in
case 14125 and two years in case 14180. All three sentences were ordered to be
served consecutively. The trial court had no authority to increase the sentences or to
run them consecutively rather than concurrently. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310
& 40-35-311(d). Neither the Community Corrections Act nor the statutes dealing with
probation authorize a court to impose a new sentence under the act after a defendant
has partially served his sentence in the Department of Correction. Bowling, 958
S.W.2d at 364. The trial court had the authority to commence execution of the original
judgment as it was originally entered, but it did not have the authority to increase the
defendant’s original sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310 & 40-35-311(d);
Bowling, 958 S.W.2d at 364. Therefore, the maximum sentence available to the court
was six (6) years in the state penitentiary. Accordingly, the amended judgment of
conviction of the trial court should be modified to reflect an effective six-year sentence.
CONCLUSION
While we find that the appellant’s sentences had not expired prior to the
institution of the revocation proceedings, the ten-year sentence imposed upon
revocation of the alternative sentencing was improper. The proper sentence is six
years in the Department of Correction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as
modified. The cause is remanded to the trial court for correction of the improper
judgment in case 14075 and the reinstatement of the six-year sentence.
Costs are assessed to the State of Tennessee.
9
____________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUSTICE
CONCUR:
Anderson, C.J.,
Drowota, Birch, Holder, JJ.
10