THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
October 26, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
ROBBY McCURRY )
) Appellate Court Clerk
Plaintiff/Appellee ) FOR PUBLICATION
)
v. ) FILED: OCTOBER 26, 1998
)
CONTAINER CORPORATION OF ) CAMPBELL CHANCERY
AMERICA, a Division of )
Jefferson Smurfit ) Hon. Billy Joe White, Chancellor
Corporation )
) No. 03S01-9705-CH-00050
Defendant/Appellant. )
)
) (Workers’ Compensation)
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
Martin L. Ellis & David H. Dunaway
Vonda M. Laughlin Dunaway & Associates
Butler, Vines & Babb, P.L.L.C. LaFollette, Tennessee
Knoxville, Tennessee
OPINION
REVERSED AND DISMISSED BARKER, J.
OPINION
In this workers’ compensation action, the employer, Container Corporation of
America (C.C.A.), defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the
Chancery Court of Campbell County finding the plaintiff-appellee’s injuries arose from
a work-related dispute and were thus compensable. The Special W orkers’
Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of
law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225 (e)(5) (Supp. 1997), affirmed the trial
court. Thereafter, C.C.A. filed a motion for full court review of the Panel’s decision
pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5)(B)(Supp. 1997).
We granted the appeal in this case to determine whether the appellee’s injuries
arose out of and in the course of his employment with the C.C.A. For the reasons
provided herein, we conclude that the injuries did not occur during the course of the
appellee’s employment. The decision of the Panel is reversed and the case is
dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The appellee, Robby McCurry, operated a flexo-folder gluer machine at
C.C.A.’s plant facility. He had worked for C.C.A. for seven years and was an operator
on a machine crew. Operating the gluer machine required a team effort and the
appellee was paired with several co-workers, including one Gary Woods.
On the evening in question, the appellee, Mr. Woods, and other employees
were supposed to be working together on the gluer machine; however, the appellee
complained that Mr. Woods was not performing his job. The appellee reported the
2
problem to a second shift supervisor and Mr. Woods was later reprimanded for his
deficient conduct. When Mr. Woods returned to the machine crew, he appeared
angry, but he did not threaten or harm the appellee at that time.
The employees worked overtime that evening and completed their shift at
approximately 2:00 a.m. Mr. Woods clocked out and left the plant shortly before the
appellee and other co-workers. After the appellee clocked out, he drove his car some
eighty (80) feet from the company premises before stopping on Anderson Road to
assist a fellow employee with car trouble. As he exited his car, he noticed Mr. Woods
driving up along the roadside behind him. Mr. Woods parked his vehicle near the
appellee and asked if they could talk. The appellee agreed that they should talk
because of their problems at work. However, as he approached Mr. Woods’ vehicle,
Mr. Woods pulled out a baseball bat and began striking the appellee multiple times on
his head, knee, and the left side of his body. The appellee suffered a ruptured spleen
and severe bruising as a result of the attack.
The record reflects that there was friction and stress inside the C.C.A. plant for
about six months before the assault. The appellee and other employees testified that
the tension was caused by their work relationship with Mr. Woods. According to
testimony at trial, Mr. Woods often listened to music through portable headphones
while on the job and would not respond when spoken to by colleagues. In addition, he
would hold up production lines by refusing to perform his work duties. The appellee
and other employees complained that Mr. W oods would lie down, perform calisthenic
exercises, and hide in the women’s bathroom to avoid doing his job. There was also
suspicion by some employees that Mr. Woods drank alcoholic beverages before and
during his work shifts.
3
The appellee and co-worker Dewey Slasher testified that the supervisors at
C.C.A. were reluctant to reprimand Mr. Woods for his deficient conduct. They
theorized that the supervisors were intimidated by Mr. W oods because of his large
stature.1 Lowell Marlow and David Brown, the second and third shift supervisors at
C.C.A., testified that they were not intimidated by Mr. Woods. Mr. Brown stated that
he frequently received complaints about various employees at the plant and did not
perceive anything unusual when the appellee complained about Mr. Woods on the
evening of the assault. Mr. Brown testified that he talked to Mr. Woods that evening
and did not notice any signs of anger or intoxication.
Mr. Marlow, the supervisor in charge of the appellee and other second shift
employees, testified that he was unaware of any problems between the appellee and
Mr. Woods prior to the assault. He recalled that Mr. Woods had argued with the
appellee approximately two months before the incident. However, he indicated that he
would not have been afraid to reprimand Mr. Woods had he been informed of Mr.
Woods’ alleged drinking and disciplinary problems. He testified that he had not
received any complaints about Mr. Woods’ drinking on the job from either the appellee
or any other employee at C.C.A.
The trial court found that there was friction in the workplace between Mr.
Woods and other C.C.A. employees. According to the trial court, the incident between
the appellee and Mr. Woods arose out of a work-related dispute and was a
culmination of the stress and tension at C.C.A. Therefore, although the appellee’s
injuries occurred off company time and away from company premises, the trial court
concluded that they were compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The
1
Mr. Woods is six feet seven inches tall and 245 pounds.
4
trial court’s judgment was affirmed by the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel.
DISCUSSION
An employee’s right to recover under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation
Act2 is based upon a finding that the employee’s personal injury arose out of and in
the course of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-103(a) (Supp. 1997). The
phrases “arising out of” and “in the course of employment” are not synonymous.
Woods v. Harry B. Woods Plumbing Co., 967 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1998). They
consist of two distinct elements with “arising out of” pertaining to the origin of the injury
and “in the course of employment” referring to the time, place, and circumstances in
which the injury occurred. McAdams v. Canale, 200 Tenn. 655, 294 S.W.2d 696, 699
(1956). Both elements must be satisfied to impose liability on the employer. Thorten
v. RCA Serv. Co., 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S.W.2d 954, 955 (1949).
We shall first address whether the appellee’s injuries arose out of his
employment with C.C.A. The “arising out of” requirement is satisfied when the
employee’s injury has a rational connection to his or her work duties. Broden v.
Sears, 833 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn. 1992). If the employee is injured from an assault,
our focus becomes whether the assault had a causal connection to the employment,
such as a dispute between employees over job performance, pay or termination. See
Woods Plumbing Co., 967 S.W.2d at 771.
Generally, if one employee assaults another solely to gratify a personal or
private grievance, unrelated to employment, the resulting injury does not arise out of
employment within the meaning of the workers’ compensation laws. Brimhall v. Home
Ins. Co., 694 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tenn. 1985). In appellee’s case, however, the conflict
2
Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 50-6-101 - 705 (Sup p. 1997).
5
between the appellee and Mr. Woods originated from their work relationship. The
record shows that Mr. Woods became angry with the appellee when the appellee
complained to supervisors about Mr. Woods’ deficient job performance. Mr. Woods
harbored his ill feelings during the remainder of the work shift and later attacked the
appellee outside of C.C.A. premises. The two had no relationship aside from being
similarly employed. We are of the opinion that the assault and resulting injuries arose
out of the appellee’s employment.
The next question is whether the appellee was in the course of employment
when the assault occurred. In Tennessee, the general rule is that an injury received
by an employee while en route to or from work is not in the course of employment.
See Pool v. Metric Constructors, Inc., 681 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tenn. 1984). This Court,
however, has recognized limited exceptions in cases where excursions away from the
workplace are a substantial part of the services for which the employee is hired and
compensated. See Smith v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., Inc., 551 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Tenn.
1977).
Other exceptions to the general rule have been made in cases where
employees are injured while en route to or from the workplace, either on the
employer’s premises or between the work facility and employee parking areas. In
Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 150 (Tenn. 1989), an employee was
injured when she slipped on a patch of ice in the company parking lot, after she had
clocked out and was preparing to leave work. Id. at 143. In allowing recovery, we
adopted a premises liability rule, holding that the course of employment includes both
6
the time of work and a reasonable time during which the employee is on the
employer’s premises3 en route to or from the workplace. Id. at 150.
Following Lollar, this Court had occasion to address whether the premises rule
should be extended to cover public thoroughfares that employees must use to access
company parking areas. See Copeland v. Leaf, Inc., 829 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn.
1992). In Copeland, it was necessary for the plaintiff and other employees to cross a
public street, running in front of the company plant, to get to an employee parking lot.
See id. at 141. On the day in question, the plaintiff was walking across the public
street when she was knocked down and injured by a fellow employee. Id. She had
clocked out and was approaching the parking area when the injury occurred. Id.
The Court noted that under Lollar, the plaintiff’s right to recover depended upon
whether she had reached the employee parking lot at the time of her injury. See
Copeland, 829 S.W.2d at 141. The Court stated that it would be inconsistent and
illogical under the workers’ compensation laws to deny coverage merely because the
plaintiff was on a public street and had not yet reached the company parking area. Id.
at 144. Therefore, the Court extended the premises rule to allow recovery for
employees who are injured on public thoroughfares while traveling on a necessary
route between the employer’s work facility and parking lot. Id.4
3
The term “prem ises” includes the entire area devoted to the employm ent by the employer,
including th e park ing lots prov ided for em ployee us e. See Lollar, 767 S.W.2d at 150; 1 Larson,
Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 15.42 (1994).
4
The Court noted that other jurisdictions have granted recovery under similar factual
circum stance s. See Branco v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 518 A.2d 621 (R .I. 1986); Baughman v. Eaton Corp.,
62 Oh io St. 2d 62 , 402 N.E .2d 1201 (1980); Epler v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 Pa. 391, 393 A.2d
1163 (1 978); Kno op v. In dus trial C om m’n , 121 Ariz. 29 3, 589 P .2d 1325 (1978); Proctor-Silex Corp. v.
Debrick, 253 M d. 477, 25 2 A.2d 8 00 (196 9); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Walter, 143 Colo. 549,
354 P.2 d 591 (1 960); Gaik v. National Aniline Div. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 5 A.D.2d 1039, 173
N.Y.S.2d 409 (19 58); Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria Co, 225 Ala. 4 62, 143 S o. 813 (1 932); Smith v.
Greenville Prods. Co., 185 M ich. App. 5 12, 462 N .W .2d 789 ( 1990); Osc ar M ayer F ood s Co rp. v. Illin ois
Indu s. Co mm ’n, 146 Ill. App. 3d 315, 99 Ill. De c. 822, 49 6 N.E.2 d 515 (1 986); West Point Pepperell, Inc.
v. McEntire, 150 G a. App. 72 8, 258 S .E.2d 53 0 (1979 ).
7
The decision in Copeland was based in part upon our recognition that public
thoroughfares become an integral part of the employer’s premises when used by
employees as necessary routes between the work facility and the employee parking
area. See id. When employees travel on these public routes to and from work, they
are deemed to be in the course of employment even though they are not officially on
company time. The reason for this extended rule is that employers are responsible for
creating the necessity of employees encountering particular hazards while traveling
between the parking areas and the work facility.
In this case, we find that the incident between the appellee and Mr. Woods
occurred outside the scope of employer liability as intended by the premises rule. The
appellee was injured approximately eighty (80) feet from the company premises after
he had driven away from the workplace and had stopped on a public road to assist a
fellow employee. The appellee admitted at trial that his decision to stop was personal
and not related to or required by his employer. He further stated that he had
completed his work duties and was on his way home when the injuries occurred.
The Panel determined that the appellee’s injuries were compensable because
they occurred nearby C.C.A. premises, shortly after the appellee had completed his
work shift. The Panel held that, “[w]hen the ill will arises in the workplace and the
assault is carried out in close proximal and temporal scope to the performance of
work, as in this case, ... the injuries arise out of and in the course of employment.”
The Panel’s decision essentially creates a “so close by rule,” requiring courts to
focus upon the degree of time and distance between work performance, the
employers’ premises, and the location of the employees’ injury. This Court has
previously rejected a similar rule, discussed in Smith v. Camel Mfg. Co., 192 Tenn.
670, 241 S.W.2d 771, 774 (1951), finding that such a rule would be difficult to apply
8
uniformly and is neither contemplated by nor required under the workers’
compensation laws. Id. Following Smith v. Camel, we again decline to adopt a liability
rule that is based upon arbitrary measurements of time and distance from the
performance of work.
We continue to follow the premises rule as adopted in Lollar and Copeland,
supra. In cases where an employee is injured while en route to or from work, the
injury is in the course of employment if it occurs on the employer’s premises or on a
necessary route between the work facility and the areas provided for employee
parking. Once the employee has exited the parking area and begins traveling on
personal time, away from the employer’s premises, he is no longer in the course of
employment.
CONCLUSION
We are mindful that the appellee suffered extensive injuries from a brutal and
senseless attack arising out of his employment with C.C.A. Nevertheless, by exiting
the work complex and stopping along a public road, the appellee was outside of
company premises and was no longer in an area of egress or ingress required by his
employer. We, therefore, conclude that his injuries were not in the course of
employment.
Based upon the foregoing, the appellee’s injuries, although unfortunate, are not
compensable under workers’ compensation. The judgment of the Panel is reversed
and the case is dismissed, with costs of this appeal taxed to the appellee.
____________________________
WILLIAM M. BARKER, JUSTICE
9
CONCUR:
Drowota, Birch, Holder, JJ.;
Anderson, C.J., not participating.
10
SUPREME COURT, KNOXVILLE
ROBBY McCURRY )
)
Plaintiff/Appellee ) CAMPBELL CHANCERY
) NO. P-13,742 Below
v. )
)
CONTAINER CORPORATION OF ) NO. 03S01-9705-CH-00050
AMERICA, a Division of )
Jefferson Smurfit ) Special Workers’ Compensation
Corporation ) Appeals Panel Reversed,
) Case Dismissed
Defendant/Appellant. )
)
JUDGMENT
This case was heard upon the record on appeal from the Special Workers’
Compensation Appeals Panel, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5)(B)
(Supp. 1997), and in consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that the
appellee’s injuries did not occur during the course of his employment with the
appellant, C.C.A.
In accordance with the opinion filed herein, it is, therefore, ordered and
adjudged that the judgment of the Panel is reversed and the case is dismissed.
Costs of this appeal will be taxed to the appellee, Robby McCurry, for which
execution will issue if necessary.
10/26/98