IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
DENNIS DYKES ) FOR PUBLICATION
)
Appellant ) FILED: SEPTEMBER 21, 1998
)
) LAKE COUNTY
v. )
) HON. JOE G. RILEY, JR.,
) JUDGE
BILLY COMPTON, Warden )
) NO. 02-S-01-9711-CC-00105
Appellee )
FILED
September 21, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
For Appellant: For Appellee: Appellate C ourt Clerk
LLOYD R. TATUM JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Henderson, Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter
MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General
ELIZABETH T. RYAN
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, Tennessee
C. PHILLIP BIVENS
District Attorney General
Dyersburg, Tennessee
OPINION
REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART BIRCH, J.
Convicted in 1989 upon a plea of guilty to aggravated
rape and now serving a thirty-five year sentence, the appellant,
Dennis Dykes, claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus that
the failure of the indictment to allege a culpable mental state
renders the indictment invalid and the resulting conviction void.
The trial court dismissed the petition, concluding that challenges
to an indictment are not subject to habeas corpus relief and
further that the judgment in question is not void on its face. The
Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that habeas corpus relief is not
available; nevertheless, it considered the appellant’s claim and
found the indictment valid.
We granted the appellant’s application for permission to
appeal in order to determine whether a challenge to an indictment
may be addressed through a petition for writ of habeas corpus and,
if so, whether the appellant is entitled to the relief sought.
After full and careful consideration, we hold that the validity of
an indictment and the efficacy of the resulting conviction may be
addressed in a petition for habeas corpus when the indictment is so
defective as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. In the present
case, however, we conclude that the indictment sufficiently vested
the trial court with jurisdiction and the resulting judgment of
conviction is valid.
Because this issue is a question of law, our review is de
novo. State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997). First, we
must determine whether a defect of this nature may be challenged in
a habeas corpus proceeding. The right to habeas corpus relief is
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guaranteed in Article I, § 15 of the Tennessee Constitution. Such
relief, however, is available “only when ‘it appears upon the face
of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon which the
judgment is rendered’ that a convicting court was without
jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a
defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has
expired.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn.
1993)(quoting State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 336-37
(1868)); see also State ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W.2d 168,
171, 193 Tenn. 113, 122 (Tenn. 1951). If the face of the record
shows that the court did not have jurisdiction, then the judgment
is void.
An important distinction must be made between void
judgments and voidable judgments. A void judgment is one in which
the judgment is facially invalid because the court did not have the
statutory authority to render such judgment. Archer, 851 S.W.2d at
161. A voidable judgment is one which is facially valid and
requires proof beyond the face of the record or judgment to
demonstrate its voidableness. In such cases, habeas corpus relief
is inappropriate. Id.
In the case under submission, the appellant contends that
the indictment is so defective that it failed to clothe the court
with jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction. A valid
indictment is an essential jurisdictional element, without which
there can be no prosecution. See Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 727; State v.
Stokes, 954 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tenn. 1997). Because a habeas corpus
3
proceeding will allow us to examine the record--including the
indictment--it is an appropriate vehicle to determine whether a
judgment is void.
Having decided to address the merits of the appellant’s
appeal, we must now determine whether the appellant is entitled to
relief under the circumstances of this case. The defect complained
of is the omission from the indictment of any reference to a
culpable mental state. Because of this omission, the appellant
asserts that the indictment failed to provide sufficient
information to enable him to understand the accusation made against
him. However, the failure to charge a culpable mental state is not
a defect so long as the indictment performs its essential
constitutional and statutory purposes. Hill, 954 S.W.2d at 729.
In Hill, an aggravated rape case prosecuted under the
Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, we stated:
for offenses which neither expressly require
nor plainly dispense with the requirement for
a culpable mental state, an indictment which
fails to allege such mental state will be
sufficient to support prosecution and
conviction for that offense so long as
(1) the language of the indictment is
sufficient to meet the constitutional
requirements of notice to the accused of the
charge against which the accused must defend,
adequate basis for entry of a proper judgment,
and protection from double jeopardy;
(2) the form of the indictment meets the
requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202;
and
(3) the mental state can be logically inferred
from the conduct alleged.
4
Id. at 726-27. The appellant argues that Hill should not apply
because this case was prosecuted under the Sexual Offenses Law of
1979, rather than the 1989 Act.
The indictment against the appellant provides:
[I]n the month of DECEMBER, 1987 in the said
county and state one DENNIS DYKES did
unlawfully and feloniously sexually penetrate
another to-wit: [B.H.]1 while the said [B.H.]
was then and there a child less than thirteen
(13) years of age in violation of Tennessee
Code Annotated Section 39-2-603 and against
the peace and dignity of the State of
Tennessee.
The aggravated rape statute contained in the 1979 Act neither
required nor plainly dispensed with a culpable mental state. Yet,
because Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301 had not yet been enacted, the
1979 Act contained no requirement of a specific culpable mental
state. Aggravated rape was simply defined as the “unlawful sexual
penetration of another” accomplished under certain aggravating
circumstances.2
1
Due to the age of the victim and the nature of the offense, we
identify the victim by initial only.
2
We do not imply that aggravated rape was a strict liability
offense under the 1979 Act. Rather, the offense of aggravated rape
was a “general intent” crime, for which a culpable mental state was
necessary, but easily inferable from the conduct which comprises
the offense. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-
52, 72 S. Ct. 240, 244, 96 L. Ed. 288, 294 (1952); Walden v. State,
178 Tenn. 71, 77, 156 S.W.2d 385, 387 (1941) (“In the crime of rape
no intent is requisite other than that evidenced by the doing of
the acts constituting the offense.”); Cherry v. State, 539 S.W.2d
51, 54 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
5
The Hill analysis is as relevant to crimes committed
under the 1979 Act as it is to those committed under the 1989 Act.
Applying Hill, we find that the language of the above indictment,
as well as the specific reference to the statute allegedly
violated, provided the appellant with ample notice of the offense
charged. The indictment also provided an adequate basis for entry
of judgment and protection from reprosecution for the same offense.
Moreover, the indictment is concise, understandable, and in
accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (1990).3 The last
requirement set forth in Hill is that the requisite culpable mental
state must be logically inferred from the conduct alleged in the
indictment. In Hill, we found the mental state easily inferable
from the conduct alleged: the unlawful sexual penetration of a
child under the age of thirteen. We find the same inference in
this case, where the indictment alleges that the appellant “did
unlawfully and feloniously sexually penetrate another,” who was a
child less than thirteen years of age. Therefore, the indictment
satisfies the Hill requirements, and the conviction based upon it
is valid.
In conclusion, we wish to emphasize once again the fact
that the Court has moved away from the strict pleading requirements
of common law. As we noted in Hill, “the purpose for the
3
Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-13-202 (1990) provides that an
indictment must:
state the facts constituting the offense in ordinary and
concise language, without prolixity or repetition, in
such a manner as to enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with that
degree of certainty which will enable the court, on
conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment; . . . .
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traditionally strict pleading requirement was the existence of
common law offenses whose elements were not easily ascertained by
reference to a statute. Such common law offenses no longer exist.”
Id. at 728. Thus, so long as the constitutional and statutory
requirements outlined in Hill are met, the indictment will be
sufficient to support a conviction.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals to the extent that it holds that challenges to an
indictment can never be addressed in a habeas corpus proceeding.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissing
the petition.
The costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, for
which execution may issue if necessary.
_________________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., JUSTICE
CONCUR:
Anderson, C.J.
Drowota, Holder, JJ.
Reid, S.J.
7