IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON FILED
June 15, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE ) FOR PUBLICATION
)
Appellee ) FILED: JUNE 15, 1998
)
V. ) MADISON COUNTY
)
) HON. FRANKLIN MURCHISON,
MICHAEL RALPH ALFORD ) JUDGE
)
Appellant ) NO. 02-S-01-9704-CC-00030
For Appellant: For Appellee:
DAVID L. HAMBLEN JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Union City, Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter
MICHAEL E. MOORE
Solicitor General
GORDON W. SMITH
Associate Solicitor General
DEBORAH A. TULLIS
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, Tennessee
JAMES G. WOODALL
District Attorney General
DONALD H. ALLEN
Assistant District Attorney
Jackson, Tennessee
OPINION
REVERSED AND REMANDED BIRCH, J.
The Circuit Court for Madison County entered judgment on
a jury verdict convicting Michael Ralph Alford, the appellant, of
aggravated assault1 for stabbing Ricky Murchison with the sharp end
of a four-way tire tool and inflicting a wound approximately five to
six inches deep. Following a hearing, the trial court imposed a
sentence of four years in the Department of Correction. Except for
sixty days to be served in the county jail, the sentence was
suspended upon the following conditions:
(1) Three years and ten months of
supervised probation;
(2) Performance of two hundred hours
of community service;
(3) Payment within ninety days of
$4,791.01 as restitution to the
victim; and
(4) Payment of $68,589.09 as
restitution to the insurance carrier
for the medical expenses it paid
under the victim’s insurance policy.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
judgment, and we granted Alford’s application for review in order to
address an issue of first impression in this state: whether a
hospitalization insurance carrier can be a “victim” and thereby
receive restitution from a defendant, as ordered by a sentencing
1
(a) A person commits aggravated assault who:
(1) Commits an assault as defined in § 39-13-101, and:
(A) Causes serious bodily injury to another; . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102 (1991).
(a) A person commits assault who:
(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another; . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101 (1991).
2
court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304(a) (1990). Because we
find that the insurance carrier (insurer) was not a “victim” under
the circumstances here presented, we vacate that portion of the
order requiring payment of $68,589.09 to the insurer and remand the
cause for a new sentencing hearing.
I
As a general rule, courts exercising criminal jurisdiction
are without inherent power or authority to order payment of
restitution except as is derived from legislative enactment. State
v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tenn. 1997). Our General Assembly
has enacted legislation authorizing trial courts in criminal cases
to order a defendant to pay restitution to the victim as a condition
of probation. This authorization is contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §
40-35-304(a) (1990), which provides:
A sentencing court may direct a
defendant to make restitution to the
victim of the offense as a condition
of probation.
Thus, whether an insurer may be a “victim” and thereby
receive restitution under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304 depends upon
the meaning of “victim” as used in that statute. Because the
statute does not define “victim,” we must rely on principles of
statutory construction to ascertain its meaning. Construction of a
statute is a question of law which we review de novo, with no
presumption of correctness. Roseman v. Roseman, 890 S.W.2d 27, 29
(Tenn. 1994).
3
In matters of statutory construction, our paramount
obligations are to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s
intent, without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage
beyond its intended scope. Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417, 419
(Tenn. 1997); Wilson v. Johnson County, 879 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tenn.
1994) (citing State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 1993)).
Legislative intent is to be ascertained primarily from the natural
and ordinary meaning of the language used, without a forced or
subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the
language. Carter, 952 S.W.2d at 419 (citing National Gas
Distributors, Inc. v. State, 804 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tenn. 1991)). The
component parts of a statute should be construed, if possible, so
that the parts are consistent and reasonable. Cohen v. Cohen, 937
S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tenn. 1996).
Accordingly, we turn first to the language of the statute
for guidance:
(b) Whenever . . . the victim of
the offense or the district attorney
general requests, the court shall
order the presentence service officer
to include in the presentence report
documentation regarding the nature
and amount of the victim’s pecuniary
loss.
(c) The court shall specify at
the time of the sentencing hearing
the amount and time of payment or
other restitution to the victim . . . .
. . . .
(e) For the purposes of this
section, “pecuniary loss” means:
(1) All special damages, but not
general damages, . . .
4
(2) Reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred by the victim
resulting from the filing of charges
or cooperating in the investigation
and prosecution of the offense; . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304 (1990) (emphasis added). Additionally,
the restitution statute was amended in 1996 to include the following
pertinent language:
(3) If the court sentences a
defendant to payment of restitution
and believes that payment to more
than one (1) victim is proper, the
court shall determine the pecuniary
loss of each victim as provided in
this section and shall order such
amount of restitution to each such
victim;
(4) If, as a result of the
defendant’s criminal conduct, the
victim or victims of the offense are
dead at the time of sentencing, the
court may sentence the defendant to
pay restitution to the victim’s or
victims’ next-of-kin; and
(5) Nothing in Acts 1996, ch. 699, §
39-11-118, § 40-35-104(c)(2) or this
subsection shall be construed to
prohibit or delay a victim from
applying for and receiving any
compensation to which such victim is
entitled under the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Act, compiled in title
29, chapter 13. If the court orders
the defendant to pay restitution
pursuant to Acts 1996, ch. 699, § 39-
11-118, § 40-35-104(c)(2) or this
subsection, the state shall have a
subrogation interest in such
restitution payments for the full
amount paid the victim under the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304(g)(3)-(5)(1997)(emphasis added). In the
context of the above-quoted language, it is apparent that the word
“victim” refers to the individual or individuals against whom the
5
offense was actually committed. Nothing in the statute supports a
broader application.
Additionally, a victim’s insurer is not within the natural
and ordinary meaning of “victim.” This is true because an insurer’s
payment of medical or other expenses is made pursuant to a
contractual obligation; thus, the insurer does not suffer the
unexpected harm that the actual victim suffers. See Hewitt v.
State, 936 P.2d 330, 332 (Nev. 1997). Rather, an insurer contracts
to accept the risk that claims will be made under the contract of
insurance. Therefore, the guidance offered from the language of the
statute is that the legislature did not intend “victim” to apply to
insurers in this context.
Our analysis does not end here, however. When the
language of a statute does not yield a clear interpretation, the
court may examine the legislative history for additional
interpretive guidance. Carter, 952 S.W.2d at 419. We examined the
legislative history of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304 and found no
relevant discussion within the history of the statute’s enactment in
1989. During a discussion of the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 40-35-304, only one relevant statement was made, albeit not in the
context of the issue here presented. A member of the General
Assembly2 stated that the victims to which the statute refers would
include “the immediate members of the family who had been out the
medical expenses, and who had been out the counseling expenses.”
Tennessee General Assembly, House Tape No. 1, 99th G.A., 2d Sess. &
2
Representative Roy Herron, 76th Legislative District.
6
1st Extraordinary Sess. (February 7, 1996). This statement,
combined with the absence of any discussion concerning whether an
insurer may be a “victim” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-403, leads
us to conclude that the legislature probably never considered this
issue.
Thus, in considering both the language and the legislative
history of the restitution statute, we conclude that the Tennessee
Legislature neither envisioned nor intended restitution to apply to
insurers which pay claims made under an insurance contract. Had the
legislature intended such application, it could have explicitly
provided for it. As previously stated, this Court cannot expand the
scope of a statute to create results not intended by the
legislature. Moreover, we must include in our analysis the rule of
statutory construction which requires that criminal statutes be
strictly construed in favor of the defendant. State v. Odom, 928
S.W.2d 18, 30 (Tenn. 1996). Under the circumstances presented,
then, the insurer is not a “victim” for the purposes of Tennessee’s
restitution provisions.3
3
Courts of other states have addressed this issue, and their
holdings vary depending upon the language of the relevant statute.
Vermont’s restitution provisions are similar to ours, referring to
“the victim” without actually defining the word. 13 Vt. Stat. Ann.
§ 7043 (Supp. 1997); 28 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 252(b)(1986 & Supp. 1997).
The Supreme Court of Vermont concluded that the statutory language
does not support the inclusion of insurers in the meaning of
“victim.” State v. Webb, 559 A.2d 658, 661 (Vt. 1989); see also,
e.g., State v. Gardiner, 898 P.2d 615, 624 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)
(superseded by statute); Hewitt, 936 P.2d at 332; State v. Fryer,
496 N.W.2d 54, 56 (S.D. 1993)(superseded by statute). But see,
State v. Blanton, 844 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); State
v. Brooks, 862 P.2d 57, 64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Chery,
511 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d
611, 613 (Utah 1985).
7
The State asserts that insurers should be awarded
restitution under a subrogation theory. As subrogees, they argue,
insurers have the same right to claim restitution in criminal
proceedings as the victims whom they have already paid. This Court,
however, does not have authority to apply the doctrine of
subrogation. The authority to award all forms of restitution,
whether by subrogation or any other procedural mechanism, must be
granted to the courts by statute. As we have already concluded, no
such authority has been granted. See Davis, 940 S.W.2d at 562;
State v. Gardiner, 898 P.2d 615, 625 (Idaho App. Ct. 1995)
(superseded by statute).
In sum, the victim’s insurer cannot be awarded restitution
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-304 because the statute does not so
provide. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed,
and that portion of the judgment requiring payment of $68,589.09 to
the insurance carrier is vacated. Inasmuch as we have vacated an
element of the appellant’s sentence, we remand the cause to the
trial court for a new sentencing hearing. Costs of this cause are
taxed against the State, for which execution may issue if necessary.
______________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
CONCUR:
Anderson, C.J.
Drowota, Holder, JJ.
Reid, S.J.
8