IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FOR PUBLICATION
Filed: April 13, 1998
ROBIN M. COLE, )
)
Appellant, ) HICKMAN CHANCERY
)
)
Vs. ) HON. DONALD P. HARRIS,
) JUDGE
)
DONAL CAMPBELL, )
COMMISSIONER, ) NO. 01-S-01-9705-CH-00104
)
Appellee. )
FILED
April 13, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Appellate Court Clerk
Alfred H. Knight John Knox Walkup
WILLIS & KNIGHT Attorney General & Reporter
Nashville, Tennessee
Michael E. Moore
Solicitor General
Patricia C. Kussmann
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, Tennessee
OPINION
COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED;
CASE REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT ANDERSON, C.J.
We granted this appeal to determine whether a convicted felon has
standing to seek public records in the possession of the Department of Correction
pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act.
The Chancery Court ruled that the prison inmate who sought
documents related to a prison riot in which he was involved lacked standing under
the Public Records Act because he was a felon and dismissed the petition. A
majority of the Middle Section Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a convicted
felon (having been rendered infamous) is not a “citizen” under the Public Records
Act.
After our review of the applicable authority, we conclude that neither
the Public Records Act nor any specific statute or law prevents a convicted felon
from seeking public records under the Public Records Act. We therefore reverse
the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the Chancery Court for
further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Robin M. Cole was an inmate at the Turney Center Industrial Prison
and Farm in Only, Tennessee, serving terms for three burglary convictions and
automobile larceny. On August 7, 1995, following a prison riot, Cole was placed in
involuntary administrative segregation. He requested copies of documents in the
possession of the Warden relating to the prison riot, but was unsuccessful.
In December of 1995, Cole filed a petition against the Commissioner
of Corrections in the Chancery Court for Hickman County requesting access to the
documents pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503 of the Public Records Act. The
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Chancery Court ruled that an inmate who has been convicted of a felony lacks
standing under the Act and dismissed the petition.
A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal on the basis
that “a person convicted of any felony is infamous,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-112,
and therefore not a “citizen” for filing an action under the Public Records Act. In
dissent, Judge Koch argued that the majority’s conclusion was contrary to the broad,
remedial purpose of the Public Records Act, and that none of the specific statutes
that impose civil disabilities upon convicted felons preclude the filing of a petition
under the Act.
We granted Cole’s application for permission to appeal to resolve this
question of first impression for this Court.
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
Our analysis of the question of whether an incarcerated convicted
felon has a right to inspect public records begins with the language of the Public
Records Act. The Act governs the right of access to records of government
agencies in this state. It provides in part:
Records open to public inspection-- Exceptions. (a)
All state, county and municipal records and all records
maintained by the Tennessee performing arts center
management corporation, except any public documents
authorized to be destroyed by the county public records
commission in accordance with §10-7-404, shall at all
times, during business hours, be open for personal
inspection by any citizen of Tennessee, and those in
charge of such records shall not refuse such right of
inspection to any citizen, unless otherwise provided by
state law.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a). A procedure for obtaining judicial review of an
agency’s decision to deny access to records is also set forth in the Act:
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Any citizen of Tennessee who shall request the right of
personal inspection of any state, county or municipal
record as provided in § 10-7-503(a), and whose request
has been in whole or in part denied by the official and/or
designee of the official or through any act or regulation of
any official or designee of any official shall be entitled to
petition for access to any such record and to obtain
judicial review of the actions taken to deny the access.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a).
In ruling on a petition for access to records, the Chancery Court is
empowered to exercise full injunctive remedies and relief under the Act. W hile
certain records are designated as confidential and are unavailable for public
inspection, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504, the Act expressly states that it “shall
be broadly construed so as to give the fullest possible public access to public
records.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(d). This Court has upheld this legislative
mandate on numerous occasions. Memphis Pub. Co. v. City of Memphis, 871
S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. 1994); Memphis Pub. Co. v. Holt, 710 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. 1986).
In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that
Cole was not a citizen and could not invoke the authority of the Public Records Act.
There is no definition of the term “citizen” in the Act, however, nor is there a specific
provision regarding the question of whether a person who has been convicted of a
felony may seek access to records by filing a petition under the Act. Moreover,
there is nothing in the Act that expressly prohibits an inmate from seeking redress. 1
We must, therefore, examine other Tennessee statutory provisions, including its civil
disability statutes, to determine whether any such restrictions exist.
1
In arguing that “citizen” has a limited application under the Act, the Comm issioner cites
a small portion of legislative history with regard to whether an out-of-state resident may petition for
relief purs uan t to the Act. In our v iew, th e cite d exc erpt h as no bear ing on the q ues tion b efor e this
Court.
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CIVIL DISABILITY STATUTES
Virtually every jurisdiction subjects a convicted defendant not only to
criminal punishment but also sanctions that restrict civil and proprietary rights.
Special Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L.
Rev. 929 (1970)(hereinafter “Special Project”). Such restrictions, or civil disabilities,
date back to ancient Greece and Rome, when a criminal conviction rendered one
“infamous,” and resulted in the loss of the right to vote, hold office, make speeches
or assemble. The sanctions were viewed as retributive and deterrence measures
imposed against those who committed crimes because they entailed the loss of
rights most cherished by society. Civil disabilities were also imposed in early
English common law in the form of “attainder.” A person convicted of treason or a
felony, i.e., attained, was not only subjected to criminal punishment but also the loss
of property, voting, and other civil rights. Id. at 941-944.
In this country, civil disabilities continue to play a significant role in the
criminal justice system and generally fall into one of two categories: civil death
statutes and specific disability statutes.
Civil death statutes are “blanket provisions that deprive the criminal of
[all] rights while he is serving a prison sentence for life or less than life.” Special
Project, supra, at 950.2 As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, civil death is:
[t]he state of a person who, though possessing natural
life, has lost all civil rights and as to them is considered
civilly dead. . . . In some states, some persons convicted
of serious crimes are declared to be civilly dead which
means that certain civil rights and privileges of the
convicted offender including the right to vote, contract
and sue and be sued are forfeited.
2
One example cited in this authority provided that “a person sentenced to imprisonment
in the state p rison for life is th ereafter deem ed civilly dead.” S pecial Pro ject, supra, at 951
(quoting, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1653(B)(1956)).
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Black’s Law Dictionary 245 (6th ed. 1990); see also 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law,
§ 1032 (1981 & Supp. 1997).
In contrast, the other category - specific disability statutes - designate
a particular civil disability that occurs upon the conviction and remains in effect
throughout the defendant’s life unless restored by a specific statutory procedure.
Special Project, supra, at 951. A civil disability pursuant to such a statute may
include the loss of the right to vote, hold office, serve as a juror, possess firearms,
and the denial of professional or occupational licensing. Id. at 952.
Like the vast majority of states, Tennessee does not have a civil death
statute but rather a series of specific disability statutes. These include the loss of
the right to vote, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-112; the loss of the right to hold
public office, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-114; and the loss of the right to serve as
a fiduciary, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-115. Persons convicted of certain violent
criminal offenses are prohibited from carrying handguns. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-
1307(b). The loss of these specific rights of citizenship may be restored pursuant
to a statutory proceeding for “restoration of citizenship” set forth in Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 40-29-101--105. See also 21A Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 1032-1033.
The Court of Appeals’ majority rests its conclusion principally upon the
proposition that a convicted felon is rendered infamous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-
112. Although the statute does not define “infamous” or “infamy,” it has been
defined as follows:
Condition of being infamous. A qualification of a man’s
legal status produced by his conviction of an infamous
crime and the consequent loss of honor and credit,
which, at common law, rendered him incompetent as a
witness, and by statute in some jurisdictions entails other
disabilities.
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Black’s Law Dictionary 777 (6th ed. 1990). 3 When Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-112 is
read in its entirety, it is evident that it pertains to specific disabilities, that is, the loss
of the right to vote and the retention of the right to testify:
Upon conviction for any felony, it shall be the judgment of
the court that the defendant be infamous and be
immediately disqualified from exercising the right of
suffrage. No person so convicted shall be disqualified to
testify in any action, civil or criminal, by reason of having
been convicted of any felony, and the fact of conviction
for any felony may only be used as a reflection upon the
person’s credibility as a witness.
Id. Obviously, there is nothing in this specific civil disability provision which pertains
to the right of a convicted felon to seek access to public records under the Public
Records Act.
As a result of our analysis, it is apparent that Tennessee does not
have a civil death statute, nor does it have a specific disability statute that prohibits a
convicted felon from filing a petition under the Public Records Act. In addition, the
limits of punishment are set by the Legislature and no punishment may imposed
without statutory authority. See State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tenn. 1997).
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ majority erred in concluding that the convicted
felon, Robin Cole, lacked standing to file an action to seek public records under the
Public Records Act.4
CONCLUSION
3
Although not cited by the Court of Appea ls’ majo rity, In re P etition of Cu rtis, 6 Tenn.
Civ. App . 12, 18 (19 15) indica tes that a p erson w ho is adju dged “inf amo us” is no lo nger a c itizen.
This dictu m, a s Ju dge Koc h obs erve d in his disse nt, sh ould n ot be cons trued as pe rm itting a civil
disability in exce ss of tha t authorized by the Leg islature.
4
Our opinion addresses only those portions of Cole’s request dealing with public records,
and he is n ot en titled to exam ine an y reco rds th at are exc luded from disclo sure unde r the P ublic
Reco rds Ac t.
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We conclude that neither the Tennessee Public Records Act nor any
other Tennessee statutory provision precludes a convicted felon from seeking
access to public records. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and this case is remanded to the Chancery Court for further proceedings.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellee, for which execution may issue if
necessary.
________________________________
RILEY ANDERSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
CONCUR:
Drowota, Birch, and Holder, JJ.
Reid, Sp.J.
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