IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
FOR PUBLICATION
Filed: April 6, 1998
REBECCA FAY WOODS, )
HARRY B. WOODS, JR., AND )
SHIRLEY ANN WOODS, )
) DAVIDSON CHANCERY
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, ) NO. 94-2388-I
)
v. ) Hon. Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.,
) Chancellor
HARRY B. WOODS PLUMBING )
COMPANY, INC., HARPETH ) No. 01S01-9606-CH-00124
CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., AND )
TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, )
DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES.
)
)
FILED
April 6, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
FOR APPELLANTS: FOR APPELLEES, Harpeth
Construction Co., Inc. and Travelers
Othal Smith, Jr. Insurance Company:
Nashville
William G. McCaskill, Jr.
Taylor, Philbin, Pigue, Marchetti &
Bennett
Nashville
OPINION
REVERSED AND REMANDED HOLDER, J.
OPINION
We granted this workers' compensation appeal to address two issues: (1)
whether the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of employment; and
(2) whether the decedent was the initial aggressor; and if so, whether the
aggressor doctrine precluded recovery. We find that the decedent's death arose
out of and in the course of employment. As to the second issue, we hold the
common law aggressor defense as it relates to workers' compensation claims
under the Act is abolished in Tennessee and does not bar the decedent's
recovery.
FACTS
The decedent, his nephew and his son arrived at a house to perform a
plumbing job. Charles Langley, Jr., was at the house performing floor
renovations to the entryway when the decedent arrived. Langley had placed a
sign on the front door indicating that the entryway should not be used. Langley
further placed tape across the doorway between the kitchen and the entryway.
The decedent, his nephew and his son entered the house from the rear.
They ducked under the tape that Langley used to cordon off the entryway and
proceeded to walk across the entryway floor to gain access to the basement
stairs. Langley then approached the decedent's son with a knife and threatened
to kill him. The decedent and Langley had a heated exchange concerning
Langley's threat to kill the decedent's son. The project supervisor intervened and
was able to diffuse the situation temporarily.
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The decedent, his nephew and his son left the house and walked toward
their vehicles. The decedent spoke briefly with his son and then began walking
toward Langley's van. The decedent apparently charged Langley and was
intercepted by the project supervisor who again attempted to intervene. Langley,
however, drew an automatic pistol and shot the decedent five times. The
decedent died as a result of the gunshot wounds.
The decedent's family filed for workers' compensation benefits. The trial
court found that the decedent's death arose out of and in the course of his
employment. The trial court, however, held that the decedent was not entitled to
recover because he became the aggressor after the initial confrontation had
concluded. The trial court's judgment was affirmed by a workers' compensation
panel.
DISCUSSION
The Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act ("Act"), Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 50-6-101 et seq., provides the exclusive remedies for workers sustaining work-
related injuries. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108. An employee's right to recover
under the Act requires a finding that the injury arose "out of and in the course of
employment." Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(5). The phrases "arising out of" and
"in the course of" employment comprise two separate requirements. The phrase
"in the course of" refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the
injury occurred. McAdams v. Canale, 294 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tenn. 1956). The
phrase "arising out of" refers to an injury's origin. Id.
The "course of employment" requirement is satisfied when an injury
occurs within the time and place limitations of the employment relationship and
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during an activity that had some connection with the employee's job-related
functions. The decedent had arrived at a job site where a dwelling was being
renovated. He entered the dwelling at which he was to perform a plumbing job.
Langley was a worker present in the dwelling when the decedent arrived. The
decedent, his son and his nephew walked across a floor that Langley was
renovating to gain access to the basement. Langley became irate and
threatened to kill the decedent's son with a carpentry knife. The confrontation
ensued until the decedent was shot at the job site outside of the dwelling.
Accordingly, the decedent's death occurred during the course of the decedent's
employment.
We shall now focus on whether the decedent's death arose out of his
employment. An accident arises out of employment when there is a causal
relationship between the employment and the injury. Orman v. Williams
Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991).
We believe that issues of whether assaults upon employees arise out of
the scope of employment can best be divided into three general classifications:
(1) assaults with an "inherent connection" to employment such as disputes over
performance, pay or termination; (2) assaults stemming from "inherently private"
disputes imported into the employment setting from the claimant's domestic or
private life and not exacerbated by the employment; and (3) assaults resulting
from a "neutral force" such as random assaults on employees by individuals
outside the employment relationship.
Assaults with an "inherent connection" to employment are compensable.
See W.S. Dickey Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 347 S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. 1961) (injuries
arising out of dispute over job performance compensable); Whaley v. Patent
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Button Co., 202 S.W.2d 649 (Tenn. 1947) (injuries inflicted by ex-employees on
employees while performing duties similar to those that had been performed by
the ex-employee are compensable). Assaults stemming from "inherently private"
disputes imported into the employment setting from the claimant's domestic or
private life and not exacerbated by the employment are not compensable. See
Brimhall V. Home Insurance Co., 694 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. 1985) (fight over use of
personal items not compensable); White v. Whiteway Pharmacy, Inc., 360
S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1962) (employee murdered on employer premises by non-
employee husband over domestic dispute non-compensable). Assaults resulting
from a "neutral force" such as random assaults may or may not be compensable
depending on the facts and circumstances of the employment. See Beck v.
State, 779 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. 1989) (where employment necessarily exposes
employee to public risks, random assault from third party is compensable).
The altercation between the decedent and Langley originated in an
argument concerning work that Langley was performing at the decedent's job
site. Moreover, the entire focus of the dispute was apparently related to the
employment setting. We, therefore, find that the decedent's death had an
"inherent connection" to the employment setting and arose out of employment as
contemplated by the Act.
The next issue with which we are confronted is: (1) whether the
decedent was an initial aggressor; and, if so, (2) whether the decedent's death
was rendered non-compensable by an initial aggressor defense. Both the trial
court and the workers' compensation panel concluded the decedent's death was
non-compensable because "[t]he decedent was the aggressor since the
altercation between the parties had terminated before [the decedent] charged
Langley."
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One question that arises in work-related assaults is whether
compensation should be denied an injured worker who was an aggressor. See 1
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 11.15(a) (1990). While "abolition of the
aggressor defense is one of the most rapid doctrinal reversals . . . in
compensation law," jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine deny benefits despite
the fact that the injury in dispute was work-related. See id. at § 11.15(c). A
common rationale for denial of benefits under the doctrine is that the worker's
injury arose out of his act of aggression thereby negating the assertion that the
injury arose out of the employment. Id.
A majority of jurisdictions have rejected the aggressor defense in the
absence of express statutory language providing for the defense. Courts have
reasoned that an aggressor defense is a purely fault-based concept borrowed
from tort law and has no place in compensation law. The chain of causation is
not necessarily broken by striking the first blow provided that the episode
originated in the employment or the sole contact between the disputants was
employment-related. See generally Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638
(Colo. 1991); Springston v. IML Freight, Inc., 704 P.2d 394 (Kan. App. 1985).
One state has rejected the defense considering it a "judicially created bar to
recovery imposed upon an entirely statutory remedial scheme." Geeslin v.
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 294 S.E.2d 150, 152 (W. Va. 1982).
The primary purpose of our Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") is to afford
workers compensation for job-related injured regardless of fault. See generally
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-103; Partee v. Memphis Concrete Pipe Co., 295 S.W.
68 (1927). The Act has further been interpreted as providing for a speedy trial
so as to assure quick and efficient benefits to injured workers. Stovall v. General
Shoe Corp., 321 S.W.2d 559 (Tenn. 1959). Moreover, the Act is based on a
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mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-
6-108; see Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., v. Stevenson, 368 S.W.2d 760 (Tenn.
1963) (noting Act is complete substitute for previous remedies in tort).
We find that the Act does not explicitly provide for an initial aggressor
defense. The aggressor defense in Tennessee, therefore, is a common law
creation that introduces a fault-based concept into a comprehensive statutory
scheme designed not to analyze culpability but to allocate cost and ensure
compensation. See Springston, 704 P.2d at 398 (holding disapproval of
employee's misconduct is not grounds for frustrating the main purpose of
workers' compensation which is to prevent dependency of the claimant and his
family). An analysis requiring a determination of who threw the first punch,
whether a sufficient cooling-off period had occurred between separate incidents
and whether a worker reacted in excessive manner is contrary to the quick and
efficient administration of disability benefits. See Geeslin, 294 S.E.2d at 153
(noting "difficulty in characterizing one of the participants as the initial aggressor
and the other as the innocent victim when faced with an escalating dispute that
culminates in physical violence"). Moreover, the Act is purely a creature of the
general assembly, and any change in its structure must come from the general
assembly and not from the courts. Lindsey v. Hunt, 384 S.W.2d 441 (1965),
rev'd on other grounds, Bettis v. Tom Wade Gin, 810 S.W.2d 140 (Tenn. 1991).
In the absence of an express statutory authorization, we hold the common law
aggressor defense as it relates to workers' compensation claims under the Act is
abolished in Tennessee and does not bar the decedent's recovery. The case is
reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. The costs of this appeal shall be assessed against the defendants
for which execution may issue if necessary.
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Janice M. Holder, Justice
Panel:
Anderson, C.J.
Reid, J.
Tomlin, S.J.
Drowota, J., not participating
Birch, J., not participating
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