I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T E N N E S S E E FILED
A T K N O X V I L L E
September 8, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
A R N O L D C A R T E R ) F O R P U B L I C A T I O N
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) F I L E D : S E P T E M B E R 8 , 1 9 9 7
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) M O N R O E C O U N T Y
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F o r A p p e l l e e : F o r A p p e l l a n t :
K E N N E T H F . I R V I N E , J R . J O H N K N O X W A L K U P
K n o x v i l l e , T N A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l a n d R e p o r t e r
M I C H A E L E . M O O R E
S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l
K A T H Y M O R A N T E
D e p u t y A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l
N a s h v i l l e , T N
J E R R Y N . E S T E S
D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l
S T E P H E N B A X T E R W A R D
A s s i s t a n t D i s t r i c t A t t o r n e y
G e n e r a l
O P I N I O N
R E V E R S E D A N D D I S M I S S E D B I R C H , J .
2
We granted the State's application in this case to
determine whether the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995 (“the
new Act”), provides to petitioners for whom the statute of
limitations had expired under the old Act additional time in which
to file petitions for post-conviction relief. We conclude that
although the language of the new Act is ambiguous, the legislative
intent is clear: petitioners for whom the statute of limitations
expired prior to the effective date of the new Act, i.e., May 10,
1995, do not have an additional year in which to file petitions for
post-conviction relief. Thus, the petition filed by Arnold Carter
is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment of the Court
of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the petition is dismissed.
I
Petitioner Arnold Carter was convicted of first-degree
murder in 1972 and sentenced to death. The Governor subsequently
commuted the death sentence to a ninety-nine year term in the state
penitentiary. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
conviction and sentence in an unpublished decision, and this Court
declined Carter’s application for permission to appeal.1
Thereafter, Carter filed three post-conviction petitions, and
relief was denied in each of the first two petitions.2
1
Arnold Carter v. State, No. 23 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
Knoxville, May 9, 1973).
2
Arnold Carter v. State, No. 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. at
Knoxville, March 1, 1985), perm. to appeal denied concurring in
results only (Tenn. 1985); Arnold Carter v. State, 600 S.W.2d 750
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
3
In this latest petition filed on July 24, 1995, Carter
alleges Brady violations and ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. The trial court found the petition barred by the statute
of limitations and dismissed it. A majority of the Court of
Criminal Appeals interpreted the enabling provision of the new Act
to provide the petitioner with a new one-year period in which to
file a claim for post-conviction relief and thus, reversed the
trial court.3
II
Prior to 1967, habeas corpus was the sole procedure
available to collaterally challenge a conviction, and this remedy
was criticized as being too limited in nature and scope. Thus, to
provide a broader avenue for collateral challenge to criminal
convictions on the basis of constitutional error, the legislature
enacted the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1967. As originally
adopted, the statute contained no statute of limitations.
Effective July 1, 1986, however, the legislature adopted a three-
year statute of limitations that was to apply prospectively. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). Thus, any petitioner whose
judgment became final on or before July 1, 1986, had until July 1,
1989, to file a petition for post-conviction relief. State v.
Masucci, 754 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
3
In his dissent, Judge Welles noted that in passing the new
Act, the legislature intended to limit the number of petitions a
petitioner could file and to reduce the time in which he or she
could file them. Judge Welles opined that the legislature did not
intend to revive a cause of action in the case of a petitioner for
whom the statute of limitations had expired.
4
On May 10, 1995, the legislature, cognizant of the degree
to which the deluge of post-conviction cases strained the courts,
enacted the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995. The new Act
included a shorter statute of limitations period and limited the
number of petitions that could be filed in any particular case.
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-202(b)(1) & 40-30-202(c)(Supp. 1996).4
The enabling provision of the Act in question reads as
follows:
This act shall take effect upon
becoming a law, the public welfare
requiring it and shall govern all
petitions for post-conviction relief
filed after this date, and any
motions which may be filed after
this date to reopen petitions for
post-conviction relief which were
concluded prior to the effective
date of this act. Notwithstanding
any other provision of this act to
the contrary, any person having a
ground for relief recognized under
this act shall have at least one (1)
year from the effective date of this
act to file a petition or a motion
to reopen under this act.
1995 Tenn. Pub. Act 207, § 3 (emphasis added).5 "[T]he most basic
principle of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect
to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding
a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." Worley v.
4
Under exceptional, statutorily limited circumstances, the
statute of limitations can be waived, or a petitioner may move to
reopen a previously concluded petition. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-
202(b) & 40-30-217(a)(Supp. 1996).
5
According to standard practice, this provision was not
published with the rest of the statute in the Tennessee Code
Annotated.
5
Weigels, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tenn. 1996)(quoting Owens v.
State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn.1995)); State v. Sliger, 846
S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 1993). Legislative intent and purpose is to
be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of
the language used, without a forced or subtle construction that
would limit or extend the meaning of the language. Tuggle v.
Allright Parking Sys., Inc., 922 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tenn. 1996);
National Gas Distrib., Inc. v. State, 804 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn. 1991).
When the language is ambiguous and does not yield a clear
interpretation, the court may consult the legislative history for
additional interpretive guidance. Storey v. Bradford Furniture
Co., 910 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1995); see also Carr v. Ford, 833
S.W.2d 68, 69-70 (Tenn. 1992).
We find the language of the enabling provision ambiguous.
The meaning of the phrase “any person having a ground for relief
recognized under this act” is uncertain. The interpretation
proffered by the petitioner is that the phrase means any person
alleging a constitutional defect in the conviction or sentence,
regardless of whether the claim would have been barred under the
previous statute of limitations. As the State points out, however,
the phrase is just as susceptible of being interpreted to mean any
person having a cognizable ground for relief that is not barred by
the previous statute of limitations. The mere fact that this
phrase is reasonably interpreted either way makes it ambiguous.
Where the language of a legislative provision is unclear,
the Court should look behind the face of the statute to determine
6
the legislature's intent. First, we note that the changes to the
post-conviction statutes, in every instance, limited the time and
opportunity to file petitions for relief. According to
Representative Jere Hargrove, the sponsor of the proposed bill, the
legislation was written to address constituents' concerns about the
inordinate amount of time allowed in post-conviction proceedings.
He explicitly stated that the purpose of the bill was to put time
constraints on the “interminable duration of criminal appeals.”
Tennessee General Assembly, House Tape No. 59, 99th G.A., 1st Sess.
(April 19, 1995)(statement of Representative Hargrove).
Representative Hargrove also expressed concern during
discussions before the Judiciary Committee that the rights of
petitioners not be extinguished by the change in the statute of
limitations. Tennessee General Assembly, House Judiciary Committee
Tape No. 3, 99th G.A., 1st Sess. (April 19, 1995). For instance,
petitioners whose convictions became final before the effective
date of the Act, would have otherwise had three years in which to
file a post-conviction petition under the old statute. As of May
10, 1995, there was a potential class of petitioners for whom the
one year limitations period under the new law had expired but the
three year limitations period under the old law had not. The
language of the enabling provision is intended to protect the
rights of this class of petitioners; it is not intended to revive
claims that were barred by the previous statute of limitations.
We agree with the view that the statute was intended to
restrict the time and opportunity to seek post-conviction relief.
7
Clearly, this purpose is not served by a statutory construction
that allows additional time and opportunity for petitioners whose
claims are already barred by the prior statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals is reversed, and Carter's petition is dismissed. Costs of
the appeal are taxed to Carter for which execution may issue, if
necessary.
____________________________________
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice
CONCUR:
Anderson, C.J.
Drowota, Reid, Holder, JJ.
8