Chase v. Commonwealth

                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA


Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Annunziata
Argued at Richmond, Virginia


DANE LESLEY CHASE
                                                  OPINION BY
v.      Record No. 2259-00-2             JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
                                              DECEMBER 4, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA


               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY
                        Thomas V. Warren, Judge

             Roger C. Hinde (Keith A. Jones; Law Offices
             of Roger C. Hinde, on brief), for appellant.

             H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney
             General (Randolph A. Beales, Acting Attorney
             General, on brief), for appellee.


        On appeal from his conviction for driving while under the

influence of alcohol, in violation of Code § 18.2-266, Dane Lesley

Chase contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a

breath test certificate showing his blood alcohol content.    He

argues that the Commonwealth violated his federal and state due

process rights by denying him a potentially exculpatory blood

test.    Because he did not raise the state due process claim at

trial, he is barred by Rule 5A:18 from asserting that claim on

appeal.    Because his federal due process rights were not violated

and the admission of the breath test certificate was proper, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court.
                           I.    BACKGROUND

     On January 19, 2000 Chase was stopped by Trooper William

Pippen on Route 60 in Powhatan County for traveling sixty-nine

miles per hour in a posted fifty-five miles per hour zone.

Trooper Pippen detected an odor of alcohol and observed that

Chase's face was flushed, his eyes were glassy, and he had

difficulty finding his driver's license.      Chase admitted that he

had drunk three or four beers.    He failed several field sobriety

tests.

     Chase was arrested for driving while under the influence of

alcohol and was transported to the Powhatan County Sheriff's

Office where he submitted to a breath test pursuant to Code

§ 18.2-268.2.   The certificate of analysis reported a blood

alcohol level of 0.10%.   Following the breath test and while still

in custody in the magistrate's office, Chase called his attorney

who asked Trooper Pippen to transport Chase to the hospital for an

independent blood test.   Trooper Pippen refused, stating that

Chase had already taken the breath test.

     At trial, Chase moved to suppress the breath test blood

alcohol certificate, arguing that the Commonwealth had denied him

his constitutional right to due process.      The court denied the

motion, and the certificate was admitted into evidence.     Chase

renewed the objection at the close of his case.     The trial court

again overruled the objection and convicted Chase of driving while

under the influence of alcohol, first offense.

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                     II.   STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM

     On appeal, Chase contends that his due process rights under

Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of Virginia were

violated.

     Rule 5A:18 provides, in relevant part:

            [n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be
            considered as a basis for reversal unless
            the objection was stated together with the
            grounds therefor at the time of the ruling,
            except for good cause shown or to enable the
            Court of Appeals to attain the ends of
            justice.

     At trial, Chase asserted the violation of his right under

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution to develop potentially exculpatory evidence.

However, he raised no similar state constitutional claim.

Consequently, he failed to preserve a state constitutional issue

for appeal.

              III.   VIRGINIA DUI TESTING AND DUE PROCESS

     Code § 18.2-268.2 governs the testing of individuals to

determine the drug or alcohol content of their blood.       That

section provides in pertinent part that:

            A. Any person, whether licensed by Virginia
            or not, who operates a motor vehicle upon a
            highway, as defined in § 46.2-100, in this
            Commonwealth shall be deemed thereby, as a
            condition of such operation, to have
            consented to have samples of his blood,
            breath, or both blood and breath taken for a
            chemical test to determine the alcohol,
            drug, or both alcohol and drug content of
            his blood, if he is arrested . . . within
            two hours of the alleged offense.

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           B. Any person so arrested for a violation
           of § 18.2-266 (i) or (ii) or both, or
           § 18.2-266.1 or of a similar ordinance shall
           submit to a breath test. If the breath test
           is unavailable or the person is physically
           unable to submit to the breath test, a blood
           test shall be given.

Id.

      Code § 18.2-268.2 provides that persons arrested for

driving under the influence of alcohol be administered only a

breath test to determine blood alcohol content.    The statute

provides two exceptions.   When a breath test is unavailable or

the accused is physically unable to submit to a breath test, a

blood test must be provided.   In this case, neither exception

applied.   Following his arrest, Chase was transported to the

sheriff's office where a breath test was available.   He took it.

He was entitled only to the breath test, which was administered

by Trooper Pippen in compliance with the statute.

      The question remains whether compliance with Code

§ 18.2-268.2 nonetheless denied Chase due process.    Chase argues

that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses

guarantee a defendant the right to develop and present evidence

in his defense.   We agree.   He further argues that this due

process right was violated when Trooper Pippen refused to

transport him to the hospital to have an independent blood test

administered, thus denying him the opportunity to obtain

potentially exculpatory evidence.   We disagree.



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     In Winston v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 386, 49 S.E.2d 611

(1948), the Supreme Court discussed this issue in addressing

Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution, which

provides the same due process guarantee found in the United

States Constitution. 1   Following his arrest for driving while

intoxicated, Winston asked to be taken to a physician for a test

to determine whether he was intoxicated.      The arresting officer

refused.   On appeal of his conviction, Winston contended that

the officer's refusal to take him to a physician deprived him of

potentially exculpatory evidence.       Id. at 388-89, 49 S.E.2d at

612-13.

     Rejecting Winston's claim, the Supreme Court said, "there

was no denial of the right of the accused to produce evidence in

his favor."    Id. at 391, 49 S.E.2d at 613.    The trooper had not

refused to allow Winston to contact a physician to arrange for

an examination, nor had he denied Winston the opportunity to be

examined in jail.   The Court concluded that "[i]n this situation

the duty of engaging the services of a physician to make such an

examination, and of thus securing his testimony to establish the

defendant's sobriety, was on the defendant and not on the

officers."    Id. at 392, 49 S.E.2d at 614.    Due process imposes


     1
       Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution states
"[t]hat in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right . . . to
call for evidence in his favor, . . . . He shall not be
deprived of life or liberty, except by the law of the land or
the judgment of his peers, . . . ."


                                - 5 -
no affirmative duty upon the police to help defendants obtain

evidence that is potentially exculpatory. 2

     Other states have ruled similarly.    In New Jersey v.

Ettore, 548 A.2d 1134 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988), Ettore was

arrested for driving while intoxicated.    After two breath tests

were performed, Ettore telephoned her attorney, asking that he

take her to have a blood test performed.      Being unable to do so,

Ettore's attorney asked the arresting trooper to take Ettore to

the hospital.   The trooper refused.   The attorney then asked

whether a taxi could be called.   The trooper replied that it was

against state police policy to release an intoxicated person

unaccompanied by a responsible escort.     Id. at 1136.

     Ettore sought to exclude the results of the two

breathalyzer tests.   She claimed violations of her statutory

right to an independent blood test as provided by New Jersey law

and of her due process rights under the New Jersey and United

States Constitutions.   Id. at 1135.   The New Jersey Superior

Court found no basis for suppressing the results of the breath

tests.   It held:

           [P]olice authorities were under no statutory
           duty to arrange for the securing of a blood


     2
       Winston's conviction was reversed for denial of other
fundamental rights. The arresting officer failed to take him
promptly before a judicial officer. He was initially denied the
opportunity for bail, resulting in his inability to obtain
material evidence. Those issues are not present in this case.



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            test by a defendant charged with drunk
            driving.

Id. at 1137 (citation omitted).   The New Jersey court further

held

            [a] policy which allows a defendant to
            contact by telephone his or her attorney or
            family member and to be released to such an
            escort in furtherance of the defendant's
            exercise of his or her right to arrange for
            independent testing does, in our view,
            provide a procedure affording the defendant
            reasonable access to such testing.

Id.    See also State v. Sidmore, 951 P.2d 558, 569-70 (Mont.

1997) (officers have no duty to assist an accused in obtaining

exculpatory evidence; they need only avoid interfering with the

accused's efforts to obtain an independent sobriety test); State

v. Leonard, 725 P.2d 493, 498 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (police

officers are not required to take the initiative or even to

assist in procuring such evidence; the state may not

unreasonably interfere with an accused's attempts to obtain

blood test near the crucial time of arrest); State v. Dake, 529

N.W.2d 46, 49 (Neb. 1995) (while police cannot hamper a

motorist's efforts to obtain independent testing, they are under

no duty to assist in obtaining such testing beyond allowing

telephone calls to obtain the test).

       Chase was denied no fundamental right to due process when

Trooper Pippen refused to transport him to the hospital for an

independent blood test.   Following the administration of the

breath test, Chase was permitted to speak to his attorney.      He

                                - 7 -
was not prevented from leaving the sheriff's office.   He had the

opportunity to secure transportation and to obtain a blood test

on his own.   Trooper Pippen was not obligated to help Chase do

so.   The trial court's admission of the breath test blood

alcohol certificate was proper.   Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

                                                        Affirmed.




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