COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge Benton, Willis and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
DAVID D. MATTHEWS, JR.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0408-98-4 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
AUGUST 3, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAUQUIER COUNTY
William Shore Robertson, Judge
Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Appellate Defender
(Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for
appellant.
Robert H. Anderson, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
On appeal from his conviction for capital murder, in
violation of Code § 18.2-31, and abduction with the intent to
defile, in violation of Code § 18.2-48, David D. Matthews, Jr.,
contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence
obtained by the police in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On the afternoon of September 25, 1995, Matthews arrived at
the home of Shirley Ashbury, a distant relative, and requested
permission to hunt on her family's land. While at her home, he
offered to take her twelve-year-old daughter, Aleasha,
"four-wheeling" in his truck. Aleasha left with Matthews. That
evening, Ashbury saw Matthews drive away from the property at a
high speed and realized that Aleasha had not come home. She
reported Aleasha missing.
That same evening, a volunteer fireman responded to a
single vehicle accident involving Matthews' truck, which had
flipped over an embankment. Fire and rescue squad personnel
transported Matthews to the Fauquier hospital, where he was
treated by doctors in the emergency ward. The doctors initially
planned to admit him to the hospital overnight for observation,
but decided instead to transfer him to the University of
Virginia Hospital. At Fauquier Hospital, Matthews was placed in
a treatment room within the emergency ward so that intravenous
fluids could be administered. Police investigating Aleasha's
disappearance came into the room, read Matthews his Miranda
rights, and questioned him. With his consent, they seized his
clothing and personal effects and took PERK samples.
Aleasha's body was recovered the next morning.
A jury convicted Matthews of capital murder, in violation
of Code § 18.2-31, and of abduction with intent to defile, in
violation of Code § 18.2-48. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
Matthews contends that the police violated his Fourth
Amendment rights when they entered the emergency ward treatment
room. He argues that because the police entry into the room was
illegal, all evidence subsequently seized from the room was
illegally obtained and should have been suppressed. To
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determine the legality of the entry, we consider whether
Matthews had an expectation of privacy in the emergency ward
treatment room. 1
The treatment room was described as having four walls and a
door, which was open. It contained a bed, on which Matthews was
lying. Members of Matthews' family were in the room with him.
Emergency ward personnel entered and left the room to administer
treatment. The room was not dedicated to long-term care of
admitted patients. It was a part of the emergency ward and was
used for the provision of emergency ward treatment.
Matthews contends that he had the same expectation of
privacy in the treatment room that he would have enjoyed in a
private room in the hospital. Relying on Morris v.
Commonwealth, 208 Va. 331, 157 S.E.2d 191 (1967), he argues that
the police could not enter his room lawfully without a warrant.
See id. at 333-34, 157 S.E.2d at 193-94. In Morris, police
seized clothing from a private hospital room, paid for by
Morris, while he was under sedation and without his consent.
The Supreme Court held that the seizure was illegal, because a
private hospital room that "has been assigned to and paid for by
the defendant" is analogous to a hotel room, which "may not
lawfully be entered without a search warrant." Id. at 334, 157
1
Because we hold that Matthews enjoyed no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the room, we do not reach the issue of
the effect, if any, of his consent to the seizure of his
property and the taking of PERK samples.
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S.E.2d at 194. See also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
51 (1951).
Matthews, however, was not in a private hospital room. He
was merely being medicated in a treatment room within the
emergency ward. The trial court found that there was "no
specific rental of a hospital room." Although the treatment
room had a door, the door was open when the police arrived.
Emergency ward staff and Matthews' family were entering and
exiting the room on a regular basis. He had been assigned no
private patient room. His stay at the hospital lasted but five
hours.
This case is controlled by Craft v. Commonwealth, 221 Va.
258, 269 S.E.2d 797 (1980). Relying on Morris, Craft sought
suppression of a bullet delivered to the police after it was
removed from his body by doctors in an emergency ward.
Rejecting Craft's contention that Morris applied, the Supreme
Court said:
Here defendant was in the emergency room of
a hospital, a place frequented not only by
doctors, nurses, patients, hospital
personnel, and police officers, but also by
friends and relatives of persons being
treated. A person admitting himself to an
emergency room has little expectation of
privacy.
Id. at 262, 269 S.E.2d at 799-800.
Matthews' family testified that they had been sitting in
the room with him and had entered and exited the room several
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times in the course of the evening. They, and the investigating
officers, testified that medical personnel were trafficking
through the room to administer medication and to monitor
Matthews' injuries. No evidence suggested that the treatment
room was separate and distinct from the emergency ward.
Matthews' contention that the room was separate from the
emergency ward and was private is without evidentiary support.
The room was a part of the emergency ward and, as such, afforded
Matthews no expectation of privacy.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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