COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Annunziata
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
DARNELL D. CRAWLEY
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2496-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
MARCH 23, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Buford M. Parsons, Judge
Matthew P. Geary (Goodwin, Sutton, Duval &
Geary, on brief), for appellant.
H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Darnell D. Crawley (appellant) appeals from his bench trial
conviction for breaking and entering pursuant to Code § 18.2-91.
On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to prove
(1) that he was the person whose fingerprints were found at the
scene of the break-in and (2) that he acted with the requisite
intent to commit larceny, assault and battery or any felony
other than murder, rape or robbery. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse appellant's conviction on the first issue
and, therefore, do not reach the second issue.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358
S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a trial court, sitting
without a jury, is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict
and will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence
to support it. See id. The credibility of a witness, the
weight accorded the testimony, and the inferences to be drawn
from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder's
determination. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199,
379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989).
Any element of a crime may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. See, e.g., Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507,
524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). Such evidence "is as competent
and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided
it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis except that of guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226
Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). However, "the
Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable hypotheses of
innocence that flow from the evidence, not those that spring
from the imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993).
Whether a hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of
fact. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 290, 373
S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988).
On appeal, appellant divides into two parts his challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove identity. He
- 2 -
contends the evidence was insufficient, first, because the
Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence through the officials
who prepared the Henrico County and Virginia State Police
fingerprint cards that appellant was the person from whom they
took the prints; and second, because Investigator Curran did not
take appellant's fingerprints and, therefore, could not match
them to the prints on the Henrico and State Police cards or to
the fingerprints taken from the scene of the break-in. The
Commonwealth contends that these arguments relate only to the
admissibility of the fingerprint cards. Because the cards were
admitted without objection, it contends, appellant waived any
right to challenge their authenticity. The Commonwealth also
argues that, even if the arguments relate to sufficiency, the
evidence of appellant's name, birth date, gender and race was
sufficient to prove appellant's identity as the perpetrator
beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with portions of both
arguments.
1.
ADMISSIBILITY OF FINGERPRINT CARDS
"It is a generally recognized rule that records and reports
prepared by public officials pursuant to duty imposed by
statute, or required by the nature of their offices, are
admissible as proof of the facts stated therein." Williams v.
Commonwealth, 213 Va. 45, 46, 189 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1972); see
- 3 -
Code § 19.2-390 (requiring, in part, that every person arrested
for a felony be fingerprinted and the fingerprints filed with
the Central Criminal Records Exchange). However, this rule
applies only to those portions of such documents "relat[ing]
facts or events within the personal knowledge and observation of
the recording official to which he could testify should he be
called as a witness." Williams, 213 Va. at 45-47, 189 S.E.2d at
379-80 (holding arrest report which contained arrestee's age as
reported by arrestee was inadmissible to prove arrestee's age
because age information was hearsay).
Because appellant registered no hearsay objection to the
admissibility of the cards, he waived the right to contest their
admissibility on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; Woodson v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 285, 288-89, 176 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1970)
("A litigant may not, in a motion to strike, raise for the first
time a question of admissibility of evidence."). At trial,
appellant merely objected to the admission of the cards subject
to cross-examination, and he never conducted any
cross-examination, thereby waiving any objections to
admissibility. Therefore, for purposes of appeal, the evidence
establishes conclusively that the fingerprints on the Henrico
County and State Police cards were obtained from Darnell Devan
Crawley, a black male 5'8" tall and weighing 140 pounds, with a
tattoo on his right arm, a birth date of December 15, 1968, a
- 4 -
Social Security number of XXX-XX-XXXX, and an address of 2828
Fairfield Avenue, Richmond, Virginia 23223, as of April 24,
1996.
2.
SUFFICIENCY OF FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE TO PROVE IDENTITY
Despite appellant's inability to challenge the proof that
the Henrico County and State Police fingerprint cards came from
a Darnell Devan Crawley with the above vital statistics, he
properly may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove
that he is the person whose fingerprints are contained on those
cards and were found at the scene of the break-in. Citing Cook
v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 225, 230, 372 S.E.2d 780, 783
(1988), the Commonwealth contends that the evidence of identity
was sufficient to prove the fingerprints were appellant's
because the "[i]dentity of names carries with it a presumption
of identity of person." We reject the application of this
principle to the facts of this case.
Cook is distinguishable, first, because it was a
sentence-enhancement case which dealt with the admissibility of
certain documents and not their sufficiency to prove the
defendant's prior convictions. 1 For any type of evidence to be
1
The defendant in Cook did not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence on appeal, and any statements in Cook regarding
sufficiency, therefore, are dicta.
- 5 -
admissible, its offeror need only prove that it is
"material--tending to prove a matter . . . properly at issue in
the case--and relevant," Johnson v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App.
598, 601, 347 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1986), or that "it has any
logical tendency, however slight, to prove a [matter at] issue."
Jenkins v. Winchester Dep't of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178,
1186, 409 S.E.2d 16, 21 (1991). The standard for judging the
sufficiency of evidence to prove identity or any other key fact
in a criminal case is much higher--the Commonwealth must prove
that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Martin v.
Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 529, 414 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1992)
(en banc); Brickhouse v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 533, 536, 159
S.E.2d 611, 613-14 (1968). Therefore, just because a particular
document is admissible does not mean it constitutes proof of a
disputed fact sufficient to support a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. Second, Cook is distinguishable because it
involved a document that "bore the defendant's exact name and
birth date." 7 Va. App. at 230, 372 S.E.2d at 783. Here,
although the Henrico County and State Police fingerprint cards
bore the same first and last names and identical birth dates, no
evidence in the record proved appellant's name or birth date.
As the Supreme Court previously has held, "[w]hen the
Commonwealth relies solely upon fingerprint evidence to identify
a criminal agent, it bears the burden of excluding every
- 6 -
reasonable hypothesis of innocence . . . ." Tyler v.
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 162, 166, 487 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1997).
Viewing the circumstantial evidence of identity here in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we hold that it was
insufficient to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of appellant's
innocence. The evidence admitted established that a Darnell
Devan Crawley, a black male 5'8" tall, 140 pounds, and with a
tattoo on his right arm, a birth date of December 15, 1968, a
Social Security number of XXX-XX-XXXX, and an address at the
time of the break-in of 2828 Fairfield Avenue, Richmond,
Virginia 23223, which was located in the same vicinity as the
victim's apartment, broke the glass in the rear door of the
victim's apartment and was on the premises without permission.
However, the only evidence admitted at trial that linked
appellant to the break-in was that his gender, race and height
were the same as those of both the perpetrator, as proved by the
fingerprint cards, and the person seen fleeing the scene of the
crime. Assuming without deciding that appellant's statements
upon arraignment constituted evidence that he was Darnell D.
Crawley, 2 the indictment itself contained only his name and did
2
Appellant admitted during his arraignment that he was
Darnell D. Crawley, the person listed in the indictment, but
this statement was not formally admitted as evidence in the
case. Compare Hooker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 454, 457, 418
S.E.2d 343, 345 (1992) (holding that defendant's arraignment
under a certain name was not evidence that it was, in fact, his
- 7 -
not list any other identifying characteristics. We are unable
to conclude that the mere similarity of appellant's name with
the names on the two fingerprint cards and the fact that
appellant was of the same gender, race and approximate height as
the person fingerprinted and the person seen fleeing the
vicinity of the break-in proved that appellant was the person
whose prints were on the cards and in the victim's apartment.
The Commonwealth attempted to have Investigator Curran
fingerprint appellant during the trial so it could prove
appellant's prints matched the perpetrator's. However,
appellant objected, and the trial court denied the
Commonwealth's request. The Commonwealth objected to the
denial, recognizing that it had the burden of "prov[ing]
identification beyond a reasonable doubt," but it did not
proffer appellant's fingerprints and offered no other evidence
to prove appellant was the perpetrator. 3 Although the
name), with Sheffey v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 602, 602-04, 194
S.E.2d 897, 898-99 (1973) (in case challenging sufficiency of
evidence to prove identity, listing accused's arraignment as
John Henry Sheffey as part of evidence proving that he was same
John Henry Sheffey whom testifying officer arrested on
outstanding warrant and upon whom officer found heroin in a
search performed incident to that arrest). The arrest warrant
purported to list appellant's name, birth date, Social Security
number and address, but the warrant was neither offered nor
admitted as evidence, and the officer who arrested appellant on
that warrant did not testify regarding the arrest.
3
Code § 19.2-390 requires, in part, that every person
arrested for a felony be fingerprinted and the fingerprints
- 8 -
circumstances were suspicious, they failed to exclude all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence and, therefore, did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was inside the victim's
apartment.
For these reasons, we reverse appellant's conviction.
Reversed.
filed with the Central Criminal Records Exchange. Presumably,
therefore, appellant was fingerprinted upon his arrest for the
instant felony offense. However, the record provides no
indication that the Commonwealth attempted to offer these
fingerprint records into evidence.
- 9 -