Quinn v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Elder
Argued at Richmond, Virginia

LESLIE CHARLES QUINN
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2393-96-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
NOVEMBER 4, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FLUVANNA COUNTY
John R. Cullen, Judge

Shanon S. Echols for appellant.
(Richard Cullen, Attorney General; Daniel J.
Munroe, Assistant Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.

Leslie Charles Quinn (appellant) appeals his convictions

of two counts of grand larceny. He contends the trial court

erred when it denied his motion to suppress two incriminating

statements he made at different times to investigators from

separate jurisdictions. For the reasons that follow, we reverse

and remand.

I.

FACTS

In the early morning hours of March 18, 1996, a magistrate

issued a warrant to search appellant's home in order to seize

evidence related to numerous burglaries appellant was suspected

of having committed. Investigator Jack Elliott and other

officers of the Goochland County Sheriff's Office executed the

warrant. The officers seized numerous items they believed were

stolen property and arrested appellant. Following his arrest,
appellant asked to meet with an attorney before communicating

further with any of the officers.

On March 19, Keith Waldrop was appointed to represent

appellant on one charge of breaking and entering a trailer in

Goochland County.

The record indicates that appellant remained in custody

continuously from the date of his arrest through his sentencing

on September 27. Prior to April 9, Investigator Elliott

approached appellant "once or twice" and asked if he was "ready

to make a statement." Appellant responded by telling the

investigator that he "wanted [his] attorney present before [he]

made any kind of a statement." The record does not indicate that

appellant ever met with Mr. Waldrop during this time.
In the morning of April 9, Investigator Elliott visited

appellant in his jail cell and told appellant that he would "like

to ask him a few questions." The investigator moved appellant

from his cell to a vacant office for the meeting. Investigator

Elliott began the meeting by advising appellant of his Miranda

rights. The investigator then asked appellant if he "had a

lawyer appointed to him yet." Appellant told the investigator

that Mr. Waldrop had been appointed to represent him.

Investigator Elliott explained to appellant that Mr. Waldrop had

been appointed to represent him on a single charge of breaking

and entering in Goochland County and not with regard to other

charges or "possible charges" in Goochland or other counties.

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The investigator told appellant that he did not intend to speak

with appellant about the charge for which Mr. Waldrop had been

appointed and that if appellant desired the assistance of counsel

prior to being interrogated, he needed to "re-invoke" his Miranda

right to counsel. Investigator Elliott later testified exactly

what he told appellant:
[I] explained to him that my understanding of
the law is that whenever he invoked his
Miranda warning the night he was arrested,
that no one was allowed to question him at
that point about that particular charge or
any other charge that he might be involved
in. Once he went to court, he was appointed
a lawyer by the Court for that particular
charge. He was not charged with another
crime. Therefore, my understanding of the
law was that his charge then became lawyer
charge specific and if he wanted to invoke
his Miranda warning on any other conversation
we had, he had to re-invoke.

Following the investigator's explanation of appellant's right to

legal assistance, appellant did not ask to consult with Mr.

Waldrop or any other attorney.

Appellant agreed to make a statement. Investigator Elliott

then questioned appellant about the items seized during the

search of his home. During this exchange, appellant disclosed

his involvement in burglaries and larcenies in both Goochland and

Fluvanna counties. Investigator Elliott asked appellant if he

would make a "formal statement" on tape. Appellant consented,

and, during his taped statement, admitted to stealing the

property at issue in this case which had been located in Fluvanna

County.

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 The Goochland County Sheriff's Office informed the

authorities in Fluvanna County of appellant's statement. On

April 22, a Fluvanna County grand jury charged appellant with two

counts of grand larceny. On April 23, the trial court ordered

appellant moved from the James River Correctional Center to the

trial court for a hearing scheduled at 2:00 p.m. on April 25. At

1:20 p.m. on April 25, Investigator Albert Bryant of the Fluvanna

County Sheriff's Office approached appellant in a holding cell

near the trial court. After appellant was warned of and waived

his Miranda rights, he again confessed to taking the property at

issue in this case.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress numerous items of

evidence, including the statements he made to Investigator

Elliott on April 9 and to Investigator Bryant on April 25.

Appellant argued that these statements had been obtained in

violation of his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Following a

hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion. The trial

court concluded that appellant never made a "specific request"

for counsel before making his statement to Investigator Elliott.

The trial court stated that "at best there was an equivocal

statement or ambiguous statement or some discussion about Mr.

Waldrop being appointed in another matter."

Appellant was subsequently tried and both of his statements

were admitted into evidence. The trial court convicted appellant

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of two counts of grand larceny.

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 II.

WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER MIRANDA

Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied

his motion to suppress the statements he made to Investigator

Elliott in Goochland County on April 9 and to Investigator Bryant

in Fluvanna County on April 25. He argues that these statements

should have been suppressed because the Commonwealth failed to

prove that he waived his Miranda right to counsel. Referencing

the so-called "Edwards rule," appellant asserts that the
Commonwealth did not prove that he waived his right to counsel

prior to making his statements because both statements were

obtained during interrogation that was initiated by the

investigators after he had previously invoked his Miranda right

to counsel. We agree.

A.

MIRANDA AND THE "EDWARDS RULE"

In order to insure that the Fifth Amendment right against

compulsory self-incrimination is protected during the custodial

interrogation of criminal suspects, the United States Supreme

Court established a series of "procedural safeguards" that law

enforcement authorities must adhere to when interviewing suspects

in their custody. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457,

114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (citing Michigan v.

Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2363-64, 41 L.Ed.2d

182 (1974)); see also Mier v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 827, 831,

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407 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (1991). Compliance with these procedures

is a "prerequisite[] to the admissibility of any statement made

by a defendant" during custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384

U.S. at 476, 86 S. Ct. at 1629; see also Goodwin v. Commonwealth,

3 Va. App. 249, 252, 349 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1986).

Included among the safeguards established in Miranda is the

right of a suspect to have counsel present at any custodial

interrogation and to terminate the interrogation by invoking this

right. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S. Ct.

1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 475,

86 S. Ct. at 1625, 1628; see also Correll v. Commonwealth, 232

Va. 454, 462, 352 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1987); Foster v. Commonwealth,

8 Va. App. 167, 173, 380 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1990). In order for a

defendant's statement to be admissible at trial, the Commonwealth

must prove that the defendant was informed of his Miranda right

to counsel, i.e., that he has the right to consult with a lawyer,

to have the lawyer present during interrogation and that, if the

defendant is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent

him. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471, 473, 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1626,

1627, 1628; Green v. Commonwealth 223 Va. 706, 710, 292 S.E.2d

605, 607 (1982). If the interrogation continues without the

presence of an attorney, the defendant's statement is

inadmissible unless the Commonwealth proves by a preponderance of

the evidence that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently waived his right to retained or appointed counsel.

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 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S. Ct. at 1884; Miranda, 384

U.S. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628. See also Colorado v. Connelly,

479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S. Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986);

Mills v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 459, 468, 418 S.E.2d 718,

722-23 (1992).

In order to "prevent police from badgering a defendant into

waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights" and to "protect

the suspect's 'desire to deal with the police only through

counsel,'" the United States Supreme Court established the

"Edwards rule" as a "second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda
right to counsel." See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458, 114 S. Ct. at

2355; McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176, 178, 111 S. Ct.

2204, 2208, 2209, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991); Michigan v. Harvey, 494

U.S. 344, 350, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1180, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990).

Pursuant to Edwards and its progeny, once the defendant invokes

his Miranda right to counsel, all police-initiated interrogation

regarding any criminal investigation must cease unless the

defendant's counsel is present at the time of questioning. See

Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S. Ct. 486, 491,

112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683,

108 S. Ct. 2093, 2099, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988); Edwards, 451 U.S.

at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885; see also Jackson v. Commonwealth,

14 Va. App. 414, 416, 417 S.E.2d 5, 6-7 (1992). If the police

initiate interrogation of a defendant after he has invoked his

Miranda right to counsel and before his counsel is present, "a

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valid waiver of this right cannot be established . . . even if he

has been advised of his rights." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 101

S. Ct. at 1884-85; see Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 252,

397 S.E.2d 385, 395 (1990); Hines v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App.

218, 221, 450 S.E.2d 403, 404 (1994). However, the Edwards rule

only applies to periods of continuous custody, and, if the

defendant is released from custody following the invocation of

his Miranda right to counsel, the Edwards rule does not bar

subsequent police-initiated interrogation. See Tipton v.

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 832, 834, 447 S.E.2d 539, 540 (1994). 1

Whether the Edwards rule renders a statement inadmissible is

determined by a three-part inquiry. Cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469

U.S. 91, 95, 105 S. Ct. 490, 492-93, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984).

First, the trial court "must determine whether the accused
1
See also United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945-46 (5th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257
(9th Cir. 1992); Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397
(11th Cir. 1988); United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813
F.2d 117, 125 (7th Cir. 1987); McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d
654, 661 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Geittmann, 733 F.2d
1419, 1429 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d
1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to
definitively address the issue of whether a break in custody
terminates the "Edwards effect" of a defendant's request for
counsel on subsequent police-initiated interrogation, dicta in
two of its cases suggest that continuous custody is a requirement
for application of the Edwards rule. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at
177, 111 S. Ct. at 2208 (stating that a suspect's statements
during post-invocation, police-initiated interrogation are
presumed involuntary "assuming there has been no break in
custody"); Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (stating
that a suspect's initial request for counsel does not disappear
when the police approach him "still in custody" about a separate
criminal investigation).

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actually invoked his right to counsel" and whether the defendant

remained in continuous custody from the time he or she invoked

this right to the time of the statement. Id.; see Tipton, 18 Va.

App. at 834, 447 S.E.2d at 540. Second, if the accused has

invoked his or her right to counsel and has remained in

continuous custody, the statement is inadmissible unless the

trial court finds that the statement was made at a meeting with

the police that was initiated by the defendant or attended by his

lawyer. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 96, 105 S. Ct. at 493 (stating

that statement is admissible if made at a defendant-initiated

meeting); Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153, 111 S. Ct. at 491 (stating

that police "may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel

present"). Third, if the first two parts of the inquiry are met,

the trial court may admit the statement if it determines that the

defendant thereafter "knowingly and intelligently waived the

right he had invoked." Smith, 469 U.S. at 96, 105 S. Ct. at 493.

On appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to

suppress, the burden is on the appellant to show that the trial

court's decision constituted reversible error. See Stanley v.

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 873, 874, 433 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1993).

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly

deducible therefrom. See Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App.

1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). We review the trial

court's findings of historical fact only for "clear error," but

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we review de novo the trial court's application of defined legal

standards to the particular facts of a case, such as

determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause. See

Shears v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 398, 477 S.E.2d 309, 311

(1996); see also Ornelas v. United States, U.S. , , 116

S. Ct. 1657, 1662, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). Whether a defendant

"invoked" his Miranda right to counsel during custodial

interrogation and whether he "waived" this right are determined

by applying judicially declared standards. See Davis, 512 U.S.

at 458-59, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (standard for invocation); Moran v.

Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1140-41, 89 L.Ed.2d

410 (1986) (standard for waiver).

B.

THE APRIL 9 STATEMENT

We hold that the trial court erred when it declined to

suppress the statement made by appellant to Investigator Elliott

on April 9. The Edwards rule clearly applied to appellant's

incriminating statement made on April 9. Appellant previously

had invoked his right to counsel, remained in continuous custody

from the time of his request until the time of his statement, and

his statement was made at a meeting initiated by Investigator

Elliott at which appellant's counsel was not present. See Hines,

19 Va. App. at 221-22, 450 S.E.2d at 404-05.

The record established that appellant invoked his right to

counsel prior to April 9. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct.

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at 2355 (stating that the invocation must be sufficiently clear

so that "a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would

understand the statement to be a request for an attorney").

Appellant testified that he "asked for an attorney" when he was

arrested on March 18, and Investigator Elliott testified that

appellant "invok[ed] his Miranda warnings the night he was

arrested." Although the trial court concluded that appellant

never made a "specific request" for counsel, the trial court's

reasoning indicated that it did not consider in its analysis

appellant's request for counsel on the night of his arrest.
The record also established that appellant remained in

continuous custody from the time of his arrest until the time he

made his statement. Appellant was arrested on March 18 and was

visited in his jail cell on April 9 by Investigator Elliott. In

addition, a series of custodial transportation orders and court

orders in the record indicate that appellant was incarcerated at

the James River Correctional Facility from April 23 through

September 27, the day his sentence was imposed. No other

evidence in the record sheds light on appellant's custodial

status during this time. Based on this evidence, we may infer

that no break occurred in appellant's custodial status following

his arrest.

In addition, the meeting with appellant on April 9 was

initiated by Investigator Elliott while appellant was still in

custody. In the morning of April 9, Investigator Elliott

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approached appellant in his jail cell and told appellant that he

wanted to ask him a few questions. He then moved appellant to

the vacant office where appellant eventually made his statement.

Nothing in the record indicates that appellant desired to speak

with Investigator Elliott prior to the investigator's visit.

Appellant's counsel was not present at any time during the

meeting. Although appellant was given and waived his Miranda

rights prior to making his statement, the fact that he had

earlier invoked his right to counsel precluded the Commonwealth

from proving a valid waiver of his rights at a meeting initiated

by the authorities at which his counsel was not present. See

Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153, 111 S. Ct. at 491, Edwards, 451 U.S. at

484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1084-85. In addition, the fact that the

investigator asked appellant about crimes that had not been

previously discussed is of no moment because appellant's initial

request for counsel is deemed non-offense-specific. See

Roberson, 486 U.S. at 683, 108 S. Ct. at 2099.

Because the Edwards rule applied to the statement made by
appellant on April 9, the Commonwealth did not establish that

appellant waived his Miranda right to counsel prior to making the

statement. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S. Ct. at 1629. For

these reasons, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the

statement.

C.

THE APRIL 25 STATEMENT

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 The admissibility of the April 25 statement raises an issue

of first impression in Virginia. We must determine whether the

Edwards rule bars admission of a statement made during an

interrogation initiated by an officer from a jurisdiction

different than the one in which the defendant initially requested

counsel. The uncertainty stems from the as yet unaddressed

effect of Roberson on Simmons v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 111, 300

S.E.2d 918 (1983).
In Simmons, the defendant, an Army sergeant, was detained by

military authorities when, after an unauthorized absence from his

post, he informed them of a possible warrant for his arrest in

Fairfax County. Simmons, 225 Va. at 114, 115-16, 300 S.E.2d at

919, 920. Later in the day, a staff sergeant who was attempting

to verify that Simmons was both "AWOL" and wanted by authorities

in Fairfax, warned Simmons of his Miranda rights and asked

Simmons if he wanted an attorney. See id. at 116, 300 S.E.2d at

920. Simmons replied that he wanted an attorney. See id.

Simmons remained in custody until a Fairfax investigator arrived

to question him about a murder in Fairfax County. See id. at

116-17, 300 S.E.2d at 920. The Fairfax investigator, who did not

know of Simmons' earlier request for counsel, informed Simmons of

his Miranda rights. Simmons then signed a written waiver form,

see id. at 117, 300 S.E.2d at 920-21, and confessed to the

Fairfax murder. See id. at 117, 300 S.E.2d at 921. Following

another period of unbroken custody and another informed waiver of

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his Miranda rights, Simmons confessed again to the murder. See

id. at 117-18, 300 S.E.2d at 921.

The trial court denied Simmons' motion to suppress his

confessions. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed,

holding that the Edwards rule did not apply to Simmons'

confessions. See id. at 121, 300 S.E.2d at 923. The Court noted

that Simmons' initial request for counsel was made to a military

sergeant during the sergeant's investigation of Simmons' "status

with reference to the military law." See id. The Court reasoned

that because Simmons' confessions occurred during interrogation

by a different law enforcement officer who did not actually know

of Simmons' initial request for counsel and who questioned

Simmons about a different crime, Edwards did not bar the

admission of his confessions. See id.

In Roberson, the United States Supreme Court addressed the

issue raised in Simmons and reached a different conclusion.

Roberson was arrested on April 16 for burglary and, after being

informed of his Miranda rights, requested the assistance of
counsel. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 678, 108 S. Ct. at 2096.

Roberson remained in custody until April 19, when he was

approached by "a different officer . . . about a different

burglary." See id. The officer, who was ignorant of Roberson's

earlier request for counsel, gave Roberson his Miranda warnings.

See id. Roberson subsequently confessed to the burglary. See
id.

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 The trial court granted Roberson's motion to suppress and

the United State Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at 678-79, 108

S. Ct. at 2096-97. In its opinion, the Court rejected both

theories relied upon by the Virginia Supreme Court in Simmons to

limit the reach of the Edwards rule. First, the Court held that

the Edwards rule is not offense specific and that a defendant's

request for counsel during an interrogation about one crime bars

subsequent police-initiated interrogation about other suspected

criminal activity. See id. at 682-84, 108 S. Ct. at 2098-99.

Second, the Court held that an officer who initiates the

reinterrogation of a defendant without knowing of the defendant's

prior request for counsel is not relieved of complying with the

Edwards rule. See id. at 687, 108 S. Ct. at 2101. The Court

indicated that law enforcement authorities have a duty to inform

each other of prior invocations of the Miranda right to counsel

by suspects in their custody and that the Edwards rule requires

officers to ascertain prior to interrogation whether a suspect

has previously requested counsel. The Court stated:
[C]ustodial interrogation must be conducted
pursuant to established procedures, and those
procedures in turn must enable an officer who
proposes to initiate an interrogation to
determine whether the suspect has previously
requested counsel . . . . Whether a
contemplated reinterrogation concerns the
same or a different offence, or whether the
same or different law enforcement authorities
are involved in the second investigation, the
same need to determine whether the suspect
has requested counsel exists. The police
department's failure to honor that request
cannot be justified by the lack of diligence
of a particular officer.

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Id. at 487-88, 108 S. Ct. at 2101 (emphasis added). Based on the

use of the word "authorities" in this passage rather than

"officers" and the fact that the Court stated it was addressing a

conflict in state and federal cases that dealt with successive

interrogations by officers from separate jurisdictions, see id.

at 680 n.3, 108 S. Ct. at 2097 n.3, we conclude that the Court

clearly did not intend this aspect of the Roberson holding to be

limited by jurisdictional lines.
Based on our reading of these two cases, we hold that

Roberson renders Simmons no longer controlling. In Roberson, the

United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the reasoning

relied upon by the Virginia Supreme Court in Simmons. Contrary

to the holding of Simmons and pursuant to Edwards and its

progeny, under Roberson if a defendant requests counsel during

custodial interrogation and remains in continuous custody, any

subsequent waiver of his Miranda right to counsel obtained during

reinterrogation initiated by the authorities and held outside the

presence of his counsel is presumed to be involuntary. See

McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177-78, 111 S. Ct. at 2208. The fact that

the subsequent interrogation (1) was initiated by authorities

from another jurisdiction who did not actually know of the

defendant's prior request for counsel or (2) concerned a separate

criminal investigation does not preclude the application of the

Edwards rule. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687-88, 108 S. Ct. at

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2101. 2

We hold that the trial court erred when it denied

appellant's motion to suppress the statement made to Investigator

Bryant on April 25. Like the circumstances surrounding the April

9 statement, the record indicates that appellant invoked his

Miranda right to counsel on March 18 and remained in continuous

custody until he was approached by Investigator Bryant in a

holding cell on April 25. Investigator Bryant advised appellant

of his Miranda rights, and appellant waived his rights and made
the incriminating statement. Appellant's counsel was not present

during the interrogation. Because there was no break in

appellant's custodial status prior to this interrogation and

because it was initiated by Investigator Bryant and held outside

the presence of appellant's counsel, the Edwards rule mandates

suppression of the statement. Even though Investigator Bryant

2
We need not address the effect of Roberson on McFadden v.
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 103, 300 S.E.2d 924 (1983), a sister case
of Simmons, because McFadden is factually distinguishable. In
McFadden, the Virginia Supreme Court held that Edwards did not
preclude the admissibility of McFadden's confessions even though
they were made at post-invocation interrogations initiated by
investigators from different jurisdictions investigating
different crimes. See McFadden, 225 Va. at 110, 300 S.E.2d at
927-28. Although not mentioned by the Virginia Supreme Court in
its reasoning, the facts of McFadden indicate that McFadden was
twice released from custody after he requested counsel and before
the interrogation that led to his confessions. See id. at 106,
300 S.E.2d at 925. As the Fourth Circuit reasoned when it
affirmed the denial of McFadden's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, these breaks in McFadden's custody mooted the "Edwards
effect" of his initial request for counsel on later
police-initiated interrogation. See McFadden v. Garraghty, supra
note 1, 820 F.2d at 661 (citing Skinner, supra note 1).

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was from a jurisdiction different from the officers who knew of

appellant's request for counsel, he knew of appellant's prior

contacts with the Goochland authorities. Pursuant to Roberson,

the investigator was required to exercise diligence prior to

interrogating appellant to determine whether appellant had

previously requested counsel. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687-88,

108 S. Ct. at 2101. This failure to honor appellant's request to

deal with the police only through counsel cannot be justified by

the lack of adequate procedures in place to inform officers

subsequently coming into contact with appellant of appellant's

prior request for counsel. See id. at 688, 108 S. Ct. at 2101.

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 III.

HARMLESS ERROR

Next we must determine whether the admission of appellant's

statements in violation of the Edwards rule constituted

reversible error. See United States v. Cannon, 981 F.2d 785,

789-90 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that Edwards violation can be

harmless); cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-10, 111

S. Ct. 1246, 1263-65, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (holding that

constitutional "trial errors," such as the admission of an

involuntary confession, can be harmless).
A federal constitutional error is harmless, and thus

excusable, only if it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827-28,

17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296, 111

S. Ct. at 1257 (applying Chapman test to erroneously admitted

confession); Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005,

407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991). The admission of evidence obtained

in violation of the federal constitution is reversible error if

"there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained

of might have contributed to the conviction." Fahy v.

Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S. Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d

171 (1963); see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S. Ct. at 828

(stating that the Chapman test "do[es] no more than adhere to the

meaning of [Fahy]").

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 We review the record in this case with an awareness of the

impact that a confession can have in a criminal trial.
A confession is like no other evidence.
Indeed, "the defendant's own confession is
probably the most probative and damaging
evidence that can be admitted against him.
. . . [T]he admissions of a defendant come
from the actor himself, the most
knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of
information about his past conduct.
Certainly, confessions have profound impact
on the jury, so much so that we may
justifiably doubt its ability to put them out
of mind even if told to do so." While some
statements by a defendant may concern
isolated aspects of the crime or may be
incriminating only when linked to other
evidence, a full confession in which the
defendant discloses the motive for and means
of the crime may tempt the [trier of fact] to
rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its
decision.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296, 111 S. Ct. at 1257-58 (citations

omitted).

The court conducting a harmless-error inquiry
must appreciate the indelible impact a full
confession may have on the trier of fact, as
distinguished, for instance, from the impact
of an isolated statement that incriminates
the defendant only when connected with other
evidence.

Id. at 313, 111 S. Ct. at 1266 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Based on our review of the record, we hold that the

erroneous admission of appellant's statements was not harmless.

Appellant's statements contained a comprehensive admission of

guilt that described in detail both his motive for taking the

stolen property and the means by which he committed the crimes.

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They also provided the only direct evidence in the record of

appellant's knowledge that the tools and equipment loaded onto

the truck by his son belonged to "another" and of his intent to

"permanently deprive" Messrs. Worley and Truslow of possession of

these items. See Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 251,

356 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1987) (defining larceny as "the wrongful

taking of the goods of another without the owner's consent and

with the intention to permanently deprive the owner of possession

of the goods"). After balancing appellant's confessions, which

were both comprehensive and extremely probative, against the

comparatively weaker lawfully admitted evidence of his guilt, we

find a reasonable possibility that appellant's confessions

contributed to the trial court's verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the convictions of two

counts of grand larceny and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

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