IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
February 3, 1999 Session
IN RE: ESTATE OF PAULINE MADDOX
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Sumner County
No. 96P-11 Tom E. Gray, Chancellor
No. M1998-00925-COA-R3-CV - Filed May 9, 2001
This appeal involves the testamentary intent of an 89-year-old widow who died leaving a sizeable
estate. After one of the decedent’s grandsons, acting as her executor, submitted for probate a
February 1991 will and a June 1995 codicil, the decedent’s surviving daughter filed a will contest
proceeding in the Chancery Court for Sumner County, alleging that the will had been procured by
the executor’s undue influence and that the distribution of the estate should be governed by a 1989
holographic instrument. Following a bench trial, the trial court upheld the validity of the 1991 will
and the 1995 codicil. On this appeal, the decedent’s daughter asserts that the trial court erred by
determining that the 1991 will and the 1995 codicil expressed the decedent’s testamentary wishes
rather than the 1989 document. We have determined that the evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusions and, therefore, affirm the judgment.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
WILLIAM C. KOCH , JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BEN H. CANTRELL , P.J., M.S.,
and WILLIAM B. CAIN , J., joined.
Wm. Kennerly Burger, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dorothy V. Maddox Wilson.
Philip C. Kelly and Gwynn K. Smith, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellees, Joe Whitaker and Allen
Whitaker.
OPINION
Pauline Maddox was a lifelong resident of Sumner County. She and Howard Maddox, her
husband, had two daughters, Polly Maddox Whitaker and Dorothy Virginia Maddox Wilson. Mr.
Maddox died in the late 1980s, and Ms. Whitaker died of cancer in 1989. After Ms. Whitaker died,
Ms. Maddox’s grandsons, Joe H. Whitaker, Sr. and Allen Whitaker, lived with her for several years
and thereafter remained devoted to Ms. Maddox for the rest of her life. Ms. Maddox had a great deal
of affection for the rest of her family, especially Ms. Wilson and her three children, but Joe Whitaker
and Allen Whitaker held a special place in her heart.
As Ms. Maddox grew older, she relied on both Joe Whitaker and Allen Whitaker to assist
her with her business affairs and errands. After Allen Whitaker moved to Kentucky in the late
1980s, Ms. Maddox relied increasingly on Joe Whitaker, who lived in Gallatin where he worked as
a real estate broker. Even though she remained capable of driving until the last year of her life, Ms.
Maddox frequently asked Joe Whitaker to drive her wherever she needed to go.
Ms. Maddox remained alert and fairly independent, even when her health began to decline
during the last years of her life. Until her death, Ms. Maddox lived in her own home with the
assistance of someone who would help with the cooking and the other household chores. Joe
Whitaker became concerned about Ms. Maddox’s safety and tried to persuade her to hire a live-in
nurse who would be there at night in the event of an emergency. However, Ms. Maddox insisted that
she was capable of living alone and refused to hire a full-time care giver.
Ms. Maddox also sought Joe Whitaker’s advice and assistance with her financial affairs. She
placed his name on her checking account and several certificates of deposit and savings accounts.
She often asked him to write and sign checks for her, even though she insisted on maintaining her
own checkbook and financial records. In the late 1980s, and again in 1994 and 1995, Ms. Maddox
gave Joe Whitaker general powers of attorney, just as her husband had done before he died. Joe
Whitaker never exercised these powers for either of his grandparents.
In addition to managing her daily financial affairs, Ms. Maddox began to be concerned about
the distribution of her estate. In the early 1990s, she retained Ronnie Fox, a certified public
accountant who did work for Joe Whitaker, to prepare her income tax returns. Later, on at least two
occasions, Ms. Maddox talked with Mr. Fox about ways to minimize the taxes on her estate. She
also discussed estate planning matters with Charles Hill Beaty, a lawyer practicing in Gallatin who
also attended her church. Mr. Beaty had represented Joe Whitaker in several business transactions.
In 1994, at Ms. Maddox’s request, Mr. Beaty also represented Ms. Wilson in the divorce proceedings
that ended her 45-year marriage. When Ms. Maddox desired to meet with Mr. Beaty, Joe Whitaker
would set up the meetings but would not attend them. Joe Whitaker never discussed Ms. Maddox’s
testamentary plans with Mr. Beaty.
Ms. Maddox eventually asked Mr. Beaty to prepare her will. She explained that she desired
that her estate be divided among her surviving daughter, her grandchildren, and her great-
grandchildren. She specifically instructed Mr. Beaty that she wanted Joe Whitaker and Allen
Whitaker to have her one-half interest in the family farm. She was also concerned about Ms.
Wilson’s ability to manage her finances because of her marital difficulties and her struggle with
alcohol abuse. Accordingly, Ms. Maddox informed Mr. Beaty that she was interested in placing Ms.
Wilson’s share of the estate in a trust to prevent it from being squandered.
Mr. Beaty assigned the task of drafting Ms. Maddox’s will to an associate, Sue Hynds
Dunning. Ms. Dunning drafted Ms. Maddox’s will based on Mr. Beaty’s notes of his conversation
with Ms. Maddox and did not interview Ms. Maddox further. On February 21, 1991, Ms. Dunning
assisted Ms. Maddox with the execution of her will. She explained each section of the will to Ms.
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Maddox, and Ms. Maddox expressed her assent to the will and signed the instrument in the presence
of two witnesses. In addition to specific gifts of personal property and cash, Ms. Maddox’s will
devised her interest in the family farm to Joe Whitaker and Allen Whitaker and gave any of her
grandsons the opportunity to purchase her home and adjoining property from the estate. The will
also created a $250,000 trust for the benefit of Ms. Wilson and directed Joe Whitaker, as trustee, to
pay Ms. Wilson one-tenth of the trust estate every year for ten years.1 Finally, the will provided for
gifts to Joe Whitaker and Allen Whitaker of $185,000 each or one-half of all the funds remaining
after the creation of the trust for Ms. Wilson.
Four years later, Ms. Maddox contacted Ms. Dunning seeking advice about the tax
consequences of some inter vivos gifts she was considering. Ms. Dunning was no longer practicing
with Mr. Beaty and was then representing Joe Whitaker in his divorce proceedings. Because one of
Ms. Maddox’s concerns was that Joe Whitaker’s wife would have access to her gifts, Ms. Dunning
recommended that Ms. Maddox retain Mr. Beaty to prepare the necessary codicil to her February
1991 will. Ms. Maddox responded, “[n]o, little girl, I like you. I want you to do it. Now go ahead
and get it done.” Accordingly, Ms. Dunning prepared a codicil to the February 1991 will, and Ms.
Maddox executed the codicil on June 12, 1995. The codicil contained specific directions regarding
several items of personal property and reduced the amount of her bequests to Ms. Wilson’s three
sons. Neither Joe Whitaker, Allen Whitaker, nor Ms. Wilson were aware of Ms. Maddox’s plan for
the distribution of her estate.
Ms. Maddox died on Thanksgiving Day in 1995 at the age of eighty-nine. She left an estate
estimated to be worth $956,000. In January 1996, Joe Whitaker filed a petition in the Sumner
County Probate Court to probate Ms. Maddox’s February 1991 will and the June 1995 codicil. In
August 1996, Ms. Wilson filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Sumner County contesting the
validity of both the will and the codicil on the ground that they had been procured by Joe Whitaker
and Allen Whitaker through undue influence and in abuse of Joe Whitaker’s confidential relationship
with Ms. Maddox. Ms. Wilson also asserted that a handwritten document prepared by Ms. Maddox
on October 10, 1989 was her mother’s holographic will.2 Both Joe Whitaker and Allen Whitaker
admitted that Joe Whitaker had a confidential relationship with Ms. Maddox but denied that they had
attempted to influence her testamentary decisions.
At the conclusion of a hearing on February 18, 1998, the trial court upheld Ms. Maddox’s
February 1991 will and the June 1995 codicil. The court concluded that Joe Whitaker had a
confidential relationship with Ms. Maddox at the time these instruments were prepared but that he
had presented sufficient evidence to clearly and convincingly rebut the presumption of undue
1
The will also provided that if Ms. Wilson were to die during the ten-year term of the trust, her three sons should
receive eq ual shares of the balance re maining in the tru st.
2
This do cument ap pears to b e a list of Ms. M addox’s property. Each entry is followed by the name of one of
Ms. Maddox’s relatives – presumably to indicate that Ms. Maddox intended to leave the property to the identified
relative. The most significant distinction be tween this do cument and the Februa ry 1991 w ill and the June 1995 c odicil
is that the handwritten list does not set up a trust for Ms. Wilson.
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influence arising from the existence of that relationship. The trial court also concluded that the
handwritten October 1989 document was not a holographic will. On February 25, 1998, the trial
court entered an order dismissing the will contest. Ms. Wilson filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion
to alter or amend the judgment based on a tape recording she secretly made during a meeting with
Ms. Dunning in December 1995. On June 8, 1998, the trial court entered an order finding that the
tape recording did not contradict Ms. Dunning’s testimony and denying Ms. Wilson’s motion.
I.
THE FEBRUARY 1991 WILL AND THE JUNE 1995 CODICIL
Ms. Wilson’s chief argument on this appeal is that the trial court erred by upholding Ms.
Maddox’s February 1991 will and the 1995 codicil. She asserts that Joe Whitaker did not present
clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of undue influence arising from his admitted
confidential relationship with Ms. Maddox during the last five years of her life. We disagree, and,
like the trial court, we have concluded that Joe Whitaker has successfully rebutted any presumption
of undue influence that may have arisen from the evidence presented by Ms. Wilson.
A.
The purpose of a will contest is to have a will declared void either because the testator lacked
the requisite testamentary capacity or because the will was procured by undue influence or fraud.
Stacks v. Saunders, 812 S.W.2d 587, 590-91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990); Muse v. Sluder, 600 S.W.2d
237, 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). It is an in rem proceeding, Lillard v. Tolliver, 154 Tenn. 304, 323,
285 S.W. 576, 581-82 (1926), intended to test the external validity of the will. Stacks v. Saunders,
812 S.W.2d at 590; Rogers v. Russell, 733 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). The proceeding
is now regulated entirely by statute. Jones v. Witherspoon, 182 Tenn. 498, 503-04, 187 S.W.2d 788,
790 (1945); Cude v. Culberson, 30 Tenn. App. 628, 637, 209 S.W.2d 506, 511 (1947).
In a will contest, the proponents of a will have the initial burden of proving that the will was
executed in compliance with all legal formalities. In re Estate of Elam, 738 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tenn.
1987). Proof of due execution makes out a prima facie case for the will’s validity because it gives
rise to the presumption that the testator was capable of making a will. Curry v. Bridges, 45 Tenn.
App. 395, 407, 325 S.W.2d 87, 92 (1959); Needham v. Doyle, 39 Tenn. App. 597, 622, 286 S.W.2d
601, 612 (1955). Thus, proof of due execution shifts the burden to the contestants to prove that the
testator was unduly influenced in making his or her will. In re Estate of Elam, 738 S.W.2d at 171;
Green v. Higdon, 870 S.W.2d 513, 520 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).
While undue influence may be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence, direct
evidence of undue influence is rarely available. Accordingly, in most cases, those challenging the
validity of a will on the ground that it was procured by undue influence must prove the existence of
suspicious circumstances warranting the conclusion that the person allegedly influenced did not act
freely and independently. Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 847 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Mitchell v.
Smith, 779 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Whether the suspicious circumstances relied
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upon by the contestants are sufficient to invalidate a will should be “decided by the application of
sound principles and good sense.” Halle v. Summerfield, 199 Tenn. 445, 454, 287 S.W.2d 57, 61
(1956).
The courts have not attempted to catalogue the types or number of suspicious circumstances
needed to invalidate a will, but the scope of relevant evidence is quite broad. 1 Jack W. Robinson
& Jeff Mobley, Pritchard on the Law of Wills and the Administration of Estates § 130, at 209-30
(5th ed. 1994). The suspicious circumstances most frequently relied upon to establish undue
influence are: (1) the existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and the
beneficiary, (2) the testator’s physical or mental deterioration, and (3) the beneficiary’s active
involvement in procuring the will. In re Elam’s Estate, 738 S.W.2d at 173; Kelly v. Allen, 558
S.W.2d 845, 848 (Tenn. 1977). Other circumstances include: (1) secrecy concerning the will’s
existence, (2) the unjust or unnatural nature of the will’s terms, (3) discrepancies between the will
and the testator’s expressed intentions, and (4) fraud or duress directed toward the testator. Mitchell
v. Smith, 779 S.W.2d at 388.
Proof of the existence of a confidential relationship, by itself, will not be sufficient to
invalidate a will. Halle v. Summerfield, 199 Tenn. at 455, 287 S.W.2d at 61; Vantrease v. Carl, 56
Tenn. App. 636, 642-43, 410 S.W.2d 629, 632 (1966). It is not the relationship that concerns the
courts but rather the abuse of the relationship. Robinson v. Robinson, 517 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1974). Proof of the existence of a confidential relationship must be coupled with evidence
of one or more other suspicious circumstances that give rise to a presumption of undue influence.
Accordingly, proof that a beneficiary had a confidential relationship, such as an unrestricted power
of attorney, coupled with evidence of a transaction or gift to the beneficiary creates a presumption
of undue influence. Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tenn. 1995); Johnson v. Craycraft,
914 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
Once a contestant presents sufficient evidence to substantiate its undue influence claim, the
burden of going forward shifts back to the will’s proponent to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the challenged transaction or gift was fair. Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d at 386;
Hager v. Fitzgerald, 934 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Bills v. Lindsay, 909 S.W.2d 434,
440-41 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Like the proof of suspicious circumstances, the scope of the evidence
regarding the fairness of a transaction or gift is quite broad. Frequently, a will’s proponents prove
the fairness of a transaction by presenting evidence that the testator received independent advice.
Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d at 386; Richmond v. Christian, 555 S.W.2d 105, 107-08 (Tenn.
1977). However, proof of independent advice becomes necessary only when it would be difficult
to show the fairness of the transaction or the competency of the testator without it. In re Depriest’s
Estate, 733 S.W.2d 74, 79 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).
B.
Joe Whitaker, in his role as the executor of Ms. Maddox’s estate, presented satisfactory
evidence that Ms. Maddox duly executed her February 1991 will and the June 1995 codicil.
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Accordingly, the burden then shifted to Ms. Wilson to prove the existence of sufficient suspicious
circumstances to call the validity of the will and codicil into question. Ms. Wilson attempted to carry
her burden by proving: (1) that Joe Whitaker had a confidential relationship with Ms. Maddox, (2)
that Ms. Maddox received all her estate planning advice from two lawyers and an accountant who
had also provided professional services to Joe Whitaker; and (3) that the terms of the February 1991
will and the June 1995 codicil differed materially from Ms. Maddox’s October 1989 handwritten
inventory of her property.
All the parties agree that Joe Whitaker had a confidential relationship with Ms. Maddox for
approximately the last five years of her life. She had given him her power of attorney, and while he
may never have exercised it, there is no question that Ms. Maddox relied on Joe Whitaker for
assistance with her personal and financial affairs. However, proof of the existence of a confidential
relationship will not, by itself, provide grounds to invalidate a will. Thus, for Ms. Wilson to
succeed, she must establish other suspicious circumstances which, “by the application of sound
principles and good sense” would cause reasonable persons to conclude that Ms. Maddox’s will and
codicil did not reflect her own testamentary intent. Having reviewed the record, we find that Ms.
Wilson’s evidence of other suspicious circumstances is wafer thin.
By all accounts, Ms. Maddox was an “independent,” “strong-willed,” and “feisty” woman
up until the time she died. She was described as being very determined and not controlled by
anyone. All who testified stated that she was knowledgeable about her personal finances and that
she had clear ideas about how she wanted her property distributed after her death. Allen Whitaker
explained that Ms. Maddox “gave everything that she did serious consideration.” Thus, while Ms.
Maddox may have become physically unfirm, there is no evidence in this record that her age or her
physical infirmities had diminished her spirit or her mental acuity.
Ms. Wilson places great emphasis on the fact that Ms. Maddox obtained estate planning
assistance from persons who had also provided professional services to Joe Whitaker in matters
having no relationship with Ms. Maddox’s will. She stresses this point because of her erroneous
belief that Ms. Maddox’s February 1991 will and the June 1995 codicil can be upheld only if there
is clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Maddox received independent advice regarding the
disposition of her estate. We have already pointed out that proof of independent advice becomes
indispensable only when the fairness of the will and the competency of the testator cannot be proved
clearly and convincingly without it.
The evidence does not bear out Ms. Wilson’s claim that Ms. Maddox did not receive
independent advice regarding the preparation of her February 1991 will and the June 1995 codicil.
While each of the three professionals whom Ms. Maddox consulted had some prior, unrelated
professional connection with Joe Whitaker, there is no evidence that Joe Whitaker participated in
Ms. Maddox’s discussions with these persons, discussed Ms. Maddox’s affairs with these persons,
or even knew the specifics of Ms. Maddox’s conversations with these persons. Both Joe Whitaker
and Ms. Wilson testified categorically that they had no knowledge of the contents of Ms. Maddox’s
will until after she died.
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While it is conceivable that a lawyer’s or accountant’s relationship with several members of
the same family could lead to a conflict of interest, we decline to establish the sort of bright-line rule
of disqualification that Ms. Wilson suggests. The Tennessee Supreme Court has already provided
general guidance for deciding these issues. For advice to be independent, the person providing the
advice must be competent to render it and must be “so disassociated from the interests of the donee
as to be in a position to advise with the donor impartially and confidently as to the consequences .
. . of the proposed benefactions.” Turner v. Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292, 297-98, 232 S.W.2d 269, 271
(1950).
Lawyers frequently advise different family members without compromising their ability to
provide competent, independent legal advice. In the context of preparing a will, it is not difficult to
conceive of at least four possible scenarios in which a lawyer’s independence might be called into
question. The first scenario involves a lawyer who assists in the preparation of a will in which the
lawyer himself or herself receives a gift. Obviously, the lawyer’s independence concerning that
instrument can be questioned. Matlock v. Simpson, 902 S.W.2d at 386; In re Estate of Cranor, No.
M1997-00231-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 343787, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2000) (No Tenn. R.
App. P. 11 application filed).
The second scenario involves a circumstance where a lawyer is simultaneously representing
the testator and a possible beneficiary in a financial matter that may affect the amount that the
beneficiary might receive in the testator’s will. In the context of this sort of multiple representation,
the beneficiary would have an extremely difficult time proving that the lawyer’s advice to the testator
was independent. The third scenario involves a circumstance where the lawyer preparing the will
is also representing one of the intended beneficiaries in an unrelated matter. While this circumstance
could possibly compromise the independence of the lawyer’s advice, each case must be examined
in light of its unique facts to ascertain whether the lawyer’s advice and counsel were unbiased and
independent. The fourth scenario involves a circumstance where the lawyer preparing the will at
some point in the past represented one of the intended beneficiaries in an unrelated matter that has
been concluded. In this circumstance, it will be extremely difficult for the contestant to prove that
the lawyer did not provide the testator independent legal advice.
Mr. Beaty knew both Ms. Maddox, her late husband, and Joe Whitaker through church. He
considered himself to be their family attorney. He represented Joe Whitaker in his business matters
up until the time of Joe Whitaker’s divorce. He also assisted Ms. Maddox with the preparation of
her February 1991 will and, at Ms. Maddox’s request, represented Ms. Wilson in her divorce. Mr.
Beaty explained that he applied the “stink” rule when it came to potential conflicts and that “if I
thought something was going on, me and . . . [Ms. Maddox] would have had one of them talks. And
we would have both cried, but we would have done what had to be done.” He also stated that “I’m
pretty darn independent and feel like I can give Dot [Ms. Wilson] advice and Joe advice and . . . [Ms.
Maddox] advice, independent of the cares, concerns, or impact on them.” Mr. Beaty never discussed
the contents of Ms. Maddox’s will with Joe Whitaker or Ms. Wilson prior to Ms. Maddox’s death.
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Ms. Dunning assisted in the preparation of Ms. Maddox’s February 1991 will and prepared
the June 1995 codicil. She was associated with Mr. Beaty when Ms. Maddox’s will was prepared
and was practicing with another firm when she prepared the June 1995 codicil. When Ms. Maddox
sought her assistance in 1995, Ms. Dunning reminded Ms. Maddox that she was currently
representing Joe Whitaker in his divorce and suggested that she should retain Mr. Beaty to prepare
the codicil. However, Ms. Maddox insisted that Ms. Dunning prepare the codicil. Ms. Dunning
stated that she never discussed the contents of Ms. Maddox’s February 1991 will or the June 1995
codicil with either Joe Whitaker or Ms. Wilson until after Ms. Maddox’s death.
Both Mr. Beaty and Ms. Dunning were representing Joe Whitaker on entirely unrelated
matters when Ms. Maddox consulted them about her will and the codicil to her will. Both of these
lawyers had long-standing relationships with Ms. Maddox and had represented Ms. Maddox and
other members of her family in the past. Joe Whitaker did not steer Ms. Maddox to these lawyers
and was not actively involved in Ms. Maddox’s discussions with them regarding the disposition of
her property. There is no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that these lawyers could not
have provided Ms. Maddox competent and independent legal advice because of their past or
continuing professional dealings with Joe Whitaker. Accordingly, we disagree with Ms. Wilson and
find that Ms. Maddox received competent and independent legal advice both with regard to her
February 1991 will and the 1995 codicil.
No one disputes that Ms. Maddox had an especially close relationship with Joe Whitaker and
Allen Whitaker. They were the two grandsons closest to her, and over the years they provided her
the most direct assistance and support. Accordingly, it was natural for Ms. Maddox to treat them
differently in her will than she treated Ms. Wilson’s three children. Despite Ms. Wilson’s assertions
to the contrary, we find that the contents of the October 1989 handwritten list of Ms. Maddox’s
property does not differ materially from Ms. Maddox’s February 1991 will except for the $250,000
trust for Ms. Wilson. However, Ms. Maddox’s reasons for creating the trust for her daughter are
clear. Ms. Maddox told both Mr. Beaty and Ms. Dunning that she was concerned that Ms. Wilson’s
ability to manage money might be impaired by her struggle with alcohol and her domestic
difficulties. It is, therefore, not remarkable that Ms. Maddox would decide to protect her bequest
to Ms. Wilson from waste and encroachment by creating a trust to pay out her gift to Ms. Wilson
over ten years.
Based on our independent review of the record, we have determined that the evidence
demonstrates clearly and convincingly that Ms. Maddox’s February 1991 will and the 1995 codicil
reflected her own testamentary intent. The record contains no direct evidence that Joe Whitaker
undertook to influence, let alone, unduly influence,3 Ms. Maddox’s decisions regarding the
distribution of her property. The circumstantial evidence offered by Ms. Wilson to challenge the will
and the codicil is, at best, weak and is clearly and convincingly rebutted by the other evidence in the
3
The law prohibits only the use of undue influence to influence a person’s testamentary decisions. It does not
proscribe persuasion or influence. Keasler v. Estate of Keasler, 973 S.W.2d 213 , 219 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 997); Parham
v. Walker, 568 S.W .2d 622 , 624 (T enn. Ct. Ap p. 1978 ).
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record showing that Ms. Maddox remained strong-willed to the end and that she acted intentionally
and deliberately with regard to her personal finances as well as her estate planning. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s decision to uphold Ms. Maddox’s February 1991 will and her June 1995
codicil.
II.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the Sumner County
Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We tax the costs of this appeal
to Dorothy Virginia Maddox Wilson and her surety for which execution, if necessary, may issue.
___________________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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