IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE
FILED
June 11, 1997
HOSSEIN AGHILI, )
) Cecil W. Crowson
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Appellate Court Clerk
) Davidson Circuit
) No. 95D-1401
VS. )
) Appeal No.
) 01A01-9605-CV-00214
HAMIDEH SABA SAADATNEJADI, )
)
Defendant/Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR DAVIDSON COUNTY
AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE
THE HONORABLE MURIEL ROBINSON, JUDGE
For the Plaintiff/Appellee: For the Defendant/Appellant:
D. Scott Parsley Peggy D. Mathes
BARRETT, JOHNSTON & PARSLEY Nashville, Tennessee
Nashville, Tennessee
REVERSED AND REMANDED
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
OPINION
This appeal involves the validity of an Islamic marriage. Shortly after the
marriage, the husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking
a divorce or, in the alternative, an annulment. After the wife counterclaimed for
a divorce, the husband moved for a summary judgment on his annulment claim.
The trial court granted the summary judgment, finding that the undisputed
evidence demonstrated that the officiant was not qualified to perform the marriage
under Islamic law and that the officiant had failed to file the marriage license
within the legally prescribed time. The wife takes issue on this appeal with the
trial court’s conclusion that the marriage was void ab initio. We have determined
that the trial court erred and, therefore, reverse the summary judgment.
I.
Hossein Aghili and Hamideh Saba Saadatnejadi are Americans of Iranian
descent. Mr. Aghili is forty-one and works as an engineer for the Tennessee
Department of Transportation. Ms. Saadatnejadi is twenty-six years old. Mr.
Aghili and Ms. Saadatnejadi met in Tennessee when Ms. Saadatnejadi was a
student. They were engaged in the Islamic Republic of Iran on October 12, 1994.
After returning to Tennessee, Mr. Aghili negotiated a marriage contract or
sadaq with Ms. Saadatnejadi’s father in accordance with Islamic custom.1 In this
contract, Mr. Aghili agreed that Ms. Saadatnejadi’s dowry would be 1,400 Iranian
gold coins and that he would pay Ms. Saadatnejadi 10,000 Iranian gold coins if
he violated any provision of the contract. Because Islamic law permits a man to
have four wives, Mr. Aghili also agreed that he would not marry anyone else if the
parties ever returned to live in Iran.
1
Islamic custom entitles the prospective wife to a sadaq when the prospective husband
proposes marriage. The sadaq is a postponed dowry that protects the woman in the event of a
divorce. Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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Mr. Aghili and Ms. Saadatnejadi obtained a marriage license in Rutherford
County on December 9, 1994. Mr. Aghili requested Ghalam Hossein Azam
Tarahian to perform an Islamic blessing2 for the couple. On December 17, 1994,
Mr. Tarahian blessed the couple in the presence of four witnesses at the home of
Ms. Saadatnejadi’s parents in Rutherford County. Following the ceremony, Mr.
Aghili, Ms. Saadatnejadi, and Mr. Tarahian signed a marriage certificate that was
filed with the mosque in Nashville. Mr. Tarahian did not, however, receive or
sign the Tennessee marriage license. Mr. Aghili apparently kept this document
because it was one of the documents required to be filed with the Interest Section
of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to make an official record of the marriage
in Iran.
Mr. Aghili and Ms. Saadatnejadi could not begin living together as husband
and wife following the blessing because Islamic custom required them to first
have a formal wedding reception. Their formal wedding reception took place on
December 30, 1994 and was attended by one hundred guests. Following the
reception, Mr. Aghili and Ms. Saadatnejadi honeymooned in Gatlinburg.
Problems arose as soon as the parties returned to Nashville. Mr. Aghili informed
Ms. Saadatnejadi that he would not record their marriage license unless she would
agree to sign another premarital agreement and to relinquish her dowry and earlier
marriage contracts. He also asserted that their marriage was invalid because Mr.
Tarahian did not have the authority to perform the December 17, 1994, Islamic
blessing.
The parties separated on January 29, 1995. On the advice of an employee
of the Rutherford County Clerk, Ms. Saadatnejadi and Mr. Tarahian later
completed and filed another marriage license form. Mr. Tarahian signed the form
as the officiant but did not date his signature or indicate on the form that he was
an imam.3 Apparently someone in the clerk’s office added the date and the
designation before filing the license with the Tennessee Department of Health.
Mr. Aghili did not sign this marriage license.
2
An Islamic blessing is a formalized ceremony intended to hold out a couple as being
married.
3
An imam is an Islamic religious leader, equivalent to a priest or rabbi. See In re
Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871, 871-72 (Ct. App. 1988).
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Mr. Aghili filed suit on May 4, 1995, seeking a divorce or an annulment,
and Ms. Saadatnejadi counterclaimed for divorce. Mr. Aghili voluntarily
dismissed his complaint and responded to Ms. Saadatnejadi’s counterclaim by
asserting that she was attempting to obtain a divorce through fraud and
misrepresentation. Later, Mr. Aghili moved for a summary judgment asserting
that the marriage was invalid because Mr. Tarahian was not qualified to solemnize
marriages and because the marriage license had not been returned to the
Rutherford County Clerk within three days following the December 17, 1994
ceremony. The trial court apparently agreed with Mr. Aghili on both grounds and,
on January 23, 1996, entered an order finding that the parties’ marriage was void
ab initio and, therefore, that Ms. Saadatnejadi’s complaint for divorce should be
dismissed as moot.
II.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment. Accordingly, our task is to
review the record to determine whether the requirements for granting a summary
judgment have been met. Payne v. Breuer, 891 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tenn. 1994);
Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991). As
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 makes clear, a summary judgment is appropriate only when
there exists no material factual dispute concerning the claim or defense asserted
in the motion, Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993), and when the
moving party is entitled to a judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Anderson
v. Standard Register Co., 857 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tenn. 1993).
Decisions to grant a summary judgment do not enjoy a presumption of
correctness on appeal. Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). A
reviewing court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 613 (Tenn.
1994), and must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.
Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tenn. 1994). A summary judgment
should be affirmed only if the undisputed facts and conclusions reasonably drawn
from the facts support the conclusion that the moving party is entitled to judgment
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as a matter of law. McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995); Carvell
v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d at 26.
III.
The summary judgment in this case rests on two grounds. First, the trial
court determined that the parties’ marriage was void ab initio because Mr.
Tarahian was not authorized to solemnize marriages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-3-301 (1996).4 Second, the trial court concluded that the marriage was void
because the marriage license was not filed within three days following the
ceremony as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-303 (1996). We have
determined that Mr. Aghili was not entitled to a summary judgment on either
ground.
A.
THE SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE
Mr. Aghili asserts that Mr. Tarahian is not qualified to solemnize marriages
under Tennessee law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301(a) provides, in part, that “[a]ll
regular ministers of the gospel of every denomination, and Jewish rabbis, more
than eighteen (18) years of age, having the care of souls . . . may solemnize the
rite of matrimony.” Since the courts look to the tenets of the particular religion
to determine whether a particular person is a regular minister having care of souls,
Mr. Aghili has the burden of proving that Mr. Tarahian cannot administer Islamic
blessings under Islamic law.
Mr. Tarahian testified in his deposition that he was qualified to perform
Islamic blessings and that he had performed a number of these blessings. Mr.
Aghili submitted two affidavits to contradict Mr. Tarahian’s claims. In the first
affidavit, Mr. Aghili himself asserts that an Islamic “blessing is not recognized in
the State of Tennessee as a legal marriage.” This is, of course, a legal conclusion
4
The final order refers to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-101 (1996), rather than Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-3-301. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-101 defines the prohibited degrees of relationship
between parties which is not at issue in this case. Thus, it seems clear that the reference to Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-3-101 is a typographical error and that the trial court intended to base its
decision on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301.
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that Mr. Aghili is not qualified to make. Thus, Mr. Aghili’s opinion did not meet
the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.05 and should not have been considered.
In the second affidavit, Mr. Aghili’s attorney simply attaches two letters
purporting to demonstrate that Mr. Tarahian was not recognized as an imam in
Nashville’s Persian community. This affidavit likewise does not satisfy the
requirements in Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.05. The letters are inadmissible hearsay and
contain opinions that are not relevant to Mr. Tarahian’s qualifications to
solemnize marriages under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-301.
In response to these affidavits, Ms. Saadatnejadi filed the affidavit of a
professor of religion at Boston University who is an expert in Islamic Studies.
The professor explained:
In contrast to Western religious teaching and practice
(particularly in Christianity, both Catholic and
Protestant, but also to some extent Judaism) Islam from
its inception to the present has consistently rejected the
distinction between clergy and laity. Islamic law
stipulates quite precisely that anyone with the requisite
knowledge of Islamic law is competent to perform
religious ceremonies, including marriage. One is not
required to have an official position in a religious
institution such as a mosque (masjid) in order to be
qualified to perform such ceremonies.
I understand that Mr. Tarahian who performed
the marriage ceremony in question is not the official
imam of the local mosque, though he does from time to
time carry out the duties ordinarily performed by an
imam. From the vantage point of Islamic jurisprudence,
the question of his right to bear the title imam is
irrelevant. His competence before Islamic law to
perform Muslim ceremonies is determined solely by his
knowledge of that legal corpus. It is quite clear that Mr.
Tarahian does possess such knowledge and that he is
recognized by members of the Muslim community as
possession [sic] the competence to perform religious
(and civil) ceremonies.
Viewing the competent proof in the light most favorable to Ms. Saadatnejadi, it
is undisputed that Mr. Tarahian possessed the authority to administer Islamic
blessings. At the most, the record contains a material factual dispute on this issue.
In either case, the trial court erred when it granted a summary judgment to Mr.
Aghili on this ground.
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B.
THE FILING OF THE MARRIAGE LICENSE
Mr. Aghili also asserts that the marriage is void because the marriage
license was not filed within three days after the December 17, 1994 ceremony.
This fact is undisputed because all parties agree that the second marriage license
was not filed in the Rutherford County Clerk’s office until February 8, 1995.
Thus, in order for Mr. Aghili to prevail on this ground, he must demonstrate that
the late filing of a marriage license invalidates a marriage as a matter of law. This
he cannot do.
The failure of an officiant to return the marriage license to the issuing clerk
within three days after the ceremony does not invalidate the marriage. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-3-306 (1996). Thus, if Mr. Tarahian could solemnize marriages
under Tennessee law, his failure to return the completed marriage license within
the time required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-303 does not undermine the validity
of the marriage.
The purpose of the filing requirement in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-303 is to
assure the preservation of a reliable, accurate record of a marriage. The filing of
the second marriage license on February 8, 1995 satisfies this requirement as long
as it contains the information required by law. The license filed on February 8,
1995 appears to be appropriate on its face. It is signed by the officiant as required
by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-103(c)(1) (1996),5 and it contains the information
required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-104(a) (1996). Despite Mr. Aghili’s
assertions that the February 8, 1995 license was invalid, the record contains no
competent evidence that the license was inadequate or that it was rejected by
either the clerk or the Department of Health.
IV.
5
The statutes governing marriage licenses do not require either the bride’s or the groom’s
signature on the marriage license.
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Tennessee protects the institution of marriage by presuming that regularly
solemnized marriages are valid. Cole v. Parton, 172 Tenn. 8, 11-12, 108 S.W.2d
884, 885 (1937). Thus, persons challenging a marriage must provide cogent and
convincing evidence that the marriage is invalid. Huey Bros. Lumber Co. v.
Anderson, 519 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1975); Moody v. T.H. Hays & Sons, Inc.,
189 Tenn. 666, 675, 227 S.W.2d 20, 24 (1950). Mr. Aghili has not carried his
burden and, therefore, was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law that his
marriage to Ms. Saadatnejadi was void ab initio.
We reverse the final judgment and remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also tax the costs of this
appeal to Hossein Aghili for which execution, if necessary, may issue.
____________________________
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
CONCUR:
________________________________
SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
________________________________
BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
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