Bates v. State

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE FILED
SEPTEMBER 1996 SESSION
June 20, 1997

WAYNE LEE BATES, * Cecil W. Crowson
* C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9603-CC-00102 Clerk
Appellate Court
Appellant, *
* COFFEE COUNTY
VS. *
* Hon. Gerald L. Ewell, Judge
STATE OF TENNESSEE, *
* (Post-Conviction)
Appellee. *

For Appellant: For Appellee:

William M. Leach, Jr. Charles W. Burson
Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis Attorney General and Reporter
Nashville City Center 450 James Robertson Parkway
511 Union Street, Suite 2100 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Nashville, TN 37219-1760
John P. Cauley
Paul J. Morrow, Jr. Assistant Attorney General
Attorney at Law 450 James Robertson Parkway
1505 Compton Avenue Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Nashville, TN 37210
(at post-conviction hearing only) Glenn R. Pruden
Assistant Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, TN 37243-0493
(at post-conviction hearing only)

Charles M. Layne
District Attorney General
307 S. Woodland
P.O. Box 147
Manchester, TN 37355

Kenneth W. Shelton, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney General
P.O. Box 147
Manchester, TN 37355

OPINION FILED:______________________

AFFIRMED

GARY R. WADE, JUDGE
OPINION

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 The petitioner, Wayne Lee Bates, appeals the trial court’s denial of

post-conviction relief on a conviction of first degree murder. His sentence was death

by electrocution. The petitioner presents the following issues for our review:

(1) whether his guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered;

(2) whether he received the effective assistance of
counsel; and

(3) whether the polygraph examination of Marvin
Littleton qualifies as Brady material. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

On June 4, 1986, the petitioner was arrested in Allen County,

Kentucky, after having stolen an automobile in Nashville, Tennessee. He was

transferred to the Allen County Jail in Scottsville, Kentucky, where he was charged

with other offenses. On July 20 of the same year, while the petitioner was attending

a church service at the courthouse, he escaped from custody and traveled by

various means to Franklin, Kentucky. In Franklin, he broke into a residence and

stole, among other things, clothing and a .410-gauge shotgun. The petitioner sawed

off the barrel and the stock of the shotgun. He then traveled to Manchester,

Tennessee, arriving in the early morning hours of July 23.

Meanwhile, Julia Guida, an engineer with Hercules Corporation in Salt

Lake City, Utah, flew to Nashville on a business trip, rented a 1986 Mercury from a

Hertz rental agency, and drove to Manchester where she checked into a Holiday

Inn. On the morning of July 23, she went jogging, carrying a Walkman radio with

headphones and her motel and car keys. The petitioner, while pointing the shotgun,

2
approached her. After a struggle, the petitioner forced the victim across an open

field into a wooded area and tied her to a small tree. He used the shoestrings from

her jogging shoes and the headphone cord from the Walkman radio to bind her and

gagged her with her socks. After assuring her that he was leaving to retrieve her

car, the petitioner shot the victim in the back of the head, killing her instantly. The

petitioner then untied the victim and covered her body with tree limbs and branches.

He buried the Walkman radio at one location and the stock of the sawed-off shotgun

at another. Before leaving the scene, he scattered other items, including her tennis

shoes, her socks, and his shotgun shells and suitcase.

Afterwards, the petitioner went to the victim’s room at the Holiday Inn,

showered, shaved, ate some fruit, and took a nap. At approximately 2:00 that

afternoon, the petitioner found the victim’s rental car and some traveler’s checks

and drove to Bristol by way of Chattanooga and Knoxville. He picked up two

hitchhikers, Francine Kelman and Marvin Littleton, along I-81 in Bristol. Kelman

forged and passed some of the traveler’s checks at various places en route to

Baltimore, Maryland. The three arrived at their destination on the morning of July 24

and rented a room in a downtown motel.

During the early morning hours of July 26, the petitioner, who had

become intoxicated while partying with friends and relatives, was stopped by a

Baltimore police officer. When the petitioner, driving the stolen vehicle, attempted to

drive away, the officer pursued. The petitioner wrecked the car and then attempted

to flee on foot; he was eventually caught, arrested for DUI, and charged with leaving

the scene. The car was impounded.

3
 The petitioner was interviewed on August 20 by FBI agents for

interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle and the possible kidnapping of the

victim. When the petitioner told agents that he needed a lawyer, the interrogation

ceased. No attorney was provided over the next thirteen days.

The investigation of the victim’s disappearance led Tennessee

authorities to Maryland. On September 2, Tennessee authorities arrived in

Baltimore to investigate the kidnapping and possible murder of the victim. Although

they were informed by the FBI of his request for an attorney, the Tennessee

authorities advised the petitioner of his rights, which he acknowledged, and sought a

statement. The petitioner was not given a written waiver to sign. After learning in a

telephone conversation that his brother had no interest in visiting him at the jail, the

petitioner confessed to the murder and drew a map to the location of the body. The

skeletal remains of the victim were found the next day. The Walkman radio, her

tennis shoes, two shotgun shells, and a .410 shotgun were found nearby.

A second statement was given to the FBI on September 11. Although

the petitioner still had no attorney, he gave a statement identical to his earlier

admissions. After the petitioner was transported to Tennessee, he confessed to the

murder to a fellow inmate in the Coffee County Jail.

The defendant pled guilty to first degree murder and grand larceny.

During the penalty phase of the trial, the state introduced proof of a 1977 conviction

for robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, a 1982 conviction for assault and

battery upon a Department of Correction employee, and a 1980 conviction for felony

escape. Helen Bates, the petitioner’s mother, testified that her son was born

prematurely in 1958 and was the oldest of her four children. She claimed that the

4
petitioner was not fully developed in his left lung or his bowels at the time of his

birth. She described how the petitioner, until age ten or eleven, would rock back

and forth as hard as he could whenever he was put to bed. She recalled that the

petitioner usually had worn himself out by the time he went to sleep. She

remembered that the petitioner seemed to resent a younger brother, twenty-two

months younger, with whom he would constantly fight.

Ms. Bates recalled that when the petitioner was three years old, his

father retired from the Navy and the family moved to Lemont, Illinois. The petitioner

continued to be a problem and did not get along with other neighborhood children.

The neighbors would not let the petitioner come near their children. During this

period, the petitioner’s father physically abused his mother in front of their children

on a regular basis. She remembered that on one occasion, when she threatened to

leave, the petitioner’s father secluded himself with the petitioner’s sister, still an

infant, and played Russian roulette.

Ms. Bates testified that the petitioner was in the home when she shot

his father four times; afterward, his father spent six to eight weeks in the hospital in

recovery. She claimed that later, he committed suicide by an overdose of

medication. Ms. Bates recalled trying to kill herself with sleeping pills; she was

hospitalized for six weeks. During that time, her children stayed with her mother in

Baltimore. She recalled that the petitioner’s behavior continued to worsen. After a

couple of years, the family moved to downtown Baltimore near the housing projects;

Ms. Bates claimed that it was because the petitioner was having trouble with the

neighbors. Ms. Bates acknowledged that during this period, she lived with a man

who had been convicted of armed robbery. She belonged to a motorcycle gang at

the time and other members of the group were in her home on a regular basis. She

5
testified that she got drunk just about every weekend and recalled that the man she

was residing with was often under the influence of drugs while in her home. Later,

she married another man who had also been convicted of armed robbery; he had

mental problems and frequently tried to kill himself. Eventually, this husband was

wounded by a police bullet in front of the house and was subsequently confined to a

mental hospital for seven months; she later divorced him. Ms. Bates testified that

while living in Baltimore, she moved her family six to seven times before petitioner

reached eighteen years of age.

Report cards established that the petitioner did not do well in school,

missed a lot of school, which Ms. Bates attributed to illness, and had problems

socially. In the third grade, the petitioner falsely set off a fire alarm and was

assigned a probation officer. He repeated third grade but was taken out of school

for burglarizing and vandalizing the school. By the age of nine, he was turned over

to juvenile authorities for evaluation. At eleven years of age, the petitioner was

committed to a juvenile institution and was in and out thereafter until he reached the

age of majority. Shortly thereafter, the petitioner began a term in prison that lasted

almost ten years.

Dr. John Griffin, a Nashville psychiatrist, also testified on behalf of the

petitioner at the sentencing hearing. He had reviewed numerous personal records

on the petitioner, met with him on three occasions, and had talked with him by

telephone. Dr. Griffin related to the jury the life history of the petitioner as

documented through treatment. He found that the petitioner’s early life included

depression and hyper-kinetic or minimal brain dysfunction. It was his opinion that as

the petitioner got older, he developed a mixed personality disorder. Dr. Griffin

testified that these three mental defects impaired the petitioner’s capacity to conform

6
his conduct to the law; he contended that the impairment was related to a mental

disease or defect.

The Tennessee Department of Mental Health determined that the

petitioner had mixed substance abuse and an anti-social personality disorder. Dr.

Griffin found that the petitioner had a mixed personality disorder which included anti-

social characteristics; he also found paranoia and significant depression. Dr. Griffin

testified that the petitioner’s mood changed frequently and that he cried, felt

hopeless at times, and had nightmares. The petitioner occasionally refused to sleep

and had an appetite disorder; a stab wound was a continuous source of pain. In Dr.

Griffin’s opinion, the petitioner had a very unusual background, highlighted by

neglect and violence over many years, including his time in prison. Although he

could not document neurologic impairment, Dr. Griffin testified that the petitioner

had subtle signs of brain damage.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the petitioner received the death

penalty. The jury found three aggravating circumstances: (1) that the petitioner had

been previously convicted of a felony involving violence; (2) that the petitioner

committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing his lawful arrest and

prosecution; and (3) that the murder was committed while the defendant was

engaged in committing robbery, larceny, or kidnapping. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-

2-203(i)(2), (6), (7) (repealed 1989).

Post-Conviction Hearing

On January 7, 1992, the petitioner filed this petition for post-conviction

relief. Eight months later, the petitioner filed a pro se letter requesting that his

attorney, Paul Morrow of the Capital Case Resource Center, be discharged and he

7
be allowed to represent himself. The petitioner also requested to dismiss his

petition and to schedule an execution date. On September 18, 1992, the petitioner

filed a pro se letter requesting that the first letter be disregarded. Five months later,

the petitioner sent a letter to the assistant district attorney indicating that he had

been "conned" by his attorneys into withdrawing his request for execution and

wanted to dismiss his case. On August 31, 1993, the petitioner filed a pro se

motion requesting that his counsel be relieved of their duties and that his post-

conviction petition be withdrawn; six weeks later, he filed another pro se motion to

dismiss his post-conviction petition. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court

dismissed counsel, dismissed the petitioner’s post-conviction petition, and set an

execution date.

An appeal by his counsel to the supreme court resulted in the

appointment of William M. Leach, Jr., as attorney ad litem. His primary obligation

was to determine whether the petitioner was competent to dismiss his attorney.

After the matter was briefed and argued, our supreme court remanded the matter for

a hearing on whether the petitioner was competent to discharge his attorney. In

early 1994, an agreed order was filed reinstating the post-conviction petition and

appointing Attorney Leach as counsel.

At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Pamela Auble, a psychologist with a

speciality in clinical psychology and neuropsychology, testified that she had

reviewed an extensive list of the petitioner’s medical, criminal, and juvenile records,

the psychiatric records of his mother, and the trial testimony of Dr. Griffin and Dr.

Marshall. She described neuropsychology as involving the evaluation of a patient to

determine whether brain damage or dysfunction may be present and how that

affects the individual. Dr. Auble interviewed the petitioner and administered several

8
neuropsychological tests designed to examine the mental functioning of the

petitioner. Because she found that the records include numerous references to the

possibility of impairment, Dr. Auble testified that neurological testing should have

been done before trial. She found evidence of brain dysfunction in several different

areas.

Dr. Auble testified that the petitioner had difficulty reasoning and

switching between different ideas when confronted with unfamiliar and complex

situations. She also found that the petitioner had trouble picking out important

details and that his performance was impaired in those situations. It was her

opinion that the petitioner’s condition limited his range of options under the

circumstances of the murder. She believed that the petitioner was impaired in terms

of speed and dexterity in his left hand, which is controlled by the right front part of

his brain; she explained that this part of the brain is also associated with the ability

to exercise emotional control and to understand other people. Dr. Auble testified

that the dysfunctional left hand indicated such limitations. It was her view that the

petitioner had the emotional controls of a two-year-old.

Dr. Auble testified that the petitioner had a diminished capacity at the

time of the murder because of sleep deprivation, his inability to control his emotions,

and his chronic pain due to an old stab wound to his back; if petitioner had

consumed intoxicants, that would have qualified as further impairment. Dr. Auble

described the petitioner’s brain damage as having been caused by his premature

birth or his mother’s alcohol consumption during pregnancy. She found evidence of

inadequate development of some of his organ systems and possible inadequacies

in brain development. Dr. Auble stated that records indicated that the petitioner

suffered a variety of head injuries and had a chaotic home life; she believed that

9
extended periods of segregation while in prison also might have had a negative

effect on the petitioner’s ability to relate to others. From all of this, Dr. Auble

concluded that the petitioner lacked the ability to conform his actions. She

described his degree of emotional control as limited to nonexistent.

Dr. Theodore H. Blau, a clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist

from Tampa, Florida, testified for the state. He reviewed the petitioner’s records and

examinations, conducted a partial examination on the petitioner, and relied upon

neuropsychological tests administered by Dr. Auble. Dr. Blau reached four major

conclusions: first, he found no evidence that the petitioner was either insane or

incompetent to stand trial; second, he found no indication that the petitioner was

under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distress at the time of the

murder; third, he found no indication that the petitioner had been substantially

impaired as a result of either mental disease, defects, or intoxication; and fourth, he

determined that at the time of his examination on April 27, 1995, there was no

indication that the petitioner was unable to participate in the post-conviction

proceeding.

Dr. Blau compared the petitioner’s various test scores with normative

data on incarcerated male felons between the ages of thirty to thirty-nine. He

determined that the petitioner’s intelligence was average in comparison. He also

found that the petitioner had the ability to separate essential from nonessential detail

and could understand and empathize with others.

The petitioner was represented at trial by Roger J. Bean of

Manchester, Tennessee, and Robert S. Peters of Tullahoma, Tennessee. Attorney

Bean, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner at the post-conviction hearing,

10
testified that he was in charge of gathering the petitioner’s records and that Attorney

Peters was to maintain the records and prepare Dr. Griffin’s testimony. Attorney

Bean acknowledged that some of the petitioner’s records would be damaging if

revealed to a jury and that counsel relied upon Dr. Griffin to gather the important

facts necessary to substantiate his opinion of the petitioner.

Attorney Bean recalled discussing with the petitioner on several

occasions the possibility of entering a guilty plea. When a motion to suppress the

confessions was overruled, he recalled telling the petitioner that he felt a guilty plea

was in the petitioner’s best interest. Attorney Bean had no recollection of telling

petitioner that he could prevent the confessions from being introduced during the

sentencing phase of the trial. He also testified to advising the petitioner that counsel

would attempt to preserve the suppression issue for appellate review. He recalled

that the petitioner was reluctant to plead guilty at first, but agreed to do so based

primarily on counsel’s recommendation.

Attorney Bean also testified that counsel recommended the guilty plea

in an effort to minimize the evidence against petitioner and, in an effort to save his

life, to focus on the mitigating circumstances. The petitioner discussed this option

with his attorneys on many occasions. Attorney Bean, conceding his belief that the

defense had the burden of proving the mitigating circumstances, testified that their

guilty plea strategy was their best chance to avoid the death penalty.

Attorney Bean, who acknowledged that the petitioner wavered on

whether to testify, recommended that he not do so. During a recess in the trial, the

issue was discussed at length in a holding cell before the final decision was made.

At that point, the petitioner agreed that it was not in his best interest to testify.

11
Attorney Bean testified that he feared the petitioner, if called to testify, could not

control his temper. He also believed that the state would cross-examine the

petitioner about events during his prior incarceration, which was potentially

dangerous.

The district attorney had maintained an "open file" policy prior to trial.

For that reason, Attorney Bean did not request Jencks material after each witness.

He did recall receiving a copy of the FBI interview sheet on Littleton and Kelman

(the hitchhikers); he did not, however, remember receiving any information on

Littleton’s polygraph examination. Attorney Bean testified that he had no indication

from any source that Kelman or Littleton were involved in the murder. He recalled

his failure to object to the introduction of a prior conviction as a mistake but noted

that the issue was unsuccessfully raised on appeal.

Attorney Peters, called as a state witness, testified that he had met

with the petitioner on many occasions. He remembered several conversations with

the petitioner about the possibility of a guilty plea. He claimed counsel performed a

careful background check which included a trip to West Virginia, to see the

petitioner’s mother, and to Maryland, where he toured the maximum security

penitentiary in Baltimore. Peters testified that he and Attorney Bean also talked to

relatives and acquaintances of the petitioner. It was Attorney Peters’s conclusion

that a first degree murder conviction was inevitable. He believed that the guilty plea

preserved credibility and maximized the opportunity to voir dire potential jurors.

Attorney Peters confirmed that the petitioner participated in the

development of trial strategy, fully cooperated with the investigation, and made no

objections to their course of action. He acknowledged that the petitioner was fully

12
aware of the ramifications of his guilty plea. Attorney Peters specifically

remembered the petitioner saying that he understood the consequences of the plea;

he believed that the decision to plead guilty was independent of any issues

surrounding the admissibility of the confession.

Attorney Peters testified that he never represented to the petitioner

that the confession would not be evidence at the sentencing hearing. He wanted to

enter the guilty plea and reserve the confession issue as a basis for appeal in the

event the jury returned a death verdict. Attorney Peters conceded that it was

arguable as to whether counsel would be successful in preserving appellate review,

but thought it was worth the risk. Attorney Peters testified that he explained to the

petitioner that the plea would bar his right to appeal the issue of guilt. He described

the agreed strategy to be that if the motion to suppress would be overruled, the case

would proceed to the penalty phase; if the death penalty were imposed, the defense

would appeal on the suppression issue.

Attorney Peters testified that even if the prosecution had not agreed to

reserve the suppression issue, the defense would have gone ahead with the guilty

plea despite the fact that the trial court had initially expressed reservations about the

admissibility of the confession. Attorney Peters conceded that there was confusion

at the time the guilty plea was entered. He testified that he may have caused the

confusion by his attempt to reserve the suppression issue for appellate review.

Attorney Peters also recalled that the petitioner never expressed a desire to testify.

He thought his testimony would be harmful to the defense.

Attorney Peters testified that he could not remember why all of the

petitioner’s prior records were not offered as evidence at trial. He was uncertain

13
whether it was an oversight or whether the matters had been fully presented through

other testimony. Attorney Peters acknowledged that the petitioner had an

abnormality which could possibly have been a type of brain syndrome. He

conceded that more access to an expert might have been helpful. He described as

the main problem a lack of resources for a more complete background summary

and physiological makeup report. Attorney Peters acknowledged that the defense

did not object to some demeaning comments by the prosecutor. He explained that

their strategy was to establish rapport with the jury by lodging objections only to

clearly impermissible commentary.

The petitioner testified that Attorney Peters told him that a guilty plea

would preclude the state from introducing the confession as evidence during the

penalty phase. The petitioner conceded that he told counsel, "Whatever you guys

want to do is all right with me. You guys are running the show." He recalled signing

a plea agreement which purportedly reserved the right to appeal the confession.

The petitioner remembered that there was an argument about the plea agreement

document and that it was changed, but that he did not understand what had been

done. He denied signing a revised agreement.

The petitioner claimed that he was unaware that a guilty plea was a

waiver of the confession issue. His recollection was that his attorneys believed that

the penalty phase would be limited to only the mitigating and aggravating

circumstances; had he known otherwise, he would not have pled guilty. The

petitioner claimed that he pled guilty based on the strategy and advice of counsel.

While recognizing that his defense counsel advised him not to testify because they

feared he would get angry, the petitioner also claimed that he wanted to testify at

trial. He testified that Attorney Bean appeared to be intimidated by his presence.

14
He acknowledged that he had pled guilty once before in Maryland; the petitioner

contended that he was coerced into that guilty plea because prison officials took him

off his medications two weeks before trial.

Ross Alderman, Deputy Public Defender for Davidson County, testified

on behalf of the petitioner as a legal expert. It was his opinion that defense counsel

was ineffective based on the cumulative nature of their errors. First, Attorney

Alderman testified that counsel should never have expressed their belief to the trial

judge that the suppression motion would be denied. Secondly, he testified that he

did not believe the law allowed for a guilty plea and the preservation of the

confession issue as to the guilt phase of the trial. Thirdly, he asserted that the

transcript indicated much confusion surrounding the suppression issue. Attorney

Alderman also testified that the defense got no tactical advantage by the guilty plea.

Furthermore, it was his belief that defense counsel misunderstood the

burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances. Attorney Alderman contended that

the defense should have objected to the district attorney’s allegation of lack of

remorse because it was irrelevant and might have qualified as a comment upon his

right not to testify. He also believed that the petitioner’s prior records supporting Dr.

Griffin’s conclusions should have been introduced into evidence. He contended that

the records revealed possible witnesses who could have discussed specific

instances regarding the petitioner’s development at various stages of his life.

Attorney Alderman testified that it was also a mistake to stipulate the petitioner’s

prior convictions and asserted that the petitioner should have been allowed to

testify; it was his opinion that a jury was less likely to execute when they knew as

much as possible about his life circumstances.

I

15
 The petitioner argues that his plea was neither knowingly nor

voluntarily made because neither the trial court nor his trial counsel explained the

consequences that a guilty plea would have on his ability to appeal the admissibility

of his prior confessions at the sentencing stage of the trial. He claims that, in

consequence, he did not fully understand what he was giving up by pleading guilty.

More specifically, the petitioner submits that he would not have pled guilty if he had

known that his prior confessions would be entered into evidence in the penalty

phase. He complains that he was further confused when there was a change in the

proposed plea agreement, and that neither his counsel nor the trial court explained

this change.

In response, the state submits that the evidence clearly shows that

every precaution was taken to ensure the petitioner understood the consequences

of his plea. The state also points out that the petitioner did in fact obtain appellate

review on the admissibility of the confession, not only as to the sentencing portion of

the proceeding but also had there been a guilt phase of the trial.

In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United States

Supreme Court established that the admonition of certain rights are required by the

Constitution. Included among these entitlements are the right against

self-incrimination, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to a trial by jury. Id.

at 243. The relinquishment of those rights cannot be presumed from a silent record.

Id.; see State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337, 341-42 (Tenn.1977). Our supreme court

has established guidelines for the review of guilty pleas. State v. Neal, 810 S.W.2d

131 (Tenn.1991) overruled in part by Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn.

1993). While the overriding determination of the validity of the guilty plea rests upon

whether it was knowingly and voluntarily entered, proof of the failure to warn of a

16
recognized right shifts the burden of proof to the state. If the trial court substantially

complies with the litany of constitutional rights mandated, there is no error. In

Johnson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn.1992), our supreme court held as follows:

[I]f the transcript shows that the petitioner was aware of
his constitutional rights, he is not entitled to relief on the
ground that the mandated advice was not given. Also, if
all the proof presented at the post-conviction hearing,
including the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, shows
that the petitioner was aware of his constitutional rights,
he is not entitled to relief.

Id. at 926. In those instances of non-compliance, the error may be harmless when

the state meets its burden of showing that the pleas were knowing and voluntary.

The petitioner’s age, level of education, intelligence, experience, general

understanding of constitutional rights, desire to avoid a greater penalty, and

representation by competent counsel at the submission hearing are all factors which

might be appropriately taken into consideration. See Blankenship v. State, 858

S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Richard Lee Sheckles, No. 1 (Tenn. Crim.

App., at Jackson, November 21, 1990).

In Neal, the Tennessee Supreme Court articulated the difference

between "substantial compliance" and "harmless error" analysis as follows:

While we have alluded to review of Boykin
violations as being "subject to substantial compliance
and harmless error scrutiny" in State v. Frazier, [784
S.W.2d 927 (Tenn.1990)], we did not mean to adopt a
substantial compliance doctrine that would be anything
less than full compliance with the heretofore set out
requirements. While absolutely literal compliance with
the advice to be given is not required, expressing the
sense of the substance of the required advice to a
guilty-pleading defendant is. That would be substantial
compliance.

810 S.W.2d at 137. Substantial compliance is not error. Where there is substantial

compliance the root purpose of the prescribed litany has been served and the guilty

plea passes due process scrutiny because it was made voluntarily and

17
understandingly. In the context of patent omissions from the advice litany, the test

is whether the error was harmless. State v. Newsome, 778 S.W.2d 34, 38

(Tenn.1989).

In our view, the record supports the conclusion that the petitioner

knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights guaranteed under Boykin. Moreover, the

record supports the finding that the petitioner understood that he was waiving the

right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion as it related to the guilt-

innocence phase.

A review of the plea proceedings demonstrates this. On April 28,

1987, an in camera hearing was held. At the hearing, the following colloquy

occurred:

MR. RAMSEY: Mr. Peters, who is lead
counsel in this case as I
understand it, approached me
this morning and advised that
they had discussed the
possibility of entering a plea
of guilty to the indictment in
this case with their client, Mr.
Bates. They advised that is
what they were going to do,
subject to their right to appeal
a Rule 11 motion on the
confession issue--

THE COURT: --That may not be necessary,
but we will just have to wait
and see.

MR. RAMSEY: In further discussion, Mr.
Peters said what they
anticipated was the Court
would, as the record stands
now, overrule the Motion to
Suppress; and only if the
death penalty was imposed,
obviously, they would reserve
their right to a Rule 11 appeal
as the record stands now.

18
THE COURT: The record will show that I
have not ruled on the Motion
to Suppress.

MR. RAMSEY: The agreement is that the
Court overrule the Motion to
Suppress to get the record in
shape.

MR. PETERS: That’s correct, preserving our
right to appeal. We will only
appeal in the event that the
death penalty is imposed.

THE COURT: I have some very serious
reservations about the
admissibility of that .... Are
you saying that there will be
an agreement that the Court
will overrule it?

MR. RAMSEY: Yes, sir.

MR. PETERS: This creates a problem ....
We would have no problem
insofar as the guilt phase is
involved. I take it in this case
the Attorney General will likely
propose to introduce into
evidence the confessions at
the penalty phase. If the
Court’s ruling is such--this will
change matters. If the Court
rules in that way, then it is
likely, if our client does not
take the stand in the penalty
phase, those statements will
likewise be inadmissible in
that stage also, which would
alter the effect of the Court’s
ruling. Obviously, preserving
our objection to the
admissibility of those
statements in the guilt phase,
when we have already pled
guilty, could only inure to our
benefit; but it would inure to
our detriment if the Court so
ruled regarding the penalty
phase. Is that not correct?

THE COURT: I am reviewing the testimony
of the suppression hearing....
At this point, I have some

19
 very, very serious
reservations that any
statements made by Bates in
Baltimore are admissible,
after his announcement to the
FBI whereupon they
terminated the interview, and
six and a half hours of
interviewing by Wix and
Floied. The FBI said they told
Wix about it, and Wix admits
it, that Bates demanded an
attorney. It’s a problem,
gentlemen.

MR. PETERS: Your Honor, the point is,
obviously, we could only
agree that that would be
overruled in the event it would
involve the guilt phase.
Obviously, if the Court is
going to rule that way, we are
still going to enter a plea--

THE COURT: --I’m not saying in which way I
am going to rule. I am not at
the end of the testimony yet. I
am saying I have some very,
very serious problems with it.
The word I got this morning is
that you were going to enter a
plea.

MR. PETERS: That’s right.

THE COURT: I anticipated that you might
enter the plea and reserve the
right to raise the question of
the statements on appeal.

MR. PETERS: Right. If the death penalty
was imposed, we would raise
that issue. If the Attorney
General intends to introduce
these statements at the
penalty phase and the Court
ruled them inadmissible, they
would only become
admissible if our client took
the stand. Isn’t that correct?

THE COURT: You all have involved me in
something at this point that I

20
 do not want to be involved in
....

MR. RAMSEY: --I understand. I apologize to
the Court. I thought we had
an understanding.

THE COURT: We had a further hearing set
on the Motion to Suppress the
Statements and the
Videotape. As far as I am
concerned, we will recess this
matter. We will pursue that
when we get to it in open
court. Whatever happens will
happen. If you are going to
reserve a right to appeal the
question of the admissibility of
the statements, I want to have
some intelligent input into the
ruling. I think it is my
obligation to, and not to go
along with an agreement on it.

MR. PETERS: I understand. Obviously, if we
enter a plea of guilty, we won’t
have any guilt phase of the
trial. Therefore, the purpose
of reserving that objection
would be at that point.
However, the penalty phase
could involve some of the
same kind of evidence; and
we cannot make that
concession at that point.

THE COURT: I’m not involved in it. I do not
think I should be. At this
point, we will go ahead and
have the hearing. Whatever
you gentlemen decide to do, I
will address it as I should in
due course in open court.

MR. RAMSEY: I don’t want to belabor the
point, but the State cannot
control the decision the
defendant wants to make--

THE COURT: --Nor can the Court, and I
don’t intend to. I am
uncomfortable in this position
now. I don’t think I ought to
be involved in it. I am

21
 divorcing myself from it
entirely. If you gentlemen
want to talk and he comes up
with a plea, that’s fine. If you
want me to go ahead and rule
on the admissibility of the
statements, that’s fine. I will
do that. I will do whatever has
to be done in due course.
Have whatever dialogue you
want to about it between
yourselves, but I am not going
to involve myself in the plea
bargain process or in any
other aspect of it, except
taking a plea or making a
ruling.

MR. RAMSEY: Can we go one step further
and ask the indulgence of the
Court for advice? Assume
that a plea is entered. We
need to consider when it is to
be entered because of the
potential for pre-trial publicity
that might adversely affect the
jury venire. Assuming that a
plea is entered, how are we
going to handle that?

THE COURT: I really do not see that it
makes any difference whether
he pleads guilty now, or
tomorrow, or after we impanel
the jury. As far as I am
concerned, counsel may very
well want to tell the jury, in
voir diring them, "Folks, you
are not going to have to be
concerned with guilt or
innocence. You are only
going to be considering the
penalty." I don’t see that it
matters whether we take the
plea now or closer to the trial
or whatever. I dare say that
defense counsel will be voir
diring the jury on that and
might say,"This man has
entered a guilty plea."
Whether they know it from
them or the newspapers, what
difference does it make?
That’s for them to decide.

22
 MR. PETERS: The only problem I had with it
was the prejudicial effect.

THE COURT: If you think it will have a
prejudicial effect, you all can
work it out if you want to in
any way that suits you.
Again, I don’t think I should
have any input into this
matter.

Three days after their in camera discussion, the trial court overruled

the motion to suppress. Four days after the ruling, the petitioner changed his plea

to guilty. Attorney Peters announced that the defense intended to reserve the right

to appeal the denial of the suppression motion even though he acknowledged that

the issue was not dispositive of the case. When the trial court inquired as to the

rationale, the following exchange occurred:

MR. PETERS: There are two reasons. The
Attorney General is going to
introduce this confession at
the sentencing phase. We
want to make clear by our
plea of guilty that we are not
waiving our objection; and
obviously, we would have an
automatic appeal. That
confession, although not
necessarily dispositive, can
have a materially adverse
effect in the jury’s decision of
whether or not to impose the
death penalty.

THE COURT: You are referring to the
sentencing phase?

MR. PETERS: Yes, sir. If this is not
adjudicated, my client would
be highly prejudiced if we did
not enter this caveat in the
record.

THE COURT: Mr. Bean, do you concur in
this motion?

MR. BEAN: Yes, Your Honor.

23
THE COURT: Tell me on the record how
much time you have spent
with your client discussing this
aspect and what you have
told him in relation to a plea of
guilty to murder in the first
degree, and the explanation
you have given him
concerning the constitutional
rights that he has and waives
by entering such a plea, and
the elements of the offense,
and the punishment possible.

MR. PETERS: This conference has been
going on for some period of
time. It was not a sudden
decision. It has taken place
over a period of time. I
believe Mr. Bean understands
the chronology better than I
do. It is not the result of just
one discussion; it is the result
of numerous discussions.

THE COURT: You indicated to me last week
that prior to that time, which
was on the record in camera,
that the matter had been
discussed with Mr. Bates at
that time.

MR. PETERS: That’s correct. I will defer to
Mr. Bean. We have been
present together, and he
[was] alone with Mr. Bates on
one or more than one
occasion when this has been
discussed. It has been
discussed on several
occasions. It was most
recently discussed at some
length last night.

MR. BEAN: Of course, we have conferred
with Mr. Bates on numerous
occasions prior to our trip to
Baltimore. After our trip to
Baltimore, we spent a
considerable amount of time
in this case interviewing
witnesses. I talked with Mr.
Bates alone and told him that
we might at some point want

24
to recommend that he change
his plea ... and that we felt
that might be the best way to
save his life .... We did not
discuss it in detail at that time,
and I just asked Mr. Bates to
be thinking about that. On the
next occasion we met, Mr.
Peters was present; and the
psychiatrist, Dr. Griffin from
Nashville, was also present.
At that time, we discussed
with Mr. Bates at considerable
length the pros and cons of a
change of plea. Of course,
Mr. Bates had previously
been advised of all the
elements of the offense. He
had previously been advised
of the range of punishment.
He was again advised of the
range of punishment and was
told that if he pleads guilty to
first degree murder, the only
alternatives that the jury
would have at the sentencing
phase are life imprisonment
or death in the electric chair.
Mr. Bates acknowledged that
he understood this. After
some discussion regarding
the pros and cons, Mr. Bates
advised us that it [was] his
decision ... to enter a plea.
This all took place prior to the
conference you have
referenced in your chambers.
After that conference in
chambers, the Court indicated
that it had problems with the
admissibility of the
confession. We, at that time,
went back to Mr. Bates and
told him we thought it was
premature at that time to
make this decision. Quite
frankly, we had felt prior to
that time that the Court would
overrule our motion. We felt it
was a good motion and still
feel that it is, and we have so
advised Mr. Bates. We went
back and talked to Mr. Bates,
advising him that we thought it

25
 was premature at that time to
make a decision pending the
Court’s ruling on the
suppression motion. After the
Court ruled on the
suppression motion, we again
went and talked to Mr. Bates.
That was last night. We spent
a considerable amount of time
in the Coffee County Jail,
talking with Mr. Bates and
advising him. It is still his
decision, based upon our
recommendation, to enter this
plea.

(Emphasis added).

At that point, the trial court addressed the petitioner in open court to

insure that the petitioner understood his rights and that his plea was voluntary. The

petitioner acknowledged that his decision to plead guilty was his, voluntarily and

freely. The trial court then accepted the plea. The state read the statement of facts

into the record. The trial court asked the petitioner whether the stipulations were

true, to which the petitioner answered that "[m]ost of it was right."

Thereafter, the following colloquy took place:

THE COURT: Gentlemen, there is
something in this order that I
did not understand when the
preliminary discussion took
place. It says, by entering this
plea of guilty, the defendant
does not waive his objection
to or his right to appeal the
order overruling the motion to
suppress the confessions ....
It was my understanding that
as far as the guilt or
innocence portion is
concerned, that was put to
rest by this plea agreement.
If you desired an appeal ...
[of] the order of May 1st, that

26
 would relate to the issue of
punishment.

MR. PETERS: Under the law, we have a
right to not waive our
objection.

THE COURT: Well, I have a right not to
accept the guilty plea under
circumstances that I deem
appropriate.

MR. PETERS: The only time this would be
required is if it were certified
and dispositive of the issue.

THE COURT: No, sir. I have a right to
accept or reject a plea at any
time. I did not understand on
the preliminary discussion that
this issue was retained as to
the guilt or innocence phase
of this trial ....

MR. PETERS: --It is not retained, ... as to the
guilt or innocence phase. It is
retained insofar as they are
going to introduce this later.
We cannot wait. I don’t see
any other way that we could
word that.

THE COURT: Mr. Attorney General, do you
have any input into this?

MR. RAMSEY: ...Maybe it could be added to
the order, "would not waive
objection to the confession at
the penalty phase."

THE COURT: I do not know if that would suit
them or not. Is guilt a
contested issue in this case?

MR. PETERS: Guilt is not a contested issue.

THE COURT: The wording of this sentence
here troubles me. I will let
you all talk about it if you want
to, but this does not comport
with my understanding of
what was conveyed to me
prior to the entry of this plea.
I was of the impression that

27
 the matter of guilt or
innocence was put to rest and
that there would be no appeal
on any issue as to the guilt
phase of the trial, and that
you were merely reserving
and preserving the right to
appeal the issue of the
confession order of May 1,
1987, if and when it was
introduced in the penalty
phase. I notice that Mr.
Ramsey is nodding in the
affirmative. Is that your
understanding of it, Mr.
Ramsey?

MR. RAMSEY: Yes, Your Honor.

***

MR. PETERS: --Couldn’t we simply retype
that or note that? It is our
intention to enter a plea of
guilty without waiving our
objection, insofar as they are
going to attempt to introduce
this at the penalty phase. We
do not want them to indicate
that we have waived our
objection.

THE COURT: I would like for that to be
added in. I signed this
certification concerning my
warning him about his rights,
the plea of guilty, and so forth.
That certification is still true,
but I am not going to accept
this plea with the wording of
that last sentence in this plea
of guilty statement that has
been signed by the
defendant. I did not realize
that was in there, and that
was not my understanding.
Look at this and change it.

***

MR PETERS: We have agreed that these
confessions are not
dispositive. This is somewhat
peculiar because this is a

28
 bifurcated trial. It says that if
the issues presented for you
were not waived as a matter
of law by the plea of guilty--I
would assume that is the only
thing we reserve. That is
more or less automatic even if
it is not in there. If we appeal,
we can raise, as an
appealable issue, that we
didn’t waive it as a matter of
law, not as a matter of fact or
stipulation or agreement. I
want to make it clear that, by
entering this plea of guilty, we
are not waiving our right to
object to its admissibility or
appeal from that if they
introduce it at the penalty
phase.

THE COURT: This is purely and simply if it
is introduced at the penalty
phase?

***

THE COURT: The matter of guilt or innocence is
now and forever more put to rest; is
that correct?

MR. PETERS: No. Let me explain. It is to
the extent that the law allows.

THE COURT: The annotations of that
portion of the rule say that
matters are not waived as a
matter of law such as the right
to counsel, conviction under
an invalid statute, and things
of that nature. I really have
some doubt that there is any
problem with this, but the
wording seems to make an
exception above and beyond
what the rule says. I didn’t
understand it that way, and
the Attorney General didn’t
understand it that way.

MR. PETERS: We can’t make an exception
under that section that is any
different from what that
section says, but we want to

29
 make it clear that we are not
waiving that. I think we have
reworded it to make it
abundantly clear that we are
going to preserve our
objection, as well as our
appeal on it if they introduce it
at the penalty phase.

THE COURT: Things that are not waived as
a matter of law are not
waived. I cannot change it,
and you cannot.

MR. BEAN: Whether that is in the order or
not, they are not waived.

THE COURT: That’s right, such as the
examples they give in the
annotation. I want to have a
clear understanding about it,
and I want to make sure I
understand and the Attorney
General understands what is
happening here. My thinking
was that the matter of that
order of May 1st, as it regards
guilt or innocence, is put to
rest. It is only pertinent and
appealable as it may relate to
the issue of punishment.

MR. PETERS: Unless we agree that it was
dispositive.

THE COURT: And you have said that it is
not dispositive.

MR. PETERS: That’s right.

THE COURT: You have said there was
ample evidence in the record
otherwise that makes it not
dispositive.

MR. PETERS: The General has indicated
that this is two trials, but it is
actually one trial. I want to
make it clear that they do not
introduce the confession and
say, "You have already
entered a plea of guilty." We
have a right to object to those
things.

30
THE COURT: I do not think he is saying
that. What do you say, Mr.
Attorney General?

MR. RAMSEY: No, Your Honor.

MR. PETERS: We have reworded it.
(Handing document to the
Court.)

THE COURT: This is what is proposed to be
entered at the end of this
order above signatures:

By entering a plea of guilty,
the defendant does not waive
his objection to, or his right to
appeal from, the order
overruling the motion to
suppress the confession
heretofore entered if
introduced at the penalty
phase of the trial and as it
relates to the penalty phase of
the trial.

I didn’t understand that if it is
introduced at the penalty
phase of the trial, it would
trigger the right to raise that
question as to guilt or
innocence.

MR. PETERS: Your Honor, the only way it
would do that is in respect to
those matters that were not
waived as a matter of law.

THE COURT: Is there any problem with it as
it is worded now, Mr. Attorney
General?

MR. RAMSEY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All that has been added is, "if
introduced at the penalty
phase of the trial" is that
correct?

MR. SHELTON: In essence. Mr. Peters, in his
handwritten proposal,
withdrew the actual rules
section.

31
 MR. PETERS: That should be introduced as
a substitute for that last
phrase.

***

THE COURT: Is it understood that the
matter of guilt or innocence is
now put to rest? Is that
correct, Mr. Peters?

MR. PETERS: Except to the extent of those
matters that, as a matter of
law, are not waived.

THE COURT: As to those matters, none of
us have control over that
anyway.

MR. PETERS: That’s correct.

THE COURT: Then I will accept the plea
under those circumstances.

After hearing testimony on this matter at the post-conviction hearing

from two medical experts, each of the trial defense attorneys and the petitioner and

his legal expert, the post-conviction court made the following findings of fact:

That the petitioner, Bates, did in fact knowingly
and intelligently enter his guilty plea, and that trial
counsel for the petitioner, attorneys Robert Peters and
Roger Bean, discussed, advised and consulted with
petitioner concerning entry of the guilty plea on
numerous occasions prior thereto; that the petitioner
upon informed advice of trial counsel accepted the
formulation of a trial strategy of entry of a guilty plea
without regard to the admissibility of previous confession
or confessions, and that petitioner was advised of and
concurred in the strategy that would attempt to reserve
the right to appeal the admissibility of the confession or
confessions notwithstanding a plea of guilty to the
Indictment if the confession or confessions were
introduced during the sentencing phase of the trial; that
petitioner was not advised that a guilty plea would
preclude the prosecution from offering into evidence prior
confessions; that the petitioner was in fact informed that
upon entry of a guilty plea he would thereafter forever
waive his right to appeal the issue of his guilt or
innocence; that trial counsel was aware that a guilty plea
would legally constitute a waiver of appeal as to the

32
 admissibility of the confession in the guilt or innocent
phase of any trial, but as a trial tactic attempted to
preserve such a right of appeal nevertheless; that the
assertions regarding a "plea agreement" document made
by petitioner are not founded in the record, and that the
trial record and the personal knowledge of the
undersigned establish that petitioner’s guilty plea was in
full compliance with all procedural rules, statutory
requirements and case law of the state of Tennessee
and the United States; that while the proceedings relative
to the confessions of petitioner may have been confusing
to him it appears in the record that they were
advantageous to him in that he obtained a review of
these issues on appeal which he probably would not
have otherwise obtained if the matter had been handled
in a different fashion; that based upon the record the
petitioner was capable of and did understand and
comprehend the guilty plea proceedings, and accordingly
the Court finds that the record fails to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the guilty plea was
not knowingly and voluntarily entered in any respect with
regard to pain medication and that the assertion of
petitioner that his medication was “manipulated” by the
State or the Sheriff is without basis in fact in this record.

This court is bound by the post-conviction court’s findings unless the

evidence preponderates otherwise. Butler v. State, 789 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tenn.

1990). This court may not reweigh or reevaluate the evidence or substitute its

inferences for those drawn by the post-conviction court. Moreover, questions

concerning the credibility of witnesses and weight and value to be given their

testimony are for resolution by the post-conviction court. Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d

752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

As indicated, this record demonstrates that the petitioner knowingly

and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty. Any conflicting testimony as to whether his

trial counsel fully advised the petitioner concerning the ramifications of his guilty

plea, especially regarding the suppression issue, was resolved by the post-

conviction court. The evidence simply does not preponderate against those

findings.

33
 II

When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of

ineffective assistance of counsel, he must first establish that the services rendered

or the advice given was below "the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases." Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). Second, he

must show that the deficiencies "actually had an adverse effect on the defense."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). Should the petitioner fail to

establish either factor, no relief is warranted. As to guilty pleas, the petitioner must

establish a reasonable probability that, but for the errors of his counsel, he would

not have entered the plea and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

On appeal, the findings of fact made by the trial court are conclusive

and will not be disturbed unless the evidence contained in the record preponderates

against them. Rhoden v. State, 816 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); Brooks

v. State, 756 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The burden is on the

petitioner to show that the evidence preponderated against those findings. Clenny

v. State, 576 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978).

Here, the petitioner claimed his trial counsel performed ineffectively in

several different ways. While the trial judge did not address each of the petitioner’s

claims, he did make the following ruling:

The Court finds that ... the assistance rendered to
petitioner was that as mandated by Baxter, supra, and
Strickland, supra ... not only has petitioner failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel and that such
ineffective assistance of counsel altered the outcome of
his trial, but to the contrary the undersigned finds and
holds that the preponderance of the evidence shows that
petitioner did in fact receive effective assistance of
counsel as contemplated by the above authorities.

34
 Initially, the petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to adequately

explain the effects of pleading guilty in relation to the motion to suppress. He

submits that his counsel represented that they would try to preserve his right to

appeal for both the sentencing hearing and the guilt-innocence stage. The

petitioner argues that his counsel encouraged the guilty plea without knowing

whether they could actually preserve the issue. Moreover, the petitioner asserts that

his counsel encouraged the guilty plea with the assumption that the motion to

suppress would be overruled when, in fact, the trial court had expressed serious

reservations about the admissibility of the confessions. The petitioner contends that

this deficiency in his counsel’s performances deprived him of his right not to

incriminate himself. U.S. Const. amend. V; Tenn. Const. art. I § 9.

In response, the state submits that the guilty plea was part of a sound

defense strategy. It contends that the deliberate waiver of appeal of an

unconstitutionally obtained confession does not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel if pursued for obvious tactical reasons.

Here, trial counsel acknowledged at the post-conviction hearing that

they were unsure whether they could actually preserve the suppression issue for

appeal if the petitioner pled guilty. Because our supreme court did consider the

issue on direct appeal, the strategy was sound, even though the merits of the

argument were rejected. Our high court ruled that "[the petitioner] did not waive his

objection to an order ... overruling a motion to suppress a confession, or his right to

appeal in the event the confession was introduced at the penalty phase of the

proceedings." State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tenn. 1991). The record

clearly shows that the petitioner understood that should the trial court admit his

35
confessions at the sentencing hearing, the petitioner would not be allowed to

withdraw his plea or otherwise contest his guilt.

Moreover, the petitioner has been unable to show how he was

prejudiced by any advice to plead guilty. Had the petitioner chosen a trial as to his

guilt or innocence, the introduction of the confessions would not have been

reversible error:

We have considered whether the error in
admission of defendant’s first confession into evidence
was reversible pursuant to the harmless error
requirement set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Viewing the
evidence as a whole, applying those standards, we are
satisfied that admission of defendant’s September 2nd
statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and
there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence
obtained contributed to his conviction. Most of the
evidence in the case, with the exception of his actual
admission to the homicide, was gathered by law
enforcement officers during the course of their
investigation of Ms. Guida’s disappearance. Beginning
with the first traveler’s check, which was cashed in
Abingdon, Virginia, defendant left a trail which led
unerringly to him, up to and including his arrest, when he
was found in possession of the vehicle she had leased
on her fateful mission to Tennessee. Moreover,
defendant made not two, but three statements. If we
were to find that both of the statements to authorities
were inadmissible ..., he would still have to overcome the
unsolicited admission made by him to Paul Carter while
both men were confined in the Coffee County Jail. This
statement ... included all of the essential elements of the
two admissions made to the authorities. Defendant’s
sentencing hearing, including the voir dire of the jury,
consumed approximately two weeks, during which the
jury members had the opportunity to observe him, his
mannerisms, actions and conduct in the courtroom. Our
review of the record leaves us with no reasonable doubt
that the jury would have reached the same verdict
without having heard the admission made by him which
we have held should have been excluded from the
record. They also had the opportunity to hear the
mitigating circumstances proffered by him in evidence at
the hearing. The defendant received a fair trial without
any constitutional entrenchment.

Id. at 876 (emphasis added).

36
 Next, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to obtain and introduce into evidence all of his medical and psychiatric

records. He asserts that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to offer the records

into evidence, rather than merely relying on the summaries provided by Dr. Griffin.

The petitioner claims that additional documents and witnesses would have

established for the jury his disadvantaged childhood, brain abnormalities, and his

lack of treatment.

In response, the state argues that trial counsel was effectively filtering

out damaging evidence about the petitioner through the testimony of Dr. Griffin. The

state claims that this method of presenting the evidence was a sound tactical

decision. In addition, the state contends that the petitioner failed to establish that

the results of his sentencing hearing would have been any different had prior

records been obtained by trial counsel and then displayed to the jury.

In death penalty cases, the jury may not be precluded from

considering any aspect of a defendant’s character or record as a basis for a

sentence less than death. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, ___, 113 S.Ct.

2658, 2665-66 (1993); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).

There is, however, no legal requirement that the accused must offer evidence at the

penalty phase of a capital trial. State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Tenn. 1989).

See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185 (1986). "A strategy of silence

may be adopted only after a reasonable investigation for mitigating evidence or a

reasonable decision that an investigation would be fruitless." Tafero v. Wainwright,

796 F.2d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 1986). An investigation so inadequate as to fail to

formulate an "accurate life profile" of the defendant may be the basis for post-

37
conviction relief. Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir. 1995). Yet the

extent of investigation required is largely dependent upon information supplied by

the defendant. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 795 (1987). See also Whitmore v.

Lockhart, 8 F.3d 614, 621 (8th Cir. 1993). The United States Supreme Court has

established the following standard:

[W]hen the facts that support a certain potential line of
defense are generally known to counsel because of what
the defendant has said, the need for further investigation
may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether.
And when a defendant has given counsel reason to
believe that pursuing certain investigations would be
fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue
those investigations may not later be challenged as
unreasonable.

Burger, 483 U.S. at 795 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691

(1984)).

It is not ineffective to offer no proof in the sentencing phase of a death

penalty trial when the mitigating evidence was already adequately presented to the

jury at the guilt-innocence stage or when the evidence was as potentially harmful as

helpful. Both of these circumstances presume an adequate background

investigation. Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 531 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). As

stated in Melson, "[c]ounsel are required to exert every reasonable effort on behalf

of a client both in the investigation and in the trial of a case." 772 S.W.2d at 421.

In Cooper, our court upheld the trial court’s finding of ineffective

assistance where trial counsel chose not to obtain the hospital records, commitment

documents, emergency evaluation documents, or school records explaining the

petitioner’s learning disabilities and problems. 847 S.W.2d at 530-31. Moreover,

trial counsel failed to seek witnesses from the petitioner’s community or past

employment who might corroborate pertinent background information. Id. at 531.

38
The court found "no record of the trial attorney making any independent

investigation of the petitioner’s background and history other than talking with the

petitioner’s mother and sister, whose information he did not pursue." Id.

Here, however, trial counsel did not act "in a factual void in an

unjustified manner." Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344, 1350 (5th Cir. 1984).

Although counsel did not uncover all of the medical and correctional records

pertaining to the petitioner and his family, there appears to have been a diligent

investigation. Background research included trips to West Virginia and Maryland.

The first nine exhibits introduced at the post-conviction hearing were the results of

their investigation. In our view, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that

the investigation of the petitioner’s history and background fell within the range of

competent representation. Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936.

It is sound strategy to introduce only those documents most helpful to

the defense. If the use of a live witness further protects the defense from damaging

evidence, trial counsel can hardly be faulted for that. At trial, a report card from

kindergarten, two report cards from second grade, two report cards from third grade,

and four photographs of the petitioner when he was a child were presented to the

jury. At the post-conviction hearing, Attorney Bean testified that he did not believe

that burdening the jury with volumes of other records would be an effective way to

present the defense. Consequently, there was a reliance upon Dr. Griffin to distill

the information in a way favorable to the petitioner. In our view, trial counsel cannot

be said to have been ineffective for failing to introduce these records as exhibits.

The strategy utilized fell within professional standards.

39
 Next, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to have neuropsychological testing for possible brain damage. The state maintains

that in light of Dr. Griffin’s medical testimony, additional neurologic testing would

have added little to the testimony at trial.

At the post-conviction hearing, the petitioner and the state presented

expert testimony as to possible neurological damage. Dr. Auble testified that

neuropsychological testing indicated that the petitioner lacked the ability to conform

his actions; this expert concluded that the emotional control exhibited by the

petitioner ranged from limited to nonexistent. On the other hand, Dr. Blau found no

indication that the petitioner was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional

disturbance when he killed the victim. Dr. Blau concluded that the petitioner had

never been substantially impaired as a result of either mental disease, defect, or

intoxication.

At the conclusion of the post-conviction hearing, the trial court "was

most impressed with Dr. Blau, his credentials and his testimony." As to areas of

disagreement between the experts, the trial court "accept[ed] the testimony of Dr.

Blau as the most credible, reasonable and realistic." Our scope of review as to the

accreditation of witnesses is limited. We must defer to the findings of the trial court.

Taylor v. State, 875 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Black v. State,

794 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)).

Next, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to certain comments by the prosecution. He specifically complains that the

reference to his lack of remorse violated his right against self-incrimination. U.S.

Const. amend. V, VIII, and XIV; Tenn. Const. art. I §§ 8, 9, and 16. In response, the

40
state points out that our supreme court considered and rejected the assertion of

error on direct appeal. Because it ruled that they did not affect the verdict or

otherwise prejudice the petitioner, the state contends the petitioner has failed to

establish any ineffectiveness on the part of counsel for failing to object.

Our supreme court made the following observation:

It was clearly improper for the State’s counsel to
make the comments which they did. Likewise, the name-
calling was inappropriate .... However, considering the
nature of the crime involved and all the facts surrounding
the homicide, we have concluded that the improper
conduct in closing argument by the State’s lawyers did
not affect the verdict to the prejudice of defendant, and
did not warrant reversal of the conviction. However, they
might be well advised to adhere more rigidly to the
disciplinary rules promulgated by the court for the
conduct of counsel at trial.

Bates, 804 S.W.2d at 881. It is apparent that the high court carefully reviewed the

comments made by the prosecution. While concluding the comments made by the

prosecution were improper, the court found that the comments did not affect the

results of the trial. Moreover, during the original proceeding, Dr. Griffin indicated

that the petitioner showed little remorse for the murder. Thus, there was a basis in

the evidence for the comment about lack of remorse. In summary, we find for the

state as to this claim.

The petitioner also argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

object to several inflammatory statements made by the prosecution during closing

arguments. He contends that the combined effect of the statements so tainted the

record that he could not have received a fair sentencing hearing.

As examples of the state’s improper comments not objected to by trial

counsel, the petitioner cites to the district attorney’s statement "[t]hank God this man

41
hasn’t got into bombing yet," and "[m]y son is hyperactive--he hasn’t killed anyone."

He also challenges the district attorney’s statement that the backgrounds of other

people in Coffee County were "not all so different from the defendant." Finally, he

complains that the district attorney was guilty of baseless conjecture when he

argued that "there is no telling what else he did" in his hour with the victim before

her death.

Closing argument must be temperate, must be predicated on evidence

introduced during the trial of a case, and must be pertinent to the issues being tried.

State v. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn. 1978). In our assessment, these

statements did qualify as either irrelevant or baseless conjecture. Trial counsel, who

acknowledged that they let some demeaning references slip by, should have

objected to these comments contemporaneously. Yet, in context, trial counsel’s

failure to object during the closing argument was hardly the basis for the jury verdict.

As we stated previously, our high court has already reviewed the comments and

determined the error did not affect the outcome of the trial.

The petitioner next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for

stipulating his prior convictions in Maryland for assault and battery upon a

correctional guard and for armed robbery. At trial, the defense did in fact stipulate

that the petitioner had the two prior convictions. At the post-conviction hearing,

Attorney Alderman, the legal expert, testified that trial counsel should have objected

to the introduction of this evidence and that, in general, counsel should never

stipulate to the existence of an aggravating factor at a death penalty sentencing

hearing.

42
 In Richard Caldwell v. State, No. 9, slip. op. at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at

Jackson, Mar. 21, 1990), however, this court ruled that trial counsel’s refusal to

stipulate to prior convictions would have only delayed, not prevented, their

admission into evidence; thus there was no ineffective assistance. Here, because

the prior convictions were admissible, trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to

object.

Next, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to the use of kidnapping as an underlying felony to support the felony-

murder aggravating circumstance, even though the petitioner had not been charged

with kidnapping the victim. Without addressing the merits, the state summarily

argues that this issue has been waived by the petitioner’s failure to cite authority or

make reference to the record in support of his argument. See Tenn. R. App. P.

27(a); Tenn. Crim. App. R. 10(b).

During closing argument, the prosecution made the following

statements:

[T]he State insists in this case that this defendant
committed this murder--that he killed Julie--while he was
engaging in, or was attempting to commit, or was fleeing
after committing or attempting to commit these crimes:
burglary, larceny--first of all, the items from the Curtis
Mayes residence in Kentucky, and secondly, Julie’s car
at the Holiday Inn--and kidnapping when he abducted her
as she jogged down Ester Lane on the morning of July
23, 1986. When he put a gun on her, abducted her, and
forced her against her will and confined her against her
will, he kidnapped her. He kidnapped her and escorted
her to her place of execution; so it is the State’s position
in this case that we have proven to you beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of this aggravating
circumstance.

The trial court instructed the jury on the felony-murder aggravating circumstance:

The murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged in committing, or was an accomplice in the

43
 commission of, or was attempting to commit, or was
fleeing after committing or attempting to commit, any
burglary, robbery, larceny or kidnapping.

There was neither a charge nor a conviction of kidnapping. The trial

court provided the jury with the statutory definitions of robbery, kidnapping, and

larceny as required when the state relies upon this aggravating circumstance. See

State v. Hines, 758 S.W.2d 515, 521-24 (Tenn. 1988); State v. Moore, 614 S.W.2d

348, 350-51 (Tenn.1981).

The state correctly points to the waiver rule when no authority has

been cited. There may, however, be no case directly on point. See Tenn. R. Evid.

404(b). In State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991), the supreme court did

rule that a conviction for kidnapping, when incidental to a robbery, violated due

process:

[W]hether the confinement, movement, or detention is
essentially incidental to the accompanying felony and is
not, therefore, sufficient to support a separate conviction
for kidnapping, or whether it is significant enough, in and
of itself, to warrant independent prosecution and is,
therefore, sufficient to support such a conviction.... [O]ne
method of resolving this question is to ask whether the
defendant’s conduct "substantially increased [the] risk of
harm over and above that necessarily present in the
crime of robbery itself."

Id. at 306 (citations omitted) (third alteration in original). If there existed a plausible

argument for trial counsel to have objected to the references to kidnapping, there

should have been an objection. When there has been inadequate briefing on an

issue, this court is not inclined to rule on the merits unless absolutely necessary in

the interests of justice. Here, the petitioner has been unable to show how he was

prejudiced by any possible error because the proof overwhelmingly supported the

finding that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a robbery or

larceny, a legitimate aggravating circumstance. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(7)

44
(repealed 1989). A finding that this statutory circumstance would have also been

applicable for kidnapping, a part of the same statutory section, would have been, in

our view, mere surplusage.

The petitioner also argues that when he expressly indicated to counsel

that he wanted and needed to testify, counsel was ineffective for advising otherwise.

He submits that he had a constitutional right to testify.

At the post-conviction hearing, Attorney Bean testified that the

petitioner vacillated on whether he wanted to testify. No decision was made until the

close of proof. After a lengthy consultation with his trial attorneys, the petitioner

agreed that it was not in his best interest to testify even though he had the right to

do so. Attorney Bean believed the petitioner, who could not control his temper,

would "scare the jury to death." Moreover, the petitioner would have been subject to

cross-examination on prior events in the Maryland penitentiary.

Attorney Alderman confirmed that the petitioner should have been

advised to testify:

In a capital phase if the defendant does not testify,
unless there is a substantial amount of proof that allows
the jury to see him as a human being, they won’t, if he
doesn’t testify because he is the only one who can
actually give himself the humanity that may be necessary
for the jury not to vote to kill him[. S]o if he wants to
testify, he certainly should be allowed to do that, yes, sir.

The following factors tend to indicate whether the failure of a defense

attorney to call the defendant to testify constitutes ineffective assistance:

(1) only the victim and the defendant were
present when the offense was committed;

45
 (2) only the defendant could present a "full
version of [his] theory of the facts";

(3) the defendant’s testimony could not be
impeached by prior criminal convictions;

(4) the defendant could give an account of the
relationship with the victim; and

(5) the attorney had let in objectionable,
prejudicial testimony with the intention of
clarifying it with the testimony of the
defendant.

State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). There is a

strong presumption that counsel’s assistance falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. In overcoming this presumption, the petitioner

must show that the alleged deficiency was unsound trial strategy. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689; Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94, 104 (Tenn. 1995).

In our view, the trial court correctly found that the petitioner was

advised of his right to testify and made a well-counseled decision to waive that right.

The advice was based on a sound trial strategy, especially considering the

petitioner’s demeanor, his lack of control, and his history of violent behavior. Thus,

we find no merit to this claim.

Next, the petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by

misinforming the jury that the petitioner had the burden of proof to prove mitigating

circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. He submits that his counsel

was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s characterization of the

burden of persuasion. The petitioner also complains that trial counsel did not object

when the state argued to the jury that the aggravating circumstances simply had to

outweigh the mitigating circumstances. He asserts that the language of the pre-

1989 statute, under which the trial court instructed the jury, did not clarify the burden

46
of proof as to mitigating and aggravating circumstances, failing to correct his

counsel’s incorrect statement of the law.

The state contends that the petitioner has taken trial counsel’s

comment on the burden of proof out of context. The state submits that trial counsel

had merely announced its intention to introduce evidence that certain mitigating

factors existed. Furthermore, the state contends that the trial court correctly

charged the jury with regard to mitigating and aggravation circumstances.

During closing argument, trial counsel made the following statement:

The burden of proof to prove mitigating circumstances is
on the defendant, and we accept that burden of proof.
Our burden of proof is not beyond a reasonable doubt,
but rather by a preponderance of the evidence, by 51
percent of the evidence, more likely than not.

At the post-conviction hearing, Attorney Bean testified that he assumed the defense

had the burden of proof to show mitigating circumstances because the state was not

going to introduce proof of mitigating circumstances. He conceded that he did not

know whether he had given the jury a correct statement of the law.

The statute under which the petitioner was sentenced, Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-2-203(g) (repealed 1989), required only that the jury find there were no

mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to outweigh any statutory

aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the state. Our

supreme court has held that this statute, "taken in context, clearly outlines where the

burden of proof lies." State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589, 596 (Tenn. 1990); State v.

Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 258 (Tenn. 1993). The statute has also withstood

constitutional attack. See State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 251-52 (Tenn.

1989).

47
 Here, counsel clearly misstated the burden of proof. The defense is

not required to present any proof at the sentencing hearing. See Melson, 772

S.W.2d at 421. Under Strickland, however, the petitioner must establish that the

services were deficient and then show that the deficiencies "actually had an adverse

effect on the defense." 466 U.S. at 693. If unsuccessful on either of the two

prongs, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground. While the petitioner has

clearly shown deficient performance by counsel’s misstatement of law, he has failed

to show that it actually had an adverse effect. The jury is presumed to have

followed the trial court’s instructions on the burden of proof. See State v. Lawson,

695 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985). As indicated, the trial court

accurately instructed the jury on the applicable law.

Furthermore, trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to

object to the prosecution’s statement on the burden of proof; the argument by the

prosecution reflected the language of the statute at the time of the sentencing

hearing. Our supreme court has ruled that the previous statute, "taken in context,

clearly outlines where the burden of proof lies." Boyd, 797 S.W.2d at 596.

III

Next, the petitioner contends that the state failed to disclose

information that could have led to material mitigating evidence in violation of Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). More specifically, the petitioner argues that the

state failed to disclose the results of a polygraph examination of Littleton, a possible

suspect in the case, which implicated Littleton in the murder.

The state asserts that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that

Littleton’s polygraph was either favorable to the defense or was suppressed by the

48
prosecution. Moreover, the state submits that the comprehensive "open-file" policy

precludes any claim of withheld evidence. It also argues that trial counsel knew of

no factual basis for a defense centered upon Littleton.

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution

had the duty to furnish exculpatory evidence upon request by the defense. 373

U.S. at 87. Exculpatory evidence was defined as pertaining to the guilt or innocence

of the accused and/or to the punishment which may be imposed if the charge results

in a conviction. State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Any "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady,

373 U.S. at 87. The duty to disclose extends to all "favorable information"

regardless of whether the evidence is admissible at trial. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d at

232-33.

The evidence which is alleged to have been withheld by the state must

be material. Id. Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the results of the proceeding would

have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The

appropriate standard of materiality, according to Supreme Court authority, is not

determined by its effect upon the defense’s ability to prepare for trial but, instead,

relates to the issues of guilt or innocence:

[I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has
been committed. This means that the omission must be
evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is
no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the
additional evidence is considered, there is no justification
for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is
already of questionable validity, the additional evidence

49
 of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976).

It appears that on August 7, 1986, a polygraph examination was given

to Littleton, one of the hitchhikers picked up by the petitioner in Bristol, Tennessee.

The polygraph examiner detected an indication of deception to the following

questions:

5. Are you lying to me about being picked up by that
person? No.

6. Do you know the true identity of the person
with you and FRAN when FRAN cashed
any of those traveler’s checks? No.

***

3. Are you deliberately lying to me about what
you were doing on July 23, 1986? No.

5. Did you cause the disappearance of that
woman named JULIE? No.

8. Were you in Manchester, Tennessee, on
July 23, 1986? No.

9. Have you personally seen or talked to that
woman [n]amed JULIE? No.

At the post-conviction hearing, Attorney Bean testified that the district

attorney general’s office "maintained ... an open file policy." He further testified that

it was his impression that the defense had everything the state had. Attorney Bean,

who received a copy of an FBI interview sheet on Littleton, did not recall receiving

any information relative to a polygraph examination; Attorney Peters was never

asked. Attorney Bean further testified that he did not recall any facts ever being

communicated to him that would have justified a defense centered around Littleton’s

involvement in the murder; he did not think the polygraph results would have been

50
admissible at trial. See State v. Adkins, 710 S.W.2d 525, 528-29 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1985).

It should be noted that at the sentencing hearing, Littleton testified for

the state that he was first approached about the investigation on August 6 in

Wisconsin. Littleton testified that "[t]hey asked me if I would be willing to take a lie

detector test. They asked me a bunch of questions." The defense did not cross-

examine Littleton.

The post-conviction court merely found that the petitioner’s allegations

of a failure to disclose were not supported in the record. The petitioner contends

that the evidence preponderates against that finding. The first question is whether

the state failed to provide the defense with Littleton’s polygraph test results. Clearly

the state had an open-file policy. Attorney Bean, however, stated that he did not

recall discovering any information about the polygraph results. While, as the trial

court ruled, there is an inadequate record for a determination that the state withheld

the evidence, in our view, the evidence was exculpatory even though not admissible.

It does not constitute material evidence unless there was a reasonable probability

that it would have changed the results of the proceedings. As stated in Augers,

materiality is not determined by its effect upon the defense’s ability to prepare for

trial; instead, it relates to the issues of guilt or innocence. 427 U.S. at 112-13.

The argument that this information could have probably changed

defense counsel’s strategy is simply not supported by the proof. The petitioner

confessed his crime to a fellow inmate. Littleton was not implicated in any of these

statements. None of the proof at the crime scene implicated anyone other than the

petitioner. No testimony presented at the trial or the evidentiary hearing suggested

51
that Littleton had any connection with the petitioner until after the murder or had any

involvement in the commission of the crime. Thus, the petitioner has been unable to

establish the materiality of the polygraph results. In summary, this record is

insufficient to establish any violation of the Brady rule.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

__________________________________
Gary R. Wade, Judge

52
CONCUR:

_____________________________
Paul G. Summers, Judge

_______________________________
L. T. Lafferty, Special Judge

53