United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-30877
Summary Calendar.
Robert LUCAS, et al., Plaintiffs,
and
Reginald B. Ware, Sr.; Jesse Carroll Knight, Sr., Reverend,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Fox McKEITHEN; Richard Ieyoub; Edwin Edwards; East Carroll
Parish School Board; Bossier Parish School Board; DeSoto Parish
School Board; Iberville Parish School Board; St. Mary Parish
School Board; West Carroll Parish School Board; all Defendants,
Defendants,
v.
Reynold MINSKY; Jack Hamilton; Grady Brown; Amos Amacker, II;
Harvey Howington; Lonnie Batton; James Thom, IV; Thomas Parker;
Charles Crawford, Movants-Appellants.
Dec. 4, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:
Reynold Minsky, Jack Hamilton, Grady Brown, Amos Amacker II,
Harvey Howington, James Thom IV, Thomas Parker, Lonnie Batton, and
Charles Crawford appeal the district court's denial of their motion
to intervene as of right and motion for permissive intervention.
We affirm the denial of intervention as of right and dismiss the
appeal of the permissive intervention ruling.
Background
1
In July 1994 a group of African-American voters brought this
action against the school boards of East Carroll Parish, Iberville
Parish, Bossier Parish, DeSoto Parish, St. Mary Parish, and West
Carroll Parish, as well as the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, and the Governor of the State of Louisiana, seeking
compliance with the Voting Rights Act of 19651 and the fourteenth
amendment's one person, one vote guaranty. The plaintiffs promptly
moved the district court to adopt an interim redistricting plan for
each defendant parish for the fall 1994 school board elections.
During a hearing in August 1994, the plaintiffs offered interim
plans that met federal requirements but split some election
precincts. East Carroll Parish School Board submitted an
alternative, Plan 6, which did not call for precinct splitting.2
The state defendants objected to plaintiffs' plans because state
law generally prohibits the splitting of precincts.3
On August 16, 1994 the district court approved an election
plan for St. Mary Parish that split precincts, but did not adopt
the plaintiffs' plan for East Carroll Parish. Rather, on August
23, 1994, the district court adopted Plan 6 as an interim plan for
East Carroll Parish so that elections could proceed, but ordered
the East Carroll Parish School Board to adopt, after the elections,
a permanent reapportionment plan that complied with the
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c, 1983.
2
Plan 6 had not been precleared by the Department of Justice
as required by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
3
See La.R.S. 17:71.3 (West 1982 & Supp.1996).
2
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act.
Elections were held under Plan 6 in the fall of 1994. After
public hearings, in January 1995 the newly elected school board
adopted a permanent redistricting plan, Plan L. Plan L provides
for the splitting of some existing parish precincts.
The Department of Justice precleared Plan L in May 1995. The
plaintiffs then moved the district court to schedule elections
under Plan L for the fall of 1995. The state defendants objected
to Plan L because: (1) the hand-drawn maps and manually calculated
statistics provided by the School Board were inadequate for the
state defendants to ascertain precisely the location of the
district lines; and (2) because Plan L called for the splitting of
precincts. Because of these objections the district court withheld
ruling on the plaintiffs' motion and ordered them to assist the
state in interpreting the School Board's material. The plaintiffs
complied and assisted in the preparation of computerized maps: The
state agreed that the materials were sufficient to ascertain the
voting lines and the School Board resubmitted the material to the
Department of Justice, which issued a no-objection letter on August
14, 1995.
On July 27, 1995 appellants, a group of white voters in East
Carroll Parish, sought to intervene to challenge Plan L largely
because it called for splitting some precincts. After a hearing
the district court denied the motion as untimely and scheduled the
elections. The proposed intervenors then filed a second motion to
intervene claiming that it was timely because the computerized maps
3
had been sent recently to the Department of Justice to confirm
section 5 preclearance.4 The district court again denied the
motion. The proposed intervenors timely appealed.
Analysis
The denial of a motion to intervene as of right is an
appealable final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.5 We have only
provisional appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion
for permissive intervention.6
Intervention is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. A non-party seeking to intervene has available
two avenues under this Rule: section (a) provides for intervention
as of right and section (b) provides for permissive intervention.
The proposed intervenors moved for both intervention as of right
and permissive intervention. We review the district court's
decision concerning the former de novo and the latter for a clear
abuse of discretion.7
A motion to intervene must be timely.8 We review a district
4
The proposed intervenors alternatively sought to intervene
for purpose of appeal only. We assume, per arguendo, that our
Rules provide for such intervention but we do not decide that issue
today.
5
Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983 (5th Cir.1996) (en
banc ).
6
Id. If there was no abuse of discretion we have no
jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.
7
Id.
8
Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a) and (b).
4
court's timeliness determination for an abuse of discretion.9
Timeliness is to be determined from all of the circumstances.
There are four pertinent factors: (1) the length of time during
which the proposed intervenors actually knew or reasonably should
have known of their interest in the case; (2) the extent of the
prejudice that the existing parties may suffer as a result of the
proposed intervenors' failure to apply for intervention as soon as
they actually knew or reasonably should have known of their
interest in the case; (3) the extent of the prejudice that the
proposed intervenors may suffer if the motion is denied; and (4)
the existence of unusual circumstances militating for or against
the determination that the motion is timely.10
The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
that the motions to intervene were untimely. First, the proposed
intervenors knew or should have known about their interest in this
suit for more than a year before seeking to intervene. Precinct
splitting was at issue as early as the plaintiffs' motion to adopt
interim plans. Second, the existing parties would have been
prejudiced by the inordinate delay; to permit intervention at the
eleventh hour would have resulted in revisiting of issues
previously addressed at length by the parties while elections would
be further delayed. Third, the proposed intervenors were not
prejudiced by the district court's ruling because the state
defendants previously had advanced the arguments they sought to
9
Edwards.
10
Id.
5
advance. Finally, there are no unusual circumstances that militate
against a finding of untimeliness.
The district court's order denying intervention as of right is
AFFIRMED and the appeal of the district court's order denying
permissive intervention is DISMISSED.
6