UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-20475
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
WILSON CALLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
August 6, 1997
Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
Wilson Calle appeals his conviction for conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and marijuana. We affirm.
I
In August 1994, Wilson Calle was indicted along with five co-
defendants. Calle was named only in count two of the indictment,
which charged him and four of the co-defendants with conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. In the second
superseding indictment, filed in December 1995, the Government
amended count two, charging Calle and others with conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846.
At trial, the Government introduced evidence establishing that
Calle, on two occasions, collected drug money for Dwayne Strothers,
a cooperating co-defendant. The first such occasion occurred in
March 1994, when Strothers “fronted” co-defendant Antonio Gonzales
two kilograms of cocaine with the understanding that Gonzales would
pay him from the proceeds of future drug sales. When Gonzales--who
also testified against Calle--failed to make timely payment,
Strothers enlisted Calle to assist in collecting the money.
Strothers, Gonzales, and Calle eventually met in the presence of
Arturo Martinez, yet another cooperating Government witness. After
a couple of hours, Gonzales was able to procure the money, and he
paid it to Strothers in Calle’s presence. For his role in
collecting the money, Calle was paid $3000 by Strothers. A similar
situation unfolded a few weeks later, when Strothers fronted
cocaine to Martinez. Martinez thereafter failed to pay, and
Strothers again enlisted Calle to collect the money. Calle
confronted Martinez but apparently was unsuccessful.
On the basis of the above evidence, a jury convicted Calle on
count two. The district court sentenced him to 160 months of
imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. Calle appeals.
II
Calle asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his
conviction. Specifically, he points out that the indictment
charged him with conspiracy to traffick in cocaine and marijuana.
He admits that he may have been involved in the cocaine enterprise,
2
but insists that there is no evidence linking him to the marijuana
conspiracy. He argues that because he was unaware of an essential
part of the enterprise, i.e., the marijuana conspiracy, his
conviction must be reversed. See United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d
1258, 1269 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that to be convicted of
conspiracy, a defendant must be aware of the essential nature and
scope of the conspiracy).
Calle’s position has little merit, for the Supreme Court
rejected a similar argument in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S.
46 (1991). In Griffin, one of the defendants was charged with
conspiring to defraud a federal agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371. The Government alleged that the conspiracy had two objects:
(1) impeding the efforts of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to
determine income taxes; and (2) impairing the efforts of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) to ascertain forfeitable assets.
Id. at 47. At trial, the Government presented evidence linking the
defendant to the IRS conspiracy, but failed to connect her to the
DEA conspiracy. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the conviction,
holding that a general guilty verdict on a multiple-object
conspiracy may stand even if the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction on one of the charged objects. See id. at 47,
60.
This case is indistinguishable from Griffin. As was the
defendant in Griffin, Calle was charged in the conjunctive with a
multiple-object conspiracy. The evidence was sufficient to connect
Calle to only one of the charged objects. Under Griffin, we must
3
affirm the conviction. See also United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d
574, 576 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying the Griffin rule).
III
Calle also contends that the district court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial
Act. This Court reviews the facts supporting a Speedy Trial Act
ruling for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo. See
United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 1994).
A
The Speedy Trial Act requires that federal criminal defendants
be tried within 70 non-excludable days from the filing date of the
indictment or from the date of the defendant’s initial appearance
before a judicial officer, whichever occurs later. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(c)(1); United States v. Willis, 958 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir.
1992). The Act, however, specifies that certain days are to be
“excluded” from the 70-day calculation. See 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1); United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 1312, 1315 (5th
Cir. 1990).
Of particular importance to this case are those exclusions
resulting from the filing of pretrial motions. The Act excludes
“delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the
motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt
disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F)
(“Subsection F”). The Subsection F exclusion applies in two
situations. First, if a motion requires a hearing, Subsection F
tolls the Speedy Trial clock from the date that the motion is filed
4
through the date that the court conducts a hearing on the motion--
even if the delay between the filing of the motion and the hearing
is unreasonable.1 See Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321,
329-30 (1986); United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940, 942-43 (5th
Cir. 1994). In this situation, Subsection F also implicitly
excludes the time after the hearing where a district court awaits
the filing of all post-hearing briefs and materials reasonably
necessary to dispose of the motion. See Henderson, 476 U.S. at
330-31; Johnson, 29 F.3d at 943. Once the court has received all
of the submissions, it is deemed to have taken the motion “under
advisement,” after which the court has a maximum of 30 excludable
days, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(J) (“Subsection J”), to
decide the motion before the Speedy Trial clock begins to run. See
Henderson, 476 U.S. at 330-31; Johnson, 29 F.3d at 943.
Second, Subsection F tolls the Speedy Trial clock where a
motion does not require a hearing. See Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329;
Johnson, 29 F.3d at 943. In such a situation, Subsection F
excludes the time necessary for “prompt disposition,” which, under
Subsection J, may be no more than 30 days from the time the motion
is taken under advisement. See Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329-30;
Johnson, 29 F.3d at 943.
Finally, in a multi-defendant prosecution such as this one,
the Speedy Trial clock begins to run when the last co-defendant
makes his initial appearance in court. See United States v.
1
When counting days for Speedy Trial purposes, the filing date
of the motion and the date of the court’s disposition are
excludable. See Johnson, 29 F.3d at 943 n.4.
5
Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1567 (5th Cir. 1994). The excludable delay
of one co-defendant may be attributable to all defendants. See id.
B
Although 511 days passed between Calle’s original indictment
and the beginning of his trial, numerous motions tolled the Speedy
Trial clock for the vast majority of those days. Upon analyzing
the various motions, we conclude that only 69 non-excludable days
accrued before Calle was tried. Thus, we affirm.
The parties agree that the Speedy Trial clock did not begin to
run until October 4, 1994, when the latest co-defendant, Raul
Elizondo, made his initial appearance in court. Thereafter, two
(2) days accrued in the Speedy Trial calculation before the
Government’s motion to certify the case as complex, filed on
October 7, 1994, tolled the clock. From this date, numerous
overlapping motions tolled the clock pursuant to Subsection F. The
last of such motions was co-defendant Antonio Gonzales’s motion to
reduce bond, filed on December 12, 1994. No hearing was held on
this motion, and thus pursuant to Subsection J, it tolled the clock
for 30 days through January 11, 1995.
The Speedy Trial clock then ticked for eight (8) days until
January 20, 1995, when co-defendant Sergio Dominguez moved to
substitute his attorney. Pursuant to Subsection F, this motion
tolled the clock through February 3, 1995, when the district court
granted the motion. Thereafter, seventeen (17) non-excludable days
accrued before Dominguez’s motion to revoke his detention tolled
the clock from the filing date on February 21, 1995, through March
6
9, 1995, when the court denied the motion.
The clock remained tolled because on March 10, 1995, Dominguez
moved to adopt his co-defendants’ motions. While this motion was
pending and the clock tolled, Dominguez moved for pretrial
determination of entrapment on March 20, 1995. The entrapment
motion remained pending when Elizondo moved to revoke his detention
on April 14, 1995, and this motion tolled the clock through April
20, 1995, when the court denied the detention motion. Thereafter,
twenty-six (26) more non-excludable days lapsed before the
Government moved to dismiss its case against co-defendant Dwayne
Strothers on May 18, 1995.2
The Speedy Trial clock was still tolled by the motion to
dismiss when the district court, on May 25, 1995, issued a warrant
for the arrest of co-defendant Joe Burrell, who failed to appear on
that date. Burrell’s absence tolled the clock through August 29,
1995, when he was rearrested.3 On the same day that Burrell was
rearrested, Calle moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds
that the delay in bringing him to trial violated the Speedy Trial
Act. Because a hearing was required, the clock remained tolled
until the court both held a hearing and denied the Speedy Trial
2
This calculation does not include May 16, 1995, when the
clock was tolled because of Calle’s rearraignment. See United
States v. Ortega-Mena, 949 F.2d 156, 158 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that the arraignment date is excludable under 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(1)).
3
Delay resulting from an unavailable defendant will toll the
Speedy Trial clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A); United States
v. Helms, 897 F.2d 1293, 1300 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that one co-
defendant’s failure to appear tolled the clock for another co-
defendant pursuant to § 3161(h)(3)(A)).
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motion on November 28, 1995.
The clock began to run after November 28, 1995, and sixteen
(16) non-excludable days accrued until Gonzales filed a motion on
December 15, 1995. That motion remained pending until the trial
date on January 9, 1996, and thus the Speedy Trial clock remained
tolled during that time.
Based on the above chronology, a total of sixty-nine (69) non-
excludable days passed between the last co-defendant’s initial
appearance in court and the beginning of Calle’s trial. Because
Calle was tried within 70 non-excludable days, we conclude that the
delay in bringing him to trial did not violate the Speedy Trial
Act.4
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Calle’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
4
The Government contends that the continuances granted by the
district court also tolled the Speedy Trial clock. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(8)(A); United States v. Jones, 56 F.3d 581, 583 (5th Cir.
1995). Because we hold that the various motions sufficiently
tolled the clock under the Speedy Trial Act, we need not reach the
issue whether the court’s continuances also tolled the clock.
8