Wegner v. Standard Insurance

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 97-20062.

Robert P. WEGNER, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

Dec. 9, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

STEWART, Circuit Judge:

This case, which calls for us to construe the phrase "overtime pay and any other extra

compensation" as it appears in a group disability insurance policy, arises from an injury suffered by

Robert P. Wegner shortly after he accepted a higher-compensating, out-of-town job assignment from

his employer. Standard Insurance Company, the issuer of the policy, contends that Wegner's higher

earnings at the time he was injured constitute excluded "overtime" or "any other extra compensation"

under the policy, and therefore the proper basis for calculating his disability benefit is his lower

pre-assignment rate of compensation. In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the

district court held in favor of Wegner, finding that his higher compensation was not overtime or extra

compensation and therefore serves as the proper basis for calculating the disability benefit. In a

separate order, the district court also awarded Wegner attorneys' fees. Standard appeals both rulings,

and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On June 29, 1990, Robert P. Wegner ("Wegner") began work as a service

technician/fabricator with CRC-Evans Pipeline, Inc. ("CRC-Evans") in Houston at the rate of $10.25

per hour. He received a pay increase to $10.75 per hour soon thereafter. On July 22, 1991, Wegner

accepted an assignment to CRC-Evan's "Kern River Project" in Las Vegas. The Employee

1
Assignment Agreement provided that he was being assigned to the proj ect as a senior

operator/technician; he would be paid a salary of $300 per day for working approximately 12 hours

per day, 7 days a week; and his assignment would end upon either the successful completion of the

project or termination of the project by CRC-Evans or the contractor. A Change

Authorization/Employment Authorization form implementing Wegner's change in status from an

hourly to a salaried employee qualified the compensation change as being effective for the duration

of the assignment only.1

On September 4, 1991, while working on a construction site, Wegner fell from a truck and

suffered shoulder and elbow injuries. On September 21, 1991, CRC-Evans executed another

authorization form, t erminating Wegner's assignment to the Kern River project and returning his

status to that of an hourly employee paid at the rate of $10.75 per hour. At the time of his injury,

Wegner was covered by a long-term disability insurance policy (the "po licy") provided by CRC-

Evans, as part of an employee welfare benefit plan within the purview of the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").2 Accordingly, Wegner applied for disability benefits

pursuant to the policy.3 Standard Insurance Company ("Standard"), the issuer of the policy, accepted

Wegner's disability claim, but the present dispute as to the proper calculation of the benefit amount

soon arose.

In the event of a disability, the policy provides coverage for 60% of an employee's

"pre-disability earnings," subject to "maximum amount" limits not applicable here. The policy defines

"predisability earnings" as follows:

1
The above-mentioned Employee Assignment Agreement, together with the Change
Authorization/Employment Authorization form, may hereinafter be referred to as "the relevant
employment documents."
2
The parties agree that the instant long-term disability plan is an employee welfare benefit plan
covered by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
3
ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) provides that "[a] civil action may be brought by a participant or
beneficiary to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

2
 PREDISABILITY EARNINGS means your monthly rate of earnings from your EMPLOYER
including commissions and deferred compensation, but excluding bonuses, overtime pay and
any other extra compensation.

(emphasis added). The predisability earnings used to compute the disability benefit is determined as

follows:

If you become DISABLED, the ... PREDISABILITY EARNINGS used to compute your
LTD BENEFIT will be based on your monthly rate of earnings in effect on your last full day
of ACTIVE WORK before you become DISABLED. Any change in the amount of your
monthly rate of earnings which is approved or becomes effective after that last full day of
ACTIVE WORK will have no effect on the amount of your ... PREDISABILITY
EARNINGS used to compute your LTD BENEFIT for that period of DISABILITY.

In determining the amount of disability benefits to be paid to Wegner, Standard based its calculation

of Wegner's predisability earnings on the $10.75 per hour rate he was earning prior to his assignment

to the Kern River project.

On or about March 14, 1995, Wegner filed suit in Texas state court, asserti ng that his

predisability earnings should be calculated on the basis of his higher $300 per day rate of

compensation at Kern River. Standard removed the case to the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, and subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment

arguing that the $300 per day rate of compensation constituted "overtime" or "any other extra

compensation" that was excluded from coverage under the policy. Wegner then filed a

counter-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the increased pay did not constitute "overtime"

or "any other extra compensation" and therefore was t he proper basis on which to calculate

predisability earnings. The parties stipulated that if Wegner's interpretation of the policy was

adopted, the amount of back benefits payable to him through July 19, 1996 would be $221,846.40;

should the court expand the benefits period beyond July 19, 1996, the appropriate rate would be

$5,459.58 per month.

On October 31, 1996, the district court ruled in favor of Wegner on the cross-motions for

summary judgment; in addition, the district court requested further briefing and production of

evidence on whether Wegner was entitled to attorneys' fees. On December 18, 1996, the district

court awarded Wegner substantially all the relief he sought regarding attorneys' fees, and entered the

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final judgment in this case. Standard timely appeals, and this court has jurisdiction of this case

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

DISCUSSION

Construction of Policy

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Todd

v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1451 (5th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is appropriate if the

record discloses "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In making this determination, we must

evaluate the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587,

106 S.Ct. at 1356; Todd, 47 F.3d at 1451.

Moreover, when we are called to interpret an ERISA-covered policy in cases involving the

denial of benefits challenged under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), we construe the terms of the plan de

novo "unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine

eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,

489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 956, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); Todd, 47 F.3d at 1451; Harms v.

Cavenham Forest Indus., 984 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir.1993). The record in this case reveals no such

grant of discretionary authority to a fiduciary or administrator. As such, the language of the policy

will guide our de novo interpretation. Harms, 984 F.2d at 688.

Federal common law governs this case, including the construction of the policy provisions

at the heart of this dispute. Todd, 47 F.3d at 1451; Jones v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 90 F.3d 114,

116 (5th Cir.1996). Although we may "draw guidance from analogous state law" in ascertaining the

applicable federal common law, Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1325 (5th Cir.1994)

(internal quotation omitted), "[w]e must nevertheless bear in mind that, in doing so, we may use [it]

... only to the extent that [it] is not inconsistent with congressional policy concerns." Todd, 47 F.3d

at 1451 (internal quotation and brackets omitted).

4
 In construing ERISA plan provisions, we interpret the contract language "in an ordinary and

popular sense as would a person of average intelligence and experience," such that the language is

given its generally accepted meaning if there is one. Todd, 47 F.3d at 1451 n. 1 (internal quotation

omitted); Jones, 90 F.3d at 116 (internal quotation omitted). Only if the plan terms remain

ambiguous after applying ordinary principles of contract interpretation are we compelled to apply the

rule of contra proferentum and construe the terms strictly in favor of the insured. Id.

The primary issue in this case is whether Wegner, at the time of his injury, was earning

"overtime" or "any other extra compensation" which was excluded from coverage under the policy.4

After reviewing the policy, we hold that the terms "overtime" and "any other extra compensation"

are not ambiguous, but rather have an ordinary and generally accepted meaning. A person of average

intelligence and experience, reading these terms of limitation in the policy, would conclude that

Wegner's $300 per day salary at the Kern River project did not constitute overtime or any other extra

compensation.

We are unimpressed with Standard's argument that a person working 12 hours a day, 7 days

a week must be working overtime. As the district court noted, the concept of "overtime" ordinarily

applies only to hourly employees: once the employee exceeds his assigned number of hours, he is

paid at a higher hourly rate for the excess.5 Wegner's $300 per day rate of compensation at Kern

River does not fall within the generally accepted meaning of the term overtime. The relevant

employment documents implementing Wegner's assignment to Kern River explicitly identify his

employment status at the project to be "full-time" (not "part-time" or "temporary") and his new pay

status to be "salaried" (not hourly). "[A]dditional compensation for extra hours worked is ... not

generally consistent with salaried status." Abshire v. County of Kern, 908 F.2d 483, 486 (9th

Cir.1990); see also Banks v. City of N. Little Rock, 708 F.Supp. 1023, 1024 (E.D.Ark.1988)

4
The terms "overtime" and "any other extra compensation" were not defined in the policy.
5
In employment contexts, "overtime" means "working time in excess of a minimum total set
for a given period ... [;] an additional payment for overtime." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, 1611 (1993).

5
("[p]ayment of a fixed amount plus additional hourly wages for extra hours worked is not consistent

with salaried status").6 Had Wegner's employer, CRC-Evans, meant for his compensation to be

overtime, it could have plainly indicated this on the relevant employment documents. Because the

facts indicate that CRC-Evans did not consider Wegner to be working overtime when the assignment

was made, we see no reason why that determination should be different now.7

Our analysis of the term "any other extra compensation" follows much the same path. There

is no dispute as to whether Wegner's Kern River salary was "compensation;" as such, our inquiry

focuses on whether it was "ext ra" compensation. In everyday parlance, "extra" generally means

"beyond the usual or norm."8 We conclude that no part of Wegner's salary at Kern River falls within

the generally accepted meaning of the term "any other "extra' compensation." The relevant

employment documents expressly changed Wegner's status from an hourly employee t o a salaried

one; they provide that he was due a salary of $300 per day for fulfilling his duties at the project.

Under these circumstances, and in the context of Wegner's work assignment, we conclude that the

$300 daily rate was his usual and normal compensation at the time of injury, and in no way was it

"extra." Wegner contracted to work long hours and to be paid a flat salary for doing so.

Standard claims that our conclusion is belied by the fact that Wegner's assignment to the Kern

River project was "temporary." On this basis, Standard contends that Wegner's previous hourly wage

of $10.75 continued to be his usual and normal salary, and the increased pay he received at Kern

River was "extra compensation" that should not enter into the determination of his predisability

6
The cited cases involve the determination of whether certain employees are exempt from the
overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The parties in this case have
made no reference to the FLSA, and we cite it and the related cases for the limited purpose of
informing our analysis of the plan terms that are in dispute here.
7
The plain language of the EMPLOYEE ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT indicates that
Wegner was being paid a salary of $300 per day for working approximately 12 hours per day, 7
days a week. We cannot envision a plausible argument in favor of finding overtime unless
Wegner was working over 84 hours a week. No such showing was made in this case.
8
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 806 (1993), defines "extra" as (1) "beyond or
greater than what is due, usual, expected, necessary, or essential;" (2) "to a degree or extent
beyond the usual;" or (3) "in excess of a usual, regular, or specified size or amount."

6
earnings. The district court found this view to be reasonable, noting evidence which showed at least

part of the reason Wegner received an increased salary was to compensate him for being away from

home for long periods and for working long hours.9 Although the documents initiating the $300 daily

rate reflect that the increased pay was to be effective only for the duration of the project, we are not

convinced by the record before us that the duration of the project alone qualifies the compensation

as merely "temporary." In fact, the word "temporary" is not found on any of the relevant employment

documents. Wegner was assigned to the Kern River project for an indefinite time, as shown by the

language on the EMPLOYEE ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT: "The term of assignment shall be

for a period of time beginning 22 July 1991 and ending upon successful completion of the project or

terminated [sic] by CRC-Evans or the contractor." Moreover, although there was space provided

on the Change Authorization/Employment Authorization form to note a change of employment

status, CRC-Evans listed Wegner as a "full-time employee" as opposed to a "part-time, temporary

or contract" employee. Accordingly, the happenstance of Wegner's being injured less than two

months into the assignment, thus causing his compensation to revert back to $10.75 per hour, does

not convince us that the $300 daily rate was temporary.10 Further, even if we were to characterize

the pay increase as "temporary," that does not necessarily mean that it was "extra compensation."

Nothing in the policy states that a beneficiary's applicable monthly rate of earnings, for purposes of

calculating predisability earnings, must be calculated on the basis of non-temporary compensation.

Had Wegner's employer, CRC-Evans, intended an "extra compensation" or "overtime"

arrangement for his new job assignment, leaving intact his status as an hourly employee, we are

confident that such intent would have been spelled out in the relevant employment documents. Here,

these documents sufficiently establish Wegner's status at the time of the assignment as a full-time,

9
The district court also found as reasonable Wegner's interpretation of " any other extra
compensation" as possibly denoting benefits, perks, or other compensation unrelated to wages.
Confronted with these two "reasonable" interpretations, the court concluded that the term "any
other extra compensation" was ambiguous.
10
Standard has argued that the temporary nature of Wegner's increased compensation was
confirmed by CRC-Evans revising his pay to $10.75 per hour seventeen days after his injury.

7
salaried employee, earning a usual and normal salary of $300 per day. Accordingly, we find that

Wegner's rate of earnings on his last day of active work before becoming disabled was roughly $9,000

a month;11 his predisability earnings should be calculated on that basis.12

Attorneys' Fees

Standard also argues that the district court erred in awarding attorney s' fees to Wegner.

Although the district court rejected Wegner's request to calculate the appropriate amount of fees on

the basis of his contingent fee contract with his attorneys, see Todd, 47 F.3d at 1459, it did grant him

$24,405 after considering his application.13

ERISA § 502(g), applicable both to trials and appeals, provi des that "the court in its

discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs ... to either party." 29 U.S.C. §

1132(g)(1); Sims v. Great-West Life Assur. Co., 941 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir.1991). We review the

district court's decision to award attorneys' fees only for an abuse of discretion. Todd v. AIG Insur.

Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1458 (5th Cir.1995).

11
Depending on the type of compensation earned, the policy places certain conditions and/or
limitations on the calculation of an employee's monthly rate of earnings. For "commissions," the
monthly rate of earnings includes the average monthly commission received during the preceding
12 months. For "weekly pay," the monthly rate of earnings is calculated by multiplying the
weekly earnings by 4.333. For "hourly pay," the monthly rate of earnings is calculated by
multiplying the hourly pay rate by the number of hours the employee is regularly scheduled to
work per month (subject to a cap of 173 hours). Because the relevant employment documents
establish that Wegner was not paid on an hourly, weekly, or commission basis at the assignment,
but rather on a daily basis, the calculation of his applicable monthly rate of earnings is not
conditioned or limited by these provisions.
12
As mentioned, the district court found the term "any other extra compensation" to be
ambiguous; it then applied the contra proferentum rule and construed the term in favor of
Wegner, the insured. Accordingly, the district court reached the same conclusion as we do: that
Wegner's disability benefit should be calculated on the basis of his $300 per day salary at the time
of his injury. Standard argues that the district court incorrectly ignored extrinsic evidence which
allegedly resolves the ambiguity in its favor, and therefore applied the contra proferentum rule
prematurely. In most cases, the question of whether a contract term is ambiguous also presents a
question of law subject to plenary review. Sunbeam-Oster Company, Inc. Group
Benefits Plan For Salaried and Non-Bargaining Hourly Employees v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d
1368, 1373 (5th Cir.1996). Because we conclude that the term "any other extra compensation" is
not ambiguous, we do not reach this issue.
13
The district court also awarded Wegner $6,430.32 in costs. Standard has not appealed this
ruling.

8
 Although the decision to award attorneys' fees is discretionary, the court should consider the

following five factors in its analysis: (1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith;

(2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees; (3) whether an award of

attorneys' fees against the opposing party would deter other persons acting under similar

circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting attorneys' fees sought to benefit all participants and

beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and

(5) the relative merits of the parties' positions. Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d

1255, 1266 (5th Cir.1980); Todd, 47 F.3d at 1458. "No one of these factors is necessarily decisive,

and some may not be apropos in a given case, but together they are the nuclei of concerns that a court

should address in applying section 502(g)." Bowen, 624 F.2d at 1266.

Here, the district court considered each one of these five factors. Although the district court

was "hesitant to state that Standard acted in bad faith while handling Wegner's disability claim," it did

note that Standard's attempt to support its benefit calculation via a Change Authorization form that

was executed after Wegner became disabled "bordered on the frivolous"; according to the district

court, the policy clearly stated that any change in compensation executed after a disabling injury has

no effect on the calculation of benefits. Standard, taking issue with the district court's

characterization of its position as somewhat frivolous, asserts that the Change Authorization form

was submitted not to support its benefit calculation, but to demonstrate that: (1) Wegner's

assignment to the Kern River project was temporary and (2) Wegner's base salary was $10.75 per

hour at the time Standard calculated the disability benefit. We are not convinced, however, by

Standard's attempt to justify its use of the Change Authorization form. We are puzzled by how this

form, which was executed simply to terminate Wegner's $300 per day salary and return him to a

$10.75 hourly wage, demonstrates that the $300 per day salary was temporary. As discussed above,

the project could conceivably have lasted for months to a year or longer. Any attempt to translate

the fortuity of Wegner's being injured so shortly after his assignment into a characterization of the

compensation as being "temporary" is misguided.

9
 Further, we view as disingenuous Standard's simultaneous argument that it looked to the

Change Authorization form simply to demonstrate that Wegner's base salary was $10.75 per hour at

the time it calculated the benefit, and not to establish a lower benefit amount. We take Standard's

argument to be as follows: (1) Wegner's base salary never changed from $10.75 per hour; (2)

therefore, his "monthly rate of earnings," for the purpose of calculating predisability earnings, was

not affected by the post-disability Change Authorization form; and therefore (3) its use of the

post-disability Change Authorization form to determine Wegner's base salary at the time it calculated

the benefit was not prohibited by the policy. Although we disagree with Standard's contention that

Wegner's base salary never changed upon his assignment to the Kern River project, this by itself has

no bearing on our assessment of Standard's good faith in dealing with his claim. However, we note

that, in making the above argument, Standard has claimed that the term "monthly rate of earnings"

is a defined concept in the policy; our reading of the policy determines this not to be the case. This

evidences a lack of credibility on Standard's part, and convinces us that the above argument is nothing

but a post hoc attempt to justify what was an otherwise proscribed use of the Change Authorization

form; in other words, a more likely scenario is that Standard was aware that Wegner's monthly rate

of earnings changed after his disabling injury, and nevertheless chose to rely on this change (as

evidenced in the Change Authorization form) to calculate a lower disability benefit. The district court

did not err in weighing such behavior against Standard.

The district court also found that Standard had the ability to satisfy an award of fees.14 It also

determined that an award of fees would deter other insurers from acting in a similar manner when

confronted with similar circumstances, and that the relative merits of the parties were evident from

its grant of summary judgment in favor of Wegner.15 After reviewing the district court's analysis of

the "nuclei of concerns" that are relevant in determining if an award of fees is appropriate, we cannot

14
Standard does not contest this finding.
15
We note that the district court, finding Standard's interpretation of the term "any other extra
compensation" to be reasonable, gave more credit to Standard's position than we do.

10
say that it committed an abuse of discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to Wegner.

We now examine whether the district court erred in the amount of attorneys' fees it awarded.

Once the district court concludes that a party is entitled to attorneys' fees, it must utilize the lodestar

method to determi ne the amount to be awarded. Todd, 47 F.3d at 1459. Under this method, the

district court must determine the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation16 and the

reasonable hourly rates for the participating attorneys, and then multiply the two figures together to

arrive at the "lodestar." Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th

Cir.1995); Forbush v. J.C.Penney Co., 98 F.3d 817, 821 (5th Cir.1996). The lodestar is then

adjusted upward or downward, depending on the circumstances of the case, after assessing the dozen

factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974).

Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 329; Forbush, 98 F.3d at 821.17 We review the district court's determination

of reasonable hours and reasonable rates for clear error. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324. Any lodestar

adjustments are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 329.

Standard contends that Wegner did not submit sufficient documentation to support the

amount of fees awarded. Specifically, Standard complains that the documentation lacks evidence of

(1) the qualifications, skill, or reputation of four of the five participating attorneys, (2) the specific

work performed by any of the attorneys, and (3) the necessary nature of such work. Further,

Standard argues t hat the district court failed to adequately apply the lodestar method in the

calculation of the fees.

16
This calculation requires not only a determination of whether the total number of hours
claimed were reasonable but also whether the particular hours claimed were reasonably expended.
Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 325.
17
These factors include: (1) the time and labor required for the litigation; (2) the novelty and
complication of the issues; (3) the skill required to properly litigate the issues; (4) whether the
attorney had to refuse other work to litigate the case; (5) the attorney's customary fee; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) whether the client or case circumstances imposed any
time constraints; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case was "undesirable;" (11) the type of
attorney-client relationship and whether that relationship was long-standing; and (12) awards
made in similar cases. Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.

11
 Preliminarily, we note that the fee applicant has the burden to submit adequate documentation

of the hours reasonably expended. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324. Litigants clearly "take their chances"

that the district court will reject or reduce fee awards if they submit vague or incomplete applications.

Id. at 326-27. Here, Wegner's proffer of documentation was marginal at best, and arguably

inadequate: (1) a computer printout listing the number of hours expended by and hourly rates of the

attorneys who worked on the case; and (2) an affidavit from lead counsel reflecting her credentials

and her view that the attorneys' fees on the printout were reasonable and necessary in the prosecution

of the case.18 We note, particularly, the absence of any time sheets or descriptions of the work done.

Although Wegner's documentation was sparse, we cannot say that it was so vague or incomplete that

the district court was precluded from conducting a meaningful review of whether the hours claimed

on this litigation were reasonably expended. See League of United Latin American Citizens # 4552

v. Roscoe Indep. School Dist., 119 F.3d 1228, 1233 (5t h Cir.1997). Other than identifying the

glaring holes in Wegner's documentation (e.g., the nondescriptive billing), Standard has not provided

us (nor did it provide the district court) with detailed information explaining why or how the total

number of hours claimed were not reasonable.19 Under these circumstances, given the district court's

familiarity with the legal work done on this relatively straightforward contract interpretation case as

18
According to the printout, the total hours expended by the participating attorneys and their
respective hourly rates were as follows:

Attorney Hours Rate Fee
J.G. Emerson 14.40 $250.00 $ 3,600.00
Bill Vidor 2.00 150.00 300.00
Teri Walter 5.30 150.00 795.00
Bruce Feichtinger 12.50 150.00 1,875.00
Terri H. Green 118.90 150.00 17,835.00
Total: 153.10 $24,405.00

All attorneys are employed by the law firm of Whittington, Pfeiffer and Vacek.
19
We are not swayed by Standard's attorneys' assessment, in their Reply Brief [to the district
court] Regarding Attorneys' Fees, that Wegner's inadequate application "robbed [them] of the
opportunity to closely examine Wegner's lawyers' activities," thus constraining their ability to
provide information to the district court. Standard's attorneys' efforts on this case should have
provided them with sufficient insight into the nature and scope of their adversaries' work.

12
well as our deferential standard of review, we are constrained to hol d that the district court had

sufficient information before it to determine reasonable hours.

Next, we turn to the district court's methodology in awarding the attorneys' fees in this case.

Acknowledging the computer printout submitted by Wegner, the court stated as follows: "[A]fter

considering the number of hours expended on this case by Wegner's attorneys, the [c]ourt finds that

the claimed hours are reasonable. The [c]ourt also finds that the hourly rates sought for the various

attorneys at Whittington, Pfeiffer and Vacek are reasonable. Therefore, the [c]ourt declines to adopt

different hourly rates." Further, after listing the Johnson modification factors, the court stated:

"[A]fter considering the various Johnson factors in the context of this case, the Court finds that

neither an enhancement nor a reduction of the lodestar is warranted. Rather, the appropriate amount

of attorney's [sic] fees in this case is $24,405.00—the amount billed hourly by the attorneys...."

Although the district court could have spoken with more detail in its order, there is no question that

it analyzed the claimed hours and rates and reviewed them against the backdrop of the twelve

Johnson factors. "A district court's Johnson analysis ... need not be meticulously detailed to survive

appellate review:

If the district court has articulated and clearly applied the criteria ..., we will not require the
trial court's findings to be so excruciatingly explicit in this area of minutiae that decisions of
fee awards consume more paper than did the cases from which they arose."

Forbush, 98 F.3d at 823 (internal quotation omitted); see also Todd, 47 F.3d at 1459 (finding an

abuse of discretion in the award of attorneys' fees when the district court failed to apply both the

Bowen factors and the lodestar calculation); Bellaire General Hospital v. Blue Cross Blue Shield

of Michigan, 97 F.3d at 833 (finding an abuse of discretion when the record contained "no discussion

of the two-step analysis necessary for an award of attorneys' fees in ERISA case, or any explanation

at all of how the district court arrived at the fee award"). Here, the district court set forth the Bowen

factors, computed the lodestar calculation, and articulated and applied the Johnson criteria. Because

we cannot say that its findings are so clearly erroneous that they represent an abuse of discretion, we

affirm the award of attorneys' fees to Wegner.

13
 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM summary judgment granted in favor of Wegner on

the issue of the proper calculation of his disability benefit under the policy. Likewise, we AFFIRM

the award of attorneys' fees of $24,405.00 in favor of Wegner.

______ _______ __________

14