UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-30098
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MICHAEL JACOBSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
POLICE OFFICER OSBORNE, ET AL.,
Defendants,
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; UNIDENTIFIED PARTY; CHARLES C. FOTI, JR.,
CRIMINAL SHERIFF OF ORLEANS PARISH,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
January 15, 1998
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge.
Primarily at issue is whether, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
15(c)(3), a proposed amendment to a complaint to add new parties
relates back to the date of the original complaint, especially for
replacing “John Doe” defendants, thereby defeating a limitations
bar as to those putative parties. For his action seeking relief
under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Michael Jacobsen appeals the
denial of his motion to amend in order to substitute the correct
defendants (police officers and sheriff’s deputies) for an
erroneously named officer and a “John Doe” deputy. We AFFIRM as to
the deputies; REVERSE as to the officers; and REMAND.
I.
Jacobsen’s original complaint contains the following
allegations: on 21 August 1994, in New Orleans, someone accosted
Jacobsen’s wife and brother; an altercation ensued, resulting in
the brother being arrested by New Orleans police; after Jacobsen,
who had been present, inquired as to the reason for the arrest, the
charges, and the location to which his brother was being taken,
Jacobsen was arrested for interfering with a police investigation
and was jailed by the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff; Jacobsen was
subjected to physical abuse and humiliating treatment until his
release the next morning; and, later, the charge of interfering
with a police investigation was dismissed.
On 17 August 1995, only four days shy of the first anniversary
of the incident, Jacobsen filed this action, pursuant to § 1983 and
state law, against New Orleans Police Officer Osborne and Deputy
John Doe, an unnamed deputy employed by the Orleans Parish Criminal
Sheriff, claiming that he was falsely arrested and abused by
Officer Osborne and sheriff’s deputies. Jacobsen also asserted
state law claims for battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress against the City of New Orleans and the Sheriff,
based on respondeat superior.
Service of the complaint was not completed until early October
1995. The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to
proceed before a magistrate judge, with trial scheduled for
September 1996.
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The Sheriff answered the complaint in late October 1995;
Officer Osborne and the City, early that December. On 30 August
1996, the City and the Officer moved to dismiss, pursuant to FED.
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), contending that the Officer was not the
arresting officer and, alternatively, that he was entitled to
qualified immunity; and that liability against the City was
incorrectly premised only upon its being the Officer’s employer.
Shortly thereafter, on 3 September, the Sheriff moved to
dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). That same day,
Jacobsen moved to continue trial (set for later that month),
asserting that he had discovered new information, requiring an
amended complaint. The magistrate judge granted the continuance
but did not assign a new trial date.
Two weeks later, on 18 September, over two years after the
incident and nearly five months after the court-ordered deadline
for amended pleadings, Jacobsen moved to amend to add as defendants
the correct officers and deputies. Apparently, he had obtained
Officer Osborne’s name as the arresting officer from arrest records
and an interrogatory answer by the City. But when deposed on 29
August 1996, the Officer had stated that he was only the
transporting, not the arresting, officer. Subsequent investigation
identified the arresting officers. As for the deputies, after
discovery requests failed to identify those involved in the
incident, Jacobsen had deposed the Sheriff’s office on 29 August
1996, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6), and had been able to
identify three deputies.
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Later, trial was reset for January 1997. Officer Osborne’s
Rule 12(b)(6) motion was denied because it sought dismissal on the
merits and involved considerations outside the scope of the
pleadings. The City’s similar motion was also denied.
Jacobsen’s motion to amend was denied as well. Regarding the
deputies, the magistrate judge ruled that the amendment was
untimely and there was nothing to indicate that their identities
could not have been discovered earlier; and that, in any event,
the amendment would be futile because the claims were time-barred.
With regard to the police officers, the magistrate judge ruled that
the amendment would be futile because the claims were time-barred
and the amendment would not relate back because the officers had
not received notice of the action as required by Rule 15(c)(3).
The magistrate judge reconsidered the ruling as to the
officers and allowed Jacobsen to add them as defendants to the
state law claims because, under Louisiana law, they had not
prescribed and the magistrate judge intended to maintain
supplemental jurisdiction over them.
The Sheriff’s motion to dismiss was then granted because
neither he nor any of his employees had been named in the § 1983
claim. Consequently, there was no viable federal claim against any
employee of the Sheriff; and the supplemental state law claims
against the Sheriff for battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress were dismissed to allow Jacobsen to bring them
in an appropriate state forum.
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In early December 1996, Jacobsen moved for entry of final
judgment. The magistrate judge noted that the only remaining
federal claim was the apparently unfounded one against Officer
Osborne. Thus, he refused to retain jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
Concomitantly, Jacobsen’s motion to dismiss Officer Osborne without
prejudice was granted.
II.
Contending that the magistrate judge abused his discretion by
denying the motion to amend, Jacobsen asserts that it was neither
untimely nor futile because the claims were not time-barred. (To
shore up his timeliness claim, Jacobsen notes that no trial date
had been fixed when the motion to amend was filed, and that leave
was later granted to add the officers for the state law claims.)
In the alternative, he claims that, under Rule 15(c), the amended
complaint relates back to the date of the original filing.
The denial of a Rule 15(a) motion to amend is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. E.g., Moody v. FMC Corp., 995 F.2d 63, 65
(5th Cir. 1993). Likewise, whether to grant such a motion is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court, e.g,
Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885, 890 (5th Cir.
1987); but, that discretion is limited by Rule 15(a), which states
that “leave shall be given when justice so requires”. Leffall v.
Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994). In
sum, the motion should not be denied “unless there is a substantial
reason to do so”. Id. Toward that end, the district court may
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consider factors such as whether there has been “undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment”.
In re Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir. 1996)(emphasis
added), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 686 (1997).
A.
The magistrate judge ruled, inter alia, that the motion to
amend, filed over two years after the incident, was futile because
the claims against the officers and deputies had prescribed. Of
course, for a § 1983 action, the court looks to the forum state’s
personal-injury limitations period. E.g., Moore v. McDonald, 30
F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994). In Louisiana, that period is one
year. Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1989).
On the other hand, federal law determines when a § 1983 claim
accrues. Moore, 30 F.3d at 620. In the context of such a claim
for wrongful arrest and confinement, it is the plaintiff’s
knowledge of those two events that triggers the limitations period.
Pete v. Metcalfe, 8 F.3d 214, 217-18 n.6 (5th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, Jacobsen’s claims accrued at the latest on 22 August
1994; therefore, his proposed amendment, sought over two years
after the incident, is futile unless, under Rule 15(c), it relates
back to the date of the original filing.
B.
Rule 15(c), as amended in 1991 and 1993, provides:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the
date of the original pleading when
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(1) relation back is permitted by the law
that provides the statute of limitations
applicable to the action, or
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the
naming of the party against whom a claim
is asserted if the foregoing provision
(2) is satisfied and, within the period
provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the
summons and complaint, the party to be
brought in by amendment (A) has received
such notice of the institution of the
action that the party will not be
prejudiced in maintaining a defense on
the merits, and (B) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning
the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against
the party.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (emphasis added).
Prior to the Rule being amended in 1991, the Supreme Court, in
Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986), interpreted it to permit
relation back if the following conditions were satisfied:
(1) the basic claim must have risen out of the
conduct set forth in the original proceeding;
(2) the party to be brought in must have
received such notice that it will not be
prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) the
party must or should have known that, but for
a mistake concerning identity, the action
would have been brought against it; and (4)
the second and third requirements must have
been fulfilled within the prescribed
limitations period.
Moore v. Long, 924 F.2d 586, 587 (5th Cir. 1991)(quoting Schiavone,
477 U.S. at 29).
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In response to Schiavone, Rule 15(c) was amended to change the
fourth relation-back factor. The Advisory Committee stated that
[subpart (3) was] revised to change the result
in Schiavone v. Fortune, with respect to the
problem of a misnamed defendant. An intended
defendant who is notified of an action within
the period allowed by Rule 4(m) for service of
summons and complaint may not under the
revised rule defeat the action on account of a
defect in the pleading with respect to the
defendant’s name provided that the
requirements of clauses (A) [notice] and (B)
[mistake] have been met. If the notice
requirement is met within the Rule 4(m)
period, a complaint may be amended at any time
to correct a formal defect such as a misnomer
or misidentification. On the basis of the
text of the former rule, the Court reached a
result in Schiavone v. Fortune that was
inconsistent with the liberal pleading
practices secured by Rule 8.
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c), Advisory Committee Notes (1991 Amendment)
(emphasis added).
“The only significant difference between the Schiavone rule
and amended Rule 15(c) is that, instead of requiring notice within
the limitations period, relation back is allowed as long as the
added party had notice within 120 days following the filing of the
complaint, or longer if good cause is shown.” Skoczylas v. Federal
Bureau of Prisons, 961 F.2d 543, 545 (5th Cir. 1992). As the
Second Circuit has noted, the amended Rule “is meant to allow an
amendment changing the name of a party to relate back to the
original complaint only if the change is the result of an error,
such as a misnomer or misidentification.” Barrow v. Wethersfield
Police Dept., 66 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 1995), modified by 74 F.3d
1366 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Looking to subpart (3) of the Rule, it is undisputed that the
claims asserted against the officers and deputies arose out of the
“occurrence” set forth in the original complaint. Accordingly, as
required by subpart (3), the provision stated in subpart (2) is
satisfied. Therefore, the “notice” and “mistake” clauses in
subpart (3) come into play. Both must be satisfied.
1.
The motion to amend as to the newly-named officers was denied
on one basis: futility. The magistrate judge ruled that they had
not received the requisite timely notice of the action being filed.
But, our court will infer notice if there is an identity of
interest between the original defendant and the defendant sought to
be added or substituted. Moore, 924 F.2d at 588; Kirk v. Cronvich,
629 F.2d 404, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1980).
“Identity of interest generally means that the parties are so
closely related in their business operations or other activities
that the institution of an action against one serves to provide
notice of the litigation to the other.” Kirk, 629 F.2d at 408 n.4
(internal quotations and citation omitted). In this regard,
notice may be imputed to the new party through shared counsel.
Barkins v. International Inns, Inc., 825 F.2d 905, 907 (5th Cir.
1987); Hendrix v. Memorial Hosp. of Galveston County, 776 F.2d
1255, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1985).
The City did not file a brief; therefore, we do not know its
position regarding identity of interest. In any event, there was
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a sufficient identity of interest between the newly-named officers,
Officer Osborne, and the City to infer notice.
The original complaint was served on the City Attorney, who
represented the original City defendants (the City and Officer
Osborne) and would necessarily have represented the newly-named
officers. The City Attorney answered the complaint on behalf of
the City and Officer Osborne and, to do so, presumably investigated
the allegations, thus giving the newly-named officers the clause A
notice of the action. Consequently, those officers “knew or should
have known” that, but for Jacobsen’s mistaken belief that Officer
Osborne was the arresting officer, the action would have been
brought against them, therefore satisfying clause B.
For the officers, the proposed amendment is exactly the
situation at which Rule 15(c)(3) is aimed: the misidentification
of a defendant, as also discussed infra. Accordingly, the proposed
amendment to substitute the officers for Officer Osborne relates
back to the original filing, and therefore was not futile. Because
the magistrate judge lacked a substantial reason to deny the
amendment, the denial constitutes an abuse of discretion.
2.
The motion to amend as to the deputies was denied on two
bases: untimeliness and futility. Because it was futile, we need
not reach the timeliness issue.
As for the clause A notice requirement, Jacobsen contends that
the identity of interest doctrine should apply, claiming that
shared counsel between the Sheriff and the deputies can be
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judicially noticed. Assuming arguendo he is correct, the failure
to clear the separate clause B “mistake” hurdle remains.
For the circumstances presented by this action, our court has
not addressed whether, in order to prevent a time-bar, an amendment
to substitute a named party for a “John Doe” defendant may relate
back under amended Rule 15(c)(3). We conclude that, in the
circumstances present in this case, relation back should not be
allowed. This is consistent with the majority of the other
circuits that have considered the issue. They have held that, for
a “John Doe” defendant, there was no “mistake” in identifying the
correct defendant; rather, the problem was not being able to
identify that defendant.
The Second Circuit has held in a case interpreting the 1991
and 1993 amendments that “Rule 15(c) does not allow an amended
complaint adding new defendants to relate back if the newly-added
defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not
know their identities”. Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470. This result is
necessitated by the goals of relation-back and Rule 15(c)(3): to
correct a mistake concerning the identity of a party. Id. The
Second Circuit reasoned that failing to identify individual
defendants cannot be characterized as a mistake. Id.
In interpreting the amended Rule, the Seventh Circuit reached
the same result in Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1257 (7th
Cir. 1993). For the Worthington § 1983 action, the plaintiff sued
“unknown named police officers”. After limitations had run, the
plaintiff moved to substitute as defendants the two officers
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involved in his arrest. In affirming the denial of that motion,
the Seventh Circuit held: “Because Worthington’s failure to name
[the correct officers] was due to a lack of knowledge as to their
identity, and not a mistake in their names, Worthington was
prevented from availing himself of the relation back doctrine of
Rule 15(c)”. Id. at 1257.
And, in a case decided after the amendments to Rule 15(c), the
First Circuit endorsed the view that relation back is not allowed
when the plaintiff simply lacks knowledge of the proper party.
Wilson v. United States Government, 23 F.3d 559, 562-63 (1st Cir.
1994). In Wilson, the plaintiff, after filing suit against the
wrong party, sought to substitute the United States after
limitations had run. Id. at 560-61. In affirming the time-bar,
the First Circuit noted that the United States had not received
notice of the action within the time allowed for service of
process. Id. at 562-63. In addition, it held that the mistake
prong of Rule 15(c)(3) had not been satisfied:
[T]here was no “mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party,” as required by
Rule 15(c)(3). Rather, Wilson merely lacked
knowledge of the proper party. In other
words, Wilson fully intended to sue [a
particular party], he did so, and [that party]
turned out to be the wrong party. We have no
doubt that Rule 15(c) is not designed to
remedy such mistakes.
Id. at 563.
On the other hand, in a case decided prior to the amendments
to Rule 15(c), the Third Circuit took an opposite approach,
allowing relation back when the plaintiff sought to add a defendant
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originally identified as an “unknown employee”. Varlack v. SWC
Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 174-75 (3d Cir. 1977). However, the
newly-named defendant testified that he knew there was a complaint
against his employer and that the “unknown employee” referred to
him. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the notice and
mistake requirements had been met. Obviously, that is not the
situation here.
In closing, we note that this action has been plagued by
delays. For example, in his brief to our court, Jacobsen states
that he first learned the identities of the deputies on 29 August
1996, following the earlier discussed Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of
the Sheriff’s office. However, in Jacobsen’s witness and exhibit
list filed on 10 July 1996, “D. Cunningham” (one of the deputies
later sought to be added as a defendant) is listed as a proposed
witness. The Sheriff’s witness list was filed on 3 July 1996; the
City’s, on 8 July. Neither listed Deputy Cunningham. There is no
explanation as to how Jacobsen learned about that Deputy by 10
July, or why he states that his identity did not surface until 29
August.
Along this line, the Sheriff moved on 22 April 1996 to compel
discovery; discovery requests had been served on Jacobsen the prior
November. But, as of April, Jacobsen had not responded. In short,
the result reached today as to the deputies could — and, indeed
should — have been avoided.
In other words, the proposed amendment as to the deputies was
not necessitated by the “mistake” or “misidentification” at which
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Rule 15(c)(3) is aimed. For such a situation, the Rule does not
allow relation back to the filing of the original complaint.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the denial of leave to amend the
complaint is AFFIRMED as to the Sheriff’s deputies, but REVERSED as
to the police officers. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED for
further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED
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