IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-40645
Summary Calendar
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ORA LEE PRYOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TRANE COMPANY, a Division
of American Standard, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
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April 24, 1998
Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, AND EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 case,
Plaintiff-Appellant Ora Lee Pryor appeals the district court’s
order denying her motion for a new trial, thereby upholding the
jury’s finding that Pryor was not “disabled” for purposes of the
ADA and thus preventing her recovery from Defendant-Appellant Trane
Company (Trane). Pryor argues that the jury verdict was against
the great weight of the evidence and asserts that the district
court abused its discretion in refusing to grant her a new trial.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1997).
I.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Pryor is employed as an assembly line worker at the Trane
plant in Tyler, Texas. In 1992, she was injured in a non-
occupational automobile accident and later underwent a fusion of
the cervical vertebrae in her neck. Pryor unsuccessfully attempted
to return to work on several occasions. When she again attempted
to return to work in November 1994, Trane requested a Functional
Capacity Evaluation (FCE), which was conducted by David Penn, an
independent physical therapist. Based on the FCE, one of Trane’s
in-house physicians, Dr. Levin, prescribed a set of restrictions
limiting Pryor’s repetitive and constant lifting and prohibiting
overhead lifting.2
On July 31, 1995, Pryor was recalled to work and placed at the
lay-in station on the wiring line, putting tape over unnecessary
holes in control boxes. She was laid off two and one-half days
later, however, after Dr. Farnham of Trane’s medical services
department determined that the position she had been given was
inconsistent with her medical restrictions because it required the
repetitive lifting of a thirteen pound cart. Pryor was allowed to
return to work in the same position four months later, however,
after the lifting component of the job had been eliminated.
2
Specifically, Pryor’s restrictions limited her to (1) no
repetitive lifting of weights over 20 pounds for greater than 66%
of a shift or 30 cycles an hour; (2) no constant lifting of weights
over 10 pounds for greater than 66% of a shift; (3) no overhead
lifting; and (4) only occasional overhead reaching (up to two times
an hour).
2
In April 1996, Pryor filed suit in district court under the
ADA, alleging that Trane had unlawfully discriminated against her
because of her disability by laying her off for the four months
from August to November, 1995. The case was tried to a jury, which
found that Pryor was not disabled. After the district court denied
her motion for a new trial, Pryor timely appealed.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The only issue raised by Pryor on appeal is whether the
district court erred in denying her motion for a new trial. “A
trial court should not grant a new trial on evidentiary grounds
unless the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.”3
The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse its
ruling without a clear showing that this discretion has been
abused.4 Indeed, our review is more narrow when a new trial is
denied than when one is granted.5 In such cases, “all the factors
that govern our review of [the trial court’s] decision favor
3
Dotson v. Clark Equip. Co., 805 F.2d 1225, 1227 (5th Cir.
1986); see also Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 957 (5th
Cir. 1981) (“The standard at the trial level on a motion for a new
trial is whether the verdict is against the clear weight of the
evidence or will result in a miscarriage of justice.”).
4
Williams v. Chevron USA, Inc., 875 F.2d 501, 505 (5th Cir.
1989); Dotson, 805 F.2d at 1227.
5
Pagan v. Shoney’s, Inc., 931 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1991).
3
affirmance,”6 and we must affirm the verdict unless the evidence ——
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict —— “points
‘so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the
court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary
[conclusion].’”7
B. Applicable Law
The ADA defines “disability” as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of [an]
individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.8
“Although the ADA does not define ‘substantially limits’ and ‘major
life activities,’ the regulations promulgated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] ‘provide significant
guidance.’”9 These regulations define “major life activities” as
“functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.”10 “Other major life activities could include lifting,
6
Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir.
1982).
7
Jones v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 870 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir.
1989) (quoting Whatley v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 861 F.2d
837, 839 (5th Cir. 1988)).
8
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
9
Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190 (5th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723,
726 (5th Cir. 1995)).
10
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996).
4
reaching, sitting, or standing.”11 Whether an impairment
substantially limits12.29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii).13 a major
life activity is determined by considering (1) the nature and
severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or expected duration,
and (3) its permanent or expected permanent or long-term impact.14
“[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with
little or no longer term or permanent impact, are usually not
disabilities.”15
Pryor contends that she was substantially limited in the major
life activities of lifting, pulling and pushing, and working.
Examining first whether Pryor’s impairment substantially limited
the major activities of lifting, pulling and pushing,16 we conclude
11
Dutcher, 53 F.2d at 726 n.7 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630,
Appendix to Part 1630 —— Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, § 1630.2(i)).
12
The regulations provide that “substantially limited” means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner
or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average
person in the general population can perform the same
major life activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii).
14
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii).
15
29 C.F.R. § 1630, App., § 1630.2(j).
16
See Dutcher, 53 F.2d at 726 & n.10 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630,
App., § 1630.2(j)):
5
that there was evidence to support the jury’s verdict that she was
not disabled. “To determine whether a person is substantially
limited in a major life activity other than working, we look to
whether that person can perform the normal activities of daily
living.”17 Although Penn noted in the FCE that Pryor’s lifting from
shoulder to overhead and her ability to pull and push were below
average, he also declared that “[h]er activities of daily living
are 100%.” The FCE specifically stated that the results of her
tests regarding sitting, reaching, bending, squatting, walking,
climbing a ladder, kneeling, and balance were all normal, and
professed that “[s]he denies difficulty with driving.” The jury’s
finding that Pryor was not disabled was therefore not against the
great weight of the evidence.
This finding is also consistent with the caselaw regarding
lifting as a major life activity under the ADA. In Dutcher, the
plaintiff presented evidence that she could “do lifting and
reaching as long as she avoid[ed] heavy lifting and repetitive
rotational movements.”18 She also testified that she “[had] trouble
picking up little things from the floor, . . . holding things up
high or real tight for long periods of time, and . . . turning the
If an individual is not substantially limited with
respect to any other major life activity, the
individual’s ability to perform the major life activity
of working should be considered. If an individual is
substantially limited in any other major life activity, no
determination should be made as to whether the individual is
substantially limited in working.
17
Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996).
18
Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726.
6
car’s ignition.”19 We affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, holding that “a jury could not find that her
impairment substantially limits life activities on this basis.”20
Similarly, in Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Systems, Inc.,21
the court held that “as a matter of law, . . . a twenty-five pound
lifting limitation . . . does not constitute a significant
restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform any other
major life activity.”22
With regard to the activity of working:
[S]ubstantially limits means significantly restricted in
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and
abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular
job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the
major life activity of working.23
Pryor testified that she could perform her job without any
accommodation, both before and after the assembly line was changed.
Furthermore, no evidence was presented that she could not perform
an entire class of jobs; in fact, Penn found Pryor able to perform
a medium level of work as defined by the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles. She was only prohibited from performing jobs that required
19
Id. at 726 n.11.
20
Id.
21
101 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1844,
137 L. Ed. 2d 1048 (1997).
22
Id. at 349; see also Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America,
85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (twenty-five pound lifting
restriction was not “significant restriction” on major life
activities).
23
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
7
constant or overhead lifting. A reasonable juror could have found
from this evidence that Pryor was not unable to perform a broad
range of jobs and was thus not substantially limited in the major
life activity of working.24
Next, Pryor asserts that her injury, surgery, hospitalization,
and inability to work for two years establish as a matter of law
that she had a record of a disability for purposes of the ADA. We
disagree. In Ray v. Glidden,25 the plaintiff missed more than a
year of work and underwent surgeries to replace his hips and
shoulders. We affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, explaining that there must be a record of an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity. We held that
restrictions indicating an inability to perform continuous, heavy
lifting or an inability to perform a particular job do not
necessarily constitute a record of disability.26 Likewise, in this
24
See McKay v. Toyota Motor Manuf., USA, Inc., 110 F.3d 369
(6th Cir. 1997), in which the court affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, stating:
In light of the regulatory framework of the ADA, we hold
that the physical restrictions caused by plaintiff’s
disability [carpal tunnel syndrome] do not significantly
restrict her ability to perform the class of jobs at
issue, manufacturing jobs; at best, her evidence supports
a conclusion that her impairment disqualifies her from
only the narrow range of assembly line manufacturing jobs
that require repetitive motion or frequent lifting of
more than ten pounds. It follows that her limited
impairment would not significantly restrict her ability
to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes.
Id. at 373.
25
85 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1996).
26
Id. at 229.
8
case, there was evidence that Pryor was given work restrictions
based on her medical history and the FCE. As in Ray, however, the
mere fact that Pryor had work restrictions did not require the jury
to find that she had a disability that substantially limited a
major life activity.
Finally, Pryor insists that Trane regarded her as having a
disability. According to the EEOC regulations, an individual is
“regarded as having such an impairment” if she “has a physical or
mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life
activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such
limitation.”27 We have explained, however, that “an employer does
not necessarily regard an employee as having a substantially
limiting impairment simply because it believes she is incapable of
performing a particular job.”28 Here, evidence was presented that,
while Trane considered Pryor to have a neck impairment that limited
her ability to perform her particular job, the company did not
regard her as disabled. There was no evidence that Trane regarded
Pryor’s neck injury as preventing her from performing an entire
class of jobs; it merely showed that at the time there were no jobs
available which fit Pryor’s restrictions. The jury was entitled to
conclude that, even though Trane was aware of Pryor’s medical
restrictions and deferred to a doctor’s judgment that her position
was incompatible with those restrictions, it did not regard her as
disabled.
27
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1).
28
Ellison, 85 F.3d at 192.
9
As the jury verdict was not against the great weight of the
evidence, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s denial of Pryor’s motion. And as we have frequently noted,
“[w]e are ‘not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury
verdict (simply) because the jury could have drawn different
inferences or conclusions or because (we) feel that other results
are more reasonable.’”29
III.
CONCLUSION
Our review of the record and the arguments of counsel leads us
to conclude that the jury verdict was supported by the law and the
evidence, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Pryor’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the
judgment of the district court is, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
29
Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244, 247 (5th
Cir. 1979) (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35,
64 S. Ct. 409, 412, 88 L. Ed. 520 (1944)).
10