FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD L. PORTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DONALD C. WINTER, Secretary of No. 07-17120
the Department of the Navy;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED D.C. No.
CV-06-00880-LJO
STATES; LAW OFFICE OF ELAINE W.
OPINION
WALLACE; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
September 17, 2009—San Francisco, California
Filed May 5, 2010
Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Stephen Reinhardt and
Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Reinhardt
6771
PORTER v. WINTER 6773
COUNSEL
Lizbeth Veronica West (argued), Charles L. Post, Weintraub
Genshlea Chediak Law Corporation, Sacramento, California,
for the plaintiff-appellant.
Lynn T. Ernce, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, Califor-
nia, for the defendants-appellees.
OPINION
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
Ronald Porter, a former civilian employee of the Navy,
brought a complaint before the Equal Employment Opportu-
6774 PORTER v. WINTER
nity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging gender discrimination
and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. The EEOC found the Navy liable for retaliation, but
not gender discrimination. Porter sought to recover the attor-
ney’s fees and costs he incurred in the Title VII administrative
proceedings, but the Navy awarded him only a fraction of the
amount he requested. After reviewing the Navy’s fee deci-
sion, the EEOC slightly increased the award.
Porter filed a complaint in district court challenging the
amount of attorney’s fees awarded to him in the Title VII
administrative proceedings. The district court dismissed the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning
that it did not “have jurisdiction to adjudicate solely a claim
for attorney’s fees without a claim of a substantive violation
of Title VII.” Porter appeals that ruling. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the district court’s deci-
sion de novo. Armstrong v. N. Mariana Islands, 576 F.3d 950,
954 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009).
We conclude that, under New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over claims brought solely to recover attorney’s
fees incurred in Title VII administrative proceedings. Accord-
ingly, we reverse.
ANALYSIS
A federal employee who is aggrieved by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s final disposition of
his Title VII complaint may file a civil action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(c). Three of the statutory provisions that govern
such actions are relevant to this appeal:
• 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an aggrieved
person to bring a civil action;
• 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) provides that “[e]ach
United States district court . . . shall have juris-
PORTER v. WINTER 6775
diction of actions brought under this subchapter”;
and
• 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that “[i]n any
action or proceeding under this subchapter the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee”.
See also id. § 2000e-16(d) (providing that civil actions
brought by federal employees are governed by 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-5(f)-(k)).
The Supreme Court interpreted these provisions in New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980). The
plaintiff in Carey filed a complaint in district court seeking
attorney’s fees, back pay, and other relief under Title VII. Id.
at 58. The parties later agreed to the dismissal of all claims
except the request for attorney’s fees, a portion of which was
based on expenses incurred in state administrative proceed-
ings. Id. at 59. The question before the Court was thus
“whether, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
federal court may allow the prevailing party attorney’s fees
for legal services performed in prosecuting an employment
discrimination claim in state administrative and judicial pro-
ceedings that Title VII requires federal claimants to invoke.”
Id. at 56 (emphasis in original).
[1] The Court first addressed the plaintiff’s entitlement to
attorney’s fees, and concluded that “[t]he words of [42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k)] leave little doubt that fee awards are authorized
for legal work done in ‘proceedings’ other than court actions,”
including federal and state administrative proceedings. Carey,
447 U.S. at 61-62. The Court then addressed the proper forum
for seeking those fees, and concluded that Title VII authorizes
“a civil suit in federal court . . . solely to obtain an award of
6776 PORTER v. WINTER
attorney’s fees for legal work done in state and local proceed-
ings.”1 Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding Carey’s clear statement that Title VII
authorizes a civil suit in federal court “solely to obtain an
award of attorney’s fees,” 447 U.S. at 66, the Navy asserts
that Carey does not control the outcome of this case. First, it
argues that the cases are factually distinguishable because in
Carey, the plaintiff’s original complaint in federal court
asserted substantive Title VII claims in addition to the claim
for attorney’s fees. Here, in contrast, Porter’s original com-
plaint in federal court asserted only a claim for attorney’s
fees. Two other circuits have considered the argument now
advanced by the Navy. The Fourth Circuit held that Carey
does not apply to a factual situation like the one now before
us, Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2000), while
the Eight Circuit rejected the argument, now asserted by the
Navy, as “a distinction without a difference.” Jones v. Ameri-
can State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1988).
[2] We agree with the Eighth Circuit. The Carey majority
stated its conclusion in a manner that clearly applies to claims
originally brought solely to recover attorney’s fees incurred in
Title VII administrative proceedings:
Since it is clear that Congress intended to authorize
fee awards for work done in administrative proceed-
ings, we must conclude that [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
1
This conclusion applies a fortiori to attorney’s fees for legal work done
in federal administrative proceedings, because the Court considered and
rejected the argument that the Title VII fee shifting provision authorized
fee awards “only for work done in federal administrative proceedings,
such as those before the EEOC, but not for state administrative or state
judicial proceedings.” Carey, 447 U.S. at 61-62 (footnote omitted). The
Court also noted that “throughout Title VII the word ‘proceeding,’ or its
plural form, is used to refer to all the different types of proceedings in
which the statute is enforced, state and federal, administrative and judi-
cial.” Id. at 62-63.
PORTER v. WINTER 6777
5(f)(1)’s] authorization of a civil suit in federal court
encompasses a suit solely to obtain an award of
attorney’s fees for legal work done in state and local
proceedings.
Carey, 447 U.S. at 66; see also id. at 71 (concluding that 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f) and 2000e-5(k) “authorize a federal-
court action to recover an award of attorney’s fees”).
Although one justice objected that “[w]hether Congress
intended to authorize a separate federal action solely to
recover costs, including attorney’s fees, incurred in obtaining
administrative relief . . . is a question that is plainly not pre-
sented by this record,” id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring), none
of the six justices in the majority agreed with his contention.2
[3] The Navy also argues, however, that Carey has been
limited by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in North
Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Com-
munity Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986). In Crest Street, the
issue before the Court was “whether a court may award attor-
ney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in a separate federal action not to
enforce any of the civil rights laws listed in § 1988, but solely
to recover attorney’s fees.” Id. at 7. In its analysis of that
issue, the Court first looked to the plain language of Section
1988, noting that it applies only to an “action or proceeding
to enforce a provision of . . . [T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.” Id. at 12 (emphasis added; alterations in the origi-
nal) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). The Court determined that a
suit brought solely to recover attorney’s fees was not an
action to enforce any of the civil rights statutes listed in Sec-
2
The majority opinion in Carey was written by Justice Blackmun and
joined in full by Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell. Chief
Justice Burger joined the majority opinion except as to footnote 6, in
which the Court “note[d] that if fees were authorized only when the com-
plainant found an independent reason for suing in federal court under Title
VII, such a ground almost always could be found.” Carey, 447 U.S. at 66
n.6.
6778 PORTER v. WINTER
tion 1988, and thus was not encompassed by the statutory lan-
guage. Id. Next, the Court examined the legislative history of
Section 1988, finding it “replete with references to the
enforcement of the civil rights statutes in suits, through the
courts and by judicial process.” Id. (citations and internal quo-
tation marks omitted). The Court concluded that “[t]he legis-
lative history clearly envisions that attorney’s fees would be
awarded for proceedings only when those proceedings are
part of or followed by a lawsuit.” Id. at 14. Accordingly, the
Court held that Section 1988 did not authorize “a completely
independent action for attorney’s fees” in federal court. Id. at
16.
In Crest Street, the Court acknowledged that “dicta” in its
previous opinions, including Carey, pointed to a different
result than the one it reached. 479 U.S. at 13-15. The Court
determined that the policy considerations set forth in those
opinions could not overcome the plain language of Section
1988 or the clear intent expressed in its legislative history,
and that in any event, the concerns “may have been exagger-
ated.” Id. at 14. The Court expressly disavowed Carey’s sug-
gestion “that today’s holding would create an incentive to file
protective lawsuits in order to obtain attorney’s fees.” Id. (cit-
ing Carey, 447 U.S. at 66 n.6).
Three other circuits have addressed the extent to which
Carey survives the Supreme Court’s decision in Crest Street.
Because Crest Street involved the interpretation of Section
1988, while Carey involved the interpretation of Title VII, the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that Crest Street did not
in any manner modify or overrule Carey. Slade v. U.S. Postal
Service, 952 F.2d 357, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1991); Jones, 857
F.2d at 498 & n.10. Due in part to Crest Street’s “discussion
and disavowal of certain policy arguments underlying the
Carey decision,” however, the Fourth Circuit has held that
Title VII does not authorize an action in federal court that ini-
tially includes only a claim for attorney’s fees. Chris, 221
F.3d at 654-55.
PORTER v. WINTER 6779
[4] We agree with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. Crest
Street did not modify or overrule Carey, and although both
cases construed fee shifting provisions, the two provisions uti-
lize different statutory language and appear within different
statutory schemes. Crest Street based its interpretation of Sec-
tion 1988 on the meaning of the phrase “to enforce,” which
is absent from Title VII’s fee shifting provision, and the legis-
lative history of Section 1988, which is specific to that statute.
We are thus bound to follow Carey’s interpretation of Title
VII, notwithstanding Crest Street’s criticism of its reasoning.
“If a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application
in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other
line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decision.” Musladin v.
Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 837 (9th Cir. 2009) (alterations in
the original) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237
(1997)). “The fact that the Supreme Court has expressed some
ambivalence about its own jurisprudence does not give us the
power to change it.” United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844,
847 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
[5] Even if we were not bound by Carey, the structure of
Title VII and the plain language of its fee shifting provision
would compel us to reach the same result. Through Title VII,
Congress “has sought to coordinate the actions of state agen-
cies, federal agencies, state courts and federal courts.” Jones,
857 F.2d at 497. The purpose of this integrated system of
administrative and judicial remedies is to provide complete
relief to victims of employment discrimination. Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). “One aspect
of complete relief is an award of attorney’s fees,” Carey, 447
U.S. at 67-68, and the “ ‘ultimate authority’ to secure compli-
ance with Title VII resides in the federal courts.” Id. at 64
(quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-
45 (1974)); accord Slade, 952 F.2d at 361; Jones, 857 F.2d
at 497-98. Consistent with that structure, Congress enacted a
broadly-worded fee shifting provision that authorizes courts
6780 PORTER v. WINTER
to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party “[i]n any
action or proceeding under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (emphasis added). Nothing in the language of
that provision suggests that federal courts may award attor-
ney’s fees only to claimants who are compelled to seek other
forms of relief as well in the federal courts, and imposing
such a limitation would be inconsistent with the responsibility
of federal courts to ensure that Title VII claimants ultimately
receive complete relief for their injuries.
[6] Because 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) and 2000e-5(k)
authorize a civil suit in federal court solely to recover attor-
ney’s fees for legal work done in administrative proceedings,
Porter’s claim qualifies as an “action[ ] brought under this
subchapter” for purposes of Title VII’s jurisdictional grant. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Accordingly, the district court erred
in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
Porter’s claim.
REVERSED and REMANDED.