(Slip Opinion) Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Per Curiam
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–607
_________________
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLD
INGS, DBA LABCORP, PETITIONER v. METABO
LITE LABORATORIES, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
[June 22, 2006]
PER CURIAM.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently
granted.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
BREYER, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–607
_________________
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLD
INGS, DBA LABCORP, PETITIONER v. METABO
LITE LABORATORIES, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
[June 22, 2006]
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and
JUSTICE SOUTER join, dissenting.
This case involves a patent that claims a process for
helping to diagnose deficiencies of two vitamins, folate and
cobalamin. The process consists of using any test
(whether patented or unpatented) to measure the level in
a body fluid of an amino acid called homocysteine and then
noticing whether its level is elevated above the norm; if so,
a vitamin deficiency is likely.
The lower courts held that the patent claim is valid.
They also found the petitioner, Laboratory Corporation of
America Holdings (LabCorp), liable for inducing infringe
ment of the claim when it encouraged doctors to order
diagnostic tests for measuring homocysteine. The courts
assessed damages. And they enjoined LabCorp from using
any tests that would lead the doctors it serves to find a
vitamin deficiency by taking account of elevated homocys
teine levels.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether
the patent claim is invalid on the ground that it improp
erly seeks to “claim a monopoly over a basic scientific
relationship,” Pet. for Cert. i, namely, the relationship
between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency. The Court
has dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. In my
2 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v.
METABOLITE LABORATORIES, INC.
BREYER, J., dissenting
view, we should not dismiss the writ. The question pre
sented is not unusually difficult. We have the authority to
decide it. We said that we would do so. The parties and
amici have fully briefed the question. And those who en
gage in medical research, who practice medicine, and who as
patients depend upon proper health care, might well benefit
from this Court’s authoritative answer.
I
A
The relevant principle of law “[e]xclude[s] from . . .
patent protection . . . laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175, 185
(1981). This principle finds its roots in both English and
American law. See, e.g., Neilson v. Harford, Webster’s
Patent Cases 295, 371 (1841); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How.
156. 175 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62 (1854); The
Telephone Cases, 126 U. S. 1 (1888). The principle means
that Einstein could not have “patent[ed] his celebrated law
that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of
gravity.” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 309
(1980). Neither can one patent “a novel and useful
mathematical formula,” Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584,
585 (1978), the motive power of electromagnetism or
steam, Morse, supra, at 116, “the heat of the sun, electric
ity, or the qualities of metals,” Funk Brothers Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 (1948).
The justification for the principle does not lie in any
claim that “laws of nature” are obvious, or that their dis
covery is easy, or that they are not useful. To the con
trary, research into such matters may be costly and time-
consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and the
fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of
great benefit to the human race. Rather, the reason for
the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protec
tion can impede rather than “promote the Progress of
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
BREYER, J., dissenting
Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional objective of
patent and copyright protection. U. S. Const., Art. I, §8,
cl. 8.
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not
only encourage research by providing monetary incentives
for invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage
research by impeding the free exchange of information, for
example by forcing researchers to avoid the use of poten
tially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly
and time-consuming searches of existing or pending pat
ents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by
raising the costs of using the patented information, some
times prohibitively so.
Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection
just as surely as it seeks to avoid the diminished incentive
to invent that underprotection can threaten. One way in
which patent law seeks to sail between these opposing and
risky shoals is through rules that bring certain types of
invention and discovery within the scope of patentability
while excluding others. And scholars have noted that
“patent law[’s] exclu[sion of] fundamental scientific (in
cluding mathematical) and technological principles,” (like
copyright’s exclusion of “ideas”) is a rule of the latter
variety. W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure
of Intellectual Property Law 305 (2003). That rule reflects
“both . . . the enormous potential for rent seeking that
would be created if property rights could be obtained in
[those basic principles] and . . . the enormous transaction
costs that would be imposed on would-be users.” Id., at
305–306; cf. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d
119, 122 (CA2 1930) (L. Hand, J.).
Thus, the Court has recognized that “[p]henomena of
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are . . . the basic tools of
scientific and technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U. S. 63, 67 (1972). It has treated fundamental scien
4 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v.
METABOLITE LABORATORIES, INC.
BREYER, J., dissenting
tific principles as “part of the storehouse of knowledge”
and manifestations of laws of nature as “free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros., supra, at
130. And its doing so reflects a basic judgment that pro
tection in such cases, despite its potentially positive incen
tive effects, would too often severely interfere with, or
discourage, development and the further spread of useful
knowledge itself.
B
In the 1980s three university doctors, after conducting
research into vitamin deficiencies, found a correlation
between high levels of homocysteine in the blood and
deficiencies of two essential vitamins, folate (folic acid)
and cobalamin (vitamin B12). They also developed more
accurate methods for testing body fluids for homocysteine,
using gas chromatography and mass spectrometry. They
published their findings in 1985. They obtained a patent.
And that patent eventually found its commercial way into
the hands of Competitive Technologies, Inc. (CTI), and its
licensee Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (Metabolite), the
respondents here.
The patent contains several claims that cover the re
searchers’ new methods for testing homocysteine levels
using gas chromatography and mass spectrometry. Supp.
App. 30. In 1991, LabCorp (in fact, a corporate predeces
sor) took a license from Metabolite permitting it to use the
tests described in the patent in return for 27.5% of related
revenues. Their agreement permitted LabCorp to termi
nate the arrangement if “a more cost effective commercial
alternative is available that does not infringe a valid and
enforceable claim of ” the patent. App. 305 (emphasis
added).
Until 1998, LabCorp used the patented tests and paid
royalties. By that time, however, growing recognition that
elevated homocysteine levels might predict risk of heart
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
BREYER, J., dissenting
disease led to increased testing demand. Other companies
began to produce alternative testing procedures. And
LabCorp decided to use one of these other procedures—a
test devised by Abbott Laboratories that LabCorp con
cluded was “far superior.” Id., at 167 (testimony of Peter
Wentz).
LabCorp continued to pay royalties to respondents
whenever it used the patented tests. But it concluded that
Abbott’s test did not fall within the patent’s protective
scope. And LabCorp consequently refused to pay royalties
when it used the Abbott test. Id., at 237 (payment elimi
nated due to “change in methodology”).
In response, respondents brought this suit against
LabCorp for patent infringement and breach of the license
agreement. They did not claim that LabCorp’s use of the
Abbott test infringed the patent’s claims describing meth
ods for testing for homocysteine. Instead, respondents
relied on a broader claim not limited to those tests, namely
claim 13, the sole claim at issue here. That claim—set
forth below in its entirety—seeks patent protection for:
“A method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or
folate in warm-blooded animals comprising the steps
of:
“assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total
homocysteine; and
“correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine
in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or
folate.” Supp. App. 30.
Claim 13, respondents argued, created a protected
monopoly over the process of “correlating” test results and
potential vitamin deficiencies. The parties agreed that the
words “assaying a body fluid” refer to the use of any test at
all, whether patented or not patented, that determines
whether a body fluid has an “elevated level of total homo
cysteine.” And at trial, the inventors testified that claim
6 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v.
METABOLITE LABORATORIES, INC.
BREYER, J., dissenting
13’s “correlating” step consists simply of a physician’s
recognizing that a test that shows an elevated homocys
teine level—by that very fact—shows the patient likely
has a cobalamin or folate deficiency. App. 108–111 (testi
mony of Dr. Sally Stabler); id., at 131–148 (testimony of
Robert Allen). They added that, because the natural
relationship between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency
was now well known, such “correlating” would occur
automatically in the mind of any competent physician.
Id., at 137–138 (same).
On this understanding of the claim, respondents argued,
LabCorp was liable for inducing doctors to infringe. More
specifically, LabCorp would conduct homocysteine tests
and report the results measured in micromoles (millionths
of a mole) per liter (symbolized µmol/L). Doctors, because
of their training, would know that a normal homocysteine
range in blood is between 7 and 22 µmol/L (and in urine
between 1 and 20 µmol/L), Supp. App. 14, and would know
that an elevated homocysteine level is correlated with a
vitamin deficiency. Hence, in reviewing the test results,
doctors would look at the µmol/L measure and automati
cally reach a conclusion about whether or not a person was
suffering from a vitamin deficiency. Claim 13 therefore
covered every homocysteine test that a doctor reviewed.
And since LabCorp had advertised its tests and educated
doctors about the correlation, LabCorp should be liable for
actively inducing the doctors’ infringing acts. See 35
U. S. C. §271(b).
The jury found LabCorp liable on this theory. The
District Court calculated damages based on unpaid royal
ties for some 350,000 homocysteine tests performed by
LabCorp using the Abbott method. The court also en
joined LabCorp from performing “any homocysteine-only
test, including, without limitation homocysteine-only tests
via the Abbott method.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a–37a
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
BREYER, J., dissenting
LabCorp appealed. It argued to the Federal Circuit that
the trial court was wrong to construe claim 13 so broadly
that infringement took place “every time a physician does
nothing more than look at a patient’s homocysteine level.”
Corrected Brief for Appellant in No. 03–1120 (CA Fed.),
p. 28 (hereinafter Brief for Appellant). Indeed, if so con
strued (rather than construed, say, to cover only patented
tests), then claim 13 was “invalid for indefiniteness, lack
of written description, non-enablement, anticipation,
and obviousness.” Id., at 38. LabCorp told the Federal
Circuit:
“If the Court were to uphold this vague claim, anyone
could obtain a patent on any scientific correlation—
that there is a link between fact A and fact B—merely
by drafting a patent claiming no more than ‘test for
fact A and correlate with fact B’ . . . . Claim 13 does
no more than that. If it is upheld, CTI would improp
erly gain a monopoly over a basic scientific fact rather
than any novel invention of its own. The law is set
tled that no such claim should be allowed. See, e.g.,
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U. S. 175 (1981); . . . Chisum on
Patents §1.03[6].” Id., at 41.
The Federal Circuit rejected LabCorp’s arguments. It
agreed with the District Court that claim 13’s “correlating”
step simply means “relating total homocysteine levels to
cobalamin or folate deficiency, a deficiency in both, or a
deficiency in neither.” 370 F. 3d 1354, 1363 (2004). That
meaning, it said, is “discernable and clear”; it is definite, it
is described in writing, and it would enable virtually
anyone to follow the instruction it gives. And that is
sufficient. Id., at 1366–1367. The Court did not address
LabCorp’s argument that, if so construed, claim 13 must
be struck down as an improper effort to obtain patent
protection for a law of nature.
Moreover, the Circuit concluded, because any competent
8 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v.
METABOLITE LABORATORIES, INC.
BREYER, J., dissenting
doctor reviewing test results would automatically correlate
those results with the presence or absence of a vitamin
deficiency, virtually every doctor who ordered and read the
tests was a direct infringer. And because LabCorp “pub
lishes . . . Continuing Medical Education articles” and
other pieces, which urge doctors to conduct the relevant
tests and to reach a conclusion about whether a patient is
suffering from a vitamin deficiency based upon the test
results, LabCorp induces infringement. Id., at 1365.
Finally, the court rejected LabCorp’s challenge to the
injunction. Id., at 1372.
LabCorp filed a petition for certiorari. Question Three
of the petition asks “[w]hether a method patent . . . direct
ing a party simply to ‘correlate’ test results can validly
claim a monopoly over a basic scientific relationship . . .
such that any doctor necessarily infringes the patent
merely by thinking about the relationship after looking at
a test result.” Pet. for Cert. i. After calling for and receiv
ing the views of the Solicitor General, 543 U. S. 1185
(2005), we granted the petition, limited to Question Three.
II
The question before us is whether claim 13, as construed
and applied in the way I have described in Part I–B, is
invalid in light of the “law of nature” principle, described
in Part I–A. I believe that we should answer that ques
tion. There is a technical procedural reason for not doing
so, namely, that LabCorp did not refer in the lower courts
to §101 of the Patent Act, which sets forth subject matter
that is patentable, and within the bounds of which the
“law of nature” principle most comfortably fits. See 35
U. S. C. §101 (patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter”); Flook, 437 U. S., at 588–589. There is also a
practical reason for not doing so, namely, that we might
benefit from the views of the Federal Circuit, which did
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 9
BREYER, J., dissenting
not directly consider the question. See, e.g., United States
v. Bestfoods, 524 U. S. 51, 72–73 (1998).
Nonetheless, stronger considerations argue for our
reaching a decision. For one thing, the technical proce
dural objection is tenuous. LabCorp argued the essence of
its present claim below. It told the Federal Circuit that
claim 13 as construed by the District Court was too
“vague” because that construction would allow “anyone” to
“obtain a patent on any scientific correlation;” it would
permit the respondents “improperly [to] gain a monopoly
over a basic scientific fact” despite “settled” law “that no
such claim should be allowed.” Brief for Appellant 41
(citing Diehr, 450 U. S., at 1185; 1 D. Chisum, Patents
§1.03[6]) (2006 ed.) (hereinafter Chisum). LabCorp explic
itly stated in its petition for certiorari that, “if the Court
allows the Federal Circuit opinion to stand . . . [respon
dents] would improperly gain monopolies over basic scien
tific facts rather than any novel inventions of their own.”
Pet. for Cert. 25 (citing Diehr, supra; Gottschalk, 409 U. S.
63; Funk Bros., 333 U. S. 127; Mackay Radio & Telegraph
Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U. S. 86 (1939)). And
after considering the Solicitor General’s advice not to hear
the case (primarily based upon LabCorp’s failure to refer
to 35 U. S. C. §101), we rejected that advice, thereby “nec
essarily consider[ing] and reject[ing] that contention as a
basis for denying review.” United States v. Williams, 504
U. S. 36, 40 (1992).
For another thing, I can find no good practical reason for
refusing to decide the case. The relevant issue has been
fully briefed and argued by the parties, the Government,
and 20 amici. The record is comprehensive, allowing us to
learn the precise nature of the patent claim, to consider
the commercial and medical context (which the parties
and amici have described in detail), and to become famil
iar with the arguments made in all courts. Neither
the factual record nor the briefing suffers from any
10 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v.
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BREYER, J., dissenting
significant gap. No party has identified any prejudice due
to our answering the question. And there is no indication
that LabCorp’s failure to cite §101 reflected unfair
gamesmanship.
Of course, further consideration by the Federal Circuit
might help us reach a better decision. Lower court consid
eration almost always helps. But the thoroughness of the
briefing leads me to conclude that the extra time, cost, and
uncertainty that further proceedings would engender are
not worth the potential benefit.
Finally, I believe that important considerations of the
public interest—including that of clarifying the law in this
area sooner rather than later—argue strongly for our
deciding the question presented now. See Part IV, infra.
III
I turn to the merits. The researchers who obtained the
present patent found that an elevated level of homocys
teine in a warm-blooded animal is correlated with folate
and cobalamin deficiencies. As construed by the Federal
Circuit, claim 13 provides those researchers with control
over doctors’ efforts to use that correlation to diagnose
vitamin deficiencies in a patient. Does the law permit
such protection or does claim 13, in the circumstances,
amount to an invalid effort to patent a “phenomenon of
nature”?
I concede that the category of non-patentable “phenom
ena of nature,” like the categories of “mental processes,”
and “abstract intellectual concepts,” is not easy to define.
See Flook, supra, at 589 (“The line between a patentable
‘process’ and an unpatentable ‘principle’ is not always
clear”); cf. Nichols, 45 F. 2d, at 122 (“[W]e are as aware as
anyone that the line [between copyrighted material and
non-copyrightable ideas], wherever it is drawn, will seem
arbitrary”). After all, many a patentable invention rests
upon its inventor’s knowledge of natural phenomena;
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 11
BREYER, J., dissenting
many “process” patents seek to make abstract intellectual
concepts workably concrete; and all conscious human
action involves a mental process. See generally 1 Chisum
§1.03, at 78–295. Nor can one easily use such abstract
categories directly to distinguish instances of likely benefi
cial, from likely harmful, forms of protection. Cf. FTC, To
Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition
and Patent Law and Policy, ch. 3, p. 1 (Oct. 2003) (herein
after FTC) (collecting evidence that “issues of fixed cost
recovery, alternative appropriability mechanisms, and
relationships between initial and follow-on innovation”
vary by industry); Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent
Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1577–1589 (2003) (“Recent
evidence has demonstrated that this complex relationship
[between patents and innovation] is . . . industry-specific
at each stage of the patent process”).
But this case is not at the boundary. It does not require
us to consider the precise scope of the “natural phenome
non” doctrine or any other difficult issue. In my view,
claim 13 is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably
interprets that doctrine.
There can be little doubt that the correlation between
homocysteine and vitamin deficiency set forth in claim 13
is a “natural phenomenon.” That is what the petitioners
argue. It is what the Solicitor General has told us. Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 19 (filed Dec. 23, 2005)
(“The natural relationship between elevated homocysteine
and deficiencies in the B vitamins is an unpatentable
‘principle in natural philosophy or physical science’ ”)
(quoting Morse, 15 How., at 116)). Indeed, it is close to
what the respondents concede. Brief for Respondents 31
(“The correlation between total homocysteine and deficien
cies in cobalamin and folate that the Inventors discovered
could be considered, standing alone, a ‘natural phenome
non’ in the literal sense: It is an observable aspect of bio
chemistry in at least some human populations”).
12 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v.
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BREYER, J., dissenting
The respondents argue, however, that the correlation is
nonetheless patentable because claim 13 packages it in
the form of a “process” for detecting vitamin deficiency,
with discrete testing and correlating steps. They point to
this Court’s statements that a “process is not unpatentable
simply because it contains a law of nature,” Flook, 437
U. S., at 590; see also Gottschalk, 409 U. S., at 67, and
that “an application of a law of nature . . . to a known . . .
process may well be deserving of patent protection.”
Diehr, 450 U. S., at 187. They add that claim 13 is a
patentable “application of a law of nature” because, con
sidered as a whole, it (1) “entails a physical transforma
tion of matter,” namely, the alteration of a blood sample
during whatever test is used, Brief for Respondents 33
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780, 788 (1877);
Gottschalk, supra, at 70), and because it (2) “produces a
‘useful, concrete, and tangible result,’ ” namely, detection
of a vitamin deficiency, Brief for Respondents 36 (citing
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368, 1373 (CA Fed 1998)).
In my view, however, the cases to which respondents
refer do not support their claim. Neither Cochrane nor
Gottschalk can help them because the process described in
claim 13 is not a process for transforming blood or any
other matter. Claim 13’s process instructs the user to (1)
obtain test results and (2) think about them. Why should
it matter if the test results themselves were obtained
through an unpatented procedure that involved the trans
formation of blood? Claim 13 is indifferent to that fact, for
it tells the user to use any test at all. Indeed, to use virtu
ally any natural phenomenon for virtually any useful
purpose could well involve the use of empirical informa
tion obtained through an unpatented means that might
have involved transforming matter. Neither Cochrane nor
Gottschalk suggests that that fact renders the phenome
non patentable. See Cochrane, supra, at 785 (upholding
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 13
BREYER, J., dissenting
process for improving quality of flour by removing impuri
ties with blasts of air); Gottschalk, supra, at 71–73 (reject
ing process for converting numerals to binary form
through mathematical formula).
Neither does the Federal Circuit’s decision in State
Street Bank help respondents. That case does say that a
process is patentable if it produces a “useful, concrete, and
tangible result.” 149 F. 3d, at 1373. But this Court has
never made such a statement and, if taken literally, the
statement would cover instances where this Court has
held the contrary. The Court, for example, has invalidated
a claim to the use of electromagnetic current for transmit
ting messages over long distances even though it produces
a result that seems “useful, concrete, and tangible.”
Morse, supra, at 16. Similarly the Court has invalidated a
patent setting forth a system for triggering alarm limits in
connection with catalytic conversion despite a similar
utility, concreteness, and tangibility. Flook, supra. And
the Court has invalidated a patent setting forth a process
that transforms, for computer-programming purposes,
decimal figures into binary figures—even though the
result would seem useful, concrete, and at least arguably
(within the computer’s wiring system) tangible.
Gottschalk, supra.
Even were I to assume (purely for argument’s sake) that
claim 13 meets certain general definitions of process pat
entability, however, it still fails the one at issue here: the
requirement that it not amount to a simple natural corre
lation, i.e., a “natural phenomenon.” See Flook, supra, at
588, n. 9 (even assuming patent for improved catalytic
converter system meets broad statutory definition of
patentable “process,” it is invalid under natural phenome
non doctrine); Diehr, 450 U. S., at 184–185 (explaining
that, even if patent meets all other requirements, it must
meet the natural phenomena requirement as well).
At most, respondents have simply described the natural
14 LABORATORY CORP. OF AMERICA HOLDINGS v.
METABOLITE LABORATORIES, INC.
BREYER, J., dissenting
law at issue in the abstract patent language of a “process.”
But they cannot avoid the fact that the process is no more
than an instruction to read some numbers in light of
medical knowledge. Cf. id., at 192 (warning against “al
low[ing] a competent draftsman to evade the recognized
limitations on the type of subject matter eligible for patent
protection”). One might, of course, reduce the “process” to
a series of steps, e.g., Step 1: gather data; Step 2: read a
number; Step 3: compare the number with the norm; Step
4: act accordingly. But one can reduce any process to a
series of steps. The question is what those steps embody.
And here, aside from the unpatented test, they embody
only the correlation between homocysteine and vitamin
deficiency that the researchers uncovered. In my view,
that correlation is an unpatentable “natural phenomenon,”
and I can find nothing in claim 13 that adds anything
more of significance.
IV
If I am correct in my conclusion in Part III that the
patent is invalid, then special public interest considera
tions reinforce my view that we should decide this case.
To fail to do so threatens to leave the medical profession
subject to the restrictions imposed by this individual
patent and others of its kind. Those restrictions may
inhibit doctors from using their best medical judgment;
they may force doctors to spend unnecessary time and
energy to enter into license agreements; they may divert
resources from the medical task of health care to the legal
task of searching patent files for similar simple correla
tions; they may raise the cost of healthcare while inhibit
ing its effective delivery. See Brief for American Clinical
Laboratory Association as Amicus Curiae 8–13.
Even if Part III is wrong, however, it still would be valu
able to decide this case. Our doing so would help diminish
legal uncertainty in the area, affecting a “substantial
Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 15
BREYER, J., dissenting
number of patent claims.” See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae 12–14 (filed Aug. 26, 2005). It would per
mit those in the medical profession better to understand
the nature of their legal obligations. It would help Con
gress determine whether legislation is needed. Cf. 35
U. S. C. §287(c) (limiting liability of medical practitioners
for performance of certain medical and surgical proce
dures).
In either event, a decision from this generalist Court
could contribute to the important ongoing debate, among
both specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent
system, as currently administered and enforced, adequately
reflects the “careful balance” that “the federal patent laws
. . . embod[y].” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 146 (1989). See also eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at
2) (KENNEDY, J., concurring); FTC, ch. 4, at 1–44; Pollack,
The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Pat
ents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and
Constitutional History, 28 Rutgers Computer & Technology
L. J. 61 (2002); Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Prop
erty: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy,
16 Berkeley Technology L. J. 535, 542–546 (2001).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.