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Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, ATTORNEY GENERAL v.
MICHELLE THOMAS ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 05–552. Decided April 17, 2006
PER CURIAM.
The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the
Attorney General to grant an alien asylum if the alien
cannot return to another country because of “persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” §101(a)(42)(A), as added, §201,
94 Stat. 102, 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added).
The respondents, Michelle Thomas and her immediate
family, applied for asylum. They checked boxes on the
application form that indicated their claim rested upon
fear of persecution in their native South Africa because of
(1) their “political opinion[s],” and (2) their “membership
in a particular social group.” In proceedings before the
Immigration Judge, they emphasized their fear of persecu
tion because of their race (they are white) and their kin
ship with Michelle’s father-in-law, “Boss Ronnie,” a white
South African who allegedly held racist views and mis
treated black workers at the company at which he was a
foreman. The Immigration Judge, focusing upon ques
tions of race and political views, rejected their claim. And
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), responding to the
Thomases’ primarily race-related arguments, summarily
affirmed that decision.
On review, a Ninth Circuit panel held by a 2-to-1 vote
that the Board had not adequately considered the
Thomases’ claim of persecution because of “membership in
a particular social group, as relatives of Boss Ronnie.”
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Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F. 3d 1169, 1177 (2004). The
Ninth Circuit took the matter en banc. The en banc court,
overruling what it considered aberrant contrary Circuit
precedent, unanimously held that in principle “a family
may constitute a social group for the purposes of the refu
gee statutes.” 409 F. 3d 1177, 1187 (2005) (en banc) (em
phasis added) (overruling, inter alia, Estrada-Posadas v.
INS, 924 F. 2d 916 (CA9 1991)). In so doing, the court
relied on earlier BIA opinions holding that certain “kin
ship ties” fall within the statutory term. See id., at 1180,
1184-1186.
The court then went on to hold, over the dissent of four
judges, that the particular family at issue, namely “ ‘per
sons related to Boss Ronnie,’ ” fell within the scope of the
statutory term “particular social group” and that the
“Thomases were attacked and threatened because they
belonged to the particular social group of ‘persons related
to Boss Ronnie’ . . . .” 409 F. 3d, at 1189. The dissenting
judges argued that the question “whether the Thomases
are a ‘particular social group’ ” should first be considered
by the relevant administrative agency. Id., at 1193 (opin
ion of Rymer, J.) (emphasis in original). And they said
that the majority’s contrary decision was inconsistent with
this Court’s holding in INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U. S.
12, 18 (2002) (per curiam).
The Solicitor General now asks us to grant certiorari to
consider whether the Ninth Circuit “erred in holding, in
the first instance and without prior resolution of the ques
tions by the” relevant administrative agency, “that mem
bers of a family can and do constitute a ‘particular social
group’ within the meaning of” the Act. Pet. for Cert. I. He
argues that a court’s role in an immigration case is typi
cally one of “ ‘review, not of first view.’ ” Id., at 29 (quoting
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005)). He
adds that the decision clearly violates what this Court
described in Ventura as the “ordinary ‘remand’ rule.” Pet.
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for Cert. 15 (quoting Ventura, supra, at 18). And he con
cludes that “the Ninth Circuit’s error is so obvious in light
of Ventura that summary reversal would be appropriate.”
Pet. for Cert. 29.
We agree with the Solicitor General. The Ninth Cir
cuit’s failure to remand is legally erroneous, and that error
is “obvious in light of Ventura,” itself a summary reversal.
The alien in Ventura sought asylum on grounds of a
reasonable fear of “persecution” in Guatemala “ ‘on ac
count of . . . [a] political opinion.’ ” 537 U. S., at 13. The
BIA held that the alien did not qualify for asylum be
cause whatever persecution he faced when he left Gua
temala in 1993 was not on account of a “ ‘political opin
ion.’ ” Ibid. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
record showed that in 1993 the alien did indeed face
politically based persecution in Guatemala. The Circuit
then went on to consider the Government’s alternative
argument—that, in any event, conditions within Guate
mala had improved to the point that political persecution
was no longer likely. Ibid. And the Circuit rejected this
“ ‘changed circumstances’ ” claim without first giving the
agency an opportunity to consider the matter. Id., at 14.
We reversed the Ninth Circuit summarily. We pointed
out that “[w]ithin broad limits the law entrusts the agency
to make the basic asylum eligibility decision.” Id., at 16.
“In such circumstances,” we added, a “ ‘judicial judgment
cannot be made to do service for an administrative judg
ment.’ ” Ibid. (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80,
88 (1943)). “A court of appeals ‘is not generally empowered
to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being re
viewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an
inquiry.’ ” Ventura, supra, at 16 (quoting Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U. S. 729, 744 (1985)). “Rather,
‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to
remand to the agency for additional investigation or ex
planation.’ ” Ventura, supra, at 16 (quoting Florida Power
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& Light Co., supra, at 744; citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U. S 194, 196 (1947)). Applying these “basic legal
principles,” we concluded that “every consideration that
classically supports the law’s ordinary remand require
ment does so here.” Ventura, 537 U. S., at 16, 17.
We must reach the same conclusion in the present case.
The agency has not yet considered whether Boss Ronnie’s
family presents the kind of “kinship ties” that constitute a
“particular social group.” The matter requires determin
ing the facts and deciding whether the facts as found fall
within a statutory term. And as we said in Ventura:
“The agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the
matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an
initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through
informed discussion and analysis, help a court later
determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway
that the law provides.” Id., at 17.
We can find no special circumstance here that might
have justified the Ninth Circuit’s determination of the
matter in the first instance. Thus, as in Ventura, the
Court of Appeals should have applied the “ordinary ‘re
mand’ rule.” Id., at 18.
We grant the petition for certiorari. We vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. And we remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.