(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP. DBA THE MOONLIGHT
CAFE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04–944. Argued January 11, 2006—Decided February 22, 2006
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for “an em-
ployer . . . to discriminate against any [employee] with respect to . . .
sex,” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1), and defines “employer” as “a person
. . . who has fifteen or more employees,” §2000e(b). The Act’s jurisdic-
tional provision empowers federal courts to adjudicate civil actions
“brought under” Title VII. §2000e–5(f)(3). Title VII actions also fit
within the Judicial Code’s grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to fed-
eral courts over actions “arising under” federal law. 28 U. S. C.
§1331. At the time Title VII was enacted, §1331 contained a $10,000
amount-in-controversy threshold, which left Title VII claims below
that amount uncovered. Section 2000e–5(f)(3) assured that the
amount-in-controversy limitation would not impede a Title VII com-
plainant’s access to a federal forum. Since 1980, when Congress
amended §1331 to eliminate the amount-in-controversy threshold,
§2000e–5(f)(3) has served simply to underscore Congress’ intention to
provide a federal forum for Title VII claims. Because Congress has
also authorized federal courts to exercise “supplemental” jurisdiction
over state-law claims linked to a federal claim, 28 U. S. C. §1367, Ti-
tle VII plaintiffs may pursue complete relief in federal court.
The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised at any stage in the
litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment, Rule 12(h)(3).
See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455. By contrast, the objection
that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted,” Rule 12(b)(6), endures only up to, not beyond, trial on the
merits, Rule 12(h)(2).
Petitioner Arbaugh sued her former employer, respondent Y&H
2 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
Syllabus
Corporation, in Federal District Court, charging sexual harassment
in violation of Title VII and asserting related state-law claims. The
case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for Arbaugh. After
the court entered judgment on that verdict, Y&H moved to dismiss
the entire action for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, as-
serting, for the first time, that it had fewer than 15 employees on its
payroll and therefore was not amenable to suit under Title VII. Al-
though recognizing the unfairness and waste of judicial resources
that granting the motion would entail, the District Court, citing Fed-
eral Rule 12(h)(3), considered itself obliged to do so because it be-
lieved the 15-or-more-employees requirement to be jurisdictional. It
therefore vacated its prior judgment and dismissed Arbaugh’s Title
VII claim with prejudice and her state-law claims without prejudice.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed based on its precedent holding that unless
the employee-numerosity requirement is met, federal-court subject-
matter jurisdiction does not exist.
Held: Title VII’s numerical threshold does not circumscribe federal-
court subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the employee-numerosity
requirement relates to the substantive adequacy of Arbaugh’s Title
VII claim, and therefore could not be raised defensively late in the
lawsuit, i.e., after Y&H had failed to assert the objection prior to the
close of trial on the merits. The basic statutory grants of federal-
court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U. S. C. §1331,
which provides for “[f]ederal-question” jurisdiction, and §1332, which
provides for “[d]iversity of citizenship” jurisdiction. A plaintiff prop-
erly invokes §1331 jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim
“arising under” the Federal Constitution or laws. See Bell v. Hood,
327 U. S. 678, 681–685. She invokes §1332 jurisdiction when she pre-
sents a claim between parties of diverse citizenship that exceeds the
required jurisdictional amount, currently $75,000. See §1332(a). Ar-
baugh invoked federal-question jurisdiction under §1331, but her
case “aris[es]” under a federal law, Title VII, that specifies, as a pre-
requisite to its application, the existence of a particular fact, i.e., 15
or more employees. The Court resolves the question whether that
fact is “jurisdictional” or relates to the “merits” of a Title VII claim
mindful of the consequences of typing the 15-employee threshold a
determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than an element of
Arbaugh’s claim for relief. First, “subject-matter jurisdiction, be-
cause it involves the court’s power to hear a case, can never be for-
feited or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630. More-
over, courts, including this Court, have an independent obligation to
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the ab-
sence of a challenge from any party. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 526 U. S. 574, 583. Nothing in Title VII’s text indicates that
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Syllabus
Congress intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the
employee-numerosity requirement is met. Second, in some instances,
if subject-matter jurisdiction turns on contested facts, the trial judge
may be authorized to review the evidence and resolve the dispute on
her own. If satisfaction of an essential element of a claim is at issue,
however, the jury is the proper trier of contested facts. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150–151. Third,
when a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. Thus, the trial
court below dismissed, along with the Title VII claim, pendent state-
law claims fully tried by a jury and determined on the merits. In
contrast, when a court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a federal claim, the court generally retains discretion to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction, pursuant to §1367, over pendent state-law
claims.
While Congress could make the employee-numerosity requirement
“jurisdictional” if it so chose, neither §1331 nor Title VII’s jurisdic-
tional provision, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(3), specifies any threshold
ingredient akin to 28 U. S. C. §1332’s monetary floor. Instead, the
15-employee threshold appears in a separate provision that “does not
speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of
the district courts.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385,
394. Given the unfairness and waste of judicial resources entailed in
tying the employee-numerosity requirement to subject-matter juris-
diction, the sounder course is to refrain from constricting §1331 or
§2000e–5(f)(3), and to leave the ball in Congress’ court. If the Legis-
lature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope
shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly in-
structed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdic-
tional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in
character. Applying that readily administrable bright line here
yields the holding that Title VII’s 15-employee threshold is an ele-
ment of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue. Pp. 8–
15.
380 F. 3d 219, reversed and remanded.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except ALITO, J., who took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–944
_________________
JENIFER ARBAUGH, PETITIONER v. Y & H COR-
PORATION, DBA THE MOONLIGHT CAFE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[February 22, 2006]
JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the distinction between two some-
times confused or conflated concepts: federal-court “sub-
ject-matter” jurisdiction over a controversy; and the essen-
tial ingredients of a federal claim for relief. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “for an
employer . . . to discriminate,” inter alia, on the basis of
sex. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The Act’s jurisdictional
provision empowers federal courts to adjudicate civil
actions “brought under” Title VII. §2000e–5(f)(3). Cover-
ing a broader field, the Judicial Code gives federal courts
subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising
under” the laws of the United States. 28 U. S. C. §1331.
Title VII actions fit that description. In a provision defin-
ing 13 terms used in Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e, Con-
gress limited the definition of “employer” to include only
those having “fifteen or more employees,” §2000e(b). The
question here presented is whether the numerical qualifi-
cation contained in Title VII’s definition of “employer”
affects federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction or, in-
stead, delineates a substantive ingredient of a Title VII
2 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
Opinion of the Court
claim for relief.
The question arises in this context. Jenifer Arbaugh,
plaintiff below, petitioner here, brought a Title VII action
in federal court against her former employer, defendant-
respondent Y&H Corporation (hereinafter Y&H), charging
sexual harassment. The case was tried to a jury, which
returned a verdict for Arbaugh in the total amount of
$40,000. Two weeks after the trial court entered judgment
on the jury verdict, Y&H moved to dismiss the entire
action for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. For
the first time in the litigation, Y&H asserted that it had
fewer than 15 employees on its payroll and therefore was
not amenable to suit under Title VII.
Although recognizing that it was “unfair and a waste of
judicial resources” to grant the motion to dismiss, App. to
Pet. for Cert. 47, the trial court considered itself obliged to
do so because it believed that the 15-or-more-employees
requirement was jurisdictional. We reject that categoriza-
tion and hold that the numerical threshold does not cir-
cumscribe federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction. In-
stead, the employee-numerosity requirement relates to the
substantive adequacy of Arbaugh’s Title VII claim, and
therefore could not be raised defensively late in the law-
suit, i.e., after Y&H had failed to assert the objection prior
to the close of trial on the merits.
I
We set out below statutory provisions and rules that
bear on this case. Title VII makes it “an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). To spare very
small businesses from Title VII liability, Congress pro-
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Opinion of the Court
vided that:
“[t]he term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding cal-
endar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .”
§2000e(b).1
This employee-numerosity requirement2 appears in a
section headed “Definitions,” §2000e, which also prescribes
the meaning, for Title VII purposes, of 12 other terms used
in the Act.3
Congress has broadly authorized the federal courts to
exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1331. Title VII surely is a
“la[w] of the United States.” Ibid. In 1964, however,
when Title VII was enacted, §1331’s umbrella provision for
federal-question jurisdiction contained an amount-in-
controversy limitation: Claims could not be brought under
§1331 unless the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000.
See §1331(a) (1964 ed.). Title VII, framed in that light,
assured that the amount-in-controversy limitation would
not impede an employment-discrimination complainant’s
——————
1 The same provision further states that the term “employer” does not
include the United States, corporations wholly owned by the United
States, Indian Tribes, certain departments and agencies of the District
of Columbia, or tax-exempt “bona fide private membership club[s]”
(other than labor organizations). §2000e(b).
2 Congress originally prescribed a 25-or-more-employee threshold,
Civil Rights Act of 1964, §701, 78 Stat. 253, but lowered the minimum
number of employees to 15 in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, §2, 86 Stat. 103.
3 The other terms defined in §2000e are: “person,” “employment
agency,” “labor organization,” “employee,” “commerce,” “industry
affecting commerce,” “State,” “religion,” “because of sex,” “complaining
party,” “demonstrates,” and “respondent.”
4 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
Opinion of the Court
access to a federal forum. The Act thus contains its own
jurisdiction-conferring provision, which reads:
“Each United States district court and each United
States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have jurisdiction of actions
brought under this subchapter.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–
5(f)(3).4
Congress amended 28 U. S. C. §1331 in 1980 to eliminate
the amount-in-controversy threshold. See Federal Ques-
tion Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, §2, 94 Stat.
2369. Since that time, Title VII’s own jurisdictional provi-
sion, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(3), has served simply to
underscore Congress’ intention to provide a federal forum
for the adjudication of Title VII claims. See Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 13; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.
We note, too, that, under 28 U. S. C. §1367, federal
courts may exercise “supplemental” jurisdiction over state-
law claims linked to a claim based on federal law.5 Plain-
tiffs suing under Title VII may avail themselves of the
opportunity §1367 provides to pursue complete relief in a
federal-court lawsuit. Arbaugh did so in the instant case
by adding to her federal complaint pendent claims arising
under state law that would not independently qualify for
——————
4 Title VII contains a separate jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C.
§2000e–6(b), authorizing suits by the Government to enjoin “pattern or
practice” discrimination.
5 Section 1367(a) states: “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)
or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties.”
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Opinion of the Court
federal-court adjudication.
The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be
raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any
stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of
judgment. Rule 12(h)(3) instructs: “Whenever it appears
by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action.” See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443,
455 (2004). By contrast, the objection that a complaint
“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”
Rule 12(b)(6), may not be asserted post trial. Under Rule
12(h)(2), that objection endures up to, but not beyond, trial
on the merits: “A defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted . . . may be made in any plead-
ing . . . or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at
the trial on the merits.” Cf. Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 459.
II
From May 2000 through February 2001, Jenifer Ar-
baugh worked as a bartender and waitress at the
Moonlight Cafe, a New Orleans restaurant owned and
operated by Y&H. Arbaugh alleged that Yalcin Hatipoglu,
one of the company’s owners, sexually harassed her and
precipitated her constructive discharge.6 In November
2001, Arbaugh filed suit against Y&H in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Her
complaint asserted claims under Title VII and Louisiana
law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 1–2.
Arbaugh’s pleadings alleged that her federal claim
“ar[o]se under Title VII” and that the Federal District
——————
6 See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U. S. 129, 147 (2004)
(constructive discharge compensable under Title VII includes an em-
ployee’s departure due to sexual harassment that renders “working
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt com-
pelled to resign”).
6 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
Opinion of the Court
Court had jurisdiction over this claim under §1331 plus
supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims under
§1367. Record in No. 01–3376 (ED La.), Doc. 3, p. 1
(Amended Complaint). Y&H’s responsive pleadings ad-
mitted Arbaugh’s “jurisdictional” allegations but denied
her contentions on the merits. Id., Doc. 4, p. 1 (Answer to
Complaint). The pretrial order submitted and signed by
the parties, and later subscribed by the presiding judge,
reiterated that the court was “vested with jurisdiction over
[Arbaugh’s Title VII claim] pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1331,”
and “ha[d] supplemental jurisdiction over [her] state law
claims pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1367.” Id., Doc. 19, p. 2.
The order listed “Uncontested Material Facts,” including:
“Plaintiff was employed as a waitress/bartender at the
Moonlight for Defendants from May, 2000 through Febru-
ary 10, 2001 when she terminated her employment with
the company.” Id., p. 3. It did not list among “Contested
Issues of Fact” or “Contested Legal Issues” the question
whether Y&H had the requisite number of employees
under 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b). Record, Doc. 19, pp. 4–5. Nor
was the issue raised at any other point pretrial or at trial.
The parties consented to trial before a Magistrate
Judge. See 28 U. S. C. §636(c). After a two-day trial, the
jury found that Arbaugh had been sexually harassed and
constructively discharged in violation of Title VII and
Louisiana antidiscrimination law. The verdict awarded
Arbaugh $5,000 in backpay, $5,000 in compensatory dam-
ages, and $30,000 in punitive damages. The trial court
entered judgment for Arbaugh on November 5, 2002.
Two weeks later, Y&H filed a motion under Federal
Rule 12(h)(3) to dismiss Arbaugh’s complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Record, Doc. 44. As sole
ground for the motion, Y&H alleged, for the first time in
the proceedings, that it “did not employ fifteen or more
employees [during the relevant period] and thus is not an
employer for Title VII purposes.” Id., p. 2 (Memorandum
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Opinion of the Court
in Support of Rule 12(h)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction). The trial court commented
that “[i]t is unfair and a waste of judicial resources to
permit [Y&H] to admit Arbaugh’s allegations of jurisdic-
tion, try the case for two days and then assert a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction in response to an adverse jury
verdict.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47. Nevertheless, reciting
the text of Rule 12(h)(3), see supra, at 5, the trial court
allowed Y&H to plead that it did not qualify as an “em-
ployer” under Title VII’s definition of that term. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 47–48; see supra, at 3.
Discovery ensued. The dispute over the employee count
turned on the employment status of Y&H’s eight drivers,
engaged to make deliveries for the restaurant, and the
company’s four owners (the Moonlight Cafe’s two manag-
ers and their shareholder spouses). As the trial court
noted, “[i]f either the delivery drivers or the four owners
are counted with the persons shown on the payroll jour-
nals, then Y&H employed fifteen or more persons for the
requisite time.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27. After reviewing
the parties’ submissions, however, the trial court con-
cluded that neither the delivery drivers nor the owner-
managers nor their shareholder spouses qualified as “em-
ployees” for Title VII purposes. Id., at 32–43. Based on
that determination, the trial court vacated its prior judg-
ment in favor of Arbaugh, dismissed her Title VII claim
with prejudice, and her state-law claims without preju-
dice. Id., at 23.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 380
F. 3d 219 (2004). Bound by its prior decisions, the Court
of Appeals held that a defendant’s “failure to qualify as an
‘employer’ under Title VII deprives a district court of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Id., at 224 (citing, e.g., Du-
mas v. Mt. Vernon, 612 F. 2d 974, 980 (1980)). Dismissal
for want of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper, the
Court of Appeals ruled, for the record warranted the con-
8 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
Opinion of the Court
clusion that Y&H’s delivery drivers, its owner-managers,
and their shareholder wives were not “employees” for Title
VII purposes, 380 F. 3d, at 225–230, and it was undis-
puted that Y&H “did not employ the requisite 15 employ-
ees without the inclusion of” those persons, id., at 231.
We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. 1031 (2005), to resolve
conflicting opinions in Courts of Appeals on the question
whether Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement, 42
U. S. C. §2000e(b), is jurisdictional or simply an element of
a plaintiff’s claim for relief. Compare, e.g., 380 F. 3d, at
223–225 (Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement is
jurisdictional), and Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F. 2d 1332,
1335 (CA6 1983) (same), with, e.g., Da Silva v. Kinsho
International Corp., 229 F. 3d 358, 361–366 (CA2 2000)
(Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement is not juris-
dictional); Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F. 3d 72,
76–83 (CA3 2003) (same); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier
Parochial School, 117 F. 3d 621, 623–624 (CADC 1997)
(Americans with Disabilities Act’s employee-numerosity
requirement, 42 U. S. C. §12111(5)(A), resembling Title
VII’s requirement, is not jurisdictional).
III
“Jurisdiction,” this Court has observed, “is a word of
many, too many, meanings.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90 (1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted). This Court, no less than other courts, has
sometimes been profligate in its use of the term. For
example, this Court and others have occasionally de-
scribed a nonextendable time limit as “mandatory and
jurisdictional.” See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 361
U. S. 220, 229 (1960). But in recent decisions, we have
clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic, “are
not properly typed ‘jurisdictional.’ ” Scarborough v. Prin-
cipi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004); accord Eberhart v. United
States, 546 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (per curiam) (slip op., at 4–
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 9
Opinion of the Court
7); Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454–455. See also Carlisle v.
United States, 517 U. S. 416, 434–435 (1996) (GINSBURG, J.,
concurring).
The dispute now before us concerns the proper classifi-
cation of Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered em-
ployers to those with 15 or more employees. If the limita-
tion conditions subject-matter jurisdiction, as the lower
courts held it did, then a conclusion that Y&H had fewer
than 15 employees would require erasure of the judgment
for Arbaugh entered on the jury verdict. But if the lower
courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction characterization is
incorrect, and the issue, instead, concerns the merits of
Arbaugh’s case, then Y&H raised the employee-
numerosity requirement too late. Its pretrial stipulations,
see supra, at 6, and its failure to speak to the issue prior
to the conclusion of the trial on the merits, see Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 12(h)(2), supra, at 5, would preclude vacation of
the $40,000 judgment in Arbaugh’s favor.
On the subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-
for-relief dichotomy, this Court and others have been less
than meticulous. “Subject matter jurisdiction in federal-
question cases is sometimes erroneously conflated with a
plaintiff’s need and ability to prove the defendant bound
by the federal law asserted as the predicate for relief—a
merits-related determination.” 2 J. Moore et al., Moore’s
Federal Practice §12.30[1], p. 12–36.1 (3d ed. 2005) (here-
inafter Moore). Judicial opinions, the Second Circuit
incisively observed, “often obscure the issue by stating
that the court is dismissing ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ when
some threshold fact has not been established, without
explicitly considering whether the dismissal should be for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a
claim.” Da Silva, 229 F. 3d, at 361. We have described
such unrefined dispositions as “drive-by jurisdictional
rulings” that should be accorded “no precedential effect”
on the question whether the federal court had authority to
10 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
Opinion of the Court
adjudicate the claim in suit. Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91.
Cases of this genre include Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U. S. 69 (1984), and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U. S. 244 (1991). Hishon involved a Title VII claim
brought by a lawyer denied partnership in a law firm. The
District Court ruled that Title VII did not apply to the
selection of partners and dismissed the case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed
that judgment. We noted that the District Court’s reason-
ing “ma[de] clear that it dismissed petitioner’s complaint
on the ground that her allegations did not state a claim
cognizable under Title VII.” 467 U. S., at 73, n. 2. Dis-
agreeing with the lower courts, we held that Title VII
applies to partnership decisions. Id., at 73–78. That
holding, we said, “ma[de] it unnecessary to consider the
wisdom of the District Court’s invocation of Rule 12(b)(1),
as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6).” Id., at 73, n. 2. The former
Rule concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, the latter,
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
See supra, at 5. Our opinion in Hishon thus raised, but
did not decide, the question whether subject-matter juris-
diction was the proper rubric for the District Court’s deci-
sions.7
In Arabian American Oil Co., we affirmed the judgment
of the courts below that Title VII, as then composed, did
not apply to a suit by a United States employee working
——————
7 Y&H features Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U. S.
202 (1997), as supportive of the jurisdictional character of the employee-
numerosity requirement. Brief for Respondent 8–10. Y&H urges that
the Court must have considered the requirement jurisdictional, for
Walters held definitively that, under the correct legal standard, the
defendant had more than 15 employees. If the requirement had been
seen as a merits issue, Y&H contends, the Court would have remanded
the employee count for determination by the trier of fact. But the
parties in Walters apparently stipulated to all relevant facts, leaving
nothing for a fact trier to resolve on remand. Cf. 519 U. S., at 211–212.
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 11
Opinion of the Court
abroad for a United States employer.8 That judgment had
been placed under a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
label. We agreed with the lower courts’ view of the limited
geographical reach of the statute. 499 U. S., at 246–247.
En passant, we copied the petitioners’ characterizations of
terms included in Title VII’s “Definitions” section, 42
U. S. C. §2000e, as “jurisdictional.” See 499 U. S., at 249,
251, 253. But our decision did not turn on that characteri-
zation, and the parties did not cross swords over it. See
Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91 (declining to follow a decision
treating an issue as jurisdictional because nothing “turned
upon whether [the issue] was technically jurisdictional” in
that case). In short, we were not prompted in Arabian
American Oil Co. to home in on whether the dismissal had
been properly based on the absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction rather than on the plaintiff’s failure to state a
claim. 499 U. S., at 247.9
The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-
matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U. S. C. §§1331 and
1332. Section 1331 provides for “[f]ederal-question” juris-
diction, §1332 for “[d]iversity of citizenship” jurisdiction.
A plaintiff properly invokes §1331 jurisdiction when she
pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution
——————
8 Congress subsequently amended Title VII to extend protection to
United States citizens working overseas. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,
§109(a), 105 Stat. 1077, codified at 42 U. S. C. §2000e(f) (“With respect
to employment in a foreign country,” the term “employee” “includes an
individual who is a citizen of the United States.”).
9 In EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107 (1988), also
featured by Y&H, see Brief for Respondent 12, a plurality of this Court
noted that “[r]eactivation of state proceedings after the conclusion of
federal proceedings serves [a] useful function,” in part because “Title
VII does not give the EEOC jurisdiction to enforce the Act against
employers of fewer than 15 employees.” 486 U. S., at 119, n. 5. That
fleeting footnote addressed the relative administrative provinces of the
EEOC and state agencies. It did not speak of federal-court subject-
matter jurisdiction, which was not at issue in the case.
12 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
Opinion of the Court
or laws of the United States. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S.
678, 681–685 (1946).10 She invokes §1332 jurisdiction
when she presents a claim between parties of diverse
citizenship that exceeds the required jurisdictional
amount, currently $75,000. See §1332(a).
Arbaugh invoked federal-question jurisdiction under
§1331, but her case “aris[es]” under a federal law, Title
VII, that specifies, as a prerequisite to its application, the
existence of a particular fact, i.e., 15 or more employees.
We resolve the question whether that fact is “jurisdic-
tional” or relates to the “merits” of a Title VII claim mind-
ful of the consequences of typing the 15-employee thresh-
old a determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather
than an element of Arbaugh’s claim for relief.
First, “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves
the court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or
waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630
(2002). Moreover, courts, including this Court, have an
independent obligation to determine whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a chal-
lenge from any party. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U. S. 574, 583 (1999). Nothing in the text of Title VII
indicates that Congress intended courts, on their own
motion, to assure that the employee-numerosity require-
ment is met.
Second, in some instances, if subject-matter jurisdiction
turns on contested facts, the trial judge may be authorized
to review the evidence and resolve the dispute on her own.
See 5B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-
——————
10 A claim invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.
§1331, Bell held, may be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is “immaterial and made solely for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or is “wholly insubstantial and
frivolous.” 327 U. S., at 682–683; see Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998). Arbaugh’s case surely does not
belong in that category.
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 13
Opinion of the Court
dure §1350, pp. 243–249 (3d ed. 2004); 2 Moore §12.30[3],
pp. 12–37 to 12–38. If satisfaction of an essential element
of a claim for relief is at issue, however, the jury is the
proper trier of contested facts. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumb-
ing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150–151 (2000).
Third, when a federal court concludes that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
complaint in its entirety. See 16 Moore §106.66[1], pp.
106–88 to 106–89. Thus in the instant case, the trial court
dismissed, along with the Title VII claim, pendent state-
law claims, see supra, at 4, fully tried by a jury and de-
termined on the merits, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 23, 47.
In contrast, when a court grants a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a federal claim, the court generally retains
discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant
to 28 U. S. C. §1367, over pendent state-law claims. See
16 Moore §106.66[1], pp. 106–86 to 106–89.
Of course, Congress could make the employee-
numerosity requirement “jurisdictional,” just as it has
made an amount-in-controversy threshold an ingredient of
subject-matter jurisdiction in delineating diversity-of-
citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1332. But
neither §1331, nor Title VII’s jurisdictional provision, 42
U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(3) (authorizing jurisdiction over ac-
tions “brought under” Title VII), specifies any threshold
ingredient akin to 28 U. S. C. §1332’s monetary floor.
Instead, the 15-employee threshold appears in a separate
provision that “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or
refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.”
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394
(1982). Given the “unfair[ness]” and “waste of judicial
resources,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47, entailed in tying the
employee-numerosity requirement to subject-matter juris-
diction, we think it the sounder course to refrain from
constricting §1331 or Title VII’s jurisdictional provision,
42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(3), and to leave the ball in Con-
14 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.
Opinion of the Court
gress’ court. If the Legislature clearly states that a
threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as
jurisdictional,11 then courts and litigants will be duly
instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.
See Da Silva, 229 F. 3d, at 361 (“Whether a disputed
matter concerns jurisdiction or the merits (or occasionally
both) is sometimes a close question.”). But when Congress
does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as juris-
dictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjuris-
dictional in character. Applying that readily adminis-
trable bright line to this case, we hold that the threshold
number of employees for application of Title VII is an
element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional
issue.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of
——————
11 Congress has exercised its prerogative to restrict the subject-matter
jurisdiction of federal district courts based on a wide variety of factors,
some of them also relevant to the merits of a case. Certain statutes
confer subject-matter jurisdiction only for actions brought by specific
plaintiffs, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §1345 (United States and its agencies and
officers), 49 U. S. C. §24301(l)(2) (Amtrak), or for claims against particular
defendants, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §2707(e)(3) (persons subject to orders of the
Egg Board); 28 U. S. C. §1348 (national banking associations), or for
actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds, e.g., 16 U. S. C.
§814, or falls below, e.g., 22 U. S. C. §6713(a)(1)(B), 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(2),
a stated amount. Other jurisdiction-conferring provisions describe par-
ticular types of claims. See, e.g., §1339 (“any civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to the postal service”); §1347 (“any civil action
commenced by any tenant in common or joint tenant for the partition of
lands where the United States is one of the tenants in common or joint
tenants”). In a few instances, Congress has enacted a separate provision
that expressly restricts application of a jurisdiction-conferring statute.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 756–761 (1975) (42 U. S. C.
§405(h) bars §1331 jurisdiction over suits to recover Social Security
benefits).
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 15
Opinion of the Court
Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.