Lockhart v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–881. Argued November 2, 2005—Decided December 7, 2005
In 2002, the Government began withholding a portion of petitioner’s
Social Security payments to offset his debt on federally reinsured
student loans that were more than 10 years overdue. Petitioner
sued, arguing that the offset was barred by the 10-year statute of
limitations of the Debt Collection Act of 1982, 31 U. S. C. §3716(e)(1).
The Social Security Act generally exempts benefits from attachment
or other legal process, 42 U. S. C. §407(a), and provides that “[n]o
other provision of law . . . may be construed to . . . modify . . . this sec-
tion except to the extent that it does so by express reference,” §407(b).
The Higher Education Technical Amendments of 1991 eliminated
time limitations on suits to collect student loans, 20 U. S. C.
§1091a(a)(2)(D). In 1996, the Debt Collection Improvement Act sub-
jected Social Security benefits to offset, “[n]otwithstanding [§407],” 31
U. S. C. §3716(c)(3)(A)(i). The District Court dismissed petitioner’s
complaint, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The United States may offset Social Security benefits to collect a
student loan debt that has been outstanding for over 10 years. Pp. 3–
5.
(a) The Debt Collection Improvement Act makes Social Security
benefits subject to offset, providing the sort of express reference that
§407(b) says is necessary to supersede the anti-attachment provision.
P. 3.
(b) The Higher Education Technical Amendments remove the 10-
year limit that would otherwise bar offsetting petitioner’s Social Se-
curity benefits to pay off his student loan debt. Debt collection by So-
cial Security offset was not authorized until five years after this ab-
rogation of time limits, but the plain meaning of the Higher
Education Technical Amendments must be given effect even though
2 LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

Congress may not have foreseen all of its consequences, Union Bank
v. Wolas, 502 U. S. 151, 158. Though the Higher Education Technical
Amendments, unlike the Debt Collection Improvement Act, do not
explicitly mention §407, an express reference is only required to au-
thorize attachment in the first place. Pp. 3–4.
(c) Though the Debt Collection Improvement Act retained the Debt
Collection Act’s general 10-year bar on offset authority, the Higher
Education Technical Amendments retain their effect as a limited ex-
ception to the Debt Collection Act time bar in the student loan con-
text. The Court declines to read any meaning into a failed 2004 con-
gressional effort to amend the latter Act to explicitly authorize offset
of debts over 10 years old. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U. S.
274, 287. Pp. 4–5.
376 F. 3d 1027, affirmed.

O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SCALIA,
J., filed a concurring opinion.
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–881
_________________

JAMES LOCKHART, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[December 7, 2005]

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether the United States may offset
Social Security benefits to collect a student loan debt that
has been outstanding for over 10 years.
I
A
Petitioner James Lockhart failed to repay federally
reinsured student loans that he had incurred between
1984 and 1989 under the Guaranteed Student Loan Pro-
gram. These loans were eventually reassigned to the
Department of Education, which certified the debt to the
Department of the Treasury through the Treasury Offset
Program. In 2002, the Government began withholding
a portion of petitioner’s Social Security payments to
offset his debt, some of which was more than 10 years
delinquent.
Petitioner sued in Federal District Court, alleging that
under the Debt Collection Act’s 10-year statute of limita-
tions, the offset was time barred. The District Court
dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 376 F. 3d 1027 (2004). We
2 LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

granted certiorari, 544 U. S. ___ (2005), to resolve the
conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit,
see Lee v. Paige, 376 F. 3d 1179 (CA8 2004), and now
affirm.
B
The Debt Collection Act of 1982, as amended, provides
that, after pursuing the debt collection channels set out in
31 U. S. C. §3711(a), an agency head can collect an out-
standing debt “by administrative offset.” §3716(a). The
availability of offsets against Social Security benefits is
limited, as the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620, as
amended, makes Social Security benefits, in general, not
“subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or
other legal process.” 42 U. S. C. §407(a). The Social Secu-
rity Act purports to protect this anti-attachment rule with
an express-reference provision: “No other provision of law,
enacted before, on, or after April 20, 1983, may be con-
strued to limit, supersede, or otherwise modify the provi-
sions of this section except to the extent that it does so by
express reference to this section.” §407(b).
Moreover, the Debt Collection Act’s offset provisions
generally do not authorize the collection of claims which,
like petitioner’s debts at issue here, are over 10 years old.
31 U. S. C. §3716(e)(1). In 1991, however, the Higher
Education Technical Amendments, 105 Stat. 123, sweep-
ingly eliminated time limitations as to certain loans:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of statute . . . no
limitation shall terminate the period within which suit
may be filed, a judgment may be enforced, or an offset,
garnishment, or other action initiated or taken,” 20
U. S. C. §1091a(a)(2), for the repayment of various student
loans, including the loans at issue here, §1091a(a)(2)(D).
The Higher Education Technical Amendments, by their
terms, did not make Social Security benefits subject to
offset; these were still protected by the Social Security
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

Opinion of the Court

Act’s anti-attachment rule. Only in 1996 did the Debt
Collection Improvement Act—in amending and recodifying
the Debt Collection Act—provide that, “[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law (including [§407] . . . ),” with a
limited exception not relevant here, “all payment due an
individual under . . . the Social Security Act . . . shall be
subject to offset under this section.” 31 U. S. C.
§3716(c)(3)(A)(i).
II
The Government does not contend that the “notwith-
standing” clauses in both the Higher Education Technical
Amendments and the Debt Collection Improvement Act
trump the Social Security Act’s express-reference provi-
sion. Cf. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302, 310 (1955) (“Ex-
emptions from the terms of the . . . Act are not lightly to be
presumed in view of the statement . . . that modifications
must be express[.] But . . . [u]nless we are to require the
Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate
an exemption from the . . . Act, we must hold that the pre-
sent statute expressly supersedes the . . . provisions of that
Act” (citation omitted)); Great Northern R. Co. v. United
States, 208 U. S. 452, 465 (1908).
We need not decide the effect of express-reference provi-
sions such as §407(b) to resolve this case. Because the
Debt Collection Improvement Act clearly makes Social
Security benefits subject to offset, it provides exactly the
sort of express reference that the Social Security Act says
is necessary to supersede the anti-attachment provision.
It is clear that the Higher Education Technical Amend-
ments remove the 10-year limit that would otherwise bar
offsetting petitioner’s Social Security benefits to pay off his
student loan debt. Petitioner argues that Congress could
not have intended in 1991 to repeal the Debt Collection
Act’s statute of limitations as to offsets against Social
Security benefits—since debt collection by Social Security
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Opinion of the Court

offset was not authorized until five years later. Therefore,
petitioner continues, the Higher Education Technical
Amendments’ abrogation of time limits in 1991 only ap-
plies to then-valid means of debt collection. We disagree.
“The fact that Congress may not have foreseen all of the
consequences of a statutory enactment is not a sufficient
reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.”
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U. S. 151, 158 (1991).
Petitioner points out that the Higher Education Techni-
cal Amendments, unlike the Debt Collection Improvement
Act, do not explicitly mention §407. But §407(b) only
requires an express reference to authorize attachment in
the first place—which the Debt Collection Improvement
Act has already provided.
III
Nor does the Debt Collection Improvement Act’s 1996
recodification of the Debt Collection Act help petitioner.
The Debt Collection Improvement Act, in addition to
adding offset authority against Social Security benefits,
retained the Debt Collection Act’s general 10-year bar on
offset authority. But the mere retention of this previously
enacted time bar does not make the time bar apply in all
contexts—a result that would extend far beyond Social
Security benefits, since it would imply that the Higher
Education Technical Amendments’ abrogation of time
limits was now a dead letter as to any kind of administra-
tive offset. Rather, the Higher Education Technical
Amendments retain their effect as a limited exception to
the Debt Collection Act time bar in the student loan
context.
Finally, we decline to read any meaning into the failed
2004 effort to amend the Debt Collection Act to explicitly
authorize offset of debts over 10 years old. See H. R. 5025,
108th Cong., 2d Sess., §642 (Sept. 8, 2004); S. 2806, 108th
Cong., 2d Sess., §642 (Sept. 15, 2004). “[F]ailed legislative
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Opinion of the Court

proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous ground on which to
rest an interpretation of a prior statute.’ ” United States v.
Craft, 535 U. S. 274, 287 (2002) (quoting Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650
(1990)). In any event, it is unclear what meaning we could
read into this effort even if we were inclined to do so, as the
failed amendment—which was not limited to offsets
against Social Security benefits—would have had a differ-
ent effect than the interpretation we advance today.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2005) 1

SCALIA, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–881
_________________

JAMES LOCKHART, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[December 7, 2005]

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring.
I agree with the Court that, even if the express-
reference requirement in §207(b) of the Social Security Act
is binding, it has been met here; and I join the opinion of
the Court, because it does not imply that the requirement
is binding. I would go further, however, and say that it is
not.
“[O]ne legislature,” Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “can-
not abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.”
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 135 (1810). “The correct-
ness of this principle, so far as respects general legisla-
tion,” he asserted, “can never be controverted.” Ibid. See
also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)
(unlike the Constitution, a legislative Act is “alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it”); 1 W. Black-
stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 90 (1765)
(“Acts of parliament derogatory from the power of subse-
quent parliaments bind not”); T. Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations 125–126 (1868) (reprint 1987). Our cases
have uniformly endorsed this principle. See, e.g., United
States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U. S. 839, 872 (1996) (plural-
ity opinion); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 318
(1932) (“[T]he will of a particular Congress . . . does not
impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years”);
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 487 (1905); Newton v.
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SCALIA, J., concurring

Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548, 559 (1880) (in cases involv-
ing “public interests” and “public laws,” “there can be . . .
no irrepealable law”); see generally 1 L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law §2–3, p. 125, n. 1 (3d ed. 2000).
Among the powers of a legislature that a prior legisla-
ture cannot abridge is, of course, the power to make its
will known in whatever fashion it deems appropriate—
including the repeal of pre-existing provisions by simply
and clearly contradicting them. Thus, in Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U. S. 302 (1955), we interpreted the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act as impliedly exempting deporta-
tion hearings from the procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), despite the requirement in §12 of
the APA that “[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to
supersede or modify the provisions of this Act except to the
extent that such legislation shall do so expressly,” 60 Stat.
244. The Court refused “to require the Congress to employ
magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption
from the Administrative Procedure Act.” 349 U. S., at 310.
We have made clear in other cases as well, that an ex-
press-reference or express-statement provision cannot
nullify the unambiguous import of a subsequent statute.
In Great Northern R. Co. v. United States, 208 U. S. 452,
465 (1908), we said of an express-statement requirement
that “[a]s the section . . . in question has only the force of a
statute, its provisions cannot justify a disregard of the will
of Congress as manifested either expressly or by necessary
implication in a subsequent enactment.” (Emphasis
added.) A subsequent Congress, we have said, may ex-
empt itself from such requirements by “fair implication”—
that is, without an express statement. Warden v. Marrero,
417 U. S. 653, 659–660, n. 10 (1974). See also Hertz v.
Woodman, 218 U. S. 205, 218 (1910).
To be sure, legislative express-reference or express-
statement requirements may function as background
canons of interpretation of which Congress is presump-
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2005) 3

SCALIA, J., concurring

tively aware. For example, we have asserted that exemp-
tions from the APA are “not lightly to be presumed” in
light of its express-reference requirement, Marcello, supra,
at 310; see also Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48, 51
(1955). That assertion may add little or nothing to our
already-powerful presumption against implied repeals.
“We have repeatedly stated . . . that absent a clearly
established congressional intention, repeals by impli-
cation are not favored. An implied repeal will only be
found where provisions in two statutes are in irrecon-
cilable conflict, or where the latter Act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended
as a substitute.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273
(2003) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S 535, 551 (1974).
When the plain import of a later statute directly conflicts
with an earlier statute, the later enactment governs,
regardless of its compliance with any earlier-enacted
requirement of an express reference or other “magical
password.”
For the reasons set forth in the majority opinion, in the
Higher Education Technical Amendments and the Debt
Collection Improvement Act, Congress unambiguously
authorized, without exception, the collection of 10-year-old
student-loan debt by administrative offset of Government
payments. In doing so, it flatly contradicted, and thereby
effectively repealed, part of §207(a) of the Social Security
Act. This repeal is effective, regardless of whether the
express-reference requirement of §207(b) is fulfilled.
Despite our jurisprudence on this subject, it is regretta-
bly not uncommon for Congress to attempt to burden the
future exercise of legislative power with express-reference
and express-statement requirements. See, e.g., 1 U. S. C.
§109; 5 U. S. C. §559; 25 U. S. C. §1735(b); 42 U. S. C.
4 LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES

SCALIA, J., concurring

§2000bb–3(b); 50 U. S. C. §§1547(a)(1), 1621(b). In the
present case, it might seem more respectful of Congress to
refrain from declaring the invalidity of the express-
reference provision. I suppose that would depend upon
which Congress one has in mind: the prior one that en-
acted the provision, or the current one whose clearly ex-
pressed legislative intent it is designed to frustrate. In
any event, I think it does no favor to the Members of
Congress, and to those who assist in drafting their legisla-
tion, to keep secret the fact that such express-reference
provisions are ineffective.