(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WATSON ET AL. v. PHILIP MORRIS COS., INC., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 05–1284. Argued April 25, 2007—Decided June 11, 2007
Petitioners filed a state-court suit claiming that respondents (Philip
Morris) violated Arkansas unfair business practice laws by advertis
ing certain cigarette brands as “light” when, in fact, Philip Morris
had manipulated testing results to register lower levels of tar and
nicotine in the advertised cigarettes than would be delivered to con
sumers. Philip Morris removed the case to Federal District Court
under the federal officer removal statute, which permits removal of
an action against “any officer (or any person acting under that officer)
of the United States or of any agency thereof,” 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1)
(emphasis added). The federal court upheld the removal, ruling that
the complaint attacked Philip Morris’ use of the Government’s
method of testing cigarettes and thus that petitioners had sued Philip
Morris for “acting under” the Federal Trade Commission. The Eighth
Circuit affirmed, emphasizing the FTC’s detailed supervision of the
cigarette testing process and likening the case to others in which
lower courts permitted removal by heavily supervised Government
contractors.
Held: The fact that a federal agency directs, supervises, and monitors a
company’s activities in considerable detail does not bring that com
pany within §1442(a)(1)’s scope and thereby permit removal. Pp. 3–
14.
(a) Section 1442(a)(1)’s words “acting under” are broad, and the
statute must be “liberally construed.” Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S.
510, 517. But broad language is not limitless. And a liberal con
struction nonetheless can find limits in a text’s language, context,
history, and purposes. The statute’s history and this Court’s cases
demonstrate that its basic purpose is to protect the Federal Govern
ment from the interference with its “operations” that would ensue
2 WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS.
Syllabus
were a State able, for example, to “arres[t]” and bring “to trial in a
State cour[t] for an alleged offense against the law of the State,” “offi
cers and agents” of the Government “acting . . . within the scope of
their authority.” Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 406 (internal
quotation marks omitted). State-court proceedings may reflect “local
prejudice” against unpopular federal laws or officials, e.g., Maryland
v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9, 32, and States hostile to the Government may
impede enforcement of federal law, see, e.g., Tennessee v. Davis, 100
U. S. 257, 263, or deprive federal officials of a federal forum in which
to assert federal immunity defenses, see, e.g., Willingham, supra, at
407. The removal statute applies to private persons “who lawfully
assist” a federal officer “in the performance of his official duty,” Davis
v. South Carolina, 107 U. S. 597, 600, but “only” if the private parties
were “authorized to act with or for [federal officers or agents] in af
firmatively executing duties under . . . federal law,” City of Green
wood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, 824. Pp. 3–7.
(b) The relevant relationship here is that of a private person “act
ing under” a federal “officer” or “agency.” §1442(a)(1) (emphasis
added). In this context, “under” must refer to what the dictionaries
describe as a relationship involving acting in a certain capacity, con
sidered in relation to one holding a superior position or office, and
typically includes subjection, guidance, or control. Precedent and
statutory purpose also make clear that the private person’s “acting
under” must involve an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the fed
eral superior’s duties or tasks. See, e.g., Davis v. South Carolina, su
pra, at 600. Such aid does not include simply complying with the
law. When a company complies with a regulatory order, it does not
ordinarily create a significant risk of state-court “prejudice.” Cf.
Soper, supra, at 32. A state-court suit brought against such a com
pany is not likely to disable federal officials from taking necessary ac
tion designed to enforce federal law, cf. Tennessee v. Davis, supra, at
262–263, nor to deny a federal forum to an individual entitled to as
sert a federal immunity claim, see, e.g., Willingham, supra, at 407.
Thus, a private firm’s compliance (or noncompliance) with federal
laws, rules, and regulations does not by itself fall within the scope of
the statutory phrase “acting under” a federal “official,” even if the
regulation is highly detailed and even if the private firm’s activities
are highly supervised and monitored. A contrary determination
would expand the statute’s scope considerably, potentially bringing
within it state-court actions filed against private firms in many
highly regulated industries. Nothing in the statute’s language, his
tory, or purpose indicates a congressional intent to do so. Pp. 7–9.
(c) Philip Morris’ two arguments to the contrary are rejected. First,
it contends that if close supervision is sufficient to turn a Gov
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Syllabus
ernment contractor into a private firm “acting under” a Government
“agency” or “officer,” as lower courts have held, it is sufficient to
transform a company subjected to intense regulation. The answer to
this argument is that the assistance that private contractors provide
federal officers goes beyond simple compliance with the law and helps
the officers fulfill other basic governmental tasks. Second, Philip
Morris argues that it is “acting under” FTC officers when it conducts
cigarette testing because, after initially testing cigarettes for tar and
nicotine, the FTC delegated authority for that task to the tobacco in
dustry in 1987 and has thereafter extensively supervised and closely
monitored testing. This argument contains a fatal flaw of omission.
Although it uses the word “delegation,” there is no evidence of any
delegation of legal authority from the FTC to the tobacco industry to
undertake testing on the Government agency’s behalf, or evidence of
any contract, payment, employer/employee relationship, or princi
pal/agent arrangement. The existence of detailed FTC rules indi
cates regulation, not delegation. The usual regulator/regulated rela
tionship cannot be construed as bringing Philip Morris within the
statute’s terms. Pp. 9–14.
420 F. 3d 852, reversed and remanded.
BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 05–1284
_________________
LISA WATSON, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. PHILIP
MORRIS COMPANIES, INC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June 11, 2007]
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal officer removal statute permits a defendant
to remove to federal court a state-court action brought
against the
“United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or
any person acting under that officer) of the United
States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or
individual capacity for any act under color of such of
fice . . . .” 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1) (emphasis added).
The question before us is whether the fact that a federal
regulatory agency directs, supervises, and monitors a
company’s activities in considerable detail brings that
company within the scope of the italicized language (“act
ing under” an “officer” of the United States) and thereby
permits removal. We hold that it does not.
I
Lisa Watson and Loretta Lawson, the petitioners, filed a
civil lawsuit in Arkansas state court claiming that the
Philip Morris Companies, the respondents, violated state
laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive business practices.
2 WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS.
Opinion of the Court
The complaint focuses upon advertisements and packag
ing that describe certain Philip Morris brand cigarettes
(Marlboro and Cambridge Lights) as “light,” a term indi
cating lower tar and nicotine levels than those present in
other cigarettes. More specifically, the complaint refers to
the design and performance of Philip Morris cigarettes
that are tested in accordance with the Cambridge Filter
Method, a method that “the tobacco industry [uses] to
‘measure’ tar and nicotine levels in cigarettes.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 63a–64a. The complaint charges that Philip
Morris “manipulat[ed] the design” of its cigarettes, and
“employ[ed] techniques that” would cause its cigarettes “to
register lower levels of tar and nicotine on [the Cambridge
Filter Method] than would be delivered to the consumers
of the product.” Id., at 63a–65a. The complaint adds that
the Philip Morris cigarettes delivered “greater amounts of
tar and nicotine when smoked under actual conditions”
than the adjective “light” as used in its advertising indi
cates. Id., at 65a. In view of these and other related
practices, the complaint concludes that Philip Morris’
behavior was “deceptive and misleading” under Arkansas
law. Id., at 64a, 66a.
Philip Morris, referring to the federal officer removal
statute, removed the case to Federal District Court. That
court, in turn, held that the statute authorized the re
moval. The court wrote that the complaint attacked Philip
Morris’ use of the Government’s method of testing ciga
rettes. For this reason (and others), it held that the peti
tioners had sued Philip Morris for “act[s]” taken “under”
the Federal Trade Commission, a federal agency (staffed
by federal “officer[s]”).
The District Court certified the question for interlocu
tory review. And the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Like the District Court, it
emphasized the FTC’s detailed supervision of the cigarette
testing process. It also cited lower court cases permitting
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Opinion of the Court
removal by heavily supervised Government contractors.
See 420 F. 3d 852, 857 (2005); Winters v. Diamond Sham
rock Chemical Co., 149 F. 3d 387 (CA5 1998) (authorizing
removal of a tort suit against private defense contractors
that manufactured Agent Orange). The Eighth Circuit
concluded that Philip Morris was “acting under” federal
“officer[s],” namely the FTC, with respect to the chal
lenged conduct. 420 F. 3d, at 854.
We granted certiorari. 549 U. S. ___ (2007). And we
now reverse the Eighth Circuit’s determination.
II
The federal statute permits removal only if Philip Mor
ris, in carrying out the “act[s]” that are the subject of the
petitioners’ complaint, was “acting under” any “agency” or
“officer” of “the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1).
The words “acting under” are broad, and this Court has
made clear that the statute must be “liberally construed.”
Colorado v. Symes, 286 U. S. 510, 517 (1932); see Arizona
v. Manypenny, 451 U. S. 232, 242 (1981); Willingham v.
Morgan, 395 U. S. 402, 406–407 (1969). But broad lan
guage is not limitless. And a liberal construction nonethe
less can find limits in a text’s language, context, history,
and purposes.
Beginning with history, we note that Congress enacted
the original federal officer removal statute near the end of
the War of 1812, a war that was not popular in New Eng
land. See id., at 405. Indeed, shipowners from that region
filed many state-court claims against federal customs
officials charged with enforcing a trade embargo with
England. See Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal
Judicial Power, 1863–1875, 13 Am. J. Legal Hist. 333, 337
(1969). Congress responded with a provision that permit
ted federal customs officers and “any other person aiding
or assisting” those officers to remove a case filed against
them “in any state court” to federal court. Customs Act of
4 WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS.
Opinion of the Court
1815, ch. 31, §8, 3 Stat. 198 (emphasis added). This initial
removal statute was “[o]bviously . . . an attempt to protect
federal officers from interference by hostile state courts.”
Willingham, 395 U. S., at 405.
In the early 1830’s, South Carolina passed a Nullifica
tion Act declaring federal tariff laws unconstitutional and
authorizing prosecution of the federal agents who collected
the tariffs. See ibid. Congress then enacted a new statute
that permitted “any officer of the United States, or other
person” to remove to federal court a lawsuit filed against
the officer “for or on account of any act done under the
revenue laws of the United States.” Act of Mar. 2, 1833,
ch. 57, §3, 4 Stat. 633 (emphasis added). As Senator
Daniel Webster explained at the time, where state courts
might prove hostile to federal law, and hence to those who
enforced that law, the removal statute would “give a
chance to the [federal] officer to defend himself where the
authority of the law was recognised.” 9 Cong. Deb. 461
(1833).
Soon after the Civil War, Congress enacted yet another
officer removal statute, permitting removal of a suit
against any revenue officer “on account of any act done
under color of his office” by the revenue officer and “any
person acting under or by authority of any such officer.”
Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, §67, 14 Stat. 171 (emphasis
added). Elsewhere the statute restricted these latter
persons to those engaged in acts “for the collection of
taxes.” §67, id., at 172.
In 1948, Congress again revised the statute, dropping
its limitation to the revenue context. And it included the
rewritten statute within its 1948 recodification. See Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §1442(a), 62 Stat. 938, 28 U. S. C.
§1442(a). It is this version of the statute that, with the
exception of a modification in response to this Court’s
decision in International Primate Protection League v.
Administrators of Tulane Ed. Fund, 500 U. S. 72 (1991), is
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5
Opinion of the Court
now before us. While Congress expanded the statute’s
coverage to include all federal officers, it nowhere indi
cated any intent to change the scope of words, such as
“acting under,” that described the triggering relationship
between a private entity and a federal officer.
Turning to precedent, we point to three cases, all involv
ing illegal liquor, which help to illustrate the need for, and
the workings of, the pre-1948 removal statutes. In 1878, a
federal revenue officer, James Davis, raided an illegal
distillery in Tennessee; was ambushed by several armed
men; returned the ambushers’ gunfire; and shot one of his
attackers dead. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 261
(1880). Tennessee indicted Davis for murder. The Court
held that the statute permitted Davis to remove the case
to federal court, reasoning that the Federal Government
“can act only through its officers and agents, and they
must act within the States.” Id., at 263. Removal, the
Court found, would help to prevent hostile States from
“paralyz[ing]” the Federal Government and its initiatives.
Ibid.
About the same time, a U. S. Army corporal (also called
Davis, Lemuel Davis) along with several other soldiers
helped a federal revenue officer try to arrest a distiller for
violating the internal-revenue laws. The soldiers sur
rounded the house; the distiller escaped through a hole in
a side wall; Corporal Davis shot the suspect; and South
Carolina indicted Davis for murder. Davis removed the
case, and this Court upheld the removal. The Court ac
knowledged that, although Davis was not a revenue offi
cer, he was a person “who lawfully assist[ed]” a revenue
officer “in the performance of his official duty.” Davis v.
South Carolina, 107 U. S. 597, 600 (1883).
In the 1920’s, Maryland charged a group of prohibition
agents and a private person acting as their driver with a
murder committed during a distillery raid. See Maryland
v. Soper, 270 U. S. 9 (1926). The prohibition agents and
6 WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS.
Opinion of the Court
their driver sought to remove the state murder trial to
federal court. This Court ultimately rejected their re
moval efforts for reasons not relevant here. But in doing
so it pointed out that the private person acting “as a
chauffeur and helper to the four officers under their orders
and . . . direction” had “the same right to the benefit of”
the removal provision as did the federal agents. Id., at 30.
Apart from demonstrating the dangers associated with
working in the illegal alcohol business, these three cases—
Tennessee v. Davis, Davis v. South Carolina, and Mary
land v. Soper—illustrate that the removal statute’s “basic”
purpose is to protect the Federal Government from the
interference with its “operations” that would ensue were a
State able, for example, to “arres[t]” and bring “to trial in
a State cour[t] for an alleged offense against the law of the
State,” “officers and agents” of the Federal Government
“acting . . . within the scope of their authority.” Willing-
ham, 395 U. S., at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See also ibid. (noting that the “purpose” of the statute “is
not hard to discern”). State-court proceedings may reflect
“local prejudice” against unpopular federal laws or federal
officials. Soper, supra, at 32; see Manypenny, 451 U. S., at
242 (noting that removal permits trials to occur free from
“local . . . prejudice”). In addition, States hostile to the
Federal Government may impede through delay federal
revenue collection or the enforcement of other federal law.
See Tennessee v. Davis, supra, at 263; cf. Findley v.
Satterfield, 9 F. Cas. 67, 68 (No. 4,792) (CC ND Ga. 1877).
And States may deprive federal officials of a federal forum
in which to assert federal immunity defenses. See Inter
national Primate Protection League, supra, at 86–87;
Willingham, supra, at 407 (“[O]ne of the most important
reasons for removal is to have the validity of the defense of
official immunity tried in a federal court”); Jefferson
County v. Acker, 527 U. S. 423, 447 (1999) (SCALIA, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that “the
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Opinion of the Court
main point” of the federal officer removal statute “is to
give officers a federal forum in which to litigate the merits
of immunity defenses”).
Where a private person acts as an assistant to a federal
official in helping that official to enforce federal law, some
of these same considerations may apply. Regardless, in
Davis v. South Carolina the Court wrote that the removal
statute applies to private persons “who lawfully assist” the
federal officer “in the performance of his official duty.”
107 U. S., at 600. And in City of Greenwood v. Peacock,
384 U. S. 808, 824 (1966), in interpreting a related re
moval provision, the Court repeated that the statute
authorized removal by private parties “only” if they were
“authorized to act with or for [federal officers or agents] in
affirmatively executing duties under . . . federal law.” All
the Court’s relevant post-1948 federal officer removal
cases that we have found reflect or are consistent with this
Court’s pre-1948 views. See Mesa v. California, 489 U. S.
121 (1989); Manypenny, supra; Willingham, supra; Pea
cock, supra.
III
With this history and precedent in mind, we return to
the statute’s language. The relevant relationship is that
of a private person “acting under” a federal “officer” or
“agency.” 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1) (emphasis added). In
this context, the word “under” must refer to what has been
described as a relationship that involves “acting in a cer
tain capacity, considered in relation to one holding a supe
rior position or office.” 18 Oxford English Dictionary 948
(2d ed. 1989). That relationship typically involves “subjec
tion, guidance, or control.” Webster’s New International
Dictionary 2765 (2d ed. 1953). See also Funk & Wagnalls
New Standard Dictionary of the English Language 2604
(1942) (defining “under” as meaning “[s]ubordinate or
subservient to,” “[s]ubject to guidance, tutorship, or direc
8 WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS.
Opinion of the Court
tion of”); 18 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 949
(“[s]ubject to the instruction, direction, or guidance of”). In
addition, precedent and statutory purpose make clear that
the private person’s “acting under” must involve an effort
to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the
federal superior. See, e.g., Davis v. South Carolina, supra,
at 600; see also supra, at 5–7.
In our view, the help or assistance necessary to bring a
private person within the scope of the statute does not
include simply complying with the law. We recognize that
sometimes an English speaker might say that one who
complies with the law “helps” or “assists” governmental
law enforcement. Taxpayers who fill out complex federal
tax forms, airline passengers who obey federal regulations
prohibiting smoking, for that matter well-behaved federal
prisoners, all “help” or “assist” federal law enforcement
authorities in some sense of those words. But that is not
the sense of “help” or “assist” that can bring a private
action within the scope of this statute. That is in part a
matter of language. One would usually describe the be
havior of the taxpayers, airline passengers, and prisoners
we have described as compliance with the law (or acquies
cence to an order), not as “acting under” a federal official
who is giving an order or enforcing the law. It is also in
part a matter of the history and the precedent we have
discussed. See supra, at 3–7.
Finally, it is a matter of statutory purpose. When a
company subject to a regulatory order (even a highly
complex order) complies with the order, it does not ordi
narily create a significant risk of state-court “prejudice.”
Cf. Soper, 270 U. S., at 32; Manypenny, supra, at 241–242.
Nor is a state-court lawsuit brought against such a com
pany likely to disable federal officials from taking neces
sary action designed to enforce federal law. Cf. Tennessee
v. Davis, 100 U. S., at 262–263. Nor is such a lawsuit
likely to deny a federal forum to an individual entitled to
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9
Opinion of the Court
assert a federal claim of immunity. See, e.g., Willingham,
395 U. S., at 407.
The upshot is that a highly regulated firm cannot find a
statutory basis for removal in the fact of federal regulation
alone. A private firm’s compliance (or noncompliance)
with federal laws, rules, and regulations does not by itself
fall within the scope of the statutory phrase “acting under”
a federal “official.” And that is so even if the regulation is
highly detailed and even if the private firm’s activities are
highly supervised and monitored. A contrary determina
tion would expand the scope of the statute considerably,
potentially bringing within its scope state-court actions
filed against private firms in many highly regulated in
dustries. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U. S. C. §136a (2000 ed. and Supp. IV)
(mandating disclosure of testing results in the context of
pesticide registration). Neither language, nor history, nor
purpose lead us to believe that Congress intended any
such expansion.
IV
Philip Morris advances two important arguments to the
contrary. First, it points out that lower courts have held
that Government contractors fall within the terms of the
federal officer removal statute, at least when the relation
ship between the contractor and the Government is an
unusually close one involving detailed regulation, monitor
ing, or supervision. See, e.g., Winters, 149 F. 3d 387. And
it asks why, if close supervision is sufficient to turn a
private contractor into a private firm “acting under” a
Government “agency” or “officer,” does it not do the same
when a company is subjected to intense regulation.
The answer to this question lies in the fact that the
private contractor in such cases is helping the Govern
ment to produce an item that it needs. The assistance
that private contractors provide federal officers goes be
10 WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS.
Opinion of the Court
yond simple compliance with the law and helps officers
fulfill other basic governmental tasks. In the context of
Winters, for example, Dow Chemical fulfilled the terms of
a contractual agreement by providing the Government
with a product that it used to help conduct a war. More
over, at least arguably, Dow performed a job that, in the
absence of a contract with a private firm, the Government
itself would have had to perform.
These circumstances distinguish Winters from this case.
For present purposes that distinction is sufficient. And we
need not further examine here (a case where private con
tracting is not at issue) whether and when particular
circumstances may enable private contractors to invoke
the statute.
Second, Philip Morris argues that its activities at issue
here did not consist simply of compliance with regulatory
laws, rules, and orders. It contends that the FTC, after
initially testing cigarettes for tar and nicotine, “delegated
authority” for that task to an industry-financed testing
laboratory in 1987. E.g., Brief for Respondents 31 (em
phasis added). And Philip Morris asserts that (along with
other cigarette companies) it was acting pursuant to that
delegation. It adds that ever since this initial “delegation”
the FTC has “extensive[ly] . . . supervis[ed]” and “closely
monitored” the manner in which the laboratory tests
cigarettes. Id., at 37, 30, 39. Philip Morris concludes that,
given all these circumstances, just as Dow was “acting
under” officers of the Department of Defense when it
manufactured Agent Orange, see Winters, supra, at 399,
so Philip Morris is “acting under” officers of the FTC when
it conducts cigarette testing. See Brief for Respondents
38.
For argument’s sake we shall overlook the fact that the
petitioners appear to challenge the way in which Philip
Morris “designed” its cigarettes, not the way in which it (or
the industry laboratory) conducted cigarette testing. We
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11
Opinion of the Court
also shall assume the following testing-related facts that
Philip Morris sets forth in its brief:
(1) In the 1950’s, the FTC ordered tobacco companies
to stop advertising the amount of tar and nicotine con
tained in their cigarettes. See id., at 3.
(2) In 1966, the FTC altered course. It permitted
cigarette companies to advertise “tar and nicotine
yields” provided that the company had substantiated
its statement through use of the Cambridge Filter
Method, a testing method developed by Dr. Clyde Ogg,
a Department of Agriculture employee. Id., at 4–5.
(3) The Cambridge Filter Method uses “a smoking
machine that takes a 35 milliliter puff of two seconds’
duration on a cigarette every 60 seconds until the
cigarette is smoked to a specified butt length.” FTC v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F. 2d 35, 37
(CADC 1985). It then measures the amount of tar
and nicotine that is delivered. That data, in turn, de
termine whether a cigarette may be labeled as “light.”
This method, Dr. Ogg has testified, “will not tell a
smoker how much tar and nicotine he will get from
any given cigarette,” but it “will indicate” whether a
smoker “will get more from one than from another
cigarette if there is a significant difference between
the two and if he smokes the two in the same man
ner.” Brief for Respondents 5–6 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
(4) In 1967, the FTC began to use its own laboratory
to perform these tests. See id., at 6. And the Cam
bridge Filter Method began to be referred to as “the
‘FTC Method.’ ” Id., at 4.
(5) The FTC published the testing results periodically
and sent the results annually to Congress. See id., at
7.
(6) Due to cost considerations, the FTC stopped test
12 WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS.
Opinion of the Court
ing cigarettes for tar and nicotine in 1987. Simulta
neously, the tobacco industry assumed responsibility
for cigarette testing, running the tests according to
FTC specifications and permitting the FTC to monitor
the process closely. See ibid.
(7) The FTC continues to publish the testing results
and to send them to Congress. See ibid.
(8) The tobacco industry has followed the FTC’s re
quirement that cigarette manufacturers disclose (and
make claims about) tar and nicotine content based ex
clusively on the results of this testing. See id., at 8–9.
Assuming this timeline, Philip Morris’ argument none
theless contains a fatal flaw—a flaw of omission. Al
though Philip Morris uses the word “delegation” or varia
tions many times throughout its brief, we have found no
evidence of any delegation of legal authority from the FTC
to the industry association to undertake testing on the
Government agency’s behalf. Nor is there evidence of any
contract, any payment, any employer/employee relation
ship, or any principal/agent arrangement.
We have examined all of the documents to which Philip
Morris and certain supporting amici refer. Some of those
documents refer to cigarette testing specifications, others
refer to the FTC’s inspection and supervision of the indus
try laboratory’s testing, and still others refer to the FTC’s
prohibition of statements in cigarette advertising. But
none of these documents establish the type of formal
delegation that might authorize Philip Morris to remove
the case.
Several former FTC officials, for example, filed an
amicus brief in which they state that “[i]n 198[7] the FTC
delegated testing responsibility to the private Tobacco
Industry Testing Lab (the ‘TITL’).” Brief for Former Com
missioners and Senior Staff of the FTC 11. But in support
of this proposition the brief cites a single source, a letter
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13
Opinion of the Court
from the cigarette manufacturers’ lawyer to an FTC offi
cial. That letter states:
“[M]ajor United States cigarette manufacturers, who
are responsible for the TITL’s operations and on
whose behalf we are writing, do not believe that
Commission oversight is needed . . . . Nevertheless, as
an accommodation and in the spirit of cooperation, the
manufacturers are prepared to permit Commission
employees to monitor the TITL testing program . . . .”
Letter from John P. Rupp to Judith P. Wilkenfeld
(June 30, 1987), online at http://tobaccodocuments.
org/nysa_ti_s1/TI57900738.html (as visited June 7,
2007, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
Nothing in this letter refers to a delegation of authority.
And neither Congress nor federal agencies normally dele
gate legal authority to private entities without saying that
they are doing so.
Without evidence of some such special relationship,
Philip Morris’ analogy to Government contracting breaks
down. We are left with the FTC’s detailed rules about
advertising, specifications for testing, requirements about
reporting results, and the like. This sounds to us like
regulation, not delegation. If there is a difference between
this kind of regulation and, say, that of Food and Drug
Administration regulation of prescription drug marketing
and advertising (which also involve testing requirements),
see Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F. 3d 1313, 1316
(CADC 1998), that difference is one of degree, not kind.
As we have pointed out, however, differences in the
degree of regulatory detail or supervision cannot by them
selves transform Philip Morris’ regulatory compliance into
the kind of assistance that might bring the FTC within the
scope of the statutory phrase “acting under” a federal
“officer.” Supra, at 8. And, though we find considerable
regulatory detail and supervision, we can find nothing
14 WATSON v. PHILIP MORRIS COS.
Opinion of the Court
that warrants treating the FTC/Philip Morris relationship
as distinct from the usual regulator/regulated relation
ship. This relationship, as we have explained, cannot be
construed as bringing Philip Morris within the terms of
the statute.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Eighth Circuit is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.