(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CAREY, WARDEN v. MUSLADIN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 05–785. Argued October 11, 2006—Decided December 11, 2006
At respondent Musladin’s murder trial, members of the victim’s family
sat in the front row of the spectators’ gallery wearing buttons dis
playing the victim’s image. The trial court denied Musladin’s motion
to order the family members not to wear the buttons. The California
Court of Appeal upheld Musladin’s conviction, stating that he had to
show actual or inherent prejudice to succeed on the buttons claim;
citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560, as providing the test for in
herent prejudice; and ruling that he had not satisfied that test. The
Federal District Court denied Musladin’s habeas petition, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the state court’s
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law,” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1), as deter
mined by this Court in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501, and Flynn,
supra.
Held: The Ninth Circuit improperly concluded that the California Court
of Appeal’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law as determined by this Court. Pp. 3–7.
(a) Because “clearly established Federal law” in §2254(d)(1) “refers
to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of
the time of the relevant state-court decision,” Williams v. Taylor, 529
U. S. 362, 412, federal habeas relief may be granted here if the Cali
fornia Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to or involved an un
reasonable application of this Court’s applicable holdings. Pp. 3–4.
(b) This Court addressed the effect of courtroom practices on defen
dants’ fair-trial rights in Williams, in which the State compelled the
defendant to stand trial in prison clothes, and Flynn, in which the
State seated uniformed state troopers in the row of spectators’ seats
immediately behind the defendant at trial. In both cases, which dealt
2 CAREY v. MUSLADIN
Syllabus
with government-sponsored practices, the Court noted that some
practices are so inherently prejudicial that they must be justified by
an “essential state” policy or interest. E.g., Williams, supra, at 505.
Pp. 4–5.
(c) In contrast to state-sponsored courtroom practices, the effect on
a defendant’s fair-trial rights of the spectator conduct to which
Musladin objects is an open question in this Court’s jurisprudence.
The Court has never addressed a claim that such private-actor court
room conduct was so inherently prejudicial that it deprived a defen
dant of a fair trial or applied the test for inherent prejudice in Wil
liams and Flynn to spectators’ conduct. Indeed, part of that test—
asking whether the practices furthered an essential state interest—
suggests that those cases apply only to state-sponsored practices. Re
flecting the lack of guidance from this Court, lower courts have di
verged widely in their treatment of defendants’ spectator-conduct
claims. Given the lack of applicable holdings from this Court, it can
not be said that the state court “unreasonably appli[ed] . . . clearly es
tablished Federal law.” Pp. 5–7.
427 F. 3d 653, vacated and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. STEVENS,
J., KENNEDY, J., and SOUTER, J., filed opinions concurring in the judg
ment.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 05–785
_________________
THOMAS L. CAREY, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
MATHEW MUSLADIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[December 11, 2006]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This Court has recognized that certain courtroom prac
tices are so inherently prejudicial that they deprive the
defendant of a fair trial. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S.
501, 503–506 (1976); Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560, 568
(1986). In this case, a state court held that buttons dis
playing the victim’s image worn by the victim’s family
during respondent’s trial did not deny respondent his right
to a fair trial. We must decide whether that holding was
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly es
tablished federal law, as determined by this Court. 28
U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). We hold that it was not.
I
On May 13, 1994, respondent Mathew Musladin shot
and killed Tom Studer outside the home of Musladin’s
estranged wife, Pamela. At trial, Musladin admitted that
he killed Studer but argued that he did so in self-defense.
A California jury rejected Musladin’s self-defense argu
ment and convicted him of first-degree murder and three
related offenses.
During Musladin’s trial, several members of Studer’s
2 CAREY v. MUSLADIN
Opinion of the Court
family sat in the front row of the spectators’ gallery. On at
least some of the trial’s 14 days, some members of Studer’s
family wore buttons with a photo of Studer on them.1
Prior to opening statements, Musladin’s counsel moved
the court to order the Studer family not to wear the but
tons during the trial. The court denied the motion, stating
that it saw “no possible prejudice to the defendant.” App.
to Pet. for Cert. 74a.
Musladin appealed his conviction to the California
Court of Appeal in 1997. He argued that the buttons
deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment and Sixth
Amendment rights. At the outset of its analysis, the Court
of Appeal stated that Musladin had to show actual or
inherent prejudice to succeed on his claim and cited Flynn,
supra, at 570, as providing the test for inherent prejudice.
The Court of Appeal, quoting part of Flynn’s test, made
clear that it “consider[ed] the wearing of photographs of
victims in a courtroom to be an ‘impermissible factor
coming into play,’ the practice of which should be discour
aged.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a (quoting Flynn, supra, at
570). Nevertheless, the court concluded, again quoting
Flynn, supra, at 571, that the buttons had not “branded
defendant ‘with an unmistakable mark of guilt’ in the eyes
of the jurors” because “[t]he simple photograph of Tom
Studer was unlikely to have been taken as a sign of any
thing other than the normal grief occasioned by the loss of
[a] family member.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 75a.
At the conclusion of the state appellate process,
Musladin filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court pursuant to §2254. In his applica
tion, Musladin argued that the buttons were inherently
——————
1 The record contains little concrete information about the buttons.
The buttons were apparently two to four inches in diameter and dis
played only a photograph of Studer. It is not clear how many family
members wore the buttons or how many days of the trial they wore
them.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Opinion of the Court
prejudicial and that the California Court of Appeal erred
by holding that the Studers’ wearing of the buttons did not
deprive him of a fair trial. The District Court denied
habeas relief but granted a certificate of appealability on
the buttons issue.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded for issuance of the writ, finding that under
§2254 the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or in
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.” §2254(d)(1). According to the Court of
Appeals, this Court’s decisions in Williams and Flynn
clearly established a rule of federal law applicable to
Musladin’s case. Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F. 3d 653,
656–658 (2005). Specifically, the Court of Appeals cited its
own precedent in support of its conclusion that Williams
and Flynn clearly established the test for inherent preju
dice applicable to spectators’ courtroom conduct. 427
F. 3d, at 657–658 (citing Norris v. Risley, 918 F. 2d 828
(CA9 1990)). The Court of Appeals held that the state
court’s application of a test for inherent prejudice that
differed from the one stated in Williams and Flynn “was
contrary to clearly established federal law and constituted
an unreasonable application of that law.” 427 F. 3d, at
659–660. The Court of Appeals denied rehearing en banc.
427 F. 3d 647 (2005). We granted certiorari, 547 U. S. ___
(2006), and now vacate.
II
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1219:
“(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on be
half of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
4 CAREY v. MUSLADIN
Opinion of the Court
claim—
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or in
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000), we explained
that “clearly established Federal law” in §2254(d)(1) “re
fers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court deci
sion.” Id., at 412. Therefore, federal habeas relief may be
granted here if the California Court of Appeal’s decision
was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of
this Court’s applicable holdings.
A
In Estelle v. Williams and Flynn, this Court addressed
the effect of courtroom practices on defendants’ fair-trial
rights. In Williams, the Court considered “whether an
accused who is compelled to wear identifiable prison cloth
ing at his trial by a jury is denied due process or equal
protection of the laws.” 425 U. S., at 502. The Court
stated that “the State cannot, consistently with the Four
teenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial
before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes,”
id., at 512, but held that the defendant in that case had
waived any objection to being tried in prison clothes by
failing to object at trial, id., at 512–513.
In Flynn, the Court addressed whether seating “four
uniformed state troopers” in the row of spectators’ seats
immediately behind the defendant at trial denied the
defendant his right to a fair trial. 475 U. S., at 562. The
Court held that the presence of the troopers was not so
inherently prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair
trial. Id., at 571. In reaching that holding, the Court
stated that “the question must be . . . whether ‘an unac
ceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Opinion of the Court
into play.’ ” Id., at 570 (quoting Williams, supra, at 505).
Both Williams and Flynn dealt with government-
sponsored practices: In Williams, the State compelled the
defendant to stand trial in prison clothes, and in Flynn,
the State seated the troopers immediately behind the
defendant. Moreover, in both cases, this Court noted that
some practices are so inherently prejudicial that they
must be justified by an “essential state” policy or interest.
Williams, supra, at 505 (concluding that the practice
“further[ed] no essential state policy”); Flynn, supra, at
568–569 (holding that the practice was not of the sort that
had to be justified by an “essential state interest”).
B
In contrast to state-sponsored courtroom practices, the
effect on a defendant’s fair-trial rights of the spectator
conduct to which Musladin objects is an open question in
our jurisprudence. This Court has never addressed a
claim that such private-actor courtroom conduct was so
inherently prejudicial that it deprived a defendant of a fair
trial.2 And although the Court articulated the test for
inherent prejudice that applies to state conduct in Wil
liams and Flynn, we have never applied that test to spec
tators’ conduct. Indeed, part of the legal test of Williams
and Flynn—asking whether the practices furthered an
essential state interest—suggests that those cases apply
only to state-sponsored practices.
Reflecting the lack of guidance from this Court, lower
——————
2 This Court has considered cases in which the proceedings were a
sham or were mob dominated. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 91
(1923) (describing allegations that “the whole proceeding [was] a
mask—that counsel, jury and judge were swept to the fatal end by an
irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts failed to
correct the wrong”); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 324–325 (1915)
(“[T]he disorder in and about the court-room during the trial and up to
and at the reception of the verdict amounted to mob domination, that
not only the jury but the presiding judge succumbed to it”).
6 CAREY v. MUSLADIN
Opinion of the Court
courts have diverged widely in their treatment of defen
dants’ spectator-conduct claims. Some courts have applied
Williams and Flynn to spectators’ conduct. Norris v.
Risley, 918 F. 2d, at 830–831 (applying Williams and
Flynn to hold spectators’ buttons worn during a trial
deprived the defendant of a fair trial); In re Woods, 154
Wash. 2d 400, 416–418, 114 P. 3d 607, 616–617 (2005) (en
banc) (applying Flynn but concluding that ribbons worn by
spectators did not prejudice the defendant). Other courts
have declined to extend Williams and Flynn to spectators’
conduct. Billings v. Polk, 441 F. 3d 238, 246–247 (CA4
2006) (“These precedents do not clearly establish that a
defendant’s right to a fair jury trial is violated whenever
an article of clothing worn at trial arguably conveys a
message about the matter before the jury”); Davis v. State,
No. 07–03–0457–CR, 2006 WL 1211091, *6–7 (Tex. App.,
May 3, 2006) (“Appellant does not cite any authority hold
ing the display of this type of item by spectators creates
inherent prejudice”). Other courts have distinguished
Flynn on the facts. Pachl v. Zenon, 145 Ore. App. 350,
360, n. 1, 929 P. 2d 1088, 1093–1094, n. 1 (1996) (in banc).
And still other courts have ruled on spectator-conduct
claims without relying on, discussing, or distinguishing
Williams or Flynn. Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 388–
389 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam); State v. Speed, 265 Kan. 26,
47–48, 961 P. 2d 13, 29–30 (1998); Nguyen v. State, 977
S. W. 2d 450, 457 (Tex. App. 1998); Kenyon v. State, 58
Ark. App. 24, 33–35, 946 S. W. 2d 705, 710–711 (1997);
State v. Nelson, 96–0883, pp. 9–10 (La. App. 12/17/97), 705
So. 2d 758, 763.
Given the lack of holdings from this Court regarding the
potentially prejudicial effect of spectators’ courtroom
conduct of the kind involved here, it cannot be said that
the state court “unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly estab
lished Federal law.” §2254(d)(1). No holding of this Court
required the California Court of Appeal to apply the test of
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Opinion of the Court
Williams and Flynn to the spectators’ conduct here.
Therefore, the state court’s decision was not contrary to or
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law.
III
The Court of Appeals improperly concluded that the
California Court of Appeal’s decision was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
as determined by this Court. For these reasons, the judg
ment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 05–785
_________________
THOMAS L. CAREY, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
MATHEW MUSLADIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[December 11, 2006]
JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000), this Court
issued two opinions announcing two separate holdings. In
Part II–B of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, the Court held
that an incorrect application of federal law was not neces
sarily an “ ‘unreasonable application of . . . clearly estab
lished Federal law’ ” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C.
§2254(d)(1). 529 U. S., at 409–413. In Parts III and IV of
my opinion, in which Justice O’Connor joined, the Court
held that the Virginia Supreme Court’s rejection of the
petitioner’s claim that he had received ineffective assis
tance of counsel was both contrary to and an unreasonable
application of law as determined by our earlier opinion in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Williams,
529 U. S., at 390–398.
In Strickland, we held that the petitioner had not been
denied the effective assistance of counsel and upheld his
sentence of death. 466 U. S., at 700. While our ultimate
holding rejected the petitioner’s ineffective assistance
claim, the reasoning in our opinion (including carefully
considered dicta) set forth the standards for evaluating
such claims that have been accepted as “clearly estab
lished law” for over 20 years. See Williams, 529 U. S., at
391. Nevertheless, in a somewhat ironic dictum in her
Williams opinion, Justice O’Connor stated that the statu
2 CAREY v. MUSLADIN
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
tory phrase “clearly established Federal law, as deter
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States” refers
to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s
decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court deci
sion.” Id., at 412. That dictum has been repeated in three
subsequent opinions in which a bare majority of the Court
rejected constitutional claims that four of us would have
upheld.* Because I am persuaded that Justice O’Connor’s
dictum about dicta represents an incorrect interpretation
of the statute’s text, and because its repetition today is
wholly unnecessary, I do not join the Court’s opinion.
Virtually every one of the Court’s opinions announcing a
new application of a constitutional principle contains some
explanatory language that is intended to provide guidance
to lawyers and judges in future cases. See, e.g., Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004); Strickland, 466 U. S.
668; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). It is quite
wrong to invite state court judges to discount the impor
tance of such guidance on the ground that it may not have
been strictly necessary as an explanation of the Court’s
specific holding in the case. Cf. County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chap
ter, 492 U. S. 573, 668 (1989) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part); (“As a general
rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not
only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also their expli
cations of the governing rules of law”); Sheet Metal Work
ers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421, 490 (1986) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although
technically dicta, . . . an important part of the Court’s
rationale for the result that it reache[s] is entitled to
——————
* See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 660–661 (2004); Lockyer
v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 71 (2003); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 664
(2001).
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment
greater weight . . .”). The text of AEDPA itself provides
sufficient obstacles to obtaining habeas relief without
placing a judicial thumb on the warden’s side of the scales.
Ultimately, however, my reasons for joining the Court’s
judgment in this case are essentially the same as those
expressed by JUSTICE SOUTER, with one caveat. In my
opinion, there is no merit whatsoever to the suggestion
that the First Amendment may provide some measure of
protection to spectators in a courtroom who engage in
actual or symbolic speech to express any point of view
about an ongoing proceeding.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 05–785
_________________
THOMAS L. CAREY, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
MATHEW MUSLADIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[December 11, 2006]
JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring in the judgment.
Trials must be free from a coercive or intimidating
atmosphere. This fundamental principle of due process is
well established. It was recognized in Frank v. Mangum,
237 U. S. 309 (1915), though the Court credited the de
termination of the state court and granted no relief; and it
was the square holding in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86
(1923), though the Court remanded for factfinding rather
than for a new trial. The disruptive presence of the press
required reversal in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333,
355 (1966), where “newsmen took over practically the
entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the
trial,” and Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532, 550 (1965), where
the presence of cameras distracted jurors throughout the
proceedings.
The rule against a coercive or intimidating atmosphere
at trial exists because “we are committed to a government
of laws and not of men,” under which it is “of the utmost
importance that the administration of justice be absolutely
fair and orderly,” and “the constitutional safeguards relat
ing to the integrity of the criminal process attend every
stage of a criminal proceeding . . . culminating with a trial
‘in a courtroom presided over by a judge.’ ” Cox v. Louisi
ana, 379 U. S. 559, 562 (1965) (quoting Rideau v. Louisi
ana, 373 U. S. 723, 727 (1963)) (finding a statute did not
2 CAREY v. MUSLADIN
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment
on its face violate First Amendment rights where it pro
hibited picketing in courthouses). Cf. Wood v. Georgia,
370 U. S. 375 (1962); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466
(1965).
The rule settled by these cases requires a court, on
either direct or collateral review, to order a new trial when
a defendant shows his conviction has been obtained in a
trial tainted by an atmosphere of coercion or intimidation
similar to that documented in the foregoing cases. This
would seem to be true whether the pressures were from
partisans, or, as seems to have been the case in Sheppard,
from persons reacting to the drama of the moment who
created an environment so raucous that calm deliberation
by the judge or jury was likely compromised in a serious
way. If, in a given case, intimidation of this nature was
brought about by the wearing of buttons, relief under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) would likely be available even in the absence of
a Supreme Court case addressing the wearing of buttons.
While general rules tend to accord courts “more leeway . . .
in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations,”
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U. S. 652, 664 (2004) (plural
ity opinion), AEDPA does not require state and federal
courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern
before a legal rule must be applied. Cf. Wright v. West,
505 U. S. 277, 308–309 (1992) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in
judgment).
In the case before us there is no indication the atmos
phere at respondent’s trial was one of coercion or intimida
tion to the severe extent demonstrated in the cases just
discussed. The instant case does present the issue
whether as a preventative measure, or as a general rule to
preserve the calm and dignity of a court, buttons proclaim
ing a message relevant to the case ought to be prohibited
as a matter of course. That rule has not been clearly
established by our cases to date. It may be that trial
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment
judges as a general practice already take careful measures
to preserve the decorum of courtrooms, thereby accounting
for the lack of guiding precedents on this subject.
In all events, it seems to me the case as presented to us
here does call for a new rule, perhaps justified as much as
a preventative measure as by the urgent needs of the
situation. That rule should be explored in the court sys
tem, and then established in this Court before it can be
grounds for relief in the procedural posture of this case.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the
Court.
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 05–785
_________________
THOMAS L. CAREY, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
MATHEW MUSLADIN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[December 11, 2006]
JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in the judgment.
In this habeas proceeding, a federal court may not set
aside the state judgment sustaining Musladin’s conviction
without finding it contrary to, or an unreasonable applica
tion of, clearly established federal law. 28 U. S. C.
§2254(d)(1). While the ground between criteria entailed
by “clearly established” and “unreasonable application”
may be murky, it makes sense to regard the standard
governing this case as clearly established by this Court.
We have a number of decisions dealing with threats to the
fundamental fairness of a criminal trial posed by condi
tions in (or originating in) the courtroom, see, e.g., Hol
brook v. Flynn, 475 U. S. 560 (1986); Estelle v. Williams,
425 U. S. 501 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333
(1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532 (1965), and the two
most recent ones agree on a general formulation harking
back to Estes, id., at 542–546: the question is whether the
practice or condition presents “ ‘an unacceptable risk . . . of
impermissible factors coming into play’ ” in the jury’s
consideration of the case. Flynn, supra, at 570 (quoting
Williams, supra, at 505). The Court’s intent to adopt a
standard at this general and comprehensive level could
not be much clearer.
As for the applicability of this standard, there is no
serious question that it reaches the behavior of spectators.
2 CAREY v. MUSLADIN
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
The focus of the later cases is on appearances within the
courtroom open to the jurors’ observation. There is no
suggestion in the opinions, and no reason to think now,
that it should matter whether the State or an individual
may be to blame for some objectionable sight; either way,
the trial judge has an affirmative obligation to control the
courtroom and keep it free of improper influence.
Sheppard, supra, at 363. And since the Williams-Flynn
standard is a guide for trial judges, not for laypersons
without schooling in threats to the fairness of trials, its
general formulation is enough to tell trial judges that it
applies to the behavior of courtroom visitors.
Nor is there any reasonable doubt about the pertinence
of the standard to the practice in question; one could not
seriously deny that allowing spectators at a criminal trial
to wear visible buttons with the victim’s photo can raise a
risk of improper considerations. The display is no part of
the evidence going to guilt or innocence, and the buttons
are at once an appeal for sympathy for the victim (and
perhaps for those who wear the buttons) and a call for
some response from those who see them. On the jurors’
part, that expected response could well seem to be a ver
dict of guilty, and a sympathetic urge to assuage the grief
or rage of survivors with a conviction would be the para
digm of improper consideration.
The only debatable question is whether the risk in a
given case reaches the “unacceptable” level. While there is
a fair argument that any level of risk from wearing but
tons in a courtroom is unacceptable, two considerations
keep me from concluding that the state court acted unrea
sonably in failing to see the issue this way and reverse the
conviction. First, of the several courts that have consid
ered the influence of spectators’ buttons, the majority have
left convictions standing. See, e.g., State v. Speed, 265
Kan. 26, 47–48, 961 P. 2d 13, 29–30 (1998); State v. Brax
ton, 344 N. C. 702, 709–710, 477 S. E. 2d 172, 176–177
Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment
(1996); State v. Lord, 128 Wash. App. 216, 219–223, 114
P. 3d 1241, 1243–1245 (2005); Nguyen v. State, 977 S. W.
2d 450, 457 (Tex. App. 1998). I am wary of assuming that
every trial and reviewing judge in those cases was unrea
sonable as well as mistaken in failing to embrace a no-risk
standard, and so I would find it hard to say the state
judges were unreasonable in this case, given the lack of
detail about the buttons’ display. Second, an interest in
protected expression on the part of the spectators wearing
mourners’ buttons has been raised, but not given focus or
careful attention in this or any other case that has come to
our notice. Although I do not find such a First Amend
ment interest intuitively strong here, in the absence of
developed argument it would be preferable not to decide
whether protection of speech could require acceptance of
some risk raised by spectators’ buttons.
For these reasons, I think Musladin has not shown the
state judge’s application of our law to be unreasonable,
and on that ground concur in the Court’s judgment.