(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDEL
SOHN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06–1221. Argued December 3, 2007—Decided February 26, 2008
In respondent Mendelsohn’s age discrimination case, petitioner Sprint
moved in limine to exclude the testimony of former employees alleg
ing discrimination by supervisors who had no role in the employment
decision Mendelsohn challenged, on the ground that such evidence
was irrelevant to the case’s central issue, see Fed. Rules Evid. 401,
402, and unduly prejudicial, see Rule 403. Granting the motion, the
District Court excluded evidence of discrimination against those not
“similarly situated” to Mendelsohn. The Tenth Circuit treated that
order as applying a per se rule that evidence from employees of other
supervisors is irrelevant in age discrimination cases, concluded that
the District Court abused its discretion by relying on the Circuit’s
Aramburu case, determined that the evidence was relevant and not
unduly prejudicial, and remanded for a new trial.
Held: The Tenth Circuit erred in concluding that the District Court
applied a per se rule and thus improperly engaged in its own analysis
of the relevant factors under Rules 401 and 403, rather than remand
ing the case for the District Court to clarify its ruling. Pp. 4–9.
(a) In deference to a district court’s familiarity with a case’s details
and its greater experience in evidentiary matters, courts of appeals
uphold Rule 403 rulings unless the district court has abused its dis
cretion. Here, the Tenth Circuit did not accord due deference to the
District Court. The District Court’s two-sentence discussion of the
evidence neither cited nor gave any other indication that the decision
relied on Aramburu or suggested that the court applied a per se rule
of inadmissibility. Neither party’s submissions to the District Court
suggested that Aramburu was controlling. That court’s use of the
same “similarly situated” phrase that Aramburu used cannot be pre
2 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN
Syllabus
sumed to indicate adoption of Aramburu’s analysis, for the District
Court was addressing a very different kind of evidence here. And the
nature of Sprint’s argument was not that the particular evidence was
never admissible, but only that such evidence lacked sufficient proba
tive value in this case to be relevant or outweigh prejudice and delay.
Pp. 4–7.
(b) Because of the Tenth Circuit’s error, it went on to assess the
relevance of the evidence itself and conduct its own balancing of pro
bative value and potential prejudicial effect when it should have al
lowed the District Court to make these determinations in the first in
stance, explicitly and on the record. Pp. 7–8.
466 F. 3d 1223, vacated and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1
Opinion of the Court
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 06–1221
_________________
SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY,
PETITIONER v. ELLEN MENDELSOHN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[February 26, 2008]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this age discrimination case, the District Court ex
cluded testimony by nonparties alleging discrimination at
the hands of supervisors of the defendant company who
played no role in the adverse employment decision chal
lenged by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals, having
concluded that the District Court improperly applied a per
se rule excluding the evidence, engaged in its own analysis
of the relevant factors under Federal Rules of Evidence
401 and 403, and remanded with instructions to admit the
challenged testimony. We granted certiorari on the ques
tion whether the Federal Rules of Evidence required
admission of the testimony. We conclude that such evi
dence is neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible.
Because it is not entirely clear whether the District Court
applied a per se rule, we vacate the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and remand for the District Court to conduct
the relevant inquiry under the appropriate standard.
I
Respondent Ellen Mendelsohn was employed in the
Business Development Strategy Group of petitioner
2 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN
Opinion of the Court
Sprint/United Management Company (Sprint) from 1989
until 2002, when Sprint terminated her as a part of an
ongoing company-wide reduction in force. She sued Sprint
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq.,
alleging disparate treatment based on her age.
In support of her claim, Mendelsohn sought to introduce
testimony by five other former Sprint employees who
claimed that their supervisors had discriminated against
them because of age. Three of the witnesses alleged that
they heard one or more Sprint supervisors or managers
make remarks denigrating older workers. One claimed
that Sprint’s intern program was a mechanism for age
discrimination and that she had seen a spreadsheet sug
gesting that a supervisor considered age in making layoff
decisions. Another witness was to testify that he had been
given an unwarranted negative evaluation and “banned”
from working at Sprint because of his age, and that he had
witnessed another employee being harassed because of her
age. App. 17a. The final witness alleged that Sprint had
required him to get permission before hiring anyone over
age 40, that after his termination he had been replaced by
a younger employee, and that Sprint had rejected his
subsequent employment applications.
None of the five witnesses worked in the Business De
velopment Strategy Group with Mendelsohn, nor had any
of them worked under the supervisors in her chain of
command, which included James Fee, Mendelsohn’s direct
supervisor; Paul Reddick, Fee’s direct manager and the
decisionmaker in Mendelsohn’s termination; and Bill
Blessing, Reddick’s supervisor and head of the Business
Development Strategy Group. Neither did any of the
proffered witnesses report hearing discriminatory remarks
by Fee, Reddick, or Blessing.
Sprint moved in limine to exclude the testimony, argu
ing that it was irrelevant to the central issue in the case:
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
Opinion of the Court
whether Reddick terminated Mendelsohn because of her
age. See Fed. Rules Evid. 401, 402. Sprint claimed that
the testimony would be relevant only if it came from em
ployees who were “similarly situated” to Mendelsohn in
that they had the same supervisors. App. 156a. Sprint
also argued that, under Rule 403, the probative value of
the evidence would be substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, mis
leading of the jury, and undue delay.
In a minute order, the District Court granted the mo
tion, excluding, in relevant part, evidence of “discrimina
tion against employees not similarly situated to plaintiff.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. In clarifying that Mendelsohn
could only “offer evidence of discrimination against Sprint
employees who are similarly situated to her,” the court
defined “ ‘ [s]imilarly situated employees,’ for the purpose
of this ruling, [as] requir[ing] proof that (1) Paul Ruddick
[sic] was the decision-maker in any adverse employment
action; and (2) temporal proximity.” Ibid. Beyond that,
the District Court provided no explanation of the basis for
its ruling. As the trial proceeded, the judge orally clarified
that the minute order was meant to exclude only testi
mony “that Sprint treated other people unfairly on the
basis of age,” and would not bar testimony going to the
“totally different” question “whether the [reduction in
force], which is [Sprint’s] stated nondiscriminatory reason,
is a pretext for age discrimination.” App. 295a–296a.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit treated the
minute order as the application of a per se rule that evi
dence from employees with other supervisors is irrelevant
to proving discrimination in an ADEA case. Specifically, it
concluded that the District Court abused its discretion by
relying on Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F. 3d 1398 (CA10
1997). 466 F. 3d 1223, 1227–1228 (CA10 2006). Aram
buru held that “[s]imilarly situated employees,” for the
purpose of showing disparate treatment in employee
4 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN
Opinion of the Court
discipline, “are those who deal with the same supervisor
and are subject to the same standards governing perform
ance evaluation and discipline.” 112 F. 3d, at 1404 (inter
nal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals
viewed that case as inapposite because it addressed dis
criminatory discipline, not a company-wide policy of dis
crimination. The Court of Appeals then determined that
the evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and
reversed and remanded for a new trial. We granted cer
tiorari, 551 U. S. ___ (2007), to determine whether, in an
employment discrimination action, the Federal Rules of
Evidence require admission of testimony by nonparties
alleging discrimination at the hands of persons who
played no role in the adverse employment decision chal
lenged by the plaintiff.
II
The parties focus their dispute on whether the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the evidence was relevant and
not unduly prejudicial under Rules 401 and 403. We
conclude, however, that the Court of Appeals should not
have engaged in that inquiry. Rather, as explained below,
we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
the District Court applied a per se rule. Given the circum
stances of this case and the unclear basis of the District
Court’s decision, the Court of Appeals should have re
manded the case to the District Court for clarification.
A
In deference to a district court’s familiarity with the
details of the case and its greater experience in eviden
tiary matters, courts of appeals afford broad discretion to
a district court’s evidentiary rulings. This Court has
acknowledged:
“A district court is accorded a wide discretion in de
termining the admissibility of evidence under the Fed
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 5
Opinion of the Court
eral Rules. Assessing the probative value of [the prof
fered evidence], and weighing any factors counseling
against admissibility is a matter first for the district
court’s sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 . . . .”
United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 54 (1984).
This is particularly true with respect to Rule 403 since it
requires an “on-the-spot balancing of probative value and
prejudice, potentially to exclude as unduly prejudicial
some evidence that already has been found to be factually
relevant.” 1 S. Childress & M. Davis, Federal Standards
of Review §4.02, p. 4–16 (3d ed. 1999). Under this defer
ential standard, courts of appeals uphold Rule 403 rulings
unless the district court has abused its discretion. See Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U. S. 172, 183, n. 7 (1997).
Here, however, the Court of Appeals did not accord the
District Court the deference we have described as the
“hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review.” General Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 143 (1997). Instead, it rea
soned that the District Court had “erroneous[ly] con
clu[ded] that Aramburu controlled the fate of the evidence
in this case.” 466 F. 3d, at 1230, n. 4.
To be sure, Sprint in its motion in limine argued, with a
citation to Aramburu’s categorical bar, that “[e]mployees
may be similarly situated only if they had the same super
visor,” App. 163a, and the District Court’s minute order
mirrors that blanket language.
But the District Court’s discussion of the evidence nei
ther cited Aramburu nor gave any other indication that its
decision relied on that case. The minute order included
only two sentences discussing the admissibility of the
evidence:
“Plaintiff may offer evidence of discrimination against
Sprint employees who are similarly situated to her.
‘Similarly situated employees,’ for the purpose of this
ruling, requires proof that (1) Paul Ruddick [sic] was
6 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN
Opinion of the Court
the decision-maker in any adverse employment action;
and (2) temporal proximity.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
24a.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, these sen
tences include no analysis suggesting that the District
Court applied a per se rule excluding this type of evidence.
Mendelsohn argued on appeal1 that the District Court
must have viewed Aramburu as controlling because Sprint
cited the case in support of its in limine motion. But
neither party’s submissions to the District Court sug
gested that Aramburu was controlling. Sprint’s memo
randum in support of its motion mentioned the case only
in a string citation, and not for the proposition that only
“similarly situated” witnesses’ testimony would be admis
sible.2 App. 163a. Mendelsohn did not cite the case in her
memorandum in opposition, see id., at 208a, and Sprint
did not address it in its reply brief, see id., at 221a.
Mendelsohn further argued that the District Court’s use
of the phrase “similarly situated,” also used in Aramburu,
evidenced its reliance on that case. Although the District
Court used the same phrase, we decline to read the Dis
trict Court’s decision as relying on a case that was not
controlling. Aramburu defined the phrase “similarly
situated” in the entirely different context of a plaintiff’s
allegation that nonminority employees were treated more
——————
1 Although,
as noted above, the parties do not address in their filings
before this Court the grounds on which we base our decision, we shall
consider the relevant arguments they made before the Court of Ap
peals.
2 Even if Sprint had argued that Aramburu requires a per se rule
excluding such evidence, it would be inappropriate for the reviewing
court to assume, absent indication in the District Court’s opinion, that
the lower court adopted a party’s incorrect argument. Cf. Lawrence v.
Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 183 (1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should
not assume that a court of appeals has adopted a legal position only
because [a party] supported it”).
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 7
Opinion of the Court
favorably than minority employees. 112 F. 3d, at 1403–
1406. Absent reason to do so, we should not assume the
District Court adopted that “similarly situated” analysis
when it addressed a very different kind of evidence. An
appellate court should not presume that a district court
intended an incorrect legal result when the order is
equally susceptible of a correct reading, particularly when
the applicable standard of review is deferential.
Mendelsohn additionally argued that the District Court
must have meant to apply such a rule because that was
the nature of the argument in Sprint’s in limine motion.
But the in limine motion did not suggest that the evidence
is never admissible; it simply argued that such evidence
lacked sufficient probative value “in this case” to be rele
vant or outweigh prejudice and delay. App. 156a.
When a district court’s language is ambiguous, as it was
here, it is improper for the court of appeals to presume
that the lower court reached an incorrect legal conclusion.
A remand directing the district court to clarify its order is
generally permissible and would have been the better
approach in this case.
B
In the Court of Appeals’ view, the District Court ex
cluded the evidence as per se irrelevant, and so had no
occasion to reach the question whether such evidence, if
relevant, should be excluded under Rule 403. The Court of
Appeals, upon concluding that such evidence was not per
se irrelevant, decided that it was relevant in the circum
stances of this case and undertook its own balancing
under Rule 403. But questions of relevance and prejudice
are for the District Court to determine in the first in
stance. Abel, supra, at 54 (“Assessing the probative value
of [evidence], and weighing any factors counseling against
admissibility is a matter first for the district court’s sound
judgment under Rules 401 and 403 . . .”). Rather than
8 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN
Opinion of the Court
assess the relevance of the evidence itself and conduct its
own balancing of its probative value and potential prejudi
cial effect, the Court of Appeals should have allowed the
District Court to make these determinations in the first
instance, explicitly and on the record.3 See Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 291 (1982) (When a
district court “fail[s] to make a finding because of an erro
neous view of the law, the usual rule is that there should
be a remand for further proceedings to permit the trial
court to make the missing findings”). With respect to
evidentiary questions in general and Rule 403 in particu
lar, a district court virtually always is in the better posi
tion to assess the admissibility of the evidence in the
context of the particular case before it.
We note that, had the District Court applied a per se
rule excluding the evidence, the Court of Appeals would
have been correct to conclude that it had abused its discre
tion. Relevance and prejudice under Rules 401 and 403
are determined in the context of the facts and arguments
in a particular case, and thus are generally not amenable
to broad per se rules. See Advisory Committee’s Notes on
Fed. Rule Evid. 401, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 864 (“Relevancy is
not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but
exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a
matter properly provable in the case”). But, as we have
discussed, there is no basis in the record for concluding
that the District Court applied a blanket rule.
III
The question whether evidence of discrimination by
other supervisors is relevant in an individual ADEA case
is fact based and depends on many factors, including how
——————
3 The
only exception to this rule is when “the record permits only one
resolution of the factual issue.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S.
273, 292 (1982). The evidence here, however, is not of that dispositive
character.
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 9
Opinion of the Court
closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circum
stances and theory of the case. Applying Rule 403 to
determine if evidence is prejudicial also requires a fact-
intensive, context-specific inquiry. Because Rules 401 and
403 do not make such evidence per se admissible or per se
inadmissible, and because the inquiry required by those
Rules is within the province of the District Court in the
first instance, we vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case with instructions to have the
District Court clarify the basis for its evidentiary ruling
under the applicable Rules.
It is so ordered.