Ashcroft v. Iqbal

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. v.
IQBAL ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 07–1015. Argued December 10, 2008—Decided May 18, 2009
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, respondent Iqbal,
a Pakistani Muslim, was arrested on criminal charges and detained
by federal officials under restrictive conditions. Iqbal filed a Bivens
action against numerous federal officials, including petitioner
Ashcroft, the former Attorney General, and petitioner Mueller, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388. The complaint al
leged, inter alia, that petitioners designated Iqbal a person “of high
interest” on account of his race, religion, or national origin, in contra
vention of the First and Fifth Amendments; that the FBI, under
Mueller’s direction, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim
men as part of its September-11th investigation; that petitioners
knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject
Iqbal to harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely
on account of the prohibited factors and for no legitimate penological
interest; and that Ashcroft was the policy’s “principal architect” and
Mueller was “instrumental” in its adoption and execution. After the
District Court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss on qualified
immunity grounds, they invoked the collateral order doctrine to file
an interlocutory appeal in the Second Circuit. Affirming, that court
assumed without discussion that it had jurisdiction and focused on
the standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S.
544, for evaluating whether a complaint is sufficient to survive a mo
tion to dismiss. Concluding that Twombly’s “flexible plausibility
standard” obliging a pleader to amplify a claim with factual allega
tions where necessary to render it plausible was inapplicable in the
context of petitioners’ appeal, the court held that Iqbal’s complaint
2 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Syllabus

was adequate to allege petitioners’ personal involvement in discrimi
natory decisions which, if true, violated clearly established constitu
tional law.
Held:
1. The Second Circuit had subject-matter jurisdiction to affirm the
District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Pp. 6–
10.
(a) Denial of a qualified-immunity claim can fall within the nar
row class of prejudgment orders reviewable under the collateral-order
doctrine so long as the order “turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530. The doctrine’s applicability in this con
text is well established; an order rejecting qualified immunity at the
motion-to-dismiss stage is a “final decision” under 28 U. S. C. §1291,
which vests courts of appeals with “jurisdiction of appeals from all fi
nal decisions of the district courts.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S.
299, 307. Pp. 7–8.
(b) Under these principles, the Court of Appeals had, and this
Court has, jurisdiction over the District Court’s order. Because the
order turned on an issue of law and rejected the qualified-immunity
defense, it was a final decision “subject to immediate appeal.”
Behrens, supra, at 307. Pp. 8–10.
2. Iqbal’s complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for
purposeful and unlawful discrimination. Pp. 11–23.
(a) This Court assumes, without deciding, that Iqbal’s First
Amendment claim is actionable in a Bivens action, see Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U. S. 250, 254, n. 2. Because vicarious liability is inappli
cable to Bivens and §1983 suits, see, e.g., Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 691, the plaintiff in a suit such
as the present one must plead that each Government-official defen
dant, through his own individual actions, has violated the Constitu
tion. Purposeful discrimination requires more than “intent as voli
tion or intent as awareness of consequences”; it involves a
decisionmaker’s undertaking a course of action “ ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.” Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256,
279. Iqbal must plead sufficient factual matter to show that petition
ers adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a
neutral, investigative reason, but for the purpose of discriminating on
account of race, religion, or national origin. Pp. 11–13.
(b) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[D]etailed factual allegations” are
not required, Twombly, 550 U. S., at 555, but the Rule does call for
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Syllabus

that is plausible on its face,” id., at 570. A claim has facial plausibil
ity when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Id., at 556. Two working principles underlie Twombly.
First, the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as
true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s ele
ments, supported by mere conclusory statements. Id., at 555. Sec
ond, determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is con
text-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience
and common sense. Id., at 556. A court considering a motion to dis
miss may begin by identifying allegations that, because they are
mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must
be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded fac
tual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then de
termine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Pp. 13–16.
(c) Iqbal’s pleadings do not comply with Rule 8 under Twombly.
Several of his allegations—that petitioners agreed to subject him to
harsh conditions as a matter of policy, solely on account of discrimi
natory factors and for no legitimate penological interest; that
Ashcroft was that policy’s “principal architect”; and that Mueller was
“instrumental” in its adoption and execution—are conclusory and not
entitled to be assumed true. Moreover, the factual allegations that
the FBI, under Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab
Muslim men, and that he and Ashcroft approved the detention policy,
do not plausibly suggest that petitioners purposefully discriminated
on prohibited grounds. Given that the September 11 attacks were
perpetrated by Arab Muslims, it is not surprising that a legitimate
policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals be
cause of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a dispa
rate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the policy’s
purpose was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. Even if the com
plaint’s well-pleaded facts gave rise to a plausible inference that
Iqbal’s arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination, that
inference alone would not entitle him to relief: His claims against pe
titioners rest solely on their ostensible policy of holding detainees
categorized as “of high interest,” but the complaint does not contain
facts plausibly showing that their policy was based on discriminatory
factors. Pp. 16–20.
(d) Three of Iqbal’s arguments are rejected. Pp. 20–23.
(i) His claim that Twombly should be limited to its antitrust
context is not supported by that case or the Federal Rules. Because
Twombly interpreted and applied Rule 8, which in turn governs the
4 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Syllabus

pleading standard “in all civil actions,” Rule 1, the case applies to an
titrust and discrimination suits alike, see 550 U. S., at 555–556, and
n. 14. P. 20.
(ii) Rule 8’s pleading requirements need not be relaxed based
on the Second Circuit’s instruction that the District Court cabin dis
covery to preserve petitioners’ qualified-immunity defense in antici
pation of a summary judgment motion. The question presented by a
motion to dismiss for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the con
trols placed on the discovery process. Twombly, supra, at 559. And
because Iqbal’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled
to discovery, cabined or otherwise. Pp. 20–22.
(iii) Rule 9(b)—which requires particularity when pleading
“fraud or mistake” but allows “other conditions of a person’s mind [to]
be alleged generally”—does not require courts to credit a complaint’s
conclusory statements without reference to its factual context. Rule 9
merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an
elevated pleading standard. It does not give him license to evade
Rule 8’s less rigid, though still operative, strictures. Pp. 22–23.
(e) The Second Circuit should decide in the first instance
whether to remand to the District Court to allow Iqbal to seek leave
to amend his deficient complaint. P. 23.
490 F. 3d 143, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,
joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–1015
_________________

JOHN D. ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JAVAID IQBAL ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 18, 2009]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Javaid Iqbal is a citizen of Pakistan and a
Muslim. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks he was arrested in the United States on criminal
charges and detained by federal officials. Respondent
claims he was deprived of various constitutional protec­
tions while in federal custody. To redress the alleged
deprivations, respondent filed a complaint against numer­
ous federal officials, including John Ashcroft, the former
Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Muel­
ler, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). Ashcroft and Mueller are the petitioners in the case
now before us. As to these two petitioners, the complaint
alleges that they adopted an unconstitutional policy that
subjected respondent to harsh conditions of confinement
on account of his race, religion, or national origin.
In the District Court petitioners raised the defense of
qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the suit, con­
tending the complaint was not sufficient to state a claim
against them. The District Court denied the motion to
dismiss, concluding the complaint was sufficient to state a
2 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

claim despite petitioners’ official status at the times in
question. Petitioners brought an interlocutory appeal in
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court,
without discussion, assumed it had jurisdiction over the
order denying the motion to dismiss; and it affirmed the
District Court’s decision.
Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal could, if
proved, demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct by some
governmental actors. But the allegations and pleadings
with respect to these actors are not before us here. This
case instead turns on a narrower question: Did respon­
dent, as the plaintiff in the District Court, plead factual
matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that petition­
ers deprived him of his clearly established constitutional
rights. We hold respondent’s pleadings are insufficient.
I
Following the 2001 attacks, the FBI and other entities
within the Department of Justice began an investigation
of vast reach to identify the assailants and prevent them
from attacking anew. The FBI dedicated more than 4,000
special agents and 3,000 support personnel to the en­
deavor. By September 18 “the FBI had received more
than 96,000 tips or potential leads from the public.” Dept.
of Justice, Office of Inspector General, The September 11
Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on
Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation
of the September 11 Attacks 1, 11–12 (Apr. 2003) (herein­
after OIG Report), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/
0306/full.pdf?bcsi_scan_61073EC0F74759AD=0&bcsi_scan
_filename=full.pdf (as visited May 14, 2009, and available
in Clerk of Court’s case file).
In the ensuing months the FBI questioned more than
1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks in par­
ticular or to terrorism in general. Id., at 1. Of those indi­
viduals, some 762 were held on immigration charges; and
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of the Court

a 184-member subset of that group was deemed to be “of
‘high interest’ ” to the investigation. Id., at 111. The high­
interest detainees were held under restrictive conditions
designed to prevent them from communicating with the
general prison population or the outside world. Id., at
112–113.
Respondent was one of the detainees. According to his
complaint, in November 2001 agents of the FBI and Im­
migration and Naturalization Service arrested him on
charges of fraud in relation to identification documents
and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Iqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F. 3d 143, 147–148 (CA2 2007). Pending trial
for those crimes, respondent was housed at the Metropoli­
tan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York.
Respondent was designated a person “of high interest” to
the September 11 investigation and in January 2002 was
placed in a section of the MDC known as the Administra­
tive Maximum Special Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU). Id.,
at 148. As the facility’s name indicates, the ADMAX SHU
incorporates the maximum security conditions allowable
under Federal Bureau of Prison regulations. Ibid.
ADMAX SHU detainees were kept in lockdown 23 hours a
day, spending the remaining hour outside their cells in
handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer
escort. Ibid.
Respondent pleaded guilty to the criminal charges,
served a term of imprisonment, and was removed to his
native Pakistan. Id., at 149. He then filed a Bivens action
in the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis­
trict of New York against 34 current and former federal
officials and 19 “John Doe” federal corrections officers.
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U. S. 388 (1971). The defendants range from the correc­
tional officers who had day-to-day contact with respondent
during the term of his confinement, to the wardens of the
MDC facility, all the way to petitioners—officials who
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Opinion of the Court

were at the highest level of the federal law enforcement
hierarchy. First Amended Complaint in No. 04–CV–1809
(JG)(JA), ¶¶10−11, App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a (hereinafter
Complaint).
The 21-cause-of-action complaint does not challenge
respondent’s arrest or his confinement in the MDC’s gen­
eral prison population. Rather, it concentrates on his
treatment while confined to the ADMAX SHU. The com­
plaint sets forth various claims against defendants who
are not before us. For instance, the complaint alleges that
respondent’s jailors “kicked him in the stomach, punched
him in the face, and dragged him across” his cell without
justification, id., ¶113, App. to Pet. for Cert. 176a; sub­
jected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when
he posed no safety risk to himself or others, id., ¶¶143–
145, App. to Pet. for Cert. 182a; and refused to let him and
other Muslims pray because there would be “[n]o prayers
for terrorists,” id., ¶154, App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a.
The allegations against petitioners are the only ones
relevant here. The complaint contends that petitioners
designated respondent a person of high interest on ac­
count of his race, religion, or national origin, in contraven­
tion of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitu­
tion. The complaint alleges that “the [FBI], under the
direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investiga­
tion of the events of September 11.” Id., ¶47, at 164a. It
further alleges that “[t]he policy of holding post-
September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions
of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was
approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in
discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Id.,
¶69, at 168a. Lastly, the complaint posits that petitioners
“each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject” respondent to harsh conditions of con­
finement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his]
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Opinion of the Court

religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate
penological interest.” Id., ¶96, at 172a–173a. The plead­
ing names Ashcroft as the “principal architect” of the
policy, id., ¶10, at 157a, and identifies Mueller as “instru­
mental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementa­
tion.” Id., ¶11, at 157a.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state sufficient allegations to show their own involvement
in clearly established unconstitutional conduct. The Dis­
trict Court denied their motion. Accepting all of the alle­
gations in respondent’s complaint as true, the court held
that “it cannot be said that there [is] no set of facts on
which [respondent] would be entitled to relief as against”
petitioners. Id., at 136a–137a (relying on Conley v. Gib
son, 355 U. S. 41 (1957)). Invoking the collateral-order
doctrine petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
While that appeal was pending, this Court decided Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), which
discussed the standard for evaluating whether a complaint
is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals considered Twombly’s applicabil­
ity to this case. Acknowledging that Twombly retired the
Conley no-set-of-facts test relied upon by the District
Court, the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussed at length
how to apply this Court’s “standard for assessing the
adequacy of pleadings.” 490 F. 3d, at 155. It concluded
that Twombly called for a “flexible ‘plausibility standard,’
which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some
factual allegations in those contexts where such amplifica­
tion is needed to render the claim plausible.” Id., at 157–
158. The court found that petitioners’ appeal did not
present one of “those contexts” requiring amplification. As
a consequence, it held respondent’s pleading adequate to
allege petitioners’ personal involvement in discriminatory
decisions which, if true, violated clearly established consti­
6 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

tutional law. Id., at 174.
Judge Cabranes concurred. He agreed that the major­
ity’s “discussion of the relevant pleading standards re­
flect[ed] the uneasy compromise . . . between a qualified
immunity privilege rooted in the need to preserve the
effectiveness of government as contemplated by our consti­
tutional structure and the pleading requirements of Rule
8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id., at 178
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Judge
Cabranes nonetheless expressed concern at the prospect of
subjecting high-ranking Government officials—entitled to
assert the defense of qualified immunity and charged with
responding to “a national and international security emer­
gency unprecedented in the history of the American Re­
public”—to the burdens of discovery on the basis of a
complaint as nonspecific as respondent’s. Id., at 179.
Reluctant to vindicate that concern as a member of the
Court of Appeals, ibid., Judge Cabranes urged this Court
to address the appropriate pleading standard “at the
earliest opportunity.” Id., at 178. We granted certiorari,
554 U. S. ___ (2008), and now reverse.
II
We first address whether the Court of Appeals had
subject-matter jurisdiction to affirm the District Court’s
order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Respondent
disputed subject-matter jurisdiction in the Court of Ap­
peals, but the court hardly discussed the issue. We are
not free to pretermit the question. Subject-matter juris­
diction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be consid­
ered when fairly in doubt. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U. S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing United States v. Cotton, 535
U. S. 625, 630 (2002)). According to respondent, the Dis­
trict Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss
is not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine. We
disagree.
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Opinion of the Court

A
With exceptions inapplicable here, Congress has vested
the courts of appeals with “jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States.”
28 U. S. C. §1291. Though the statute’s finality require­
ment ensures that “interlocutory appeals—appeals before
the end of district court proceedings—are the exception,
not the rule,” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 309 (1995),
it does not prevent “review of all prejudgment orders.”
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S. 299, 305 (1996). Under the
collateral-order doctrine a limited set of district-court
orders are reviewable “though short of final judgment.”
Ibid. The orders within this narrow category “are imme­
diately appealable because they ‘finally determine claims
of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi­
cated.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949)).
A district-court decision denying a Government officer’s
claim of qualified immunity can fall within the narrow
class of appealable orders despite “the absence of a final
judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530 (1985).
This is so because qualified immunity—which shields
Government officials “from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab­
lished statutory or constitutional rights,” Harlow v. Fitz
gerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982)—is both a defense to
liability and a limited “entitlement not to stand trial or
face the other burdens of litigation.” Mitchell, supra, 472
U. S., at 526. Provided it “turns on an issue of law,” id., at
530, a district-court order denying qualified immunity
“ ‘conclusively determine[s]’ ” that the defendant must bear
the burdens of discovery; is “conceptually distinct from the
merits of the plaintiff’s claim”; and would prove “effec­
8 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id.,
at 527−528 (citing Cohen, supra, at 546). As a general
matter, the collateral-order doctrine may have expanded
beyond the limits dictated by its internal logic and the
strict application of the criteria set out in Cohen. But the
applicability of the doctrine in the context of qualified­
immunity claims is well established; and this Court has
been careful to say that a district court’s order rejecting
qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage of a
proceeding is a “final decision” within the meaning of
§1291. Behrens, 516 U. S., at 307.
B
Applying these principles, we conclude that the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ appeal. The
District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dis­
miss turned on an issue of law and rejected the defense of
qualified immunity. It was therefore a final decision
“subject to immediate appeal.” Ibid. Respondent says
that “a qualified immunity appeal based solely on the
complaint’s failure to state a claim, and not on the ulti­
mate issues relevant to the qualified immunity defense
itself, is not a proper subject of interlocutory jurisdiction.”
Brief for Respondent Iqbal 15 (hereinafter Iqbal Brief). In
other words, respondent contends the Court of Appeals
had jurisdiction to determine whether his complaint avers
a clearly established constitutional violation but that it
lacked jurisdiction to pass on the sufficiency of his plead­
ings. Our opinions, however, make clear that appellate
jurisdiction is not so strictly confined.
In Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S. 250 (2006), the Court
reviewed an interlocutory decision denying qualified im­
munity. The legal issue decided in Hartman concerned
the elements a plaintiff “must plead and prove in order to
win” a First Amendment retaliation claim. Id., at 257,
n. 5. Similarly, two Terms ago in Wilkie v. Robbins, 551
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Opinion of the Court

U. S. 537 (2007), the Court considered another interlocu­
tory order denying qualified immunity. The legal issue
there was whether a Bivens action can be employed to
challenge interference with property rights. 551 U. S., at
549, n. 4. These cases cannot be squared with respon­
dent’s argument that the collateral-order doctrine restricts
appellate jurisdiction to the “ultimate issu[e]” whether the
legal wrong asserted was a violation of clearly established
law while excluding the question whether the facts
pleaded establish such a violation. Iqbal Brief 15. Indeed,
the latter question is even more clearly within the cate­
gory of appealable decisions than the questions presented
in Hartman and Wilkie, since whether a particular com­
plaint sufficiently alleges a clearly established violation of
law cannot be decided in isolation from the facts pleaded.
In that sense the sufficiency of respondent’s pleadings is
both “inextricably intertwined with,” Swint v. Chambers
County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 51 (1995), and “directly
implicated by,” Hartman, supra, at 257, n. 5, the qualified
immunity defense.
Respondent counters that our holding in Johnson, 515
U. S. 304, confirms the want of subject-matter jurisdiction
here. That is incorrect. The allegation in Johnson was
that five defendants, all of them police officers, unlawfully
beat the plaintiff. Johnson considered “the appealability
of a portion of” the District Court’s summary judgment
order that, “though entered in a ‘qualified immunity’ case,
determine[d] only” that there was a genuine issue of mate­
rial fact that three of the defendants participated in the
beating. Id., at 313.
In finding that order not a “final decision” for purposes
of §1291, the Johnson Court cited Mitchell for the proposi­
tion that only decisions turning “ ‘on an issue of law’ ” are
subject to immediate appeal. 515 U. S., at 313. Though
determining whether there is a genuine issue of material
fact at summary judgment is a question of law, it is a legal
10 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

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question that sits near the law-fact divide. Or as we said
in Johnson, it is a “fact-related” legal inquiry. Id., at 314.
To conduct it, a court of appeals may be required to con­
sult a “vast pretrial record, with numerous conflicting
affidavits, depositions, and other discovery materials.”
Id., at 316. That process generally involves matters more
within a district court’s ken and may replicate inefficiently
questions that will arise on appeal following final judg­
ment. Ibid. Finding those concerns predominant, John
son held that the collateral orders that are “final” under
Mitchell turn on “abstract,” rather than “fact-based,”
issues of law. 515 U. S., at 317.
The concerns that animated the decision in Johnson are
absent when an appellate court considers the disposition
of a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient plead­
ings. True, the categories of “fact-based” and “abstract”
legal questions used to guide the Court’s decision in John
son are not well defined. Here, however, the order deny­
ing petitioners’ motion to dismiss falls well within the
latter class. Reviewing that order, the Court of Appeals
considered only the allegations contained within the four
corners of respondent’s complaint; resort to a “vast pretrial
record” on petitioners’ motion to dismiss was unnecessary.
Id., at 316. And determining whether respondent’s com­
plaint has the “heft” to state a claim is a task well within
an appellate court’s core competency. Twombly, 550 U. S.,
at 557. Evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint is not a
“fact-based” question of law, so the problem the Court
sought to avoid in Johnson is not implicated here. The
District Court’s order denying petitioners’ motion to dis­
miss is a final decision under the collateral-order doctrine
over which the Court of Appeals had, and this Court has,
jurisdiction. We proceed to consider the merits of peti­
tioners’ appeal.
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009)
11

Opinion of the Court

III

In Twombly, supra, at 553–554, the Court found it
necessary first to discuss the antitrust principles impli­
cated by the complaint. Here too we begin by taking note
of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim of
unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled
to assert the defense of qualified immunity.
In Bivens—proceeding on the theory that a right sug­
gests a remedy—this Court “recognized for the first time
an implied private action for damages against federal
officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional
rights.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S.
61, 66 (2001). Because implied causes of action are disfa­
vored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens
liability “to any new context or new category of defen­
dants.” 534 U. S., at 68. See also Wilkie, 551 U. S., at
549 –550. That reluctance might well have disposed of
respondent’s First Amendment claim of religious discrimi­
nation. For while we have allowed a Bivens action to
redress a violation of the equal protection component of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see
Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we have not found
an implied damages remedy under the Free Exercise
Clause. Indeed, we have declined to extend Bivens to a
claim sounding in the First Amendment. Bush v. Lucas,
462 U. S. 367 (1983). Petitioners do not press this argu­
ment, however, so we assume, without deciding, that
respondent’s First Amendment claim is actionable under
Bivens.
In the limited settings where Bivens does apply, the
implied cause of action is the “federal analog to suits
brought against state officials under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42
U. S. C. §1983.” Hartman, 547 U. S., at 254, n. 2. Cf.
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 609 (1999). Based on the
rules our precedents establish, respondent correctly con­
cedes that Government officials may not be held liable for
12 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a
theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal Brief 46 (“[I]t is un­
disputed that supervisory Bivens liability cannot be estab­
lished solely on a theory of respondeat superior”). See
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S.
658, 691 (1978) (finding no vicarious liability for a munici­
pal “person” under 42 U. S. C. §1983); see also Dunlop v.
Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269 (1812) (a federal official’s
liability “will only result from his own neglect in not prop­
erly superintending the discharge” of his subordinates’
duties); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U. S. 507, 515–516 (1888)
(“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the mis­
feasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or
negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or
servants or other persons properly employed by or under
him, in the discharge of his official duties”). Because
vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and §1983
suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution.
The factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will
vary with the constitutional provision at issue. Where the
claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the
First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear
that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant
acted with discriminatory purpose. Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 540–541 (1993)
(First Amendment); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229,
240 (1976) (Fifth Amendment). Under extant precedent
purposeful discrimination requires more than “intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences.” Person
nel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279
(1979). It instead involves a decisionmaker’s undertaking
a course of action “ ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ [the
action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Ibid.
It follows that, to state a claim based on a violation of a
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 13

Opinion of the Court

clearly established right, respondent must plead sufficient
factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and im­
plemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral,
investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating
on account of race, religion, or national origin.
Respondent disagrees. He argues that, under a theory
of “supervisory liability,” petitioners can be liable for
“knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates’ use of
discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions
among detainees.” Iqbal Brief 45–46. That is to say,
respondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his
subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the
supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this
argument. Respondent’s conception of “supervisory liabil­
ity” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that
petitioners may not be held accountable for the misdeeds
of their agents. In a §1983 suit or a Bivens action—where
masters do not answer for the torts of their servants—the
term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicari­
ous liability, each Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own miscon­
duct. In the context of determining whether there is a
violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified
immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is required to
impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitu­
tional discrimination; the same holds true for an official
charged with violations arising from his or her superin­
tendent responsibilities.
IV

A

We turn to respondent’s complaint. Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” As the Court held in Twombly, 550
U. S. 544, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does
14 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully­
harmed-me accusation. Id., at 555 (citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U. S. 265, 286 (1986)). A pleading that offers
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” 550 U. S., at
555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked
assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id.,
at 557.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must con­
tain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570. A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reason­
able inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon­
duct alleged. Id., at 556. The plausibility standard is not
akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlaw­
fully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id., at 557 (brackets omitted).
Two working principles underlie our decision in
Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inappli­
cable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclu­
sory statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555 (Although for
the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the
factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it
does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed
with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a com­
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 15

Opinion of the Court

plaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss. Id., at 556. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the
Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experi­
ence and common sense. 490 F. 3d, at 157–158. But
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court considering a
motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying plead­
ings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal con­
clusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations. When there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Our decision in Twombly illustrates the two-pronged
approach. There, we considered the sufficiency of a com­
plaint alleging that incumbent telecommunications pro­
viders had entered an agreement not to compete and to
forestall competitive entry, in violation of the Sherman
Act, 15 U. S. C. §1. Recognizing that §1 enjoins only anti­
competitive conduct “effected by a contract, combination,
or conspiracy,” Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U. S. 752, 775 (1984), the plaintiffs in Twombly
flatly pleaded that the defendants “ha[d] entered into a
contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive
entry . . . and ha[d] agreed not to compete with one an­
other.” 550 U. S., at 551 (internal quotation marks omit­
ted). The complaint also alleged that the defendants’
“parallel course of conduct . . . to prevent competition” and
inflate prices was indicative of the unlawful agreement
alleged. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

The Court held the plaintiffs’ complaint deficient under
Rule 8. In doing so it first noted that the plaintiffs’ asser­
tion of an unlawful agreement was a “ ‘legal conclusion’ ”
and, as such, was not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Id., at 555. Had the Court simply credited the allegation
of a conspiracy, the plaintiffs would have stated a claim
for relief and been entitled to proceed perforce. The Court
next addressed the “nub” of the plaintiffs’ complaint—the
well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation of parallel
behavior—to determine whether it gave rise to a “plausi­
ble suggestion of conspiracy.” Id., at 565–566. Acknowl­
edging that parallel conduct was consistent with an
unlawful agreement, the Court nevertheless concluded
that it did not plausibly suggest an illicit accord because it
was not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely
explained by, lawful, unchoreographed free-market behav­
ior. Id., at 567. Because the well-pleaded fact of parallel
conduct, accepted as true, did not plausibly suggest an
unlawful agreement, the Court held the plaintiffs’ com­
plaint must be dismissed. Id., at 570.
B
Under Twombly’s construction of Rule 8, we conclude
that respondent’s complaint has not “nudged [his] claims”
of invidious discrimination “across the line from conceiv­
able to plausible.” Ibid.
We begin our analysis by identifying the allegations in
the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. Respondent pleads that petitioners “knew of, con­
doned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject
[him]” to harsh conditions of confinement “as a matter of
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.”
Complaint ¶96, App. to Pet. for Cert. 173a–174a. The
complaint alleges that Ashcroft was the “principal archi­
tect” of this invidious policy, id., ¶10, at 157a, and that
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 17

Opinion of the Court

Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting and executing it,
id., ¶11, at 157a. These bare assertions, much like the
pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to nothing
more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a
constitutional discrimination claim, 550 U. S., at 555,
namely, that petitioners adopted a policy “ ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.” Feeney, 442 U. S., at 279. As such, the allegations
are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.
Twombly, supra, 550 U. S., at 554–555. To be clear, we do
not reject these bald allegations on the ground that they
are unrealistic or nonsensical. We do not so characterize
them any more than the Court in Twombly rejected the
plaintiffs’ express allegation of a “ ‘contract, combination or
conspiracy to prevent competitive entry,’ ” id., at 551,
because it thought that claim too chimerical to be main­
tained. It is the conclusory nature of respondent’s allega­
tions, rather than their extravagantly fanciful nature, that
disentitles them to the presumption of truth.
We next consider the factual allegations in respondent’s
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an enti­
tlement to relief. The complaint alleges that “the [FBI],
under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and
detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its
investigation of the events of September 11.” Complaint
¶47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a. It further claims that
“[t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in
highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they
were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants
ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks
after September 11, 2001.” Id., ¶69, at 168a. Taken as
true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners’
purposefully designating detainees “of high interest”
because of their race, religion, or national origin. But
given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly
establish this purpose.
18 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab
Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in
good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist
group. Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—
Osama bin Laden—and composed in large part of his Arab
Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that a
legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and
detain individuals because of their suspected link to the
attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on
Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was
to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respon­
dent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely law­
ful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain
aliens who were illegally present in the United States and
who had potential connections to those who committed
terrorist acts. As between that “obvious alternative ex­
planation” for the arrests, Twombly, supra, at 567, and the
purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to
infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.
But even if the complaint’s well-pleaded facts give rise
to a plausible inference that respondent’s arrest was the
result of unconstitutional discrimination, that inference
alone would not entitle respondent to relief. It is impor­
tant to recall that respondent’s complaint challenges
neither the constitutionality of his arrest nor his initial
detention in the MDC. Respondent’s constitutional claims
against petitioners rest solely on their ostensible “policy of
holding post-September-11th detainees” in the ADMAX
SHU once they were categorized as “of high interest.”
Complaint ¶69, App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a. To prevail on
that theory, the complaint must contain facts plausibly
showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of
classifying post-September-11 detainees as “of high inter­
est” because of their race, religion, or national origin.
This the complaint fails to do. Though respondent
alleges that various other defendants, who are not before
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 19

Opinion of the Court

us, may have labeled him a person of “of high interest” for
impermissible reasons, his only factual allegation against
petitioners accuses them of adopting a policy approving
“restrictive conditions of confinement” for post-September­
11 detainees until they were “ ‘cleared’ by the FBI.” Ibid.
Accepting the truth of that allegation, the complaint does
not show, or even intimate, that petitioners purposefully
housed detainees in the ADMAX SHU due to their race,
religion, or national origin. All it plausibly suggests is
that the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the
aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep
suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions avail­
able until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activ­
ity. Respondent does not argue, nor can he, that such a
motive would violate petitioners’ constitutional obliga­
tions. He would need to allege more by way of factual
content to “nudg[e]” his claim of purposeful discrimination
“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly,
550 U. S., at 570.
To be sure, respondent can attempt to draw certain
contrasts between the pleadings the Court considered in
Twombly and the pleadings at issue here. In Twombly,
the complaint alleged general wrongdoing that extended
over a period of years, id., at 551, whereas here the com­
plaint alleges discrete wrongs—for instance, beatings—by
lower level Government actors. The allegations here, if
true, and if condoned by petitioners, could be the basis for
some inference of wrongful intent on petitioners’ part.
Despite these distinctions, respondent’s pleadings do not
suffice to state a claim. Unlike in Twombly, where the
doctrine of respondeat superior could bind the corporate
defendant, here, as we have noted, petitioners cannot be
held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a
constitutionally protected characteristic. Yet respondent’s
complaint does not contain any factual allegation suffi­
cient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state
20 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

of mind. His pleadings thus do not meet the standard
necessary to comply with Rule 8.
It is important to note, however, that we express no
opinion concerning the sufficiency of respondent’s com­
plaint against the defendants who are not before us.
Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal alleges serious
official misconduct that we need not address here. Our
decision is limited to the determination that respondent’s
complaint does not entitle him to relief from petitioners.
C
Respondent offers three arguments that bear on our
disposition of his case, but none is persuasive.
1
Respondent first says that our decision in Twombly
should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an
antitrust dispute. Iqbal Brief 37–38. This argument is
not supported by Twombly and is incompatible with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Twombly de­
termined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in anti­
trust, the decision was based on our interpretation and
application of Rule 8. 550 U. S., at 554. That Rule in turn
governs the pleading standard “in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Our decision in Twombly expounded the
pleading standard for “all civil actions,” ibid., and it ap­
plies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike. See 550
U. S., at 555–556, and n. 3.
2
Respondent next implies that our construction of Rule 8
should be tempered where, as here, the Court of Appeals
has “instructed the district court to cabin discovery in such
a way as to preserve” petitioners’ defense of qualified
immunity “as much as possible in anticipation of a sum­
mary judgment motion.” Iqbal Brief 27. We have held,
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 21

Opinion of the Court

however, that the question presented by a motion to dis­
miss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn
on the controls placed upon the discovery process.
Twombly, supra, at 559 (“It is no answer to say that a
claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if
groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process
through careful case management given the common
lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking
discovery abuse has been on the modest side” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach
is especially important in suits where Government-official
defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified
immunity. The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity
doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation,
including “avoidance of disruptive discovery.” Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U. S. 226, 236 (1991) (KENNEDY, J., concurring
in judgment). There are serious and legitimate reasons for
this. If a Government official is to devote time to his or
her duties, and to the formulation of sound and responsi­
ble policies, it is counterproductive to require the substan­
tial diversion that is attendant to participating in litiga­
tion and making informed decisions as to how it should
proceed. Litigation, though necessary to ensure that
officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms
of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and re­
sources that might otherwise be directed to the proper
execution of the work of the Government. The costs of
diversion are only magnified when Government officials
are charged with responding to, as Judge Cabranes aptly
put it, “a national and international security emergency
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.”
490 F. 3d, at 179.
It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery
for petitioners can be deferred while pretrial proceedings
continue for other defendants. It is quite likely that, when
22 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

Opinion of the Court

discovery as to the other parties proceeds, it would prove
necessary for petitioners and their counsel to participate
in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a
misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their
position. Even if petitioners are not yet themselves sub­
ject to discovery orders, then, they would not be free from
the burdens of discovery.
We decline respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading
requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals
promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery. That
promise provides especially cold comfort in this pleading
context, where we are impelled to give real content to the
concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who
must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous
performance of their duties. Because respondent’s com­
plaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to dis­
covery, cabined or otherwise.
3
Respondent finally maintains that the Federal Rules
expressly allow him to allege petitioners’ discriminatory
intent “generally,” which he equates with a conclusory
allegation. Iqbal Brief 32 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 9).
It follows, respondent says, that his complaint is suffi­
ciently well pleaded because it claims that petitioners
discriminated against him “on account of [his] religion,
race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penologi­
cal interest.” Complaint ¶96, App. to Pet. for Cert. 172a–
173a. Were we required to accept this allegation as true,
respondent’s complaint would survive petitioners’ motion
to dismiss. But the Federal Rules do not require courts to
credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without refer­
ence to its factual context.
It is true that Rule 9(b) requires particularity when
pleading “fraud or mistake,” while allowing “[m]alice,
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 23

Opinion of the Court

[to] be alleged generally.” But “generally” is a relative
term. In the context of Rule 9, it is to be compared to the
particularity requirement applicable to fraud or mistake.
Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discrimina­
tory intent under an elevated pleading standard. It does
not give him license to evade the less rigid—though still
operative—strictures of Rule 8. See 5A C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1301, p. 291 (3d
ed. 2004) (“[A] rigid rule requiring the detailed pleading of
a condition of mind would be undesirable because, absent
overriding considerations pressing for a specificity re­
quirement, as in the case of averments of fraud or mis­
take, the general ‘short and plain statement of the claim’
mandate in Rule 8(a) . . . should control the second sen­
tence of Rule 9(b)”). And Rule 8 does not empower re­
spondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action,
affix the label “general allegation,” and expect his com­
plaint to survive a motion to dismiss.
V
We hold that respondent’s complaint fails to plead suffi­
cient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful
discrimination against petitioners. The Court of Appeals
should decide in the first instance whether to remand to
the District Court so that respondent can seek leave to
amend his deficient complaint.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

SOUTER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–1015
_________________

JOHN D. ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JAVAID IQBAL ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 18, 2009]

JUSTICE SOUTER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE
GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
This case is here on the uncontested assumption that
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S.
388 (1971), allows personal liability based on a federal
officer’s violation of an individual’s rights under the First
and Fifth Amendments, and it comes to us with the ex­
plicit concession of petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller that
an officer may be subject to Bivens liability as a supervisor
on grounds other than respondeat superior. The Court
apparently rejects this concession and, although it has no
bearing on the majority’s resolution of this case, does away
with supervisory liability under Bivens. The majority then
misapplies the pleading standard under Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), to conclude that
the complaint fails to state a claim. I respectfully dissent
from both the rejection of supervisory liability as a cogni­
zable claim in the face of petitioners’ concession, and from
the holding that the complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I
A
Respondent Iqbal was arrested in November 2001 on
charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and
2 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

fraud in relation to identification documents, and was
placed in pretrial detention at the Metropolitan Detention
Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F. 3d
143, 147–148 (CA2 2007). He alleges that FBI officials
carried out a discriminatory policy by designating him as a
person “ ‘of high interest’ ” in the investigation of the Sep­
tember 11 attacks solely because of his race, religion, or
national origin. Owing to this designation he was placed
in the detention center’s Administrative Maximum Special
Housing Unit for over six months while awaiting the fraud
trial. Id., at 148. As I will mention more fully below,
Iqbal contends that Ashcroft and Mueller were at the very
least aware of the discriminatory detention policy and
condoned it (and perhaps even took part in devising it),
thereby violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights.1
Iqbal claims that on the day he was transferred to the
special unit, prison guards, without provocation, “picked
him up and threw him against the wall, kicked him in the
stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across
the room.” First Amended Complaint in No. 04–CV–1809
(JG) (JA), ¶113, App. to Pet. for Cert. 176a (hereinafter
Complaint). He says that after being attacked a second
time he sought medical attention but was denied care for
two weeks. Id., ¶¶187–188, at 189a. According to Iqbal’s
complaint, prison staff in the special unit subjected him to
unjustified strip and body cavity searches, id., ¶¶136–140,
at 181a, verbally berated him as a “ ‘terrorist’ ” and “ ‘Mus­
lim killer,’ ” id., ¶87, at 170a–171a, refused to give him
adequate food, id., ¶91, at 171a–172a, and intentionally
turned on air conditioning during the winter and heating
during the summer, id., ¶84, at 170a. He claims that

——————
1 Iqbal
makes no claim against Ashcroft and Mueller based simply on
his right, as a pretrial detainee, to be free from punishment prior to an
adjudication of guilt on the fraud charges. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U. S. 520, 535 (1979).
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

SOUTER, J., dissenting

prison staff interfered with his attempts to pray and en­
gage in religious study, id., ¶¶153–154, at 183a–184a, and
with his access to counsel, id., ¶¶168, 171, at 186a–187a.
The District Court denied Ashcroft and Mueller’s motion
to dismiss Iqbal’s discrimination claim, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. Ashcroft and Mueller then asked this
Court to grant certiorari on two questions:
“1. Whether a conclusory allegation that a cabinet­
level officer or other high-ranking official knew of,
condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly
unconstitutional acts purportedly committed by sub­
ordinate officials is sufficient to state individual­
capacity claims against those officials under Bivens.
“2. Whether a cabinet-level officer or other high­
ranking official may be held personally liable for the
allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials
on the ground that, as high-level supervisors, they
had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly
carried out by such subordinate officials.” Pet. for
Cert. I.
The Court granted certiorari on both questions. The first
is about pleading; the second goes to the liability standard.
In the first question, Ashcroft and Mueller did not ask
whether “a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking
official” who “knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a
plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts committed by
subordinate officials” was subject to liability under Bivens.
In fact, they conceded in their petition for certiorari that
they would be liable if they had “actual knowledge” of
discrimination by their subordinates and exhibited “ ‘de­
liberate indifference’ ” to that discrimination. Pet. for
Cert. 29 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 837
(1994)). Instead, they asked the Court to address whether
Iqbal’s allegations against them (which they call conclu­
sory) were sufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), and in particu­
4 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

lar whether the Court of Appeals misapplied our decision
in Twombly construing that rule. Pet. for Cert. 11–24.
In the second question, Ashcroft and Mueller asked this
Court to say whether they could be held personally liable
for the actions of their subordinates based on the theory
that they had constructive notice of their subordinates’
unconstitutional conduct. Id., at 25–33. This was an odd
question to pose, since Iqbal has never claimed that
Ashcroft and Mueller are liable on a constructive notice
theory. Be that as it may, the second question challenged
only one possible ground for imposing supervisory liability
under Bivens. In sum, both questions assumed that a
defendant could raise a Bivens claim on theories of super­
visory liability other than constructive notice, and neither
question asked the parties or the Court to address the
elements of such liability.
The briefing at the merits stage was no different.
Ashcroft and Mueller argued that the factual allegations
in Iqbal’s complaint were insufficient to overcome their
claim of qualified immunity; they also contended that they
could not be held liable on a theory of constructive notice.
Again they conceded, however, that they would be subject
to supervisory liability if they “had actual knowledge of
the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification
of suspects as being ‘of high interest’ and they were delib­
erately indifferent to that discrimination.” Brief for Peti­
tioners 50; see also Reply Brief for Petitioners 21–22.
Iqbal argued that the allegations in his complaint were
sufficient under Rule 8(a)(2) and Twombly, and conceded
that as a matter of law he could not recover under a theory
of respondeat superior. See Brief for Respondent Iqbal 46.
Thus, the parties agreed as to a proper standard of super­
visory liability, and the disputed question was whether
Iqbal’s complaint satisfied Rule 8(a)(2).
Without acknowledging the parties’ agreement as to the
standard of supervisory liability, the Court asserts that it
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

SOUTER, J., dissenting

must sua sponte decide the scope of supervisory liability
here. Ante, at 11–13. I agree that, absent Ashcroft and
Mueller’s concession, that determination would have to be
made; without knowing the elements of a supervisory
liability claim, there would be no way to determine
whether a plaintiff had made factual allegations amount­
ing to grounds for relief on that claim. See Twombly, 550
U. S., at 557–558. But deciding the scope of supervisory
Bivens liability in this case is uncalled for. There are
several reasons, starting with the position Ashcroft and
Mueller have taken and following from it.
First, Ashcroft and Mueller have, as noted, made the
critical concession that a supervisor’s knowledge of a
subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct and deliberate
indifference to that conduct are grounds for Bivens liabil­
ity. Iqbal seeks to recover on a theory that Ashcroft and
Mueller at least knowingly acquiesced (and maybe more
than acquiesced) in the discriminatory acts of their subor­
dinates; if he can show this, he will satisfy Ashcroft and
Mueller’s own test for supervisory liability. See Farmer,
supra, at 842 (explaining that a prison official acts with
“deliberate indifference” if “the official acted or failed to
act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm”). We do not normally override a party’s concession,
see, e.g., United States v. International Business Machines
Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 855 (1996) (holding that “[i]t would
be inappropriate for us to [e]xamine in this case, without
the benefit of the parties’ briefing,” an issue the Govern­
ment had conceded), and doing so is especially inappropri­
ate when, as here, the issue is unnecessary to decide the
case, see infra, at 8. I would therefore accept Ashcroft and
Mueller’s concession for purposes of this case and proceed
to consider whether the complaint alleges at least knowl­
edge and deliberate indifference.
Second, because of the concession, we have received no
briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory
6 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

liability, much less the full-dress argument we normally
require. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 676–677 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). We consequently are in no posi­
tion to decide the precise contours of supervisory liability
here, this issue being a complicated one that has divided
the Courts of Appeals. See infra, at 7–8. This Court
recently remarked on the danger of “bad decisionmaking”
when the briefing on a question is “woefully inadequate,”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at
14), yet today the majority answers a question with no
briefing at all. The attendant risk of error is palpable.
Finally, the Court’s approach is most unfair to Iqbal.
He was entitled to rely on Ashcroft and Mueller’s conces­
sion, both in their petition for certiorari and in their mer­
its briefs, that they could be held liable on a theory of
knowledge and deliberate indifference. By overriding that
concession, the Court denies Iqbal a fair chance to be
heard on the question.
B
The majority, however, does ignore the concession.
According to the majority, because Iqbal concededly can­
not recover on a theory of respondeat superior, it follows
that he cannot recover under any theory of supervisory
liability. Ante, at 13. The majority says that in a Bivens
action, “where masters do not answer for the torts of their
servants,” “the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer,”
and that “[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government
official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for
his or her own misconduct.” Ibid. Lest there be any mis­
take, in these words the majority is not narrowing the
scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens
supervisory liability entirely. The nature of a supervisory
liability theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under
certain conditions, for the wrongdoing of his subordinates,
and it is this very principle that the majority rejects.
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

SOUTER, J., dissenting

Ante, at 19 (“[P]etitioners cannot be held liable unless they
themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected
characteristic”).
The dangers of the majority’s readiness to proceed with­
out briefing and argument are apparent in its cursory
analysis, which rests on the assumption that only two
outcomes are possible here: respondeat superior liability,
in which “an employer is subject to liability for torts com­
mitted by employees while acting within the scope of their
employment,” Restatement (Third) of Agency §2.04 (2005),
or no supervisory liability at all. The dichotomy is false.
Even if an employer is not liable for the actions of his
employee solely because the employee was acting within
the scope of employment, there still might be conditions to
render a supervisor liable for the conduct of his subordi­
nate. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Meléndez-Rivera, 431 F. 3d 1,
14 (CA1 2005) (distinguishing between respondeat supe­
rior liability and supervisory liability); Bennett v. East­
pointe, 410 F. 3d 810, 818 (CA6 2005) (same); Richardson
v. Goord, 347 F. 3d 431, 435 (CA2 2003) (same); Hall v.
Lombardi, 996 F. 2d 954, 961 (CA8 1993) (same).
In fact, there is quite a spectrum of possible tests for
supervisory liability: it could be imposed where a supervi­
sor has actual knowledge of a subordinate’s constitutional
violation and acquiesces, see, e.g., Baker v. Monroe Twp.,
50 F. 3d 1186, 1994 (CA3 1995); Woodward v. Worland,
977 F. 2d 1392, 1400 (CA10 1992); or where supervisors
“ ‘know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it,
condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might
see,’ ” International Action Center v. United States, 365
F. 3d 20, 28 (CADC 2004) (Roberts, J.) (quoting Jones v.
Chicago, 856 F. 2d 985, 992 (CA7 1988) (Posner, J.)); or
where the supervisor has no actual knowledge of the
violation but was reckless in his supervision of the subor­
dinate, see, e.g., Hall, supra, at 961; or where the supervi­
sor was grossly negligent, see, e.g., Lipsett v. University of
8 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

Puerto Rico, 864 F. 2d 881, 902 (CA1 1988). I am unsure
what the general test for supervisory liability should be,
and in the absence of briefing and argument I am in no
position to choose or devise one.
Neither is the majority, but what is most remarkable
about its foray into supervisory liability is that its conclu­
sion has no bearing on its resolution of the case. The
majority says that all of the allegations in the complaint
that Ashcroft and Mueller authorized, condoned, or even
were aware of their subordinates’ discriminatory conduct
are “conclusory” and therefore are “not entitled to be
assumed true.” Ante, at 17. As I explain below, this con­
clusion is unsound, but on the majority’s understanding of
Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standards, even if the majority ac­
cepted Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession and asked
whether the complaint sufficiently alleges knowledge and
deliberate indifference, it presumably would still conclude
that the complaint fails to plead sufficient facts and must
be dismissed.2
II
Given petitioners’ concession, the complaint satisfies
Rule 8(a)(2). Ashcroft and Mueller admit they are liable
for their subordinates’ conduct if they “had actual knowl­
edge of the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classi­
fication of suspects as being ‘of high interest’ and they
were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination.” Brief
for Petitioners 50. Iqbal alleges that after the September
11 attacks the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
“arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men,”
Complaint ¶47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, that many of
——————
2 If I am mistaken, and the majority’s rejection of the concession is

somehow outcome determinative, then its approach is even more unfair
to Iqbal than previously explained, see supra, at 6, for Iqbal had no
reason to argue the (apparently dispositive) supervisory liability
standard in light of the concession.
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

SOUTER, J., dissenting

these men were designated by high-ranking FBI officials
as being “ ‘of high interest,’ ” id., ¶¶48, 50, at 164a, and
that in many cases, including Iqbal’s, this designation was
made “because of the race, religion, and national origin of
the detainees, and not because of any evidence of the
detainees’ involvement in supporting terrorist activity,”
id., ¶49. The complaint further alleges that Ashcroft was
the “principal architect of the policies and practices chal­
lenged,” id., ¶10, at 157a, and that Mueller “was instru­
mental in the adoption, promulgation, and implementa­
tion of the policies and practices challenged,” id., ¶11.
According to the complaint, Ashcroft and Mueller “knew
of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject [Iqbal] to these conditions of confinement as a
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race,
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological
interest.” Id., ¶96, at 172a–173a. The complaint thus
alleges, at a bare minimum, that Ashcroft and Mueller
knew of and condoned the discriminatory policy their
subordinates carried out. Actually, the complaint goes
further in alleging that Ashcroft and Muller affirmatively
acted to create the discriminatory detention policy. If
these factual allegations are true, Ashcroft and Mueller
were, at the very least, aware of the discriminatory policy
being implemented and deliberately indifferent to it.
Ashcroft and Mueller argue that these allegations fail to
satisfy the “plausibility standard” of Twombly. They
contend that Iqbal’s claims are implausible because such
high-ranking officials “tend not to be personally involved
in the specific actions of lower-level officers down the
bureaucratic chain of command.” Brief for Petitioners 28.
But this response bespeaks a fundamental misunder­
standing of the enquiry that Twombly demands. Twombly
does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to
consider whether the factual allegations are probably true.
We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take
10 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court
may be. See Twombly, 550 U. S., at 555 (a court must
proceed “on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)”); id., at 556
(“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes
a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is
improbable”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U. S. 319,
327 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . dis­
missals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual
allegations”). The sole exception to this rule lies with
allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as
we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s
recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel. That is
not what we have here.
Under Twombly, the relevant question is whether,
assuming the factual allegations are true, the plaintiff has
stated a ground for relief that is plausible. That is, in
Twombly’s words, a plaintiff must “allege facts” that,
taken as true, are “suggestive of illegal conduct.” 550
U. S., at 564, n. 8. In Twombly, we were faced with allega­
tions of a conspiracy to violate §1 of the Sherman Act
through parallel conduct. The difficulty was that the
conduct alleged was “consistent with conspiracy, but just
as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competi­
tive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common
perceptions of the market.” Id., at 554. We held that in
that sort of circumstance, “[a]n allegation of parallel con­
duct is . . . much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a
§1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim,
but without some further factual enhancement it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id., at 557 (brackets omitted).
Here, by contrast, the allegations in the complaint are
neither confined to naked legal conclusions nor consistent
with legal conduct. The complaint alleges that FBI offi­
cials discriminated against Iqbal solely on account of his
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

SOUTER, J., dissenting

race, religion, and national origin, and it alleges the
knowledge and deliberate indifference that, by Ashcroft
and Mueller’s own admission, are sufficient to make them
liable for the illegal action. Iqbal’s complaint therefore
contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id., at 570.
I do not understand the majority to disagree with this
understanding of “plausibility” under Twombly. Rather,
the majority discards the allegations discussed above with
regard to Ashcroft and Mueller as conclusory, and is left
considering only two statements in the complaint: that
“the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER,
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . .
as part of its investigation of the events of September 11,”
Complaint ¶47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, and that “[t]he
policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were
‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants
ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks
after September 11, 2001,” id., ¶69, at 168a. See ante, at
17. I think the majority is right in saying that these
allegations suggest only that Ashcroft and Mueller “sought
to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist
activity,” ante, at 19, and that this produced “a disparate,
incidental impact on Arab Muslims,” ante, at 18. And I
agree that the two allegations selected by the majority,
standing alone, do not state a plausible entitlement to
relief for unconstitutional discrimination.
But these allegations do not stand alone as the only
significant, nonconclusory statements in the complaint, for
the complaint contains many allegations linking Ashcroft
and Mueller to the discriminatory practices of their subor­
dinates. See Complaint ¶10, App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a
(Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the discrimina­
tory policy); id., ¶11 (Mueller was “instrumental” in adopt­
12 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

SOUTER, J., dissenting

ing and executing the discriminatory policy); id., ¶96, at
172a–173a (Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” Iqbal to harsh
conditions “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his]
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate
penological interest”).
The majority says that these are “bare assertions” that,
“much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount
to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the ele­
ments’ of a constitutional discrimination claim” and there­
fore are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Ante, at 17
(quoting Twombly, supra, at 555). The fallacy of the ma­
jority’s position, however, lies in looking at the relevant
assertions in isolation. The complaint contains specific
allegations that, in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks, the Chief of the FBI’s International Terrorism
Operations Section and the Assistant Special Agent in
Charge for the FBI’s New York Field Office implemented a
policy that discriminated against Arab Muslim men, in­
cluding Iqbal, solely on account of their race, religion, or
national origin. See Complaint ¶¶47–53, App. to Pet. for
Cert. 164a–165a. Viewed in light of these subsidiary
allegations, the allegations singled out by the majority as
“conclusory” are no such thing. Iqbal’s claim is not that
Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully
and maliciously agreed to subject” him to a discriminatory
practice that is left undefined; his allegation is that “they
knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to
subject” him to a particular, discrete, discriminatory policy
detailed in the complaint. Iqbal does not say merely that
Ashcroft was the architect of some amorphous discrimina­
tion, or that Mueller was instrumental in an ill-defined
constitutional violation; he alleges that they helped to
create the discriminatory policy he has described. Taking
the complaint as a whole, it gives Ashcroft and Mueller
“ ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 13

SOUTER, J., dissenting

which it rests.’ ” Twombly, 550 U. S., at 555 (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 47 (1957) (omission in
original)).
That aside, the majority’s holding that the statements it
selects are conclusory cannot be squared with its treat­
ment of certain other allegations in the complaint as non­
conclusory. For example, the majority takes as true the
statement that “[t]he policy of holding post-September­
11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confine­
ment until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by
Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in
the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Complaint ¶69,
App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a; see ante, at 17. This statement
makes two points: (1) after September 11, the FBI held
certain detainees in highly restrictive conditions, and (2)
Ashcroft and Mueller discussed and approved these condi­
tions. If, as the majority says, these allegations are not
conclusory, then I cannot see why the majority deems it
merely conclusory when Iqbal alleges that (1) after Sep­
tember 11, the FBI designated Arab Muslim detainees as
being of “ ‘high interest’ ” “because of the race, religion, and
national origin of the detainees, and not because of any
evidence of the detainees’ involvement in supporting
terrorist activity,” Complaint ¶¶48–50, App. to Pet. for
Cert. 164a, and (2) Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, con­
doned, and willfully and maliciously agreed” to that dis­
crimination, id., ¶96, at 172a. By my lights, there is no
principled basis for the majority’s disregard of the allega­
tions linking Ashcroft and Mueller to their subordinates’
discrimination.
I respectfully dissent.
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

BREYER, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 07–1015
_________________

JOHN D. ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL,
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JAVAID IQBAL ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[May 18, 2009]

JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting.
I agree with JUSTICE SOUTER and join his dissent. I
write separately to point out that, like the Court, I believe
it important to prevent unwarranted litigation from inter
fering with “the proper execution of the work of the Gov
ernment.” Ante, at 21. But I cannot find in that need
adequate justification for the Court’s interpretation of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The law, after all,
provides trial courts with other legal weapons designed to
prevent unwarranted interference. As the Second Circuit
explained, where a Government defendant asserts a quali
fied immunity defense, a trial court, responsible for man
aging a case and “mindful of the need to vindicate the
purpose of the qualified immunity defense,” can structure
discovery in ways that diminish the risk of imposing un
warranted burdens upon public officials. See Iqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2007). A district court, for
example, can begin discovery with lower level government
defendants before determining whether a case can be
made to allow discovery related to higher level govern
ment officials. See ibid. Neither the briefs nor the Court’s
opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these
alternative case-management tools inadequate, either in
general or in the case before us. For this reason, as well
2 ASHCROFT v. IQBAL

BREYER, J., dissenting

as for the independently sufficient reasons set forth in
JUSTICE SOUTER’s opinion, I would affirm the Second
Circuit.