UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-20185
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
MASSOOD DANESH PAJOOH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
June 8, 1998
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Massood Danesh Pajooh filed a petition for rehearing
from this Court’s decision issued on February 10, 1998, complaining
that the Court affirmed pursuant to Local Rule 47.6. Appellant
argues in his petition that Local Rule 47.6 is unconstitutional as
applied because it deprives a litigant of due process of law.
Actually, the panel issued a brief per curiam opinion which did not
cite Local Rule 47.6. Assuming arguendo that the opinion was the
equivalent to an affirmance pursuant to Local Rule 47.6, we address
the Appellant’s argument and conclude that no constitutional
deprivation occurred.
This Court may affirm pursuant to Local Rule 47.6 which
provides that the judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced
without opinion under certain circumstances. Those circumstances
are: (1) that a judgment of the district court is based on
findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous; (2) that the
evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient; (3) that
the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole; (4) in the case of a summary
judgment, that no genuine issue of material fact has been properly
raised by the appellant; and (5) no reversible error of law
appears. If the circumstances are met, the Court may, in its
discretion, enter the order “AFFIRMED”. See 5th Cir. R. 47.6.
There is no constitutional right to appeal; the right to
appeal is a statutory one. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651, 656 (1977); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th
Cir. 1992); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742. Appeals as of right in
criminal cases were not even permitted in this country until 1889,
a century after the Supreme Court of the United States was
established. Abney, 431 U.S. at 656 n.3; Judiciary Act of 1789.
The Supreme Court declared that “a review by an appellate court of
the final judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of
which the accused is convicted, was not at common law, and is not
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now, a necessary element of due process of law.” McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
Appellant argues that because Congress has created the
statutory mechanism by which to appeal a criminal judgment of
conviction, due process entitles him to “meaningful appellate
review.” Petition at 2. We agree. Litigants are entitled to have
all issues fully considered and ruled on by a panel of the Court of
Appeals. Appellant, however, seems to equate meaningful review to
a full written opinion. In doing so, Appellant fails to
distinguish between the review process and the manner in which the
Court announces its decision. Whether the case merits a lengthy
opinion, or whether it can be affirmed pursuant to Local Rule 47.6,
or by some other form of summary disposition is determined on a
case by case basis. In general decisions regarding publication and
the extent to which the Court determines that a written explanation
of its decisions is called for is driven by whether a full opinion
will benefit bench, bar, or the litigants. These decisions,
however, are quite distinct from the meaningfulness of the Court’s
review. We find that the court did not deprive Appellant of
meaningful review of his appeal.
With respect to Appellant’s second argument in his petition
for rehearing regarding the merits of his case: We have considered
them and find them without merit.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for rehearing
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filed in the above-entitled case is DENIED.
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