RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 10a0188p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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Plaintiff-Appellee, -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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No. 08-6381
v.
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Defendant-Appellant. -
RANDY WAYNE SPRINGER,
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 07-00261-001—Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., District Judge.
Decided and Filed: June 29, 2010
Before: GUY, BOGGS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
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COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Michael J. Flanagan, LAW OFFICE, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.
Addison Thompson, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Nashville, Tennessee,
for Appellee.
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OPINION
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BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Randy Wayne Springer, a member of the United States
Army, took a live rocket home from Fort Campbell and kept it beside the central vacuuming
unit in his garage for over four years. He concedes that he did not have authority to do so.
After his then-wife alerted police, he was convicted of possessing an unregistered firearm,
in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871. He then launched this appeal, arguing that
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. The gist of his
argument is that, because he was a soldier, the rocket was always in the possession and under
the control of the United States. This contention fails, and we therefore affirm.
1
No. 08-6381 United States v. Springer Page 2
I
Springer’s mostly commendable career in the United States Army has taken him into
combat areas on four separate occasions, and he has been the recipient of numerous
decorations, including a Meritorious Service Medal, six Army Commendation Medals, and
four Army Achievement Medals. As he testified at trial, “[r]ight up until these charges were
pending, all my Good Conduct Medals had arrived like they were supposed to. I have never
been in trouble. My record has been flawless.” Ibid. Unfortunately, that changed.
In June 2003, Springer served as a noncommissioned armament officer at Fort
Campbell, home to the United States Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment,
also known as the Night Stalkers. Springer’s job was to maintain weapons systems on attack
helicopters. During night training exercises on Fort Campbell’s vast firing ranges, he would
remain on the ground, where he and others replenished helicopters depleted of rockets,
bullets, and gas. It was also part of Springer’s responsibilities to “de-arm” helicopters that
returned to the arming pad at the end of the night with unspent ammunition.
One evening, at the conclusion of training exercises, Springer noticed that a
helicopter had been mistakenly returned to the hangar with an unfired high-explosive rocket.
According to Springer’s trial testimony, the rocket was supposed to have been transferred
to ammunition personnel and transported back to the base’s ammunition supply point
(“ASP”), but somehow the rocket had been left in its pod on the helicopter. After calling the
ASP and receiving no answer, Springer “made the decision to throw the rocket in the back
of [his] car and drive it to the ASP and leave it with the ASP guys there.” He admitted at
trial that it was against regulations to place the rocket in a private vehicle, but it was late and
he was tired. When he arrived at the ASP, no one was there. At that point, he decided to
take the rocket to his home, which was not located on the base, and bring it back later.
When he got home that night, Springer placed the rocket against the wall in the back
of his garage, but only after tearing out some wires so as to ensure that the device would not
be detonated by static electricity. The following morning, he returned to the base without
the rocket. That day, he learned he would imminently be deployed to Iraq, and within three
days, he was overseas. He did not return the rocket prior to his deployment. Nor did he
return it after his deployment, which ended in October 2003. In fact, the rocket remained
No. 08-6381 United States v. Springer Page 3
in his garage for what he described as “countless hundreds of days [on which he] could have
taken it back.”
On October 19, 2007, the rocket was finally removed from its spot adjacent to
Springer’s central vacuuming unit. The events leading to the rocket’s removal began when
Springer’s then-wife phoned local authorities to discuss an order of protection she had taken
out against him. During the call, she disclosed the rocket’s presence to police, who later
contacted military personnel to secure it. An explosive ordnance disposal technician was
dispatched, and the rocket was returned to the ASP at Fort Campbell, precisely where it
should have gone in the first place.
Springer was subsequently indicted for possession of an unregistered firearm, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871. During his trial, he moved for a judgment of
acquittal on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The
motion was denied, as was a renewed motion filed subsequent to the jury’s verdict. At
sentencing, he received three years’ probation. Additionally, the district court took note of
Springer’s generally admirable military history and permitted him to possess firearms,
despite his conviction, during “his service in the Army.”
Springer now appeals.
II
The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq., is “an interrelated statutory
system for the taxation of certain classes of firearms.” Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85,
87 (1968). The Act’s purpose is to curb the proliferation of especially dangerous weaponry
“identifiable generally and broadly, if not exclusively, with criminal activities.” United
States v. Black, 431 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1970); see also Haynes, 390 U.S. at 87 n.4
(indicating that the Act’s primary purpose “was to make it more difficult for the gangster
element to obtain certain types of weapons”). Among the firearms covered by the Act are
sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and “destructive devices,” such as bombs, grenades, and
rockets. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), (f).
Two provisions of the Act are relevant to Springer’s appeal. The first is § 5841,
which sets forth the Act’s registration requirements. Under § 5841(a), the Secretary of the
No. 08-6381 United States v. Springer Page 4
Treasury is required to “maintain a central registry of all firearms in the United States which
are not in the possession or under the control of the United States.” That registry is known
as the National Firearm Registration and Transfer Record. Ibid.
The second pertinent provision is § 5861(d), which makes it “unlawful for any
person . . . to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record[.]” To make out a violation, the government
must establish that: (1) the defendant possessed a firearm; (2) the defendant knew of the
firearm’s characteristics; and (3) the firearm was not registered to him. See Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 602 (1994); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). The government is not required to prove that the
defendant knew the weapon was unregistered. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 607 (opinion of the
Court). Upon conviction, the defendant is subject to a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment
of up to ten years, or both. 26 U.S.C. § 5871.
III
Springer’s sole argument is that the district court erred in denying his motion for
acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under § 5861(d).
In making this argument, he contends that there is an exception to § 5861(d) for possession
of a firearm that is in the possession or under the control of the United States. He further
contends that, because he was a soldier, “the rocket was always in the possession of the
United States through [him].” Appellant’s Br. at 9. Thus, according to Springer, the
government failed to demonstrate that his possession of the rocket was illegal.
A
We begin with Springer’s claim that § 5861(d) contains an exception for possession
of a firearm that is in the possession or under the control of the United States. Claims like
this, which raise questions of statutory construction, are reviewed de novo. Douglas v.
Babcock, 990 F.2d 875, 877 (6th Cir. 1993). In assessing such questions, the starting point
is invariably the language of the statute. Appleton v. First Nat’l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791,
801 (6th Cir. 1995). If the language is unambiguous, we must give effect to its plain
No. 08-6381 United States v. Springer Page 5
meaning. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762, 769 (6th Cir.
2005).
Turning first to the text of the statute, we note that it may support Springer’s cause.
True, the language of § 5861(d) is unambiguously devoid of express exceptions, providing
only that no individual can legally possess an unregistered firearm. Cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o)(2)(A) (creating an exception to § 922(o)(1)’s blanket ban on machine gun
possession for “possession by or under the authority of” the United States). However, the
language of § 5841(a) appears to create an implicit exception to § 5861(d). Under § 5841(a),
firearms “in the possession or under the control of the United States” are exempt from
registration in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. 26 U.S.C. § 5841(a).
Because registration is a fundamental component of the regulatory scheme set forth in the
National Firearms Act, Congress’s decision to exempt government-owned firearms from
registration can be interpreted to signify a broader purpose of granting the government
unencumbered access to firearms. In other words, it seems obvious that an exemption from
registration entails a concomitant exemption from penalties arising out of unregistered
possession.
Additionally, without a corresponding exception to § 5861(d), the language of
§ 5841(a) creates a problem. As mentioned above, § 5841(a) provides for the creation of the
National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. By definition, the Record includes only
firearms “which are not in the possession or under the control of the United States.” 26
U.S.C. § 5841(a); see also United States v. Khatib, 706 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that firearms in the possession of the United States are “excepted from
registration”). Under § 5861(d), it is illegal to possess a firearm that does not appear in the
Record. Thus, under a literal reading of the statutory text, no individual could legally
possess a firearm that is in the possession or under the control of the United States. That
would be a manifestly absurd result. There is no question that the federal government can
legitimately possess and utilize firearms; the language of the statute assumes as much. See
26 U.S.C. § 5841(a). However, as an “abstract entity,” the government “has no hand to write
or mouth to speak . . . . It speaks and acts only through agents, or more properly, officers.”
The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 676 (1868). Unsurprisingly, the government
is also dependent on flesh-and-blood representatives to transport, maintain, and wield
No. 08-6381 United States v. Springer Page 6
firearms. If those representatives cannot legally possess firearms, the government cannot
legally possess firearms—at least not meaningfully. Congress surely did not intend that
outcome.
Luckily, there is a simple way of averting this scenario. If § 5841(a) is read to create
an implicit exception to § 5861(d)’s prohibition on unregistered possession, then federal
agents are not vulnerable to prosecution for performing their firearm-related duties, and the
government’s ability to possess and employ firearms is not jeopardized. Furthermore, this
reading of the statute is fully consistent with Congress’s avowed purpose in enacting the
National Firearms Act, which, as noted above, is to prevent especially dangerous weapons
from falling into the hands of the “gangster element.” Haynes, 390 U.S. at 87 n.4.
Accordingly, we hold that § 5861(d) does not prohibit possession of an unregistered firearm
that is in the possession or under the control of the United States. In so holding, we join the
former United States Army Court of Military Review, which recognized that § 5861(d)
“covers unregistered possession of all automatic firearms, except those under the possession
or control of the United States.” United States v. De Marco, 41 C.M.R. 613, 614 (A.C.M.R.
1969).
Of course, given its justification, the exception is only available to those who receive
or possess a firearm while acting as an agent of the United States. The key to determining
whether an individual is functioning as a federal agent, as opposed to a private citizen, is his
authority to act on the government’s behalf. See Black’s Law Dictionary 68 (8th ed. 2004)
(Agents are those who are “authorized to act for or in place of another.”); Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 40 (1981) (defining an agent as “one that acts for . . . another
by authority from him”). Thus, to obtain the benefit of the exception, one must have the
authority, conferred upon him by the United States, to receive or possess a given firearm at
a given time. This standard ensures that only those who are furthering the aims of the United
States, as determined by the government itself, are excluded from the reach of § 5861(d).
Springer urges a different construction of the exception. He seems to suggest that,
as a matter of law, soldiers are exempt from prosecution under § 5861(d) simply by virtue
of their status as members of the armed forces. It does not take a rocket scientist to see that
this claim does not fly. If Springer were correct, a soldier would face no consequences under
No. 08-6381 United States v. Springer Page 7
§ 5861(d) for stealing “large quantities of items such as Claymore anti-personnel mines,
M-67 hand grenades, C-4 plastic explosives, T.N.T., dynamite, 35 mm. practice L.A.W.S.
rockets, detonation devices, and tons of ammunition and other military supplies, including
large shells such as 106 mm. and 90 mm. canisters.” United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d
1508, 1511 (11th Cir. 1989) (upholding the convictions of two active-duty soldiers under
§ 5861(d) for stealing the aforementioned ordnance). Obviously, an exception broad enough
to permit such conduct would defy common sense.
B
The final question, then, is whether the evidence presented at Springer’s trial
supports the finding that he acted outside his authority in taking and keeping the rocket. “In
reviewing a claim that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction, we
consider ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Carter, 465 F.3d 658, 664 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 600 (6th Cir. 2003)). When conducting this
inquiry, “[w]e are bound to make all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in support
of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1140 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing
United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Here, a reasonable juror could easily have found that Springer’s possession of the
rocket was unauthorized. Springer himself admitted that “no soldier is allowed to transport
weapons and ammunition in a privately-owned [sic] vehicle.” He also confirmed that
“soldiers aren’t authorized to store firearms and ammunition in their private residences.”
Additionally, he conceded that he could have taken the rocket back to base on “countless
hundreds of days.” He then admitted that “[t]he only reason why [he did not] was an
ultimate act of procrastination on [his] part.” On top of that, he verified that he never
informed anyone in his chain of command that he had the rocket. From this testimony alone,
we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that Springer did not
qualify for the exception to § 5861(d).
No. 08-6381 United States v. Springer Page 8
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Springer’s conviction.