IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
________________
No. 97-60271
________________
CITIZENS FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI;
CITY OF QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI
DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE;
CITY OF QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI
ELECTION COMMISSION,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
____________________
July 24, 1998
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:
After finding that the City of Quitman (“the City” or “Quitman”) had violated Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act by electing its five alderman from at-large districts, the district court entered
a decree ordering that the City’s alderman be elected from four single-member districts and one at-
large district “unless and until the City of Quitman adopts and effectuates another method of
election.” We reverse and remand. On remand, the district court must either articulate a sufficiently
“singular combination of unique factors” justifying the inclusion of an at-large district in its
redistricting plan, Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 333 (1973), or enter a decree redistricting
Quitman into five single-member districts.
I.
In 1993, the plaintiff, Citizens for Good Government (“Citizens”), brought suit against
Quitman arguing that the City’s method of electing its alderman from five at-large districts violated
the Voting Rights Act. The complaint sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and a court
order redistricting Quitman into five single-member districts. The district court granted Citizens’
request for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the upcoming 1993 alderman elections.
In response to the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the City and Citizens began
negotiating a permanent redistricting plan for Quitman. Consistent with Mississippi law, the parties
agreed to a redistricting plan that provided for four single-member districts and one at-large district
(“the City’s 4-1 plan”). See Stewart v. Waller, 404 F. Supp. 206, 213-15 (N.D. Miss. 1975)
(reinstating Miss. Code Ann. § 3374-36 (1942), which authorizes alderman to be elected from five
at-large districts or four single-member districts and one at-large district). The parties then submitted
this plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. The Attorney General, however, objected to the
redistricting plan, and Citizens’ dilution claim under the Voting Rights Act was subsequently tried
before the district court.
After a bench trial, the district court concluded that the City’s system of electing its five
alderman from at-large districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.1 The Court then
provided the City with another opportunity to collaborate with Citizens and develop a redistricting
plan for the upcoming 1997 alderman elections. In light of the Attorney General’s objection to their
prior plan, the parties jointly declined this opportunity to negotiate another redistricting plan. Left
1
The City does not contest the validity of this finding on appeal.
2
with no choice but to fashion its own redistricting plan, the district court appointed a special master
to devise a redistricting plan “in order that the elections scheduled for May 6, 1997 (and with a
candidate qualifying deadline of April 4, 1996), may ensue.”
The special master recommended a redistricting plan that provided for one at-large district
and four single-member districts (“the special master’s 4-1 plan”). Notwithstanding its recognition
that the Supreme Court has expressed a “preference for utilization of single-member districts in court-
ordered remedial plans,” the district court adopted the special master’s plan “in order that the
upcoming 1997 City elections may proceed in accordance with this plan.”
Following the entry of this order, Citizens filed a motion requesting the district court to clarify
the interim nature of the special master’s 4-1 plan and to order the City to submit a permanent
redistricting plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. In response, the City indicated that it had
no intention of drafting another redistricting plan and argued that the redistricting plan utilized for
the 1997 elections should accordingly be made permanent. On April 9, 1997, the district court
entered an order adopting the special master’s 4-1 plan as the redistricting plan that will govern the
election of alderman in Quitman until the City devises a new plan that is approved by the Attorney
General. Citizens then filed this appeal.
II.
On appeal, Citizens argues that the district court erred by failing to order the City to adopt
a new redistricting plan and submit it to the Attorney General for preclearance. In addition, Citizen
contends that the district court’s redistricting plan is defective because the at-large seat is not justified
by a “singular combination of unique factors.” In response, the City argues that it cannot be forced
to draft a redistricting plan and that the district court is responsible for creating such a plan because
3
the City declined the district court’s invitation to do so. The City also contends that Citizens is
estopped from contesting the validity of the at-large seat because it had previously agreed to a
redistricting plan that included one at-large seat. Finally, the City claims that the district court
correctly determined that the special master’s 4-1 plan is justified by special circumstances.
A.
Citizens’ contention that the district court erred by not ordering Quitman to develop a
redistricting plan and submit it to the Attorney General for preclearance misconceives the principles
of federalism at play in this case. Redistricting is a legislative function “`which the federal courts
should make every effort not to preempt.’” Ramos v. Koebig, 638 F.2d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978)). Citizens, however, seeks to turn this rule
of comity on its head by invoking it as a justification for a district court order directing a state or local
government to draft a redistricting plan when a dist rict court has found an existing plan to be
unlawful. Rather than issue such an order, a district court must give a legislative body “an
opportunity to enact” an acceptable plan. Mississippi Chapter, Operation PUSH, Inc. v. Mabus, 932
F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1991); see Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S. Ct. 2186, 2192-93
(1997); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 150 n.30 (1981). If a “governmental body is unable or
unwilling to fulfill its legislative duties” by accepting the district court’s invitation to develop a
redistricting plan and submit it to the Attorney General for preclearance, then it “become[s] the
`unwelcome obligation’ of the [district] court to devise and impose a plan.” Ramos, 638 F.2d at 843;
see Lawyer, 117 S. Ct. at 2192-93; McDaniel, 452 U.S. at 150 n.30.
In this case, the district court provided Quitman with two opportunities to draft a redistricting
plan. After issuing a preliminary injunction, the district court gave the City an opportunity to develop
4
a redistricting plan. The City availed itself of this opportunity, but the Attorney General did not
preclear its 4-1 plan. Likewise, after the district court held that Quitman’s use of five at-large
alderman districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, it provided the City with another
opportunity to devise a legislative redistricting plan. The City, however, declined to submit another
redistricting plan because it believed that any 4-1 plan that it was authorized to develop under
Mississippi law would again be rejected by the Attorney General. Under these circumstances, the
district court properly appointed a special master to devise a judicial redistricting plan and did not err
by refusing to order Quitman to develop another plan and to submit it to the Attorney General for
preclearance.
B.
According to the City, Citizens is estopped from challenging the inclusion of the at-large seat
in the judicial redistricting plan because it failed to object to the special master’s 4-1 plan when it was
proposed. This contention reflects a misunderstanding of the differences between interim and
permanent judicial redistricting plans. As the district court’s order appointing the special master
indicates, the special master’s 4-1 plan was initially adopted as an interim measure to govern the
upcoming alderman elections. Under these circumstances, the inclusion of an at-large seat in the
special master’s interim judicial redistricting plan may have been permissible. See Howell, 410 U.S.
at 333; Corder v. Kirksey, 639 F.2d 1191, 1195 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Corder III”) (noting that the “short
time” a district court possesses “to fashion a fair remedy in the face of an impending election” might
justify using an at-large district in an “interim” judicial redistricting plan). As Citizens correctly
argued before the district court, however, this justification for the special master’s 4-1 plan did not
provide the court with a basis fo r departing from the preference for single-member districts when
5
fashioning a permanent judicial remedy. Citizens, therefore, is not estopped from challenging the
inclusion of an at-large seat in the permanent judicial redistricting plan simply because it did not
object to the use of such a seat in an interim remedial plan.
C.
We turn now to the heart of Citizens’ appeal, which is its claim that the district court abused
its discretion, East Carrol Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 639-40 (1976), by adopting
a permanent redistricting plan that included an at-large district. Although we review for an abuse of
discretion, the district court’s discretion to depart from the longstanding general rule that single-
member districts are to be used in judicially crafted redistricting plans, see, e.g., Connor v. Finch,
431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); East Carrol Parish Sch. Bd., 424 U.S. at 639; Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S. 1, 18 (1975); Howell, 410 U.S. at 333, is quite limited. Only if the district court has identified
a “singular combination of unique factors,” Howell, 410 U.S. at 333, justifying the abandonment of
this clear preference for single-member districts, will its decision be upheld. Corder III, 639 F.2d at
1195. Accordingly, we now consider the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation of why this
case presents “rare” or “exceptional” circumstances “allowing for a court-fashioned election scheme
incorporating an at-large element.” Id.
In its April 9th order adopting the special magistrate’s 4-1 plan as the redistricting plan to
remain in effect until the City secures federal approval for a new plan, the district court did not
identify any factors favoring the inclusion of an at-large district in this permanent remedial plan. This
alone would normally mandate a remand. See Corder v. Kirksey, 585 F.2d 708, 715 (5th Cir. 1978)
(“Corder I”). We will assume, however, that the April 9th order incorporated the district court’s
reasons for adopting the special magistrate’s 4-1 plan as an interim redistricting plan. As noted
6
above, the district court believed that the use of an at-large district was justified because the parties
had earlier agreed to the inclusion of such a district in the City’s 4-1 plan. In addition, the City
contends that a special circumstance is presented by this case because Mississippi law has traditionally
authorized a city like Quitman to elect its alderman from four single-member districts and one at-large
district.
We pause briefly to explain why these two circumstances provide insufficient support for the
inclusion of an at-large district in a permanent redistricting plan. First, the agreement of the parties
when formulating a legislative redistricting plan has no bearing on the propriety of including an at-
large seat in a judicially crafted redistricting plan. “In contrast [to “court-ordered plans”],
reapportionment plans prepared by legislative bodies may employ multimember [or at-large]
districts.” McDaniel, 452 U.S. at 139; see Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. Westwego, 872
F.2d 1201, 1204 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that “at-large voting schemes” are not “per se violations of
section 2"); Corder III, 639 F.2d at 1194 (“It is clear that an at-large election scheme is not a per se
unconstitutional dilution of minority votes.”). Second, that Mississippi law has traditionally
authorized Quitman to utilize four single-member districts and one at-large district does not, when
standing alone, rise to the level of a special circumstance justifying the use of an at-large district in
a judicial redistricting plan. In order for an at-large district to be used in Quitman, the district court
must, for example, explain why compliance with Mississippi law “would better serve the values of
fair representation and political access,” Wallace v. House, 538 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1976), or
why the use of five single-member districts would be “impractical” and why compliance with the
State’s authorization of a 4-1 plan “makes good sense” in light of the structure and function of the
board of alderman, the duties that alderman are elected to perform, and the interests each alderman
7
is elected to represent, see Corder III, 639 F.3d at 1195-96 (approving a 4-1 judicial redistricting plan
for the Pickens County School Board because the four alderman elected from single-member districts
each represented one of Pickens County’s four high schools, Alabama had a longstanding policy
favoring the use of five-member school boards because of their “structural desirability,” and the use
of five single-member districts would be impractical and would distort the equality of representation
for each high school under the 4-1 plan); cf. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 250-53 (11th
Cir. 1987) (rejecting the claim that the responsibilities of the chairperson of the Calhoun County
Commission were sufficiently distinct from those of the associate commissioners to justify continuing
the traditional practice of electing the chairperson from an at-large district). The district court,
however, made no findings relating to the desirability of adhering to Mississippi law when it adopted
the special master’s 4-1 plan. Further, the City’s cryptic reference to “sound public policy
considerations” as a justification for the at-large district is insufficiently tied to the specific public
policy needs of Quitman to justify the district court’s inclusion of this district in its permanent
redistricting plan.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s decision to adopt a permanent
redistricting plan including an at-large district and REMAND this case for further proceedings. On
remand, the district court must either sufficiently articulate the relevant unique circumstances
justifying the inclusion of an at-large seat in its redistricting plan or enter an order dividing Quitman
into five single-member districts.
8