United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 09-3126
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United States of America, *
*
Appellee, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* Eastern District of Missouri.
Aaron Williams, *
*
Appellant. *
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Submitted: June 15, 2010
Filed: August 5, 2010
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Before MURPHY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
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BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Following the denial of Aaron Williams's motion to suppress evidence seized
during a warrantless arrest and search of a vehicle in which he was a passenger, a jury
found Williams guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess of
one kilogram of heroin. The district court1 sentenced Williams to 262 months'
imprisonment, ten years' supervised release, and ordered forfeiture of $1 million.
Williams appeals and we affirm.
1
The Honorable Catherine D. Perry, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri.
I. BACKGROUND
During the course of a Los Angeles, California, investigation into individuals
trafficking drugs, Drug Enforcement Agents (DEA) in St. Louis learned of some
"overlap" in their area and began wiretapping Kenneth Drones's telephone, among
others, to investigate a heroin trafficking conspiracy. Drones was a mid-level heroin
supplier in the St. Louis area. Cardia Johnson served as both Drones's drug courier
and as a go-between for Drones and his supplier, Williams. The investigation leading
up to the day's events at issue in this case was extensive, including months of wiretap
and physical surveillance, vehicle searches, and other police activity.
On October 21, 2007, agents intercepted a call between Drones and Johnson in
which Drones asked Johnson if she had talked to her "boyfriend," apparently a
reference to Drones's supplier, Williams. Subsequent calls revealed that Drones's
supplier was in St. Louis and that Johnson would be meeting with Drones to obtain
money to take to the supplier. An agent conducting physical surveillance observed
Johnson enter Drones's residence and exit with a white plastic bag that appeared to be
full. Johnson then traveled to downtown St. Louis, picked up two individuals and
drove a short distance to the Adam's Mark Hotel, where the two individuals, later
identified as Williams and Johnny Hicks, took the money. Williams and Hicks then
traveled in a red Toyota, following Johnson around the corner near a Hooters
restaurant, where Williams reentered Johnson's vehicle and gave her a package. As
the two cars were en route, agents intercepted a call between Johnson and Drones in
which Johnson told Drones that there was a problem and that "he" was not willing to
go forward. Johnson asked Drones whether she should "come back and get that" and
Drones told her to "come back and get it." After the encounter near Hooters, the
Toyota drove away and a pursuing agent observed Williams throw a white plastic
shopping bag into the back seat of the Toyota.
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The Toyota returned to the Adam's Mark Hotel and agents continued
surveillance and learned that Johnny Hicks of Chicago, Illinois, rented a room in the
hotel that day for cash. Agents intercepted additional calls between Johnson and
Drones discussing the problem with the money Drones provided to Williams and
Hicks in exchange for heroin. Later that evening, agents observed Johnson enter the
Adam's Mark Hotel and exit a very short time later. Agents then stopped Johnson's
vehicle and found $1,000 in currency in her purse. Based on their experience, the
agents believed the money represented a courier fee. Following this stop, Johnson
called Drones and told him she had been stopped and that she was nervous. She
further explained that she called to warn the supplier about her stop and possible
police activity.
Based on the above information, agents decided to make a traffic stop of the
Toyota. To avoid a pursuit in downtown St. Louis, agents placed a tire deflation
device on the Toyota. After the intercept of Johnson's call to Drones explaining that
she had warned the supplier, Hicks and Williams left the hotel in the Toyota and
proceeded onto the interstate. Agents pulled over the Toyota as its tires deflated.
Then, they removed Hicks (the driver) and Williams (the passenger) from the vehicle
and handcuffed them. Next, an agent asked Hicks for consent to search the vehicle
as well as the hotel room, and Hicks replied, "go ahead." A search of the Toyota
revealed a white plastic sack containing $62,496.00 in currency in the rear
compartment of the vehicle on the passenger side.
Williams was subsequently charged with conspiring to distribute and possession
with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and
criminal forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853. Williams filed a motion to suppress any
evidence or statements arising out of the automobile stop. The court denied
Williams's motion to suppress and, after a three-day trial, a jury found Williams guilty
of the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute charge. During the sentencing
phase, the government sought the application of a mandatory minimum sentence of
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twenty years' imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) based on Williams's
previous Illinois state felony drug conviction.2 Williams objected, but the district
court overruled his objection and applied the mandatory minimum sentence. The
court then calculated Williams's guidelines range at 360 months to life, but applied a
downward variance and sentenced Williams to 262 months' imprisonment, ten years'
supervised release, and ordered forfeiture of $1 million.
Williams appeals the court's pretrial denial of his motion to suppress, and his
ultimate judgment and conviction, claiming that the search of the vehicle in which he
traveled on the day in question was unconstitutional, and that the court erred in
applying the mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Suppress and Constitutionality of Search
Williams first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence from the search of the vehicle in which he was a passenger because
any alleged consent to search given by the driver of the vehicle was involuntary, or
in the alternative, the police lacked probable cause for the warrantless arrest and
subsequent search. As a result, Williams claims, his judgment of conviction must be
vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial free from the tainted evidence.
Because the search was lawful, however, we have no occasion to visit Williams's
consent claim.
2
Before trial, the government properly filed an information with the court and
attached a certified copy of Williams's prior conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)
(notice requirements for using prior convictions to enhance sentences).
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"In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's
factual determinations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo." United States
v. Parish, 606 F.3d 480, 486 (8th Cir. 2010). "Because this case proceeded to trial, we
examine the entire record, not merely the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing,
in considering the denial of [Williams's] motion to suppress." United States v. Inman,
558 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 304 (2009). "The existence of
probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo." Parish,
606 F.3d at 486.
Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, subject to a few
well-established exceptions. United States v. Madrid, 152 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir.
1998). One such exception is the "automobile exception." The Supreme Court has
held "that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a
lawful arrest when it is 'reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest
might be found in the vehicle.'" Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009)
(quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment)); United States v. Winters, 600 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2010). "[T]he
offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an
arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein." Id. The government bears the burden
of establishing that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
Given the above, our first inquiry is whether the police had probable cause to
arrest Williams. "'Probable cause to make a warrantless arrest exists when,
considering all the circumstances, police have trustworthy information that would lead
a prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.'"
Parish, 606 F.3d at 486 (quoting United States v. Velazquez-Rivera, 366 F.3d 661,
664 (8th Cir. 2004)). Here, the officers had probable cause to arrest Williams.
Williams argues that a lack of probable cause to arrest him is demonstrated by the
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failure of any mention of Williams during the months of wiretap surveillance leading
up to the events on October 21, 2007. But, the fact that Williams's name had not yet
been specifically mentioned to-date in the investigation is not dispositive. Nor is the
fact that the officers did not "know" Williams at the time they stopped the vehicle,
which Williams intimates on appeal. Probable cause does not require certainty
regarding Williams's identity. Cf. United States v. Muhammad, 604 F.3d 1022, 1027-
28 (8th Cir. 2010) (reiterating that absolute certainty is not required by probable cause
in the similar context of the plain-view exception to the Fourth Amendment search
and seizure requirements).
At the time the officers witnessed Williams interacting with Johnson, they did
not know his actual identity but he could certainly be reasonably identified by a
prudent person as participating in a drug transaction and involved in the greater
conspiracy at play. The officers had intercepted calls between Drones and Johnson,
a supplier and suspected drug courier respectively, wherein Johnson discussed
obtaining money from Drones to give to Drones's own supplier who was currently in
St. Louis. And, officers observed Johnson leave Drones's residence with a white
plastic shopping bag and observed Johnson conducting a transaction with a man later
identified as Williams. Williams then tossed a similar-looking white plastic shopping
bag into the back seat of the identified vehicle. Later that evening, after Johnson
returned to the hotel to give what officers believed was more money to the supplier,
and after receiving a "warning" call from Johnson regarding suspected police activity,
Williams left the hotel and got on the interstate traveling in the same vehicle he was
seen in earlier. Given these events, a prudent person, especially in light of the
ongoing extensive investigation leading up to that day's events, would be led to
believe the men traveling in the Toyota had committed or were committing a drug
crime. The circumstances of the investigation, the physical surveillance and the
intercepted wiretap calls revealed Williams's participation in the heroin conspiracy.
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Because the Toyota left the Adam's Mark after the day's transactions with
Johnson, and in close temporal proximity to Johnson's phone conversation with
Drones's supplier warning him of police activity, in addition to the surveillance of
Williams tossing a white plastic shopping bag into the back seat of the Toyota after
meeting with Johnson, the police had probable cause to believe that evidence relevant
to the drug crime would be found in the vehicle. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719
(distinguishing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618 and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 456
(1981), where the defendants were arrested for drug offenses, from Gant, where the
defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, an offense for which
there is "no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence"). In
short, these officers had probable cause to believe that contraband or other evidence
of drug crimes would be found in the stopped vehicle. Thus the search was
constitutionally reasonable and we affirm the district court's denial of Williams's
motion to suppress.
Because there was probable cause for the arrest and the search of the vehicle
was not unreasonable, we need not determine whether the driver of the vehicle gave
valid consent to search the vehicle.
B. Prior Conviction
At sentencing, the district court applied a mandatory minimum sentence of
twenty years' imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) based on Williams's
previous Illinois state felony drug conviction. On appeal, Williams claims the district
court erred in its application of § 841(b)(1)(A). Specifically, Williams challenges the
"finality" of the Illinois criminal record submitted in support of the enhancement
application and argues that the government failed to support beyond a reasonable
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doubt the basis for the requested enhancement.3 To apply the enhancement under §
841(b)(1)(A), the government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that Williams committed the present offense "after a prior conviction for a felony drug
offense has become final." 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 851(c)(1). To satisfy its
burden here, the government submitted a Certified Statement of
Conviction/Disposition from Cook County, Illinois, which was a multi-page document
containing multiple "minute entries" and truncated court notations. Williams claims
the government relied upon "an obviously incomplete and/or inaccurate record as its
sole support for doubling the mandatory minimum from ten years to twenty," and thus
failed to meet its burden.
"Because resolution of this claim requires us to interpret [21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A)], we review de novo the district court's use of . . . prior convictions for
enhancement purposes." United States v. Stallings, 301 F.3d 919, 920 (8th Cir. 2002)
3
Williams also, in part, claims that his prior Illinois offense was not a "felony"
for purposes of the enhancement, pointing to a notation of "M" on the Certified
Statement following a notation of "Change in Priority Status," which Williams argues
clearly indicates a misdemeanor and not a felony. But state law is not relevant to our
inquiry. The critical historical fact for our purposes today is that, as the district court
held, Williams pled guilty to the Illinois offense, the punishment for which meets the
definition of "felony" under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) ("Felony drug
offense" is defined by statute as "an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country
that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic
steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.") Even if the Illinois court later
changed its notation, or even if it had expunged Williams's record altogether, the
initial plea satisfies the enhancement in this case. See Dickerson v. New Banner Inst.,
Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 115 (1983) (discussing this issue in the context of an application
for a license as a firearms and ammunition dealer and manufacturer, regulated by the
Gun Control Act of 1968, which made it unlawful for a person convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to receive). We thus
affirm the district court's conclusion that the Illinois offense was a felony for purposes
of the enhancement.
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(quotation omitted). "[T]he determination of what constitutes a 'final conviction' for
purposes of section 841(b) is a question of federal law." United States v. Slicer, 361
F.3d 1085, 1087 (8th Cir. 2004). Thus, Williams's argument regarding what
constitutes a "conviction" in Illinois, is inapposite.
Williams points to several ambiguous notations on the Certified Statement,
attempting to raise doubt as to the finality of his conviction. However, based on the
Conviction/Disposition, it is clear that (1) Williams was charged with felony
possession of a controlled substance in Cook County, Illinois, (2) he pled guilty to that
crime, (3) he was sentenced to probation, and (4) he was found guilty of violating his
probation. In United States v. Ortega, we held that "deferred adjudications or
probated sentences constitute convictions in the context of § 841." 150 F.3d 937, 948
(8th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). There, we found a prior "final conviction" under
§ 841(b) where the defendant was found guilty and was required to serve three years
of supervised probation, but also received a suspended imposition of sentence.
Moreover, we determined that the defendant's prior conviction was "final" even
though a motion to withdraw his guilty plea for the prior offense was pending in state
court. We explained, "we will consider [defendant's] guilty plea final until such time
as the state court grants its motion." Id.
Also instructing our determination is an analysis conducted by the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. McAllister, 29 F.3d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1994). There, the
Seventh Circuit determined whether the defendant's prior Illinois state offense
constituted a "prior conviction" under § 841(b). A defendant in McAllister pled guilty
to a felony drug offense under Illinois law, was sentenced to probation, and completed
the terms/conditions of his probation and was discharged. Due to the successful
completion of his probation and discharge, his offense was not treated as a
"conviction" under Illinois law. Id. Even so, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
"[p]robation is not imposed upon someone who is not guilty of a crime," and held that
"probation is a conviction under § 841(b)(1)(B)." Id.
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Therefore, under this circuit's precedent, including our reasoning in Ortega, and
instructed by our sister circuit's analysis in McAllister, Williams's Illinois drug offense
constitutes a final, prior conviction for a felony drug offense under § 841(b)(1)(A).
We affirm the district court's application of the enhancement.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
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