United States v. Green

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-2330

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DAVID GREEN,

Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 1-06-cr-00612-001
District Judge: The Honorable Robert B. Kugler

Argued March 10, 2010

Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

(Filed: August 9, 2010)
Mark S. Greenberg (argued)
LaCheen Wittels & Greenberg
1429 Walnut Street, Suite 1301
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Appellant

Ralph J. Marra, Jr.
George S. Leone
Jennifer H. Chin
Steven G. Sanders (argued)
Office of United States Attorney
970 Broad Street
Room 700
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee

OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted David Green of attempted possession
with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. Green
appeals, arguing that the District Court erred by allowing the
Government to introduce evidence that he threatened to kill an
undercover police officer. We will affirm.

I.

2
 In March of 2006, Green was arrested in New Jersey on
state-law drug charges. This arrest came about in part through
the efforts of an undercover officer identified in the record as
“A.G.,” “Gus,” and “Gussy.”

Three months later, Green and an acquaintance,
Jacqueline Stahl, were in a vehicle together when they drove
past A.G.’s home. Green told Stahl that he was going to blow
up A.G. as retaliation for getting him arrested. He stated his
desire to purchase dynamite and blasting caps, as well as
cocaine. Alarmed, Stahl contacted law enforcement, reported
what Green had said, and agreed to act as an informant.1 In the
weeks that followed, Stahl, acting at the direction of the FBI,
surreptitiously recorded a series of conversations with Green
about the possibility of acquiring dynamite and cocaine through
“Frankie,” Stahl’s boyfriend from Florida.

On July 1, 2006, Stahl and Green met at a convenience
store in Mantua, New Jersey. Green confirmed his interest in
buying dynamite and blasting caps. Stahl told Green that
Frankie could get him six sticks of dynamite. The conversation
then turned to the possibility of buying cocaine through a man
Green knew in Miami. Stahl volunteered to drive to Florida to
consummate the deal. Green agreed that Stahl should make the
trip, because she was “middle class looking” and would not

1
Three of Stahl’s brothers were active or retired state
troopers.

3
arouse suspicion. Later, the conversation returned to the subject
of explosives. Green said, “look, serious . . . let’s do some
dynamite.” Stahl asked him what he planned to do with it, and
told him he’d better not kill anyone she knew, or “go blow up
that Gus’s house.” Green remained coy, saying only that he
wanted to keep “something handy” because he intended to do
“something.” When Stahl pressed him, asking “who you got in
mind?”, Green responded, “you never know.”

On July 7, Stahl and Green again discussed the possibility
of buying cocaine and dynamite from Frankie. Stahl asked
Green whether he needed small sticks of dynamite, such as
would be used to blow up a car or a tree stump, or big sticks, to
destroy a building. She again asked whether he intended to use
it to blow up A.G.’s home. Green steadfastly refused to specify
his target, but he did ask Stahl to tell him more about A.G. The
remainder of the conversation revolved around the terms of the
deal. Stahl told Green that Frankie would accept “fifteen
hundred [dollars] and an ounce of coke for six little ones or 300
apiece for the small ones,” or “2 ounces of coke and a thousand
cash” for “the big ones.” Green told Stahl that these prices were
too high. He was also skeptical that Frankie would have any use
for cocaine from New Jersey, since the drug was abundant in
Florida. Stahl promised to find out how much cash Frankie
would require.

In the weeks that followed, Green’s interest in buying
dynamite appeared to wane. At one meeting, Green told Stahl

4
that the dynamite was on the “back burner” because he was low
on money. But he was still interested in cocaine, which he could
sell for a hefty profit. On July 19, Stahl told Green that Frankie
would sell him a kilogram of cocaine in exchange for $5,000 up
front and $11,000 more within a month. She also told him that
the total purchase price of $16,000 included “the sticks [of
dynamite].” Green responded, “I ain’t, forget the sticks. I’m
talking about the powder.” He also told Stahl that he did not
“wanna keep talking about this thing” because he feared he was
under surveillance. The next day, Green told Stahl that he
would accept Frankie’s terms, and described his plan to sell the
cocaine through a friend in Pottstown, Pennsylvania. On July
28, Stahl told Green that Frankie’s associates would be up from
Florida the following weekend and that Green should have his
$5,000 ready. Stahl reminded him that “the sticks are right in
with the 11 grand . . . . Take it, book and then you can deal more
with him later.”

The sale was scheduled for August 3. Green had not
pulled together the necessary $5,000, but he brought along
$3,100 plus the title to a vehicle he intended to offer as
collateral. Stahl picked up Green at his apartment and drove
him to a motel, where they met “Mario,” an FBI agent posing as
Frankie’s friend. After initial conversations inside the motel,
Mario, Green, and Stahl went to Mario’s vehicle. Mario opened
the trunk and showed Green one bag containing dynamite and
another containing cocaine. Green twice said, “alright,” then
went to retrieve Stahl’s vehicle. As he walked to the car,

5
however, he noticed police officers sitting in several of the
vehicles in the parking lot. He decided to abandon the deal. He
got into Stahl’s car, stopped in front of Mario’s car, pulled Stahl
into the vehicle, and sped away. As they drove away, Green
exclaimed to Stahl that there were police officers (“the man”) in
the parking lot. Stahl feigned ignorance, but Green angrily
accused her of setting him up. He exclaimed: “Look, look.
That’s the fucking man . . . . bitch I oughta kill your fucking
ass.” Stahl denied any involvement with the police, but Green
was not convinced. He ordered Stahl to stay away from him,
drove her car back to his apartment, and dropped himself off.
Stahl drove away unharmed.

Green was arrested four days later. He was indicted on
one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute 500
grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(B) and 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was not charged in
connection with his attempts to procure dynamite or his threat
to kill A.G.

Before trial, the Government filed a motion in limine to
admit recorded and testimonial evidence of Green’s attempts to
purchase dynamite and threats to kill A.G. Specifically, the
Government’s theory of admissibility was that Green’s pursuit
of dynamite constituted “intrinsic evidence” concerning the
charged cocaine offense. This argument relied on United States
v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1990), and similar cases
from other courts of appeals. In Williams, the Fifth Circuit

6
stated that evidence of uncharged bad acts is “intrinsic” to the
charged offense “when the evidence of the other act and the
evidence of the crime charged are ‘inextricably intertwined’ or
both acts are part of a ‘single criminal episode’ or the other acts
were ‘necessary preliminaries’ to the crime charged.” Id. at 825.
The court distinguished such evidence from “extrinsic”
evidence, which, unlike intrinsic evidence, must be analyzed
under Rule 404(b). Id. The Government contended that
Green’s attempts to buy dynamite were inextricably intertwined
with the charged cocaine offense because Green’s drug crime
“occurred concurrently with and arose out of [his] negotiations
for explosives, and because the final price, quantity, and terms
of the charged cocaine transaction were inextricably bound up
in and influenced by Green’s negotiations for explosives.”

Green argued for exclusion of all references to the
dynamite and why he wanted it. He argued that discussions
about dynamite and killing A.G. were not “intrinsic” to the
charged cocaine offense, and could easily be redacted from the
recordings of his conversations with Stahl about cocaine. He
also argued that even if the references to dynamite were intrinsic
evidence, they should be excluded under Rule 403.

After a hearing, the District Court granted the
Government’s motion. The District Judge apparently accepted
the Government’s “intrinsic evidence” argument, because he did
not conduct a Rule 404(b) analysis. He reasoned that “the
dynamite explains how we got into a drug deal in the first

7
place,” and that “the Government certainly is entitled to give the
background [and an] explanation [of] how this all came about,
how they ended up together in this position to arrest [Green]
under these charges.” The District Judge also declined to
exclude the Government’s evidence under Rule 403. He
recognized that the evidence was highly prejudicial, but offered
to give a limiting instruction to the jury.

At trial, the jury heard recordings of the conversations
between Stahl and Green recounted above. Stahl supplemented
those recordings with testimony about the conversations and
Green’s attempts to procure dynamite and cocaine. She testified
that she went to the FBI after she learned that “Green wanted to
kill a couple officers and he was looking for . . . some cocaine
and dynamite.” She also said that she agreed to cooperate with
the subsequent investigation because “officers’ lives were in
danger.” Shortly after that testimony, the jury heard the July 7
conversation in which Stahl questioned Green about his desire
to “blow up” Gussy. The prosecutor asked who Gussy was.
Stahl responded that Gussy was “an officer” and that Green
“wanted to know where he lived . . . because . . . you know, he
wanted to kill him. He wanted to murder him because he was
busted.”

Meanwhile, Green attacked Stahl’s credibility throughout
the trial. In his opening statement, he called her a “profane,
aggressive, and unpleasant individual” whose cooperation with
the FBI was “motivated by money.” He developed this line of

8
attack during his cross-examination of the Government’s first
witness, FBI Agent Robert Barbieri, who was Stahl’s FBI
handler. Barbieri testified that the FBI paid Stahl approximately
$900 for her work as an informant, both to compensate her for
her time and to reimburse her for gas and the use of her cell
phone. He acknowledged that Stahl had asked for money from
the FBI “five or six times” since the investigation of Green had
concluded, and had threatened not to testify against Green
unless the FBI gave her more money. He also admitted that
Stahl had asked if the FBI could help her son, who was facing
state-law criminal charges in an unrelated matter. Green
resumed this attack during cross-examination of Stahl herself.
He suggested that the $900 she received from the FBI was a lot
of money to her, and again suggested that she cooperated to help
her son. Stahl denied any improper motive and insisted that she
approached the FBI out of a desire to “protect people, lives that
[were] in danger.”

Near the end of the trial, the District Court reminded the
jury that Green was “not on trial for any acts or attempted acts
relating to dynamite,” and cautioned jurors not to use evidence
about dynamite as proof that Green was a bad person with a
propensity for committing criminal acts. Green’s trial counsel
approved this charge, telling the District Court that its proposed
instruction was “great.” The jury found Green guilty.

In determining Green’s offense level for purposes of
calculating his advisory Guidelines range, the District Court

9
applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Obstructive conduct under § 3C1.1 includes
“threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing
a . . . witness . . . directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.”
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(a). Green received this enhancement
because he yelled, “bitch I oughta kill your fucking ass” at Stahl
as they drove away from the motel. The District Court
concluded that this statement amounted to a “threat,” inasmuch
as Green had menaced Stahl precisely because he realized she
had set him up, and was likely to be a witness against him in the
future.

The Court sentenced Green to 96 months in prison.
Green filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).2

II.

In the District Court, Green challenged the admissibility
of all evidence concerning his attempts to buy dynamite. He has
narrowed his challenge on appeal. He admits that his
discussions about dynamite permeated and “could be said to
have intertwined” with his discussions about cocaine. Green
contends, however, that the District Court erred in allowing
evidence that he had threatened to use that dynamite to kill A.G.

2
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §
3231.

10
In other words, he no longer argues that the jury should not have
learned that he sought to buy dynamite. He argues only that it
should not have been allowed to learn why he wanted that
dynamite. He claims that this evidence was not “intrinsic
evidence.” Additionally, he argues that evidence of his threat to
kill A.G. was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), and in any event
should have been excluded under Rule 403.3

As it did in the District Court, the Government asserts
that evidence of Green’s threat to kill A.G. was intrinsic
evidence and thus admissible without reference to Rule 404(b).
In the alternative, it argues that the evidence was admissible
under Rule 404(b), and need not have been excluded under Rule

3
He also claims that the District Court erred by
enhancing his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. He
admits that he threatened Stahl, but argues that he did not
obstruct justice because his threat was neither “real” nor
“credible” and was never carried out. We are not persuaded.
See United States v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602, 609 (4th Cir. 1994)
(upholding § 3C1.1 enhancement in light of defendant’s threats
against trial judge, which the defendant claimed were merely
“idle” threats, because “[a]s between the threatener and the
threatened, we think that the threatener should bear the risk of
misunderstanding”), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v.
United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); United States v. McIntosh,
23 F.3d 1454, 1459 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument that §
3C1.1 enhancement was unjustified because defendant’s threats
against suspected informants were never carried out).

11
403. As a fallback position, the Government maintains that
admission of the evidence was, at worst, harmless error.

“We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings
principally on an abuse of discretion standard.” Complaint of
Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 1997). An
abuse of discretion occurs only where the district court’s
decision is “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable”—in
short, where “no reasonable person would adopt the district
court’s view.” United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d
Cir. 2009). “We exercise plenary review, however, of [the
district court’s] rulings to the extent they are based on a legal
interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Complaint of
Consolidation Coal Co., 123 F.3d at 131. This includes plenary
review “of whether evidence falls within the scope of Rule
404(b).” United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394 (3d Cir.
2003).4

III.

4
The fact that Green has narrowed his intrinsic evidence
argument on appeal does not necessitate plain error review. The
argument he advances here—that evidence of his motive for
purchasing dynamite should have been excluded—was
necessarily included within, and specifically advanced as part of,
his broader argument in the District Court for exclusion of all
evidence about dynamite.

12
 We begin with Green’s argument that evidence of his
threat to kill A.G. was not “intrinsic” to the crime charged. In
doing so, we examine several evidentiary concepts that have
frustrated courts and commentators alike. Accordingly, recourse
to some legal history affords useful context.

“The original attitude of the English courts was that any
relevant evidence of the defendant’s misconduct was admissible
even if the only theory of relevance was to establish the
defendant’s character and, in turn, use character as
circumstantial proof of conduct.” 1 Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 2:25 (2009) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence]. Abuse of this
rule, among others, by the inquisitors of the Star Chamber
prompted Parliament to pass the Treason Act of 1695. Id. That
law granted several new rights to individuals accused of treason.
First, it entitled the accused to a copy of the indictment stating
the charges against him. Second, it mandated that any overt act
of treason alleged in the indictment be proved by two witnesses,
testifying in open court subject to cross-examination. Third, and
most importantly for present purposes, it provided that no overt
act that was not alleged in the indictment could be proved at
trial. See Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of
Other Criminal Acts Evidenced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50
U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 716-17 (1981) [hereinafter Reed, Trial by
Propensity] (citing 7 Will. III, ch. 3 (1695)). Over time, courts
extended the rule against proving uncharged acts to criminal
trials generally, not just trials for treason. Id. at 717. By 1810,

13
it was more or less settled that “bad acts evidence which merely
demonstrate[d] the propensity of the defendant to do acts similar
to those charged” was inadmissible. See Norman Krivosha et
al., Relevancy: The Necessary Element in Using Evidence of
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts To Convict, 60 Neb. L. Rev.
657, 664 (1981) (citing the 1810 case of Rex v. Cole).5

English decisions in this area influenced American
courts, and the rule here throughout the 19th and 20th centuries
mirrored that of England: evidence that the accused had
committed some other crime was not admissible to prove that
the defendant had a propensity for committing crimes, and

5
See also Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct
Evidence, supra, § 2:26 (explaining that Cole “forbade the
prosecution only from using the defendant’s subjective character
as circumstantial proof of the defendant’s conduct” with respect
to the crime charged); David P. Leonard, The New Wigmore:
Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events § 4.3.1 (2009)
(“The general ban on evidence of character to prove action in
conformity was well-established in Great Britain by 1810.”).
But see Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact
Evidence: England, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 954, 960-61 (1933)
(recounting English courts’ treatment of character evidence and
arguing that Cole announced “a very narrow principle of
exclusion” that was not widely followed).

14
therefore probably committed the charged crime.6 Reed, Trial
by Propensity, supra, at 736, 739. See also David P. Leonard,
The New Wigmore: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar
Events § 3.3 at 101 (2009) (“American courts plainly followed
English practice in excluding [uncharged misconduct] evidence
when offered to prove guilt through an inference of bad
character.”).

It was held early on, however, that this rule did not
require the exclusion of all evidence of uncharged crimes.7
Courts allowed such evidence when it was introduced not to
demonstrate propensity, but to establish the “res gestae” (“thing

6
Theories varied for why this should be. Some argued
that evidence that the defendant had committed an uncharged
crime as proof of criminal propensity was simply irrelevant.
The most common view was that such evidence was relevant,
but that the risk of unfair prejudice outweighed its usefulness.
Others pointed out the unfairness of surprising the defendant
a n d f o rc in g h im to defend again s t u n c h a rg e d
misdeeds—hearkening back to the abuses that brought about the
Treason Act of 1695. See Leonard, supra, § 1.2 (collecting
citations).
7
We will sometimes use the term “crimes” as a
shorthand for the more accurate, but cumbersome, term “crimes
or wrongful acts.” For purposes of this discussion, there is no
material difference between criminal and non-criminal bad acts.

15
done”) of the charged crime.8 Most of the early cases arose in
the state courts. Walker v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. (1 Leigh)
574, 1829 WL 772 (Va. 1829), was one such case, though it did
not explicitly invoke the term “res gestae.” In Walker, the
defendant was indicted for larceny of a watch, a gold chain, and
a key. At trial, the prosecution was permitted to introduce
evidence that the defendant had also stolen a cloak, a theft
which was the subject of a separate indictment. Id. at *1. The
defendant was convicted and appealed, contending that
admission of evidence concerning the stolen cloak was error.
The General Court of Virginia agreed. It began its analysis by
acknowledging the general rule that the prosecution was
forbidden to “go into proof of the commission of any other

8
Use of the term “res gestae” in the evidentiary context
originated in the law of hearsay. It developed as one exception
to the general rule against hearsay, with the applicable rule
being stated as follows: “Whenever any act may be proved,
statements accompanying and explaining that act made by or to
the person doing it, may be proved if they are necessary to
understand it.” James B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case –
Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta, 15 Am. L. Rev. 1, 2
(1881). See also 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence
§ 218 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining hearsay origins of res gestae).
The idea was that, with respect to the events at issue in a case,
“the conduct and the accompanying words were all part of the
same transaction or the ‘things done,’ and if the conduct was
admissible, so were the words.” Chris Blair, Let’s Say Goodbye
to Res Gestae, 33 Tulsa L.J. 349, 350 (1997).

16
offence than that charged or of the character of the prisoner[.]”
Id. at *2. It then recognized that

[i]t frequently happens, however, that as the
evidence of circumstances must be resorted to for
the purpose of proving the commission of the
particular offence charged, the proof of those
circumstances involves the proof of other acts,
either criminal or apparently innocent. In such
cases, it is proper . . . that the chain of evidence
should be unbroken. If one or more links of that
chain consist of circumstances . . . which tend to
prove that the prisoner has been guilty of other
crimes than that charged, this is no reason why the
court should exclude those circumstances. They
are so intimately connected and blended with the
main facts adduced in evidence . . . that they
cannot be departed from with propriety; and there
is no reason why the criminality of such intimate
and connected circumstances . . . should exclude
them, more than other facts apparently innocent.

Id. The court gave the following hypothetical: suppose a man
is indicted for murder. Suppose further that the murder weapon
was a pistol; that this pistol once belonged to another man, but
was stolen on the same night the defendant was seen at the
rightful owner’s house; and that the defendant was seen in
possession of the pistol on the day of the murder. This evidence
would tend to suggest that the defendant had stolen the pistol.
Should it be admitted in the murder trial? The court said yes,

17
even though the evidence tended to prove both larceny and
murder, because it was “intimately connected and blended with
the main facts” of the charged murder. The court distinguished
between evidence which “constitute[d] a part of the
transaction”—the sort of evidence that became known as res
gestae—and evidence of “circumstances hav[ing] no intimate
connexion with the main fact.” Id. The former was admissible;
the latter was not.

Application of similar rules led to a different result in
Commonwealth v. Heath, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 735, 1842 WL 2475
(Va. 1842). There, the trial court allowed a witness to testify
that the defendant had shot him shortly before he murdered the
victim. The General Court upheld that decision, noting that “the
fact of the shooting, as being part of the circumstances and of
the res gestae, ought not to have been precluded from being
given in evidence to the jury, although such evidence might
itself have tended to prove a distinct felony committed by the
prisoner.” Id. at *5. Brown v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 319, 1874
WL 13019 (Pa. 1874), was to the same effect. In that case, the
defendant was accused of murdering a husband and wife. In a
separate trial for the murder of the wife, prosecutors sought to
prove that the husband’s body had been found nearby. The
defendant argued that nothing about the husband’s murder
should be admitted. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
disagreed. It held that “[b]eing parts of the same res gestae,”
the two murders “together, tend[ed] to throw light on each other,
and there is no reason that the truth should be thrown out by

18
excluding” evidence concerning the murder of the husband. Id.
at *16. This despite the general rule that “the commission of a
distinct offense, even similar in character, cannot be given in
evidence” against a defendant. Id.

The most famous case on this issue was People v.
Molineaux, 6 Bedell 264 (N.Y. 1901). In that case, Molineaux
was accused of poisoning and killing one Mrs. Adams. At trial,
the court allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence
suggesting that Molineaux had also poisoned a romantic rival
with the same drug that felled Mrs. Adams. Id. at 281-84. The
New York Court of Appeals held that this evidence should not
have been admitted. It declared it “universally recognized and
. . . firmly established in all English-speaking lands” that “the
general rule of evidence applicable to criminal trials is that the
state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in
the indictment, either as a foundation for a separate punishment,
or as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged.”
Id. at 291. The court recognized that there were exceptions to
this rule, however, such as where the evidence tended to prove
“(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident;
(4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two
or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends
to establish the others; [or] (5) the identity of the person charged
with the commission of the crime on trial.” Id. at 293. In
explaining the “common scheme” exception, the court
acknowledged that evidence of other crimes could be admissible
“where two or more crimes are so connected that it is impossible

19
to distinguish them and proof of all, in the effort to establish
one, is a part of the res gestae.” Id. at 308 (citing Brown, 76 Pa.
319, and People v. Foley, 31 N.W. 94 (Mich. 1887)).

In the decades that followed, federal courts generally
adhered to the approach outlined in Molineaux. They held that
evidence of uncharged misconduct was generally inadmissible,
but recognized many exceptions to that rule, including one for
evidence that was part of the res gestae. Gianotos v. United
States, 104 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1939), is representative. In that
case, Gianotos and two others were charged with unlawfully
importing opium. Thomas, a co-defendant who had been caught
with the opium, pleaded guilty and agreed to testify for the
government. Thomas testified that he agreed to hold the opium
only because Gianotos had threatened to inform police that
Thomas had assisted him in a separate act of opium smuggling
months earlier. Id. at 930. On appeal, Gianotos argued that no
evidence concerning the earlier smuggling should have been
admitted. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It began by recognizing
the general rule against admitting evidence “that the accused has
committed another crime wholly independent of that for which
he is on trial.” Id. at 932. The court recognized, however, that
there were many exceptions to this rule, including one for
instances in which “two distinct offenses are so inseparably
connected that the proof of one necessarily involves proving the
other[.]” Id. Applying this exception, the Ninth Circuit held
that the challenged evidence was admissible because it
explained why Thomas feared Gianotos enough to go along with

20
the charged offense. The court reasoned that “[t]he purpose of
this evidence relating to the former crime was not to establish
the commission of a distinct offense,” but the charged offense,
insofar as it explained Thomas’s involvement. Id. (emphasis
added). It concluded by stating the prevailing rule: “in proving
a crime, all the res gestae may always be shown, though it
involve proof or evidence concerning the commission of another
and independent crime by the defendant at the same time.” Id.
at 933.

Similarly, in United States v. Tuffanelli, the Seventh
Circuit allowed evidence of uncharged wrongful acts in a
conspiracy case involving violations of federal liquor laws, on
the theory that those acts were “logically connected” with the
charged offense and “so closely and inextricably mixed up with
the history of the guilty act itself as to form part of the plan or
system of criminal action.” 131 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1942).
In Bracey v. United States, the D.C. Circuit synthesized more
than a dozen cases and concluded that, notwithstanding the
general rule against the admission of uncharged crimes,
“evidence of other criminal acts has been held admissible by this
court when they are so blended or connected with the one on
trial as that proof of one incidentally involves the other; or
explains the circumstances thereof; or tends logically to prove
any element of the crime charged.” 142 F.2d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir.
1944). See also United States v. Hughes, 441 F.2d 12, 19-20
(5th Cir. 1971) (upholding admission of evidence that
defendants possessed firearms in a trial for counterfeiting

21
because the defendants’ guns were part of the res gestae; they
“were so closely blended and inextricably bound up with the
history of the crime itself as to constitute a part of the plan or
system of criminal action involved in the case”); United States
v. Crowe, 188 F.2d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1951) (citing Tuffanelli
and Gianotos); Lynch v. United States, 12 F.2d 193, 194 (4th
Cir. 1926) (“The general rule is that, where a defendant is on
trial for one offense, evidence of separate and distinct offenses
is not permissible, except where . . . the subject of inquiry is so
related to the main offense as to throw material light thereon.”).

While use of the res gestae exception grew common,
critics argued the term was too vague to be useful and
encouraged rote incantation of Latinisms in lieu of thoughtful
analysis. Professor Wigmore was especially unsparing. He
wrote that res gestae was an “empty phrase [which encouraged]
looseness of thinking and uncertainty of decision,” 6 John
Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1767 (Chadbourn rev. 1976),
and “most frequently used as a cover for loose ideas and
ignorance of principles,” 1A John Wigmore, Wigmore on
Evidence § 218 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983). Professor Morgan wrote
that res gestae was a “troublesome expression” which owed its
prominence “to an inclination of judges and lawyers to avoid the
toilsome exertion of exact analysis and precise thinking.”
Edmund Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances
Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229, 229 (1922). He
argued that the phrase was marked by “exasperating
indefiniteness” that did “nothing but bewilder and perplex,” and

22
faulted courts for choosing to “express[] in a dead and foreign
tongue an idea for which there are accurate and adequate
English words.” Id. Professor Thayer likewise criticized the
“growing and intolerable vagueness of the expression.” James
B. Thayer, Bedingfield’s Case – Declarations as a Part of the
Res Gesta, 15 Am. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1881). These criticisms were
chiefly directed to the use of res gestae as a hearsay exception,
but they were equally applicable to its use in the context of
uncharged crimes.9 See Leonard, supra, § 5.2 at 322-24.

In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The new codification included Rule 404(b), which
provided that evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” was
inadmissible to prove a person’s character in order to show
action in conformity therewith, but admissible for “other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

9
These criticisms live on. See, e.g., United States v.
Hill, 953 F.2d 452, 457 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (cautioning against
use of the “overly-broad” res gestae doctrine); United States v.
Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1332 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981)
(describing res gestae as “an appellation that tends merely to
obscure the analysis underlying the admissibility of the
evidence”); 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Federal Evidence § 4:33 (3d ed. 2003) (describing res gestae as
a “mind-numbing and elastic term” which “pretends much but
means little”); Chris Blair, Let’s Say Goodbye to Res Gestae, 33
Tulsa L. J. 349 (1997) (arguing that Oklahoma courts should
abandon the term).

23
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” The rule codified the common law bar against the
use of uncharged crimes to prove criminal propensity—albeit in
a modified form. The common law rule was widely, though not
universally, stated in “exclusionary” terms. That is, it set forth
a general rule of inadmissibility, subject to exceptions, such as
res gestae. See, e.g., United States v. Clemons, 503 F.2d 486,
489 (8th Cir. 1974) (describing “narrow exceptions to [a]
general rule of exclusion”); Molineaux, 6 Bedell at 293. By
contrast, Rule 404(b) was “inclusionary.” It stated a general rule
of admissibility, subject to a single exception—evidence of
other wrongful acts was admissible so long as it was not
introduced solely to prove criminal propensity. Thus, the
proponent no longer had to pigeonhole his evidence into one of
the established common-law exceptions, on pain of exclusion.
If he could identify any non-propensity purpose for introducing
the evidence, it was admissible.10 See, e.g., United States v.

10
A minority of courts, including this Court, adhered to
an inclusionary rule even before Rule 404(b) was adopted. See
United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1958)
(adopting the inclusionary statement of the rule against other
crimes evidence), rev’d on other grounds, Stirone v. United
States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960). See also Thomas J. Reed, The
Development of the Propensity Rule in Federal Criminal Causes
1840-1975, 51 U. Cin. L. Rev. 299, 303-04 (1982) (explaining
that the Second and Tenth Circuits also took the inclusionary
view before Rule 404(b) was adopted).

24
Long, 574 F.2d 761, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1976) (contrasting the
exclusionary and inclusionary approaches); United States v.
Bradwell, 388 F.2d 619, 621-22 (2d Cir. 1968) (same); Leonard,
supra, § 4.3; Reed, Trial by Propensity, supra, at 728-30.

Since Rule 404(b) was enacted, the term “res gestae” has
largely given way to its “modern, de-Latinized” descendant:
“intrinsic evidence,” the term invoked by the Government in this
case.11 See 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Federal Evidence § 4:33 (3d ed. 2003). See also Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res Gestae, 50 Cath. U.
L. Rev. 719, 728 (2010) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, The Second
Coming of Res Gestae] (describing the inextricably intertwined
doctrine as “arguably the second coming of the common-law res
gestae principle”). As mentioned earlier, modern cases divide
evidence of other crimes and bad acts into two categories: those
“extrinsic” to the charged offense, and those “intrinsic” to it.
Extrinsic evidence must be analyzed under Rule 404(b); intrinsic
evidence need not be. Recalling the logic for allowing res
gestae evidence, courts today exempt intrinsic evidence from
application of Rule 404(b) on the theory that there is no “other”
wrongful conduct at issue; the evidence is admissible as part and
parcel of the charged offense. Compare Gianotos, 104 F.2d at
932 (res gestae evidence admissible “not to establish the

11
The term “res gestae” is still incanted by courts from
time to time. See, e.g., United States v. Till, 434 F.3d 880, 884
(6th Cir. 2006).

25
commission of a distinct offense . . . . but for its bearing on the
crime under investigation”), with United States v. Gibbs, 190
F.3d 188, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1999) (intrinsic evidence is not
subject to Rule 404(b) analysis because there is no “other”
crime). The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence
has been criticized, see, e.g., United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d
308, 320 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923,
927 (D.C. Cir. 2000), but it is one we have accepted, see, e.g.,
United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 189 (3d Cir. 2008);
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 217.

This brings us to the issue presented in this appeal. Was
evidence of Green’s threat to kill A.G. “intrinsic” to the charged
offense of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute? The answer to that question depends on the
definition of “intrinsic evidence,” a term we have used before
but never conclusively defined. Exhuming the “inseparably
connected” and “inextricably mixed up” language of res
gestae,12 most courts of appeals today hold that acts are
“intrinsic” to the charged offense if they are “inextricably
intertwined” with that offense. Cross, 308 F.3d at 320. They
allow this evidence for the same reason courts once allowed res
gestae evidence: it helps the factfinder to “evaluate all of the
circumstances under which the defendant acted.” United States
v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1081, 1087 (5th Cir. 1991). In other words,

12
See Gianotos, 104 F.2d at 932; Tuffanelli, 131 F.2d at
893.

26
it aids understanding by “complet[ing] the story” of the charged
crime. See, e.g., United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 326
(4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 687 (5th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir.
2000).

Courts following this reasoning employ a variety of tests
for determining whether an act is “inextricably intertwined” with
the charged offense. The Eleventh Circuit holds that evidence
is inextricably intertwined if it is “not part of the crime charged
but pertain[s] to the chain of events explaining the context” of
the crime; or is “linked in time and circumstances with the
charged crime”; or “forms an integral and natural part of an
account of the crime”; or “complete[s] the story of the crime for
the jury.” United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit exempts from Rule 404(b)
evidence of misconduct that supplies “a complete story of the
crime on trial”; evidence necessary to avoid “a chronological or
conceptual void in the story of the crime”; and evidence that is
“so blended or connected that it incidentally involves, explains
the circumstances surrounding, or tends to prove any element of,
the charged crime.” United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 673, 681
(7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). The Eighth Circuit
considers evidence inextricably intertwined if it is “an integral
part of the immediate context of the crime charged.” United
States v. Hall, 604 F.3d 539, 543 (8th Cir. 2010). The Second
Circuit inquires whether the uncharged crime evidence is
“necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.” United

27
States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 309 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). The Tenth Circuit asks
whether a witness’s testimony “would have been confusing and
incomplete without mention of the [uncharged] act.” United
States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 1994).

There are at least three problems with the “inextricably
intertwined” test and its subsidiary formulations. The first is
that the test creates confusion because, quite simply, no one
knows what it means. Such an impediment stands as an obstacle
to helpful analysis. Indeed, we have criticized the “inextricably
intertwined” standard as “a definition that elucidates little.”
Cross, 308 F.3d at 320. The Seventh Circuit, which has
consistently used the test, admits that it is often “unhelpfully
vague.” United States v. Taylor, 522 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir.
2008).13 Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick argue that it “has
proved elastic and invites abuse.” 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick,
supra, § 4:33. Others note that it “substitutes a careful analysis
with boilerplate jargon,” 1-404 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al.,
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 404.02[12] (9th ed.), and
“invites sloppy, non-analytical decision-making,” Leonard,
supra, § 5.2 at 327. Even Professor Imwinkelried, who defends

13
See also United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011,
1018-21 (7th Cir. 2009) (crediting several criticisms of the
inextricably intertwined test and holding that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting evidence pursuant to the
doctrine).

28
the test, concedes that the “vacuous nature of [its] wording gives
courts license to employ sloppy analysis and allows them
quickly to slip from a conclusory analysis to a desired
conclusion.” Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res Gestae,
supra, at 729-30.

Indeed, this case exemplifies how elusive and unhelpful
the “inextricably intertwined” standard can be. All of the
formulations used by the courts of appeals purport to embody
the same test, but clearly they are not interchangeable. Whether
evidence qualifies as intrinsic in a particular case may well
depend on which version of the test one employs. For example,
Green’s threat to kill A.G. would qualify as intrinsic if the test
is whether it “pertain[s] to the chain of events explaining the
context” of the crime, Wright, 392 F.3d at 1276, because it
“pertained to” (in fact, triggered) Stahl’s decision to go to the
FBI and the subsequent chain of events through which Green
was caught attempting to possess cocaine. The same threat
would not be intrinsic, however, if the test were whether that
threat was “an integral part of the immediate context of the
crime charged.” Hall, 604 F.3d at 543. The District Court just
as easily could have forced the Government to start the tale of
Green’s wrongdoing with the fact that Stahl went to the FBI
because Green had expressed interest in buying cocaine and
dynamite. It was not strictly necessary for the jury to know why
Green wanted dynamite in order for it to understand that he did,
and that his inquiries on that point drove Stahl to the FBI.
Likewise, Green’s threat to kill A.G. would probably be intrinsic

29
evidence if the touchstone were whether that threat “explain[ed]
the circumstances surrounding” Stahl’s decision to warn the
FBI. Gibson, 170 F.3d at 681. It would not be intrinsic,
however, if the relevant inquiry is whether Stahl’s testimony
“would have been confusing and incomplete without mention”
of the threat against A.G. Johnson, 42 F.3d at 1316. We see no
principled way to choose among these competing incarnations
of the test, yet that choice could well be determinative. “Simply
stated, the indefinite phrasing of the doctrine is a virtual
invitation for abuse.” Imwinkelried, The Second Coming of Res
Gestae, supra, at 730.

The second problem with the inextricably intertwined test
is that resort to it is unnecessary. The most common
justification for admitting evidence of “intertwined” acts is to
allow a witness to testify freely and coherently; we do not want
him to have to tiptoe around uncharged bad acts by the
defendant, and thereby risk distorting his narrative. This is a
worthy goal, but it can be accomplished without circumventing
Rule 404(b). As the D.C. Circuit explained in Bowie:

If the so-called “intrinsic” act is indeed part of the
crime charged, evidence of it will, by definition,
always satisfy Rule 404(b). The rule bars bad acts
evidence only when the evidence is offered solely
to “prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith.”
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Evidence that constitutes the
very crime being prosecuted is not of that sort.

30
232 F.3d at 927. There is little practical difference between
admitting inextricably intertwined evidence as “background”
pursuant to Rules 401 and 402, and admitting it under Rule
404(b). In both cases, the evidence must be relevant, it must
pass muster under Rule 403, and it must not be introduced solely
to prove the defendant’s criminal propensity. “[T]he only
consequences of labeling evidence ‘intrinsic’ are to relieve the
prosecution of Rule 404(b)’s notice requirement and the court
of its obligation to give an appropriate limiting instruction upon
defense counsel’s request.” Id. See also United States v. Ameri,
297 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (E.D. Ark. 2004) (“It is difficult for
me to conjure up a fact situation where ‘inextricably
intertwined’ evidence wouldn’t be admissible under Rule
404(b). If this is true, why discard the Rule 404(b) safeguards?
. . . . [T]he notice requirement of 404(b) is manifestly important,
and is often crucial if the Defendant is to meet the ‘bad act’
evidence.”). Stated another way, the “inextricably intertwined”
doctrine exempts evidence of wrongful acts that explain the
circumstances of the crime from the rigors of Rule 404(b). But
the same evidence would also be admissible within the
framework of that rule because allowing the jury to understand
the circumstances surrounding the charged crime—completing
the story—is a proper, non-propensity purpose under Rule
404(b). See, e.g., United States v. O’Leary, 739 F.2d 135, 136
(3d Cir. 1984) (identifying the need “to show the background of
the charges [and] the parties’ familiarity with each other” as a
proper purpose); United States v. Simmons, 679 F.2d 1042, 1050
(3d Cir. 1982) (concluding that providing the jury with

31
“necessary background information” was a proper purpose
under Rule 404(b)); United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 58
(3d Cir. 1976) (upholding introduction of prior criminal acts by
defendants because “the background information provided by
this testimony enabled the jury to better understand [the
witness’s] role in the bribery scheme as well as his testimony as
a whole”).14 All that is accomplished by labeling evidence
“intrinsic” is relieving the Government from providing a
defendant with the procedural protections of Rule 404(b).

The third problem with the inextricably intertwined test
is that some of its broader formulations, taken at face value,
classify evidence of virtually any bad act as intrinsic. See, e.g.,
Gibson, 170 F.3d at 681 (permitting evidence of any act that
“explains the circumstances surrounding . . . the charged
crime”). As we warned in Cross, such a regime would
eviscerate Rule 404(b). See 308 F.3d at 320. See also Bowie,
232 F.3d at 929; Ameri, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (explaining that
a “liberal view of the ‘inextricably intertwined’ exception to
Rule 404(b) would essentially nullify the 404(b) restrictions on
‘bad act’ evidence”).

14
See also Taylor, 522 F.3d at 736 (describing the need
to avoid juror confusion as a proper purpose); United States v.
Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86-88 (4th Cir. 1980) (explaining that the
need to “complete the story” of the crime for the factfinder is a
proper purpose under Rule 404(b)); 1 Kenneth S. Broun,
McCormick on Evidence § 190 (6th ed. 2009) (same).

32
 This Court has never adopted its own version of the
“inextricably intertwined” test. In Cross, we noted some of the
problems with the test but ultimately reserved judgment. We
observed that “the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic . .
. evidence is often fuzzy” and noted that “most circuit courts
view evidence as intrinsic if it is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with
the charged offense . . . or if it ‘completes the story’ of the
charged offense.” Cross, 308 F.3d at 320. We pointed out that
the former approach was “a definition that elucidates little,” and
the latter “so broad that it renders Rule 404(b) meaningless.” Id.
However, we found it unnecessary to go beyond highlighting
these “pedagogical problems with understanding intrinsic
evidence.” Because Cross arose from a criminal conspiracy
charge, the intrinsic/extrinsic issue was easy to resolve. We
noted that, under Third Circuit precedent, “acts are intrinsic
when they directly prove the charged conspiracy.” Id. (citing
Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 217-18). We concluded that because the
evidence at issue did not directly prove the charged conspiracy,
it was not intrinsic. Id. Accordingly, we declined to decide the
boundaries of intrinsic evidence for every case. Specifically, we
expressed “no view on whether ‘other acts’ evidence that does
not directly prove an element of the charged offense may be
‘intrinsic’ . . . if [it is] ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the events
underlying the charge, so that the evidence is necessary for the
jury to understand how the offense occurred or to comprehend
crucial testimony.” Id. at 320 n.19.

Our resistance to the “inextricably intertwined” standard

33
has not diminished since Cross, and today we make clear that
this is not our test for intrinsic evidence. Like its predecessor
res gestae, the inextricably intertwined test is vague, overbroad,
and prone to abuse, and we cannot ignore the danger it poses to
the vitality of Rule 404(b).

That is not to say we reject the concept of intrinsic
evidence entirely. Instead, we will reserve the “intrinsic” label
for two narrow categories of evidence. First, evidence is
intrinsic if it “directly proves” the charged offense. See e.g.,
Cross, 308 F.3d at 320; Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 218 (acts of violence
admissible as direct proof of the charged drug conspiracy). See
also Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929 (acknowledging that evidence of
“an act that is part of the charged offense . . . is properly
considered intrinsic”). This gives effect to Rule 404(b)’s
applicability only to evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts.”
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (emphasis added). If uncharged
misconduct directly proves the charged offense, it is not
evidence of some “other” crime. Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 218.
Second, “uncharged acts performed contemporaneously with the
charged crime may be termed intrinsic if they facilitate the
commission of the charged crime.” Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929.
But all else must be analyzed under Rule 404(b).

As a practical matter, it is unlikely that our holding will
exclude much, if any, evidence that is currently admissible as
background or “completes the story” evidence under the
inextricably intertwined test. We reiterate that the purpose of

34
Rule 404(b) is “simply to keep from the jury evidence that the
defendant is prone to commit crimes or is otherwise a bad
person, implying that the jury needn’t worry overmuch about the
strength of the government’s evidence.” Taylor, 522 F.3d at
735-36. “No other use of prior crimes or other bad acts is
forbidden by the rule,” and one proper use of such evidence “is
the need to avoid confusing the jury.” Id. at 736 (emphasis
added). See also Simmons, 679 F.2d at 1050 (recognizing that
other crimes evidence may be admissible if offered for any non-
propensity purpose, and identifying the need “to provide
necessary background information” about the relationships
among the players as a proper purpose). Thus, most, if not all,
other crimes evidence currently admitted outside the framework
of Rule 404(b) as “background” evidence will remain
admissible under the approach we adopt today.15 The only
difference is that the proponent will have to provide notice of
his intention to use the evidence, and identify the specific, non-
propensity purpose for which he seeks to introduce it (i.e.,
allowing the jury to hear the full story of the crime). See Bowie,
232 F.3d at 927. Additionally, the trial court will be required to
give a limiting instruction upon request. See United States v.
Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 296 (3d Cir. 2007); Bowie, 232 F.3d at

15
Of course, the fact that evidence is admissible for
some purpose does not necessarily mean that it should be
admitted. As always, district courts must exclude evidence
under Rule 403 where its clarifying value as “background” may
be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

35
927-28 (explaining that designation of evidence as “inextricably
intertwined” unduly deprives the defendant of the right to a
limiting instruction).

Applying the standards set forth above, this is a
straightforward case. Evidence of Green’s threat to kill A.G.
with dynamite was not intrinsic evidence. First, it did not
directly prove that Green attempted to possess cocaine with
intent to distribute. Additionally, it did not in any meaningful
way facilitate his attempt to procure cocaine through “Frankie”
and “Mario”—the only crime with which he was charged.

Mindful that we may affirm for any reason supported by
the record, however, we turn to the government’s alternative
argument that evidence of Green’s threat to kill A.G. was
admissible under Rule 404(b).

IV.

To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence of
uncharged crimes or wrongs must (1) have a proper evidentiary
purpose; (2) be relevant; (3) satisfy Rule 403; and (4) be
accompanied by a limiting instruction (where requested) about
the purpose for which the jury may consider it. United States v.
Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001). As explained above,
the District Court gave a limiting instruction that Green
explicitly approved. We conclude that the remaining
requirements were met as well.

36
 First, the evidence served at least two proper purposes.
A proper purpose is one that is “probative of a material issue
other than character.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681, 686 (1988). The evidence must fit “into a chain of logical
inferences, no link of which may be the inference that the
defendant has the propensity to commit the crime charged.”
United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994).
As explained in the previous section, one proper purpose under
Rule 404(b) is supplying helpful background information to the
finder of fact. Simmons, 679 F.2d at 1050. Here, evidence of
Green’s threat was admissible as background information which
completed the story of the crime. It explained why Green was
under investigation, why Stahl agreed to serve as an informant,
and the references to A.G. in their conversations. See id.;
O’Leary, 739 F.2d at136; Dansker, 537 F.2d at 58.

Evidence that Green threatened to kill A.G. was also
admissible proof of motive. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). “Motive” is
“[s]omething . . . that leads one to act.” Black’s Law Dictionary
at 1039 (8th ed. 2004). Here, Green put Stahl’s motives for
cooperating with the FBI squarely at issue during the trial. Both
in his opening statement and on cross-examination, he
vigorously suggested that Stahl cooperated with the
investigation in order to make money, or to get the FBI to help
her son with his criminal charges. In light of that attack, the
Government was entitled to produce evidence of an alternative
motive for her cooperation—namely, her concern that “officers’
lives were in danger”—which it hoped would improve her

37
credibility with the jury, especially in light of her testimony that
three of her brothers were either active or retired state troopers.16
See United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1021 (3d Cir. 1988)
(upholding district court decision to allow other crimes evidence
which helped the jury “evaluate the witnesses’ motives for
cooperating with the government”). We recognize that in the
ordinary case the requisite “proper purpose” explains something
about the defendant’s motive, plan, or knowledge. This case is
unusual in that the proper purpose we have identified relates to
a witness’s motive, not the defendant’s. While this may be
uncommon, it is appropriate. Rule 404(b) provides that
evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove the character
of “a person,” but may be admissible as proof of that person’s
“motive, opportunity, intent,” etc. It does not specify that
evidence is only admissible to prove the defendant’s motive,
opportunity, or intent. See, e.g., Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1021;
Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, supra, § 6:12
(noting that other crimes evidence may be admissible “to explain
the conduct of the police, . . . the victim, an informer, a
government witness, or the defendant”). In this case, the fact

16
Or, to skip a step in the analysis, the required proper
purpose was the rehabilitation of Stahl’s credibility, in light of
Green’s suggestions that she was motivated by money and
cooperated solely for selfish reasons. See United States v.
Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the list of
permissible purposes provided in the text of Rule 404(b) is not
exhaustive).

38
that evidence of Green’s threat helped to explain Stahl’s motives
for acting as an informant was sufficient to satisfy Rule
404(b).17

Second, evidence that Green threatened to kill A.G. was
relevant. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. This
definition is “very broad.” Gibson v. Mayor & Council of
Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). “Proof of bias
is almost always relevant,” United States v. Werme, 939 F.2d
108, 114 (3d Cir. 1991), because a “showing of bias on the part
of a witness would have a tendency to make the facts to which
he testified less probable in the eyes of the jury than it would be
without such testimony.” United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49
(1984). See also Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003,
1015 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[b]ias is always relevant in assessing”

17
Green’s only argument against admissibility under
Rule 404(b) is that evidence of his threat to kill A.G. could not
have been admitted under Rule 404(b) because his motive for
buying dynamite (retribution) was entirely unrelated to his
motive for the charged cocaine offense (making money). Even
if true, the point is irrelevant. As we have explained, Rule
404(b) does not require that the evidence at issue help explain
the defendant’s motives, only the motive of some person whose
motive is relevant.

39
credibility).

If proof of bias is almost always relevant, so too is
evidence of a lack of bias. United States v. Fusco, 748 F.2d
996, 998 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Because evidence of bias or lack of
bias is substantive, rather than collateral, it may be developed on
direct . . . [or] cross-examination, just like any other substantive
evidence”) (emphasis added). Recognition of the value of such
evidence settles the relevance issue here. Green attacked Stahl
as less than credible because she was biased in favor of the
Government. See United States v. Sumlin, 271 F.3d 274, 282
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that an accusation of bias “is an
acceptable method of attacking a witness’[s] credibility”).
Therefore, evidence that Stahl cooperated not for the purpose of
obtaining favors from the Government, but because A.G.’s life
was in danger, was relevant. It provided an explanation for her
cooperation that, if believed, increased her credibility relative to
what it would have been if Green’s attacks had gone
unanswered, and thus made the facts to which she testified
“more probable . . . .[than they would have been] without the
evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. See also United States v. Porter,
881 F.2d 878, 886 (10th Cir. 1989) (because the government
witness’s “credibility had been placed in issue by the defense,”
evidence corroborating that witness’s testimony was “relevant
for the purpose of overcoming that attack”). Indeed, evidence
concerning a witness’s credibility is always relevant, because
credibility is always at issue, see United States v. Universal
Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 666 (3d Cir. 2000) (en

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banc) (noting that “[j]urors are instructed, . . . in almost all
cases, that they are to determine the credibility of all witnesses
who testify . . . . even in the absence of an affirmative challenge
to witness credibility”), especially when the witness is testifying
for the government in a criminal trial. United States v.
Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1363 (3d Cir. 1991) (recognizing that,
“[i]n any criminal trial, the credibility of the prosecution’s
witnesses is central”).

Third, and contrary to Green’s argument on appeal, the
District Court was not required to exclude evidence of Green’s
threat under Rule 403. That rule permits a trial judge to exclude
relevant evidence if “its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid.
403. We review for abuse of discretion, which means we must
uphold the District Court unless its ruling was “arbitrary or
irrational.” Universal Rehab. Servs., 205 F.3d at 665.

We find no abuse of discretion here. The evidence at
issue carried some probative value. It helped explain why talk
of dynamite permeated Green and Stahl’s taped conversations
about cocaine, and why Stahl was working with the FBI.
Meanwhile, the risk of unfair prejudice, while certainly present
given the deplorable nature of Green’s threat, was not so great
as to require reversal. We note that we have rejected Rule 403
challenges to the admission of evidence that was just as
prejudicial as the evidence at issue here. See, e.g., Scarfo, 850
F.2d at 1020 (evidence of uncharged murders); United States v.

41
Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 748 (3d Cir. 1996) (evidence of uncharged
rape). Furthermore, any risk of unfair prejudice was minimized
by the District Court’s limiting instruction, which carefully
circumscribed the purpose for which the jury could consider the
evidence pertaining to dynamite. See Sriyuth, 98 F.3d at 748
(trusting the jury to “compartmentalize the evidence and
consider it for its proper purposes” in light of trial court’s
limiting instruction).

For these reasons, we hold that the challenged evidence
was admissible under Rule 404(b). As a result, we need not
decide whether its admission was harmless error.

V.

Evidence of Green’s threat to murder A.G. was not
intrinsic evidence. It was, however, admissible under Rule
404(b). The District Court did not err by admitting it at trial.
We will affirm the judgment.

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