REVISED, August 13, 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
97-10818
__________________
SAMUEL JOHN MAJOR DAVIS, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
VINCENT J. FECHTEL, JR., Commissioner
of the United States Parole Commission;
VICTOR M. F. REYES, Commissioner of the
United States Paroles Commission; G.
MACKENZIE RAST, Commissioner of the
United States Parole Commission,
Respondents-Appellees.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
______________________________________________
August 7, 1998
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
Samuel John Major Davis, Jr., a federal prisoner, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. section 2241 habeas
petition as an abuse of the writ.1 This case is now before us on
a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We write
1
Davis’s primary argument on appeal is that the district
court erred in construing his mandamus action as a section 2241
habeas petition. As discussed below, the district court properly
construed Davis’s petition as one for habeas relief under section
2241, rather than a petition for mandamus under 28 U.S.C. section
1361.
principally to decide an issue not yet addressed in this circuit,
whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act (hereinafter PLRA)2
applies to section 2241 habeas petitions. Concluding that Congress
did not intend for the term “civil action” to include section 2241
habeas proceedings, we find that the PLRA does not apply.
Additionally, we determine that the district court properly
dismissed Davis’s third petition as an abuse of the writ. Because
Davis has failed to present a nonfrivolous issue on appeal, we deny
his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1994, Davis filed a section 2241 habeas petition alleging
that the United States parole commission had failed to comply with
its own regulations and federal statutes in denying him parole.
The district court denied his petition, and this Court affirmed on
the merits. Davis subsequently filed a second section 2241
petition, which the district court dismissed as an abuse of the
writ. On appeal, this Court dismissed it as an abuse of the writ.
Undaunted, Davis filed a third suit (styled as a mandamus
under 28 U.S.C. section 1361), purporting to seek only a directive
to the individual members of the parole commission to correct
errors that he complained of in a previous petition.3 The court
2
Congress enacted the PLRA as Title VIII of the Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). Section 804 of the PLRA amends 28
U.S.C. section 1915 to change the procedures prisoners must follow
when seeking to proceed in forma pauperis in civil actions.
3
Davis initially filed this action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, which construed the
action as one seeking habeas relief, and transferred the case to
2
below construed Davis’s petition as a section 2241 habeas petition
and concluded that because the grounds for relief had previously
been determined to constitute an abuse of the writ, the instant
petition also was an abuse of the writ and dismissed the petition
with prejudice.
Davis then moved to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
After reviewing Davis’s inmate trust record and observing that
Davis had received more than $1200 into his inmate account in
recent months, the district court denied the motion, concluding
that Davis could afford the $105 appellate filing fee. In its
order of denial, the district court determined that the PLRA was
not applicable to a section 2241 habeas petition. Before us now is
Davis’s “motion for leave to file appeal without prepayment of
filing fee and to pay the $105 filing fee in (4) installment
payments.”
II. ANALYSIS
A. HABEAS OR MANDAMUS ACTION
Davis strenuously argues that the district court erred in
construing his mandamus action as a section 2241 habeas petition.
This Court has held that a court may liberally construe a pro se
petitioner’s pleading and treat it as a habeas corpus petition,
where appropriate. See Russell v. Knight, 488 F.2d 96, 97 (5th Cir
1973) (construing mandamus petition as a section 2254 habeas
petition).
Mandamus is, of course, an extraordinary remedy. In re Stone,
the Northern District of Texas.
3
118 F.3d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1997). To obtain a mandamus order,
a petitioner must establish “(1) a clear right to the relief, (2)
a clear duty by the respondent to do the act requested, and (3) the
lack of any other adequate remedy.” Id.
Contrary to Davis’s contentions, his challenge directly
implicates the duration of his present confinement. He requests
that a mandamus issue to order the parole commission to perform an
act that would reduce his sentence. As such, his claim is
challenging the execution of his sentence and therefore is a
section 2241 claim. United States v. Tubwell, 37 F.3d 175, 177
(5th Cir. 1994) (challenging execution of sentence is section 2241
claim).
Indeed, the District of Columbia Circuit has held that
mandamus was not the appropriate avenue to redress a federal
prisoner’s challenge to his parole eligibility date and that
section 2241 provided the exclusive remedy. Chatman-Bey v.
Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 808-810 & n.5, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1988). We
need not determine today, however, whether habeas corpus is the
exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner bringing a challenge to the
execution of his sentence. Clearly, habeas corpus was available to
Davis, and his abuse of the Great Writ did not render it
unavailable or inadequate. Thus, the district court properly
construed Davis’s pleading as one falling under section 2241.
B. WHETHER THE PLRA APPLIES
Next, we must determine whether the PLRA’s financial screening
and assessment requirements apply to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas
4
proceedings. The PLRA amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to impose filing
fee obligations on a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files
an appeal in forma pauperis.” § 1915(b)(1).4 Here, the question
is whether a § 2241 habeas proceeding is a “civil action” within
the meaning of the PLRA.
When interpreting a statute, we first look to its plain
language. Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir.
1987). “Specific words within a statute, however, may not be read
in isolation of the remainder of that section or the entire
statutory scheme.” Id. at 1293.
It is true that habeas corpus proceedings are technically
“civil actions.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made clear
that that “label is gross and inexact” and that “the proceeding is
unique.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94, 89 S.Ct. 1082,
1087 (1969). We must presume, of course, that Congress was aware
of the construction courts had given to the terms in the statute.
Sutton, 819 F.2d at 1294.
Although this Court has not addressed the precise question of
whether the PLRA applies to section 2241 proceedings,5 we have
determined that actions brought under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255 and 2254
are not “civil actions” for the purposes of the PLRA. United
4
The prisoner must “pay the full amount of a filing fee.”
The full amount is not required upon filing. The court assesses a
partial filing fee and certain monthly payments are to be made in
accordance with § 1915.
5
In Ojo v. I.N.S., 106 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 1997), a § 2241
proceeding, we determined that the PLRA did not apply because the
petitioner, a detainee who was about to be deported, was not a
“prisoner” within the meaning of § 1915(a)(2).
5
States v. Cole, 101 F.3d 1076 (5th Cir. 1996) (§ 2255); Carson v.
Johnson, 112 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 1997)(§ 2254). In Cole, this Court
looked to the holdings of three other circuits which had recognized
that although habeas proceedings are technically “civil actions,”
there are several considerations that counsel against applying the
PLRA to them.6 The Third Circuit stated that habeas proceedings
were of a hybrid nature, and a plethora of case law demonstrated
that habeas proceedings were not necessarily encompassed by the
phrase “civil action.” Santana, 98 F.3d at 754-55.
Further, we found the following analysis from the Second
Circuit persuasive:
First, the [PLRA] was aimed primarily at
prisoners’ suits challenging prison
conditions, many of which are routinely
dismissed as frivolous. There is nothing in
the text of the [PLRA] or its legislative
history to indicate that Congress expected its
filing fee payment requirements to apply to
habeas corpus petitions. Second, we note that
Congress has endeavored to make the filing of
a habeas corpus petition easier than the
filing of a typical civil action by setting
the district court filing fee at $5, compared
to the $120 applicable to civil complaints . .
. . Third, Congress gave specific attention to
perceived abuses in the filing of habeas
corpus petitions by enacting Title I of the
AEDPA.7 That title imposes several new
restrictions on habeas corpus petitions, but
makes no change in filing fees or in a
6
Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 1996); Santana v.
United States, 98 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1996); Martin v. United States,
96 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1996).
7
Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (hereinafter AEDPA) of 1996, sections 101-108, Pub.L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (1996) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
sections 2244-2266; Fed.R.App. P. 22) became effective two days
prior to the PLRA.
6
prisoner’s obligation for payment of existing
fees.
Cole, 101 F.3d at 1077 (quoting Reyes, 90 F.3d at 678) (footnote
added).
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit observed a practical
difficulty with applying the PLRA to habeas proceedings. If a
prisoner previously had filed three frivolous suits, he could not
file a petition for habeas relief without paying the full filing
fee.8 “This result would be contrary to a long tradition of ready
access of prisoners to federal habeas corpus, as distinct from
their access to tort remedies.” Martin, 96 F.3d at 855-56.
Finding these reasons persuasive, this Court held that the PLRA did
not apply to § 2255 proceedings. Cole, 101 F.3d at 1077.
Not long after our holding in Cole regarding section 2255
actions, we addressed whether the PLRA applied to section 2254
proceedings. Carson, 112 F.3d 818. In that case, we opined that
all the rationales set forth in Cole for not applying the PLRA to
section 2255 actions “apply with equal, if not greater, force to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petitions . . . .” Therefore, we held that the PLRA
did not apply to section 2254 proceedings.
Likewise, we believe the above stated reasons for not applying
the PLRA to sections 2254 and 2255 cases would also apply to habeas
8
We recognize that the full district court filing fee for
habeas petitions, including those filed pursuant to section 2241,
is only five dollars. Although five dollars is a very small
amount, “if one does not have it and is unable to get it the fee
might as well be [an exorbitant sum].” Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.
708, 712, 81 S.Ct. 895, 897 (1961). On appeal, the filing fee is
$105.
7
petitions brought pursuant to section 2241. There is, however, a
split in the circuits on this issue.
The Tenth Circuit held that “[b]ecause the nature of a § 2241
proceeding is the same as § 2254 and § 2255 proceedings,” § 2241
actions are not “civil actions” within the meaning of the PLRA.
McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Commission, 115 F.3d 809, 911 (10th Cir.
1997). Recognizing that “a § 2241 attack on the execution of a
sentence may challenge some matters that occur at prison, such as
deprivation of good-time credits and other prison disciplinary
matters,” the Tenth Circuit nevertheless opined that this does not
make a § 2241 action like a “condition of confinement” lawsuit. An
execution-of-sentence claim is still challenging the fact or
duration of a prisoner’s confinement. The prisoner is seeking
earlier release as opposed to monetary compensation for prison
conditions.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit held that the PLRA did
apply to section 2241 proceedings. Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429
(7th Cir. 1997). In that case, the petitioner argued that the
parole commission had miscalculated his mandatory release date.
The Seventh Circuit believed that challenges to the denial of
parole did not affect the validity of a criminal sentence and that
such litigation could not be deemed a “functional continuation of
the criminal prosecution.” Although it conceded that parole
affects the duration of confinement, the Court likened the
petitioner’s challenge to his parole calculation to a challenge to
the revocation of good time credits, which, in a previous opinion,
8
it had stated in dicta was a “civil action” for the purposes of the
PLRA.
Very recently, the District of Columbia Circuit issued a
persuasive opinion aligning itself with the Tenth Circuit and
rejecting the analysis of the Seventh Circuit. Blair-Bey v. Quick,
__ F.3d __ 1998 WL 412488 (D.C.Cir. July 24, 1998). The District
of Columbia Circuit took issue with the purported distinction the
Seventh Circuit had attempted to draw between “criminal” and
“civil” habeas petitions, stating that there was no authority for
the proposition, and thus, “[t]here is no evidence that Congress
might have relied on a preexisting distinction between “criminal”
and “civil” habeas corpus petitions when it enacted the PLRA. Nor
is there any indication that Congress itself intended to establish
any such distinction in the PLRA.” Id. at *4-5.9
We agree. In fact, the legislative history of the PLRA
indicates that Congress was interested in discouraging suits
involving frivolous challenges to prison conditions. See e.g.,
United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1997)
(referencing Senator Dole’s statement in regard to limiting such
prison condition suits involving a challenge to the amount of
storage space and the now infamous creamy peanut butter versus
chunky peanut butter controversy).10 Further, as we recognized in
9
Additionally, “the PLRA contains several other provisions
directed specifically at prison conditions litigation . . . but
makes no specific reference anywhere in the Act to challenges to
the fact or length of confinement.” Blair-Bey at *5.
10
141 Cong. Rec. S7498-01, S7524 (daily ed. May 25, 1995).
9
Carson, the AEDPA, which became effective two days prior to the
PLRA, set forth separate procedures for addressing abuses of the
habeas process, strongly suggesting that Congress never intended
for the PLRA to apply to habeas petitions. 112 F.3d at 820.
Our case law indicates that claims regarding denial of parole
(and loss of good time credits) sound in habeas. We have explained
that although a § 1983 suit can be used to challenge
unconstitutional parole procedures, when a prisoner challenges the
result of a specific defective parole hearing or the board’s rules
and procedures that affect his release, and resolution would
automatically entitle him to accelerated release, then the
challenge must be pursued in a habeas corpus proceeding. Orellana
v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29 (5th Cir. 1995); see also In re: Cain, 137 F.3d
234 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a prisoner should seek redress
for loss of good conduct credits through a habeas proceeding).
Here, the bottom line is that Davis seeks accelerated release
from prison. Davis’s challenge to the execution of his sentence
therefore most certainly is a challenge to the duration of his
confinement--not to a condition of his confinement. As such, his
claim sounds in habeas, specifically, a section 2241 proceeding.
Although claims brought under section 2241 do not challenge the
validity of a conviction or sentence because the error complained
of did not occur during the criminal proceedings, we believe such
claims are more akin to claims brought pursuant to sections 2254
and 2255 than they are to claims challenging conditions of a
prisoner’s confinement brought in civil rights suits under 42
10
U.S.C. section 1983. Simply put, habeas claims involve someone’s
liberty, rather than mere civil liability. Cf. O’Neal v. McAninch,
115 S.Ct. 992, 996 (1995) (comparing the stakes involved in habeas
proceedings to those in civil cases in the context of discussing
the standard of review in a habeas case).
In short, because the alleged error affects the duration of
confinement, a section 2241 claim is more closely related to other
habeas claims brought pursuant to sections 2254 and 2255 than
claims challenging conditions of confinement. We see no reason to
distinguish a section 2241 proceeding from the other types of
habeas proceedings. Accordingly, agreeing with the Tenth and
District of Columbia Circuits, we hold that because the nature of
a section 2241 proceeding is the same as those under sections 2254
and 2255, section 2241 proceedings are not “civil actions” for the
purposes of section 1915. The PLRA thus does not apply to section
2241 proceedings.
C. ABUSE OF THE WRIT
As set forth above, Davis is attempting to raise the same
grounds for relief that he raised in his second section 2241
petition, which was deemed an abuse of the writ. In his brief, he
does not specifically argue that the district court erred in
holding that he had abused the writ. His sole argument is that the
court erred in construing the petition as a habeas petition. Under
these circumstances, we need not determine whether the gate-keeping
provisions of the AEDPA apply to the instant petition, Davis’s
third section 2241 petition, because it clearly constitutes an
11
abuse of the writ either under our pre- or post-AEDPA
jurisprudence.
In conclusion, we find that the PLRA does not apply and that
Davis’s third section 2241 petition constitutes an abuse of the
writ. We therefore DENY his motion to proceed without prepayment
of filing fees and DISMISS the appeal as an abuse of the writ.
12