PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 5/7/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 95-3121
v.
CALVIN MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas at Kansas City, Kansas
(D.C. No. 92-20071-01)
Leon J. Patton, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender, Kansas City, Kansas, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
The district court resentenced the appellant Calvin Moore pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 after his original counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Upon resentencing,
the district court effectively ruled that its jurisdiction limited it to imposition of the
original sentence, precluded rehearing of previously considered arguments and motions,
and barred consideration of new arguments and new evidence. The district court’s
jurisdiction, however, is not so limited and this court remands to the district court for
further proceedings.
I.
Appellant Calvin Moore was charged in an indictment alleging that over the period
from October 3, 1991, to March 5, 1992, he knowingly and intentionally conspired to
distribute a substance containing cocaine base (“crack cocaine”) and did distribute crack
cocaine on three separate occasions, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. On December
15, 1992, Moore pleaded guilty to count one of the indictment, conspiracy to distribute.
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas sentenced Moore to a
term of imprisonment of 188 months on April 2, 1993. Moore’s trial counsel filed
objections to the presentence report that were overruled by the district court in imposing
sentence. No timely notice of appeal was filed, but Moore submitted a motion to file an
untimely notice of appeal. Because that motion was untimely filed 100 days after the
entry of Moore’s sentence, the district court denied the motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4 (b).
Moore next filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. § 2255. Moore alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file an
appeal following his original sentencing, errors by the district court in enhancing his base-
offense level, and a challenge to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines. The
district court determined that Moore’s original counsel was ineffective, resulting in the
failure to perfect an appeal. The district court then determined that the proper remedy
was to resentence Moore enabling him to perfect an appeal. In addition, the district court
appointed the federal public defender as Moore’s new counsel.
Moore’s newly appointed counsel filed a new set of objections to the presentence
report. In this new set of objections, Moore alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective
not only in failing to perfect his appeal but also in failing to properly defend him at his
sentencing. He reasserted objections to specific adjustments in his base-offense level
made at the original sentencing and advanced new arguments based upon additional
evidence he claimed had come to light since the first sentencing.
At the resentencing hearing, Moore sought to introduce the new evidence and to
make the additional arguments concerning his base-offense level. In the face of these
new matters, the district court rescheduled the hearing. After consideration of
memoranda directed at the court’s jurisdiction, the district court concluded that it had no
jurisdiction or power to consider new evidence or expanded objections not presented at
the original sentencing. The premise of this conclusion was that Moore was only entitled
to be placed in the same position he would hold had his original counsel perfected an
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appeal. The district court then sentenced Moore consistent with the original sentence and
Moore perfected this appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a)(2). This
court reviews the district court’s ruling on a jurisdictional question de novo. FDIC v.
Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1479 (10th Cir. 1994).
The district court was correct to conclude that resentencing under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 is the proper remedy for a criminal defendant who has had ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to perfect an appeal. See United States v. Davis, 929 F.2d 554, 557
(10th Cir. 1991); Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821, 823 (10th Cir. 1990). In Davis, this court
held that resentencing enables the defendant to perfect an appeal. 929 F.2d at 557. The
court has expressly noted that the purpose of resentencing is to place the defendant “back
into the position he would have been had counsel perfected a timely notice of appeal.”
United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1511 (10th Cir. 1991).
Notwithstanding this expression, nothing in Davis, Abels, or Saucedo in any way
limits the jurisdictional power of a district court in conducting a resentencing pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. Instead, these cases merely prescribe the remedy to be given to a
defendant following a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to perfect an
appeal. The only jurisdictional concern in Davis was providing a basis for appellate
jurisdiction. 929 F.2d at 557. Resentencing in order to allow a criminal defendant to
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timely file a notice of appeal is the remedy to secure appellate jurisdiction over the
defendant’s case. Id. Davis, Abels, and Saucedo do not restrict the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court to only those issues and the evidence raised at the original sentencing.
In support of the position taken by the district court here, the United States
analogizes to cases under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35. The authority granted under Rule 35 (c),
however, is expressly narrow.1 United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 290 (10th Cir.
1994). The district court here correctly noted that the particulars of Rule 35, which
allows limited sentence correction within seven days, do not apply in the circumstances of
Moore’s resentencing; its jurisdiction arose more than seven days subsequent to the
original sentencing under a § 2255 motion. Davis, Abels, and Saucedo recognize that 28
U.S.C. § 2255 grants a sentencing court the power to vacate the original sentence and
impose a new sentence upon a motion that may be made on a number of grounds and at
any time.2 Considering these differences, it is clear that Rule 35 is not a guide for 28
1
But Rule 35 does not limit a court’s jurisdiction at any time to correct certain
types of errors on the narrow grounds specified in Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.
2
The statute reads, in pertinent part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
(continued...)
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U.S.C. § 2255.
Moore asserts that the district court was required to resentence him de novo. His
authorities for this, however, are appellate decisions that corrected particular sentencing
errors and remanded. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 993 F.2d 204, 207-08 (10th Cir.
1993); United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1455-56 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
879 (1991). Here, the district court itself vacated Moore’s original sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. In contrast to the cases cited by Moore, at this stage in the instant case,
this court is not considering the type of sentencing error that would mandate de novo
resentencing on any issue upon remand. Compare Smith, 930 F.2d at 1456 (vacating
sentence and remanding for de novo sentencing) with United States v. Davis, 912 F.2d
1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming sentence and retaining jurisdiction but requiring
the district court to explain fully its Sentencing Guidelines departure decision).
Although the vacation of the sentence was here ordered by the district court, the
same court that will resentence Moore, analogizing to procedures following vacation and
remand by an appellate court is instructive. As this court has held, when a defendant’s
sentence is vacated on appeal and remanded for new sentencing, the lower court must
2
(...continued)
sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
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begin anew with de novo proceedings. United States v. Ortiz, 25 F.3d 934, 935 (10th Cir.
1995). The court went on to clarify that the de novo resentencing “permits the receipt of
any relevant evidence the court could have heard at the first sentencing hearing.” Id.
(emphasis added); United States v. Warner, 43 F.3d 1335, 1340 (10th Cir. 1994). As a
consequence, the court on remand has the discretion to entertain evidence that could have
been presented at the original sentencing even on issues that were not the specific subject
of the remand. See United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1995). This is
consistent with the parameters of what has been labeled “the mandate rule”: where the
appellate court has not specifically limited the scope of the remand, the district court
generally has discretion to expand the resentencing beyond the sentencing error causing
the reversal.3 See United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1421 (6th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992).
The First Circuit has explained that the mandate rule, which generally requires trial
court conformity with the articulated appellate remand, is a discretion-guiding rule
subject to exception in the interests of justice. United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 251
(1st Cir. 1993). The Fourth Circuit has summarized these exceptional circumstances as:
(1) a dramatic change in controlling legal authority; (2) significant new evidence that was
not earlier obtainable through due diligence but has since come to light; or (3) that blatant
The facts of this case do not present the issue of whether the district court on
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remand may consider new evidence that could increase Moore’s sentence.
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error from the prior sentencing decision would result in serious injustice if uncorrected.
United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 67 (4th Cir. 1993). Most importantly, the First Circuit
further explained that the mandate rule is a rule of policy and practice, not a jurisdictional
limitation, which thus allows some flexibility in exceptional circumstances. Bell, 988
F.2d at 251.
These cases demonstrate that a district court, following the appellate vacation of a
sentence, possesses the inherent discretionary power to expand the scope of the
resentencing beyond the issue that resulted in the reversal and vacation of sentence. It
follows, then, that where the district court itself ordered the vacation, it has the discretion
to determine the scope of the resentencing. Because it has this discretionary power, the
district court necessarily has the jurisdiction to order de novo resentencing on any or all
issues. The district court thus erred when it held that the limited purpose of Moore’s
original § 2255 motion correspondingly limited its jurisdiction in resentencing. Rather,
the vacation of Moore’s sentence required the district court to exercise its inherent
discretion to determine the appropriate scope of the resentencing proceedings.
In addition, the district court’s ruling on its jurisdictional limitations was
potentially in conflict with the ability of the parties to move to raise new issues with
respect to the presentence report at any time prior to the imposition of sentence. As a
result of the district court’s vacation of Moore’s original sentence, Moore at resentencing
stood in the position of a defendant who had pleaded guilty to a charge against him, had
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originally briefed the sentencing issues, and was awaiting sentence. Under these
circumstances, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 (b)(6)(D) allows the parties to raise new objections to
the presentence report for good cause shown. The district court’s ruling on its jurisdiction
was implicitly to the contrary: it eviscerated Rule 32 (b)(6)(D) and suggested that the
original, but now vacated, sentence had some continuing effectiveness. After vacation of
the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, however, it is Rule 32 (b) which is effective
and the original sentence which is eviscerated. Rule 32 (b)(6)(D) thus provides another
avenue for the district court to exercise its discretion and determine the scope of the
resentencing.
Because this court has not addressed a claim of substantive sentencing error, the
remand will not direct the district court to conduct de novo resentencing proceedings.
The district court is thus under no obligation to conduct a de novo sentencing, although it
is within its discretion under this remand to do so. It could be that on remand, the district
court will determine that common sense and efficiency dictate sentencing de novo. On
the other hand, in the exercise of its discretion, the district court could resolve not to
entertain new arguments and evidence and simply rely on the original briefing and
arguments. The district court, however, must exercise its discretion and determine the
parameters of the resentencing hearing. The district court’s ruling on its jurisdiction
prevented it from exercising this discretion. Such a failure to exercise discretion when
there is an obligation to do so is itself error. ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d
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1455, 1459 (10th Cir. 1995).
The district court’s ruling on its jurisdiction is thus REVERSED and this case is
REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. In light of this
remand and the reasons therefor, other issues presented by Moore are inappropriate for
appellate disposition at this time.
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