IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 97-40933
Summary Calendar
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
LARRY MICHAEL JEANES,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
_________________________
August 7, 1998
Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Larry Jeanes appeals the denial of his motion for post-
sentence modification of his term of supervised release. We
affirm.
I.
In 1992, Jeanes pleaded guilty to each count of a three-count
information charging him with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(felon in possession of a firearm), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D)
(possession of marihuana with intent to distribute), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime). He
was sentenced to twenty-one months on counts 1 and 2, to be served
concurrently, and sixty months on count 3, to be served
consecutively.
In 1996, Jeanes filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence in light of Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Specifically, Jeanes
challenged the evidence underlying his § 924(c) plea, arguing that
the evidence did not support a finding that he actively employed
the firearm. The district court vacated the § 924(c) judgment and
sentence. Because Jeanes had already served more than twenty-one
months, he was immediately released from custody and began his term
of supervised release stemming from the remaining two counts.
Jeanes then filed a motion for post-sentence modification of
his term of supervised release, arguing that the court should apply
his good-time credits and time served to his supervised release
term. The court denied the motion.1
II.
The question presented is whether the district court erred in
refusing to reduce Jeanes's term of supervised release. Jeanes
1
The government argues that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because
Jeanes's notice of appeal was not timely filed. This argument is without merit,
as the record indicates that Jeanes filed notice within 10 days of entry of
judgment.
2
deploys two overlapping arguments: that the court should have
reduced his term pursuant to the plain language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(1) and should have reduced his term by applying his time
served and good-time credits that accrued during his incarceration
for the § 924(c) count. We review for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Grandlund, 71 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1995), clarified,
77 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 1996).
A.
Jeanes argues that the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to discharge him from his remaining term of supervised
release pursuant to the statute's plain language. He points out
that his conduct as a federal prisoner was exemplary and argues
that the interest of justice warranted his release.
The district court, under § 3583(e)(1), may terminate a term
of supervised release at any time after the defendant has served
one year of supervised release. The statute directs the court to
take into account a variety of considerations, including the nature
of the offense and the history of the offender, as well as any
implications for public safety and deterrence. These are largely
the same considerations the court must assess when imposing the
original sentence.
After weighing these factors, the court may discharge the
defendant from supervised release “if it is satisfied that such
3
action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and
the interest of justice.” § 3583(e)(1). In sum, the statute
confers broad discretion.
The court noted that the probation office, should it find that
Jeanes posed little danger to the community, could weaken his
reporting requirements or otherwise modify the conditions of
supervised release. Accordingly, the court concluded that keeping
Jeanes under the continued supervision of the probation office was
“a much better alternative than completely removing [him] from the
Probation Office's supervision.” Jeanes paints these remarks as an
abdication of the court's responsibility to consider on its own the
merits of his motionSSamounting, he says, to an abuse of
discretion.
This is a mischaracterization: The district court explicitly
considered such factors as Jeanes's exemplary conduct while in
custody and the burden on his family stemming from continued
supervision. These factors cut in favor of his claim. But the
court also observed that Jeanes “is a convicted felon, and certain
consequences flow from choices he has made.” See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B) (noting that district court must consider whether
its decision will “afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct”). Moreover, the court was agnostic as to whether
Jeanes's discharge from supervision might pose a risk to the
community. While lauding his behavior to date, the court was
4
careful to note that problems might arise in the future.
Accordingly, the court determined that continued supervision was
the wisest choice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (holding that
district court must consider whether its decision will “protect the
public from further crimes of the defendant”). Given the
foregoing, we do not agree that the court abused its discretion.
B.
Jeanes asks that his time served and good-time credits on the
now-vacated § 924(c) sentence be applied to reduce his term of
supervised release. Although framed as a double-jeopardy
challenge, his argument is essentially that he is entitled to
reduction or termination of his supervised release term as
compensation for the time served on the wrongful conviction and
sentence.
Although we have yet to pass on the question, a similar
situation was confronted in United States v. Joseph, 109 F.3d 34
(1st Cir. 1997). There, a defendant whose § 924(c) conviction was
vacated sought to have his term of supervised release (stemming
from a separate, valid conviction) reduced accordingly. The court
rejected his claim, observing that “imprisonment and supervised
release are designed to serve very different purposes.” Id. at 38.
The court explained:
Rather than being punitive, supervised release is
intended to facilitate “the integration of the violator
5
into the community, while providing the supervision
designed to limit further criminal conduct.”
Incarceration, to the contrary, does nothing to assist a
defendant's transition back into society and is not a
reasonable substitute for a portion of the supervised
release term.
Id. at 38-39 (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, comment. (n. 4), p.s.)
(internal citation omitted).2
We agree that incarceration and supervised release are not
fungible. The supervised release term serves a broader, societal
purpose by reducing recidivism. While substituting wrongful
incarceration time for supervised release time may even the ledger
from the defendant's perspective, it affects the public by
eliminating the defendant's transition period.
We note that Jeanes's claim to a time-served offset is fully
cognizable under § 3583(e)(1), which requires a district court to
consider the “interest of justice” in deciding whether termination
of a term of supervised release is appropriate. See Joseph, 109
F.3d at 39. So, in making its decision, a court may take into
account the fact that a defendant served time under a wrongful
conviction and sentence. Like the First Circuit, however, we opt
not to invent some form of “automatic credit” as a means of
compensation. See id. Claims of injustice or unfairness may
properly be evaluatedSSas one factor among manySSunder the broad and
general directive of § 3583(e)(1).
2
See also United States v. Love, 19 F.3d 415, 417 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1994)
(noting purposes of supervised release).
6
AFFIRMED.
7