Baker v. Barnard Construction Co.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 18 1998

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

REX BAKER; JOSEPH N.
BORDELON; CHARLIE E.
BRADSHAW, JR.; LARRY
CUNNINGHAM; DENNY HENSLEY;
STEVEN D. HENSLEY; LEONARD
L. MAHAN; MACK D. MANTLE;
RAY E. FOWLER,

Plaintiffs,

and

ALAN BOYD; WILLIAM R.
CLARENCE; GARY COON;
ROBERT CORNETT, JR.; TRACY R.
MCMANUS; EDDIE MILLER;
GERALD MILLER; DAVID L.
ROBINSON; JAMES D. SPEARS,
JR.; DENNIS STILES; GARY
MILLER, SR.,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 96-2223
BARNARD CONSTRUCTION CO.,
INC.; DAVY MCKEE
CORPORATION; FLINT
ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY; MOUNTAIN WEST
FABRICATION PLANTS &
STATIONS, INC.; PIONEER
CONTRACTING COMPANY, INC.,

Defendants,

and

FOUR-WAY COMPANY, INC.;
FOUTZ & BURSUM
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.,

Defendants - Appellees.

_________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-93-140-BB)
_________________________

David N. Mark, Seattle, Washington (K. Lee Peifer, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Thomas J. Hynes of Hynes, Hale & Gurley, Farmington, New Mexico, for
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________

Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

_________________________

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McKAY, Circuit Judge.

_________________________

At issue in this case is whether return travel time associated with refueling

and maintaining construction equipment qualifies as work under the Fair Labor

Standards Act [FLSA], 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and is therefore compensable under

the FLSA. Plaintiffs, employees of Defendants Four-Way Company and Foutz &

Bursum Construction Company, were hired to perform welding work on oil and

gas pipelines. They brought this action against their employers, alleging

violations of the FLSA’s overtime provisions.

As part of the terms of Plaintiffs’ employment, Defendants required

Plaintiffs to provide their own fueled and stocked welding rigs each work day.

Plaintiffs were compensated by a “split-check system” which divided their hourly

rate into labor compensation and rental compensation for the welding rigs.

Defendants then equated Plaintiffs’ labor compensation rate with the “regular

rate” used to determine overtime rates under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a).

Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs for their return travel time associated with

refueling and restocking the welding rigs in the evenings.

At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants on each of

Plaintiffs’ claims. After the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), Plaintiffs’ appealed. We

assume jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and, for the reasons set forth

below, we reverse and remand.

Plaintiffs assert on appeal that the district court erroneously instructed the

jury that Plaintiffs could waive their overtime rights by agreeing with Defendants

that the rig rental fee would compensate them for travel time associated with

refueling and restocking the welding rigs. See Appellants’ App. at 59, Instr. No.

9. Because Plaintiffs objected to Instruction Nine at trial, we review the

instruction de novo. See United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1076 (10th Cir.

1997). Instruction Nine reads, in pertinent part:

[T]o award damages to Plaintiffs as a result of travel time
Plainiffs [sic] claim was necessary to refuel and restock their welding
rigs, you must find both that:

1) travel back from the job site was integral and indispensable
to the principle [sic] activity or activities for which Plaintiffs were
hired, and

2) the parties made no mutual agreement that the rig rental fee
would compensate Plainiffs [sic] for travel time associated with
refueling and restocking their welding rigs.

Appellants’ App. at 59. We agree with Plaintiffs that if their travel time was

integral and indispensable to the principal activities for which they were hired, no

mutual agreement could waive the application of the FLSA minimum wage and

overtime provisions to that work.

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 Under Instruction Nine, Plaintiffs must first prove that their return travel

from a job site is compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act, codified at 29

U.S.C. §§ 251-262. Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, employers need not pay

minimum wage or overtime to an employee engaged in “activities which are

preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities, which occur

either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee

commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he

ceases, such principal activity or activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). In Steiner v.

Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956), the Supreme Court interpreted section

254(a)(2) of the Act, holding that if an activity is “an integral and indispensable

part of the principal activities for which covered workmen are employed,” it

constitutes a compensable principal activity rather than a non-compensable

preliminary or postliminary task. Whether an activity is preliminary or

postliminary to principal activities for purposes of § 254(a)(2) of the Portal-to-

Portal Act is a mixed question of law and fact because the precise nature of the

employee’s duties is a question of fact, while application of the FLSA to those

duties is a question of law. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,

450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981); Baker v. GTE North, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1104, 1111-12

(N.D. Ind. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 110 F.3d 28 (7th Cir. 1997). The first

part of Instruction Nine appropriately asks the jury whether Plaintiffs have proved

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that their return travel is compensable under the Supreme Court’s “integral and

indispensable” standard.

The second part of Instruction Nine requires Plaintiffs to prove that “the

parties made no mutual agreement that the rig rental fee would compensate

Plainiffs [sic] for travel time associated with refueling and restocking their

welding rigs.” Appellants’ App. at 59. We hold that this instruction incorrectly

stated the law because travel time meeting the “integral and indispensable” test

must be compensated pursuant to the FLSA regardless of any employer-employee

agreement. If Plaintiffs’ travel time associated with refueling and restocking the

rigs is integral and indispensable, the disputed agreement in this case would

violate the FLSA.

If the jury found that Plaintiffs’ return travel time is integral and

indispensable to the principal activities for which Plaintiffs were hired, Plaintiffs’

travel time would be compensable unless another section of the FLSA provided an

exception to the Portal-to-Portal payment requirements or approved of an

alternative pay arrangement. 1 See D A & S Oil Well Servicing, Inc. v. Mitchell,

1
Although Plaintiffs must persuade the jury that their return travel was
integral and indispensable to the principal activities for which they were hired,
they need not also prove the absence of an agreement which provides an alternate
method of compensation or excludes certain activities from the regular pay rate.
The district court erroneously placed the burden of proving the absence of the
disputed agreement on Plaintiffs.

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262 F.2d 552, 554-55 (10th Cir. 1958). In other words, regardless of whether

employer-employee agreements classified the return travel associated with

maintaining the rigs as noncompensable or compensated through rig rental, if

payment for that return travel is required by the FLSA, Defendants must apply the

minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA to that return travel. See

Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (The

Supreme Court has “frequently emphasized the nonwaivable nature of an

individual employee’s right to a minimum wage and to overtime pay under the

Act. Thus, [the Court has] held that FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract

Defendants must prove, if they can, that, notwithstanding the compensable
nature of Plaintiffs’ work activities, Defendants were exempt from paying the
minimum wage and overtime required by the Portal-to-Portal Act. See Local 246
Util. Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 83 F.3d 292, 296 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing Idaho Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 209 (1966),
for the proposition that it is the employer’s burden to justify a 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)
exclusion of payments from the regular rate of compensation); Minizza v. Stone
Container Corp. Corrugated Container Div. E. Plant, 842 F.2d 1456, 1459 (3d Cir.
1988) (“[T]he term ‘regular rate’ is defined to include ‘all remuneration for
employment paid to, or on behalf of, [an] employee’ . . . and the employer bears
the burden of establishing an exemption.”) (citations omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(e)). They must prove the existence of the alleged agreement concerning
compensation for travel time and its legality under the FLSA. Such burden
allocation comports with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit concerning employer exemptions under the FLSA. See Corning Glass
Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974) (“[T]he general rule [is] that the
application of an exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a matter of
affirmative defense on which the employer has the burden of proof.”); Spradling
v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 95 F.3d 1492, 1499 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___
U.S. , 117 S. Ct. 1081 (1997) (“FLSA case law is clear that the employer bears
the burden of demonstrating its right to an exemption”).

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or otherwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of the statute and

thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.”) (citations omitted);

Dunlop v. Gray-Goto, Inc., 528 F.2d 792, 794-95 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating that

“private agreement or understanding between the parties cannot circumvent the

overtime pay requirements of the Act”).

Defendants assert that compensation for Plaintiffs’ travel time associated

with maintaining the rented rigs is properly allocated to a rental fee rather than

employee wages. They contend that even if Plaintiffs’ travel time is an integral

and indispensable activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2)

allows them to exclude such time from the hours of Plaintiffs’ work which require

minimum wage or overtime payments because section 207(e)(2) excludes

equipment rental rates from an employee’s regular rate of pay.

Section 207(e)(2) lists one of “seven categories of employer payments

[that] are not to be taken into consideration in determining what an employee’s

‘regular rate’ of pay is.” Dunlop, 528 F.2d at 794; see 29 U.S.C. § 207(e).

Section 207(e)(2) authorizes exclusion from the regular rate of “other similar

payments to an employee which are not made as compensation for his hours of

employment.” In the applicable regulation, “[s]ums paid to an employee for the

rental of his truck or car” is an example of the type of payment intended to be

excluded from the regular rate as “other similar payments.” 29 C.F.R. §

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778.224(b) (1997). Thus, a rental payment for a vehicle is not included in the

calculation of an employee’s regular rate of pay because it is not “compensation

for [the employee’s] hours of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2).

Because 29 C.F.R. § 778.224(b)(1) excludes payments for rig rental from

the calculation of Plaintiffs’ regular rate of pay, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’

maintenance and transport of the rented rigs ought to be excluded from minimum

wage and overtime compensation if such services are compensated by the rig

rental fee. Their argument follows the reasoning of the district court’s decision

earlier in this case; they argue that we would read section 778.224(b)(1) too

narrowly if we prohibited payment by a rental fee for services such as

maintenance of rented equipment. See Baker v. Barnard Constr. Co., 863 F.

Supp. 1498, 1502 (D.N.M. 1993).

We do read section 778.224(b)(1) narrowly because we have consistently

followed the Supreme Court’s instruction that such FLSA exemptions are to be

construed narrowly. See Sanders v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., 112 F.3d 468,

470 (10th Cir. 1997); 29 C.F.R. § 790.2 (1997) (“It would therefore appear that

the Congress did not intend by the Portal Act to change the general rule that the

remedial provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act are to be given liberal

interpretation and exemptions therefrom are to be narrowly construed and limited

to those who can meet the burden of showing that they come ‘plainly and

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unmistakably within (the) terms and spirit’ of such an exemption.”) (footnote

omitted) (quoting A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945)). To

foster the Act’s purpose of compensating work, we strictly construe all exceptions

to the FLSA.

Under Defendants’ interpretation of 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2), Plaintiffs could

agree to have the time they spent on integral and indispensable activities excluded

from minimum wage and overtime calculations because those activities are

services to equipment rented by Defendants from Plaintiffs. Such an

interpretation of section 207(e)(2) expands the exemption to include

compensation for some of an employee’s hours of integral and indispensable

work. If Plaintiffs’ return travel is integral and indispensable, the disputed rig

rental agreement is a payment “made as compensation for hours of work.” 29

C.F.R. § 778.224(a). Since the section 207(e)(2) exemption applies to payments

“not made as compensation for [an employee’s] hours of employment,”

Defendants’ interpretation contradicts the express language of section 207(e)(2)

and its implementing regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2); see 29 C.F.R. §

778.224(a).

Additionally, we cannot harmonize Defendants’ interpretation of section

207(e)(2) with prior Supreme Court opinions addressing integral and

indispensable work, such as Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S. 260, 262

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(1956). In King Packing, the Court held that the policy behind the FLSA would

be circumvented if employers could require their employees to provide equipment

requiring daily maintenance without treating that maintenance as labor. The

Court would not allow an employer to avoid paying for its employees’ daily labor

by requiring the employees to provide sharpened knives. The employer was

required to compensate the employees for the time spent sharpening the knives.

The payments Defendants argue are covered by the rental agreement are

dissimilar in character to those listed in section 207(e)(2). 2 We cannot adopt

Defendants’ interpretation since it would exaggerate the effect of section

207(e)(2) exemptions and would substantially undermine the purposes of the

FLSA by creating loopholes susceptible to significant abuse. Considering the

number of industries that require employees to provide their own equipment, see

Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 810 (10th Cir. 1989), Defendants’ interpretation of

section 207(e)(2) could allow employers to circumvent the FLSA by allocating

2
Defendants argue that the rental rate includes “the time it takes to
transport the welding rig from the jobsite to be refueled and restocked” by
Plaintiffs each day. Appellees’ Answer Br. at 16. Such a rental agreement covers
more than bare vehicle rental; it compensates for more than just a maintained
piece of transportation. It allegedly compensates for the stocking and
transporting of other items and equipment related to the job. These activities go
beyond services such as keeping the tires blown up and putting gas in the tank.
Therefore, we need not and do not address whether trivial vehicle maintenance
activities could be compensated pursuant to a vehicle rental agreement. We need
not decide whether such services necessary to have the rented equipment
functioning at the jobsite are covered by the section 207(e)(2) exemption.

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many services to rental agreements. It was error for the district court to instruct

the jury that Plaintiffs could waive their overtime rights by agreeing with

Defendants that the rig rental fee would compensate them for integral and

indispensable activities.

Defendants ask us to hold that Plaintiffs’ travel time was not an integral

and indispensable part of Plaintiffs’ principal activities and therefore Instruction

Nine was not erroneous. They argue that the travel was ordinary home-to-work

travel which clearly is not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act without a

contract or custom of compensation. See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (specifically

designating walking, riding, and traveling to and from work as activities for

which the FLSA does not require compensation). Plaintiffs assert their return

travel is not “[n]ormal travel from home to work.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.35. They rely

on our holding in Crenshaw v. Quarles Drilling Corp., 798 F.2d 1345, 1350 (10th

Cir. 1986), that if travel is an indispensable part of performing one’s job, it is a

principal activity and, therefore, compensable under the FLSA.

As we have noted, it is “difficult to fix a definite standard for determining

what activities of an employee, performed before and after his hours of work, are

an integral part of and indispensable to his principal activities. Each case must be

decided upon its particular facts.” D A & S, 262 F.2d at 554-55. We leave the

parties’ contentions regarding the integral and indispensable nature of the return

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travel to be resolved by the jury on remand. The jury will resolve factual disputes

such as whether Plaintiffs were truly free to go where they wanted at the end of

the work day and to use whatever method of transportation they chose. The jury

will consider whether Plaintiffs could have left the rigs at the work site to be

refueled and maintained on site, or whether Plaintiffs were required, by policy or

practical reality, to transport the rigs from the work site each day to refuel and

restock. In making its determination of whether the travel associated with

refueling and restocking the rigs is integral and indispensable, the jury will

consider and evaluate the parties’ contradictory testimony and evidence.

Defendants also argue that despite the flaw in Instruction Nine, the jury

instructions taken as a whole did not mislead the jury. Although Defendants

articulate the appropriate standard of review for jury instruction challenges, see

Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1454 (10th Cir. 1997), we

cannot hold that the jury in this case was not misled. Nothing in the generalized

instructions that Defendants cite would persuade the jury that they could disregard

Instruction Nine’s statement that integral and indispensable travel time could be

compensated through a rental agreement instead of according to the FLSA

minimum wage and overtime provisions. The jury’s verdict did not specifically

find that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the return travel time was compensable

under the “integral and indispensable” standard of the Portal-to-Portal Act. We

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therefore cannot hold as a matter of law that Plaintiffs’ suit failed for this reason

alone. Even if Plaintiffs convinced the jury that the return travel was integral and

indispensable to their principal activities, the jury, following the given

instructions, would have ruled against Plaintiffs if it believed or was simply

unsure whether an agreement was made substituting rig rental fee for minimum

wage and overtime. The jury was expressly required to find the absence of such

an agreement in order to rule in Plaintiffs’ favor. Because we have “substantial

doubt that the jury was fairly guided,” United States v. Mullins, 4 F.3d 898, 900

(10th Cir. 1993), we hold that the error in Instruction Nine warrants reversal and

remand.

Without filing a cross-appeal, 3 Defendants assert that the district court

erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law. 4 They contend that

3
Our cases hold that “an appellee ‘may defend the judgment won below on
any ground supported by the record without filing a cross-appeal.’” Tinkler v.
United States ex rel. F.A.A., 982 F.2d 1456, 1461 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation
omitted). Since Defendants are “merely advanc[ing] an argument that would
provide another avenue by which [the court] could reach the same favorable
judgment” and they are not attacking the district court’s decision “with a view
toward enlarging [their] own rights or lessening the rights of” Plaintiffs, we can
consider Defendants’ contentions. Hansen v. Director, OWCP, 984 F.2d 364, 367
(10th Cir. 1993); see City of Wichita, Kan. v. United States Gypsum Co., 72 F.3d
1491 (10th Cir. 1996) (reaching appellees’ argument for an alternative ground for
sustaining the verdict even though the alternative ground was the denial of a
motion for judgment as a matter of law which was not appealed).
4
Defendants also assert error in the district court’s denial of their motion
for summary judgment. However, because the denial was based on the existence
of a material factual dispute, it is not properly reviewable on an appeal from a

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any error in the jury instructions was harmless because the travel time issue

should never have reached the jury. Although the record provided to review

Defendants’ argument is sparse, from such record as was submitted on appeal

there was enough evidence to defeat Defendants’ contentions regarding their

motion for judgment as a matter of law. See O’Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 857

n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (record was inadequate but excerpts provided were sufficient

to decide the case on the merits).

We review de novo the district court’s determination of the motion for

judgment as a matter of law. See Mason, 115 F.3d at 1450. In conducting this

review, “[t]he evidence and inferences therefrom must be construed most

favorably to the nonmoving party.” Wolfgang, 111 F.3d at 1522; see Mason, 115

F.3d at 1450. Since the evidence presented at trial created a genuine factual

dispute of whether Plaintiffs’ travel time met the integral and indispensable

standard, we cannot hold as a matter of law that the return travel was not integral

final judgment entered after trial. See Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports,
Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997); Schmidt v. Farm Credit Servs., 977
F.2d 511, 513 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992); Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d 1248,
1250-51 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993). “[E]ven if summary
judgment was erroneously denied, the proper redress would not be through appeal
of that denial but through subsequent motions for judgment as a matter of law . . .
and appellate review of those motions if they were denied.” Whalen, 974 F.2d at
1251. Therefore, we do not review Defendants’ contentions regarding their
summary judgment motion, and we only consider the district court’s denial of
Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law.

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and indispensable. As we previously explained, Plaintiffs’ return travel

associated with restocking and refueling the rigs must be compensated according

to the FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions if that travel time is integral

and indispensable to the principal activities for which they were hired. Under the

deferential standard required when reviewing requests for judgment as a matter of

law, Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the alleged violations

of the FLSA was appropriately denied.

Defendants also argue that their motion for judgment as a matter of law

should have been granted because Plaintiffs failed to introduce sufficient

evidence for the jury to accurately calculate damages. This court described the

burdens of proof for FLSA damages in Donovan v. Simmons Petroleum Corp.,

stating:

The employee bears the burden of proving he performed work
for which he was not properly compensated. Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 1192, 90
L.Ed. 1515 (1946). However, employers have a duty to keep
accurate records. If employers do not keep accurate records the
employee’s burden is extremely difficult. In order to prevent the
employee from being penalized by the employer’s failure to keep
adequate records, the Supreme Court held in Anderson that an
employee carries his burden by proving that he has “in fact
performed work for which he was improperly compensated and . . .
[producing] sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of
that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Id. Upon
such a showing, the burden shifts to the employer to produce
evidence of the precise amount of work performed or to negate the
reasonableness of the inference drawn from the employee’s evidence.
If the employer does not rebut the employee’s evidence, then

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 damages may be awarded even though the result is only approximate.
The employer cannot complain that the damages lack the precision
that would have been possible if the employer had kept the records
required by law. Id. at 687-88, 66 S.Ct. at 1192.

Donovan, 725 F.2d 83, 85-86 (10th Cir. 1983); see Metzler v. IBP, Inc., 127 F.3d

959, 965-66 (10th Cir. 1997).

In this case, Plaintiffs produced “sufficient evidence to show the amount

and extent of [improperly compensated] work as a matter of just and reasonable

inference.” Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687. Defendants attempt to diminish the

sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ evidence by criticizing the admissibility of some of it.

See Appellees’ Br. at 12-13. However, even if we were to disregard the criticized

evidence, the other evidence Plaintiffs produced was sufficient to meet Plaintiffs’

burden of proof. The fact that Plaintiffs did not connect their travel time to any

specific job site or specific work day does not mean they failed to introduce

sufficient evidence under FLSA case law. The record reflects that Plaintiffs’

employment requires them to travel to pipelines that are various distances from

Defendants’ fixed facilities. Defendants concede that Plaintiffs’ travel time

ranges from three-fourths of an hour to two hours a day, see Appellees’ Br. at 11,

and testimony at trial supports Defendants’ concession. Our review of the record

reveals that Plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence under the circumstances to

shift the burden to Defendants “to produce evidence of the precise amount of

work performed or to negate the reasonableness of the inference drawn” from

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Plaintiffs’ evidence. Donovan, 725 F.2d at 85. We therefore conclude that

Defendants cannot prevail on a judgment as a matter of law due to insufficient

damages evidence.

We cannot say that as a matter of law the compensation arrangement did

not violate the FLSA. Because we hold that the district court appropriately

denied Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, and because the error

in Instruction Nine was not cured by the jury instructions as a whole, we reverse

the jury’s verdict and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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No. 96-2223, Boyd v. Four-Way Company

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the reversal and remand of this case because of the erroneous

giving of Instruction 9. Defendants’ failure to provide an adequate record

precludes me from addressing their contentions that the district court erred in

denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law.