F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 17 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
ANGELA MORSE and STACY
HANDLEY,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 96-1555
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
COLORADO,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 96-N-1743)
Submitted on the briefs: *
L. Dan Rector of Norton Frickey & Associates, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Stephen Zweck-Bronner, University of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Before BRORBY, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
_________________________
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
_______________________
Plaintiffs, Ms. Angela Morse and Ms. Stacy Handley, filed an action
against Defendants, the Regents of the University of Colorado [University], a
recipient of Title IX federal funding, claiming that while they were enrolled as
students in the University of Colorado’s Reserve Officer Training Corps [ROTC]
program they were subjected to acts of gender bias and harassment which created
a sexually hostile educational environment. They allege that the acts creating a
sexually hostile environment were committed by a fellow student who acted in his
capacity as a higher-ranking cadet in the ROTC program. Plaintiffs also allege
that when they reported the harassment to a superior ROTC officer he retaliated
against them by denying them further opportunities in the ROTC program, and by
subjecting them to other acts of sexual harassment. Plaintiffs assert that they
reported the harassment to University representatives and that the University did
not adequately respond to the allegations of harassment.
Plaintiffs assert that the facts alleged establish valid claims against the
University for violation of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972,
codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688. They also claim that the University denied
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their due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspired to deny
Plaintiffs’ civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and violated state law by
breaching University equal-employment and affirmative-action policies.
The University replied to Plaintiffs’ complaint with a motion to dismiss,
arguing that it is not liable for the acts of members of the ROTC because they are
not agents of the University, i.e., the University does not exercise control over
them. See Appellee’s Br. at 9. Plaintiffs filed a brief in response to the motion to
dismiss, attaching affidavits and other documents to support their contention that
the University was liable for the harassment. See Appellants’ App. at 9. The
district court granted the University’s motion to dismiss the Title IX claim
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their
complaint to include the United States Department of the Army as a defendant.
See id. at 136-42. The district court dismissed the state breach-of-policy claim
and the section 1983 claim for lack of jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See id. at 141-42. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ section 1985
claim because the University is not considered a “person” for the purposes of that
section. See id. at 142.
We review the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de
novo. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 1996). In reviewing
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a decision on a motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and we resolve all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
See id. at 1231-32. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the
pleadings give a defendant notice of the nature of the claims against him. See
Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 611 (10th Cir. 1979); accord Lillard v.
Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 1996). Dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) is a “harsh remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to
effectuate the spirit of the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the interests
of justice.” Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d
1357, 1359 (10th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is inappropriate “unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
The district court analyzed Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim under the test stated by
this court in Seamons v. Snow. Seamons held that to state a Title IX claim, a
plaintiff must establish:
(1) that [s]he is a member of a protected group; (2) that [s]he was
subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based
on sex; (4) that the sexual harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive so as unreasonably to alter the conditions of [her]
education and create an abusive educational environment; and (5)
that some basis for institutional liability has been established.
See 84 F.3d at 1232. In dismissing Plaintiffs’ Title IX action, the district court
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adopted the view that institutional liability under Title IX is governed by agency
principles. The district court dismissed the claim because it concluded that
Plaintiffs had not alleged facts showing how members of the ROTC program were
agents of the University, and it believed that any such allegation “would likely be
inaccurate.” Appellants’ App. at 139.
In its order dismissing the case, the district court does not mention the
documents submitted by Plaintiffs to support their assertion that the University is
liable for their harm. Although the district court did not explicitly exclude the
affidavits and documents, it appears that the court did not consider them in
reaching its decision. If, in the process of reaching its decision, the court did
consider the University’s contention that it had no authority over the alleged
harassers, the court should also have examined the documents filed by Plaintiffs
in response to that argument. Because the district court clearly ignored Plaintiffs’
responsive documents and decided the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) rather than
converting the University’s motion into a Rule 56 motion, we limit our review to
an examination of the pleadings, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, to determine if they have stated a cause of action under Title IX. See
Childers v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1340 (10th Cir. 1982).
The Supreme Court clarified Title IX law in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District, ____ U.S. ____, 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). Gebser
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clearly rejects the theories of vicarious liability and agency liability as bases for
institutional liability in Title IX teacher-student sexual harassment cases. See id.
at 1997 (“[W]e conclude that it would ‘frustrate the purposes’ of Title IX to
permit a damages recovery against a school district for a teacher’s sexual
harassment of a student based on principles of respondeat superior . . . .”); see
also Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014, 1027 (7th
Cir. 1997) (rejecting agency standard of institutional liability in Title IX cases),
cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3814, 3815 (U.S. June 26, 1998) (No. 97-1541). After
rejecting the agency theory of institutional liability, the Court held that a school
district is liable under Title IX for sexual harassment perpetrated by a teacher
only when an official of the district has actual notice of the misconduct. See
Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999-2000. An educational institution’s liability is
predicated on its “deliberate indifference” to notice of misconduct in an
institutional program. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999.
Under the holding in Gebser, plaintiffs may proceed on a claim under Title
IX if they have sufficiently alleged that: (1) they were subjected to quid pro quo
sexual harassment or subjected to a sexually hostile environment; (2) they brought
the situation to the attention of an official at the educational institution receiving
Title IX funds who had the “authority to take corrective action” to remedy the
harassment; and (3) that the institution’s response to the harassment amounted to
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“deliberate indifference.” Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999. Plaintiffs allege that “[a]t
all times pertinent hereto, Plaintiffs Angela Morse and Stacy Handley were cadets
in the Reserve Officer Training Corp. (ROTC) program as students at the
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs.” Appellants’ App. at 2. Their
complaint states that “[w]hile under the direction of the University as a student at
the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, Angela Morse was participating
in and completing a so-called ROTC course of study.” Id. It also states that
“Stacy Handley was subject to supervision and direction of representatives of the
University . . . as part of the so-called ROTC course of study.” Id. at 3. Although
stated in a fashion that is less than ideal, the pleadings reasonably allege that the
ROTC program was a program offered by (therefore presumably controlled by)
the University. The pleadings claim that the fellow student who harassed Plaintiff
Morse was a superior cadet in the ROTC program. See id. at 2. It is reasonable
to infer that because the student was a superior cadet he exercised some measure
of authority over Plaintiff Morse. Plaintiffs also allege that the sexually hostile
environment created by the fellow student was exacerbated and perpetuated by the
acts of an ROTC instructor. We may reasonably infer from the complaint that the
allegedly offending ROTC Colonel was acting in his capacity as an instructor in
the University’s ROTC program. Plaintiffs assert that they were denied
opportunities within the ROTC program because they reported incidents of sexual
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harassment by ROTC participants. The pleadings explicitly allege that Plaintiffs
reported “acts of sexual harassment and gender bias . . . to representatives of the
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs . . . without any remedial action taken
by the University in response to the complaints.” Id. at 3, 4.
In context and read as a whole, Plaintiffs’ pleadings state a Title IX claim.
The conclusion that the University is liable for the acts of two ROTC members is
reasonably inferred from the pleadings in part because the complaint properly
names the University, a Title IX recipient, as the party liable for Plaintiffs’ harm.
See, e.g., Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir. 1998), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. Apr. 20, 1998) (No. 97-8906). Construing the complaint in favor of
Plaintiffs, see Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1231-32, the pleadings allege that the ROTC
program is a University-sanctioned program and that a fellow student acting with
authority bestowed by that program and an ROTC officer responsible for
administering that program committed acts forbidden by Title IX. Plaintiffs
allege that they reported the harassment to a University dean and to the University
Affirmative Action Officer, either or both of whom presumably would have the
“authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective
measures on the [University’s] behalf.” Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999. The
complaint may reasonably be read to assert that the University failed to exercise
any authority that it possessed over actors within the ROTC “course of study” by
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not taking “any remedial action” in response to notice of alleged sexual
harassment within a University program. 1 Appellants’ App. at 2-4.
We reasonably infer from the pleadings that Plaintiffs contend that the
University is liable to them for the harm they have suffered as a result of the
sexual harassment and hostile environment created by a fellow student and an
1
The district court believed that any allegation that ROTC members were
subject to the University’s control “would likely be inaccurate.” Appellants’ App.
at 139. In support of this statement, the district court cites McHugh v. University
of Vermont, 758 F. Supp. 945 (D. Vt. 1991), aff’d, 966 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1992).
McHugh implies that a university does not have control over the administration of
its ROTC program. See id. at 949. However, broadly contradictory authority is
found in Zentgraf v. Texas A. & M. University, 492 F. Supp. 265 (S.D. Tex.
1980). In Zentgraf, the court addressed the defendants’ motions to dismiss a
gender-based discrimination action against a university and individuals in their
official capacities. The plaintiffs were denied opportunities in the ROTC because
of their gender. One of the issues raised in Zentgraf was whether an ROTC
official who was also a colonel in the United States Army was an indispensable
party to the litigation. See id. at 273. The court held that the ROTC officer was
not an indispensable party to the litigation because the university was at least
partially responsible for the administration of the ROTC program:
Federal regulations affecting ROTC programs clearly establish that
the Commandant of an ROTC unit is responsible to the authorities of
the host institution for conducting the program in accordance with
institutional rules, regulations and customs. 32 C.F.R. §
562.4(e). . . . [T]he head of the institution exercises the same control
over the department of military science as he does over the other
departments of the institution. 32 C.F.R. § 562.5.
Id. (internal citation omitted). To reach the conclusion that the principles
articulated in Zentgraf do not apply to the University’s ROTC program, we would
have to examine the structural composition of the University’s ROTC program, a
factual inquiry not appropriate at this stage of the proceedings.
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ROTC instructor because the University knew of harassment in a University
program and did not respond adequately. We hold that these pleadings are
sufficient to state a Title IX claim against the University under the illuminating
Supreme Court opinion in Gebser. See 118 S. Ct. at 1999. Therefore, the
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) was erroneous, and the case must be remanded for further proceedings on
that claim consistent with this opinion. We have reviewed Plaintiffs’ section
1983, section 1985, and state breach of policy claims and conclude that they were
properly dismissed.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
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