F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 29 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
RANDY GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STEELTEK, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee. No. 97-5103
_____________________________
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 97-CV-136-K)
Steven R. Hickman, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
William S. Leach, Rhodes, Hieronymus, Jones, Tucker & Gable, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee.
C. Gregory Stewart, General Counsel, J. Ray Terry, Jr., Deputy General Counsel,
Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General Counsel, Carolyn L. Wheeler,
Assistant General Counsel, Paula R. Bruner, Attorney, Equal Opportunity
Employment Commission, Washington, D.C., on the brief for Amicus Curiae.
Before BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
This case requires us to determine whether a non-disabled individual has a
cause of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(2)(A), when as a job applicant he or she is asked questions regarding
his or her medical history or condition on an employment application. We
conclude that in light of the language of the statute and the purposes of its
enactment, a non-disabled job applicant does have such a cause of action.
Consequently, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of the employer in this case.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellant Randy Griffin (“Griffin”), a non-disabled individual,
applied for a position as a grinder with Defendant-Appellee Steeltek, Inc.
(“Steeltek”). Griffin was not hired for the position, allegedly because he did not
have the two years of grinding experience required by Steeltek. According to
Griffin, he was never told that Steeltek required two years of grinding experience,
and in fact was told at the time he applied that he was the best qualified applicant
for the position.
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After Steeltek declined to hire Griffin, Griffin filed suit in the Northern
District of Oklahoma, contending that Steeltek’s application process violated the
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A). That section prohibits employers from asking
a job applicant “whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to
the nature or severity of such disability.” Griffin identified two questions on
Steeltek’s employment application that allegedly violated § 12112(d)(2)(A). The
first question asked: “Have you received Worker’s Compensation or Disability
Income payments? If yes, describe.” The second asked: “Have you physical
defects which preclude you from performing certain jobs? If yes, describe.” In
response to the first question, Griffin wrote “3 degree burn to hand & foot,
surgery to elbow, spain [sic] in shoulder.” He left the answer space blank in
response to the second question. Griffin did not contend that he was disabled or
that Steeltek perceived him to be disabled. Rather, the sole basis of Griffin’s
claim was that Steeltek violated the ADA by asking these two questions and then
by not hiring him because of his responses to these improper questions. Griffin
also advanced evidence in an affidavit that the reason Steeltek said it did not hire
him – because he did not have two years of grinding experience – was pretextual.
His affidavit stated that he was never told by Steeltek that a set amount of time of
prior experience was required for the job, and, in fact, he was told he was the
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“most qualified applicant” and “would probably be hired” based upon his
experience.
The district court held that “[b]ecause [Griffin] has failed to allege either
that he was disabled or perceived as disabled as defined under the ADA, he has
not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination.” Hence, Steeltek
was entitled to summary judgment “as a matter of law.”
Because the district court ruled as a matter of law that Griffin had failed to
establish a prima facie case because he was neither disabled nor perceived to be
disabled, the court never reached the issue of whether Griffin was causally injured
by being required to answer the impermissible questions. Additionally, the court
did not rule whether Steeltek’s proffered reason for not hiring Griffin – that he
lacked two years of grinding experience – was pretextual. The district court did
observe, however, that “the parties dispute whether this requirement [of two years
grinding experience] was ever revealed to [Griffin], or whether the requirement
actually existed.” By acknowledging that the issue of injury and the bona fides of
Steeltek’s proffered reasons were in dispute, the district court implicitly
acknowledged that summary judgment would not be appropriate at this time on
those grounds. Thus, as the case comes before us and as it was ruled upon below,
it presents a pure legal question: does a job applicant fail as a matter of law to
state a prima facie claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) of the Americans with
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Disabilities Act if the applicant is neither disabled nor perceived to be disabled.
We believe that question has already been answered in the negative in our Circuit
in Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conf. Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1997),
and that Roe requires us to reverse and remand for further proceedings in this
case.
DISCUSSION
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) as the district court. See
Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1081 (10th Cir. 1997).
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.
The ADA section at issue in this case, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2), states:
(d) Medical examinations and inquiries
...
(2) Preemployment
(A) Prohibited examination or inquiry
Except as provided in paragraph (3), a covered entity
shall not conduct a medical examination or make
inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant
is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or
severity of such disability.
(B) Acceptable inquiry
A covered entity may make preemployment inquiries
into the ability of an applicant to perform job-related
functions.
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Griffin and the EEOC argue that this section provides all applicants, disabled or
not, with a cause of action against employers who include impermissible
questions on their employment applications. For the purpose of the motion for
summary judgment, we shall assume without deciding that the two questions here
at issue would have been impermissible and actionable if directed toward a
disabled job applicant. 1 The issue we must decide is whether improper medical
questions are actionable under § 12112(d)(2) if asked of a non-disabled applicant.
Although we have never had occasion to analyze § 12112(d)(2), this court
was recently called upon to construe § 12112(d)(4), the § 12112(d) subsection
prohibiting medical examinations and inquiries of current employees. 2 See Roe v.
Cheyenne Mountain Conf. Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1997). In Roe,
defendant employers instituted a broad drug and alcohol testing policy that, inter
alia, required employees to report to their supervisors any type of prescription
1
In the appendix to the federal regulations implementing Title I of the
ADA, it states, “This provision makes clear that an employer cannot inquire as to
whether an individual has a disability at the pre-offer stage of the selection
process. Nor can an employer inquire at the pre-offer stage about an applicant’s
workers’ compensation history.” 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. at 362-63 (1998).
2
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) states:
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall
not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an
individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the
disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-
related and consistent with business necessity.
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medication they used. See id. at 1226. The plaintiff there, who was an employee
of the defendant, claimed that this requirement violated § 12112(d)(4) and was
granted summary judgment. See id. at 1226-27.
On appeal, the employer contended that plaintiff lacked standing to bring
this claim because she had not shown that she was a disabled individual. See id.
at 1228. We rejected this argument, noting that “whether a plaintiff suing under
the ADA comes within the definition of a person with a disability is simply not a
question of standing but of whether an essential element of the claim can be
established.” Id. at 1229. Plaintiff had standing because she “sufficiently
alleged” each of the elements of standing: that she had suffered an injury in fact,
that the defendant’s conduct caused her injury, and that it was likely a favorable
decision would redress the injury. See id. Addressing whether plaintiff had
established an essential element of her claim, we held “plaintiff’s ability to
maintain the particular ADA claim she has alleged does not require her to prove
that she is an individual with a disability.” Id. We continued:
As the district judge aptly observed, adopting defendant’s position
would defeat the very purpose of prohibiting disability related
inquiries: “It makes little sense to require an employee to
demonstrate that he has a disability to prevent his employer from
inquiring as to whether or not he has a disability.” We also agree
with the district court’s reasoning that this common sense rejection
of defendant’s argument is consistent with the statutory language:
The ADA explicitly prohibits employers from
making disability-related inquiries of employees, unless
the inquiry is job-related or consistent with business
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necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). This provision
applies to all employees. Unlike suits based on a failure
to provide a reasonable accommodation, this provision is
not limited to qualified individuals with disabilities. Cf.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
Id. (citation omitted). 3
Although the Roe panel specifically stated that it was not deciding the issue
before us today pertaining to job applicants and § 12112(d)(2), see id. at 1229 n.5,
we find that the reasoning articulated in Roe applies equally to § 12112(d)(2).
The language of the two statutes is very similar. Section 12112(d)(2) uses the
term “job applicant,” while § 12112(d)(4) uses the term “employee.” It is
important that neither section uses the narrower defined term of “qualified
individual with a disability,” which is the term Congress used in much of § 12112
but chose not to use in § 12112(d)(2) or § 12112(d)(4). Compare 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12112(a), 12112(b). The use of terms in §§ 12112(d)(2) & (4) defining a
broader class of people than the class specified elsewhere in the ADA (the class
of qualified individuals with disabilities) cannot be accidental, and it points
inextricably to the broader scope of coverage intended for those two sections.
In addition, the policy of the ADA is to eliminate disability discrimination.
See H. Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 22-23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3
See Gonzales v. Sandoval County, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1442, 1444 (D. N.M.
1998) (“Plaintiff, however, need not establish disability to state a claim for a
prohibited inquiry under the ADA.” (citing Roe)).
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303, 304 (“The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with
disabilities . . . .”). This policy is best served by allowing all job applicants who
are subjected to illegal medical questioning and who are in fact injured thereby to
bring a cause of action against offending employers, rather than to limit that right
to a narrower subset of applicants who are in fact disabled. The legislative
history of the ADA indicates that Congress wished to curtail all questioning that
would serve to identify and exclude persons with disabilities from consideration
for employment by drafting “a prohibition on pre-offer medical examinations or
inquiries,” see id. at 72-73, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 355, and allowing
non-disabled job applicants who are injured thereby to sue will enhance and
enforce the blanket prohibition drafted by Congress. Furthermore, Congress was
also concerned with the potential stigmatizing effect of medical inquiries and
examinations, noting that individuals with diseases such as cancer “may object
merely to being identified, independent of the consequences.” See id. at 75,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 357-58. If we were to require individuals to
make a showing of disability as part of a prima facie § 12112(d)(2) case, we
would in effect be making individuals with disabilities identify themselves as
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disabled to prevent potential employers from inquiring whether they have a
disability. Such a course makes little sense. 4
We note that the Fifth Circuit recently held that a non-disabled plaintiff
could not proceed with a suit for being asked impermissible medical questions on
an employment application. See Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554,
562 (5th Cir. 1998). In that case, however, the court assumed without deciding
that a non-disabled plaintiff did have a cause of action under § 12112(d)(2) and
went on to determine whether a violation of that section alone constituted a
compensable injury. See id. at 559, 561. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the
applicant needed to show “some cognizable injury in fact of which the violation is
a legal and proximate cause for damages to arise from a single violation.” Id. at
562. Because the non-disabled applicant in that case could not show a cognizable
injury caused by being asked the impermissible questions, the court concluded
that he had failed to show entitlement to damages and affirmed the dismissal of
4
In addition, we give little weight to the fact that the ADA is entitled the
“Americans With Disabilities” Act (emphasis added). “[U]nder the general rules
of statutory interpretation, the title to a statutory provision is not part of the law
itself, although it can be used to interpret an ambiguous statute.” Johnston v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 114 F.3d 145, 150 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quotations omitted). Further, the legislative history of the ADA indicates that
the title was not meant to be an exclusive listing of the persons to be covered by
the ADA. See H. Rep. No. 101-336(II), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (noting that the ADA’s protection is not limited to
“Americans” despite the title).
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his suit. See id. at 562, 564. However, the court held open the “possibility of
liability based on any injuries legally and proximately caused by such a
violation.” Id. at 562 n.20. In contrast to Armstrong, in our case Griffin has
sufficiently alleged that he suffered an injury in fact, specifically that Steeltek did
not hire Griffin because of his responses to the impermissible questions, and he
seeks damages and injunctive relief to remedy his injury. Consequently, we hold
that his suit can go forward. 5
CONCLUSION
5
The dissent suggests that Griffin may not be able to prove injury because
the affidavit of Johnny McKnight, Steeltek’s plant manager, asserts that the
decision not to hire Griffin had nothing to do with any disability he may have had
or any perception that he was disabled. That, however, is not the basis of
Griffin’s claim. He does not claim he was injured because of his disability or
perception of disability, but rather because of incriminating responses and
refusals to respond to questions which the ADA prohibits from being asked.
Hence, that portion of Mr. McKnight’s affidavit is simply unresponsive to
Griffin’s claim. Mr. McKnight’s affidavit goes on to state that Steeltek did not
hire Griffin because of his inadequate experience as a grinder. However,
Griffin’s affidavit in opposition to the summary judgment motion challenges that
proffered reason as pretextual, and the district court acknowledged that was a
disputed issue. Thus, summary judgment cannot be supported at this time on that
basis. It may be that, at trial, Steeltek will be able convincingly to show that its
proffered reason was bona fide. In that case, it will prevail. All we are holding
in this case is that it was error to rule, as the district court did, that a job applicant
cannot as a matter of law state a prima facie claim under § 12112(d)(2)(A) of the
ADA unless he or she is disabled or perceived to be disabled. At trial, of course,
before the plaintiff can prevail he must prove injury flowing from his or her
responses to employment questions which the ADA prohibits from being asked.
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A job applicant need not make a showing that he or she is disabled or
perceived as having a disability to state a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(2). Consequently, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary
judgment and REMAND for the district court to determine whether the questions
on Steeltek’s questionnaire violated the ADA’s prohibition on medical inquiries,
and, if so, whether Griffin is entitled to the relief he seeks.
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No. 97-5103, Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In its haste to make law, the court loses sight of the procedural posture of
this case and holds that the ADA provides a non-disabled job applicant with a
cause of action against a prospective employer for violating 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(2)(A). Specifically, the court confuses the standard for dismissing a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), with the standard for granting summary
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In this case, the wise policy of judicial
restraint counsels that we assume the ADA provides Plaintiff with a cause of
action despite his lack of disability or perceived disability, and that Plaintiff has
established a violation of § 12112(d)(2)(A). Thus, Plaintiff’s complaint may
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. These assumptions alone, however,
are insufficient to withstand Defendant’s Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
Whether in some other context the law might afford a non-disabled individual
judicial relief for a violation of § 12112(d)(2)(A), Plaintiff in this case has not
demonstrated any redressible injury as a result of Defendant’s improper
questioning. See Court’s Op. at 11 n.5 (acknowledging that “before the Plaintiff
can prevail he must prove injury flowing from his . . . responses to employment
questions which the ADA prohibits”). Accordingly, I would affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant. 1
In his affidavit in support of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
Johnny McKnight, Steeltek’s plant manager, stated:
The fact that we were not able to offer Mr. Griffin a position with
our company had absolutely nothing to do with any disability he may
have had or our perception of any disability he may have had. The
fact that we were unable to offer him a position of employment was
due solely and exclusively to the fact that he had insufficient
experience to do the job safely.
Appellant’s Appendix at 15. Plaintiff responded by stating that he had “not sued
Defendant claiming that Defendant considered Plaintiff disabled or that Plaintiff
was disabled. Rather, Plaintiff has sued Defendant for a rank and admitted
violation of the [ADA].” Id. at 18. Plaintiff continued: “The bottom line is that
Defendant improperly asked Plaintiff about his workers’ compensation history in
the pre-offer stage of the employment process. Such is a violation of the law and
subjects Defendant to liability.” Id. at 20.
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff in effect admits he has not suffered any
1
Despite this court’s contrary assertion, the district court did not
acknowledge that the issue of injury was in dispute and that summary judgment
would be inappropriate on those grounds. The court never reached that question.
Instead, the court held that Plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of
disability discrimination because he failed to allege that he was disabled or
perceived to be disabled. Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 317, 319 (N.D.
Okla. 1997). While I would not affirm the district court on the basis of its
holding, the law is well established that “we may affirm on any ground supported
by the record.” Gowan v. United States Dept. of the Air Force, 148 F.3d 1182,
1189 (10th Cir. 1998).
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cognizable injury or damage caused by Defendant’s ADA violation. Rather,
Plaintiff appears to argue that a violation of § 12112(d)(2)(A) necessarily
constitutes a compensable injury. In other words, Plaintiff’s theory of the case
sounds strikingly similar to strict liability. To be sure, Plaintiff alleges in his
complaint that he “was denied employment with Defendant by virtue of
Defendant’s violations of the ADA.” Appellant’s Appendix at 2. That unsworn
allegation, however is insufficient to withstand summary judgment in light of
McKnight’s unrebutted affidavit that any violation of the ADA had nothing to do
with Defendant’s decision not to hire Plaintiff.
The court concludes that Plaintiff advanced evidence in his affidavit that
Defendant’s reason for failing to hire him was pretextual, and thus summary
judgment for want of injury is improper. I disagree. While the court does a good
job of instructing Plaintiff how to proceed on remand, the fact that Defendant
never informed Plaintiff of the precise job requirements does nothing to negate
McKnight’s affidavit that upon review of Plaintiff’s application, Defendant
concluded Plaintiff was unqualified for the job. Rule 56 “mandates the entry of
summary judgment . . .against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Plaintiff has failed to establish any compensable injury
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caused by Defendant’s improper questioning.
The court further states that our decision in Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain
Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1997), requires us to reverse
the district court. Court’s Op. at 5. I again disagree. First, in Roe the court
expressly stated: “We need not and do not decide whether the ADA provides a
cause of action to an unsuccessful job applicant who has been subjected to a
prohibited inquiry. . . . We hold only that a present employee may sue for
injunctive relief from such a prohibited inquiry, as is the case here.” Id. at 1229
n.5. Second, I am willing to assume for purposes of this case that the ADA
provides a cause of action to any unsuccessful job applicant subjected to a
prohibited inquiry. The court may very well be correct when it states the policy
of the ADA is “best served by allowing all job applicants who are subjected to
illegal medical questioning and who are in fact injured thereby to bring a cause of
action against offending employers.” Court’s Op. at 9 (emphasis added). The
record in this case, however, shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that Plaintiff was
not injured by Defendant’s illegal questioning. Accordingly, I would follow the
Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554
(5th Cir. 1998), which is indistinguishable from our case.
In Armstrong, the district court held, as did the district court in our case,
that because plaintiff presented no evidence that he was disabled within the
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meaning of the ADA, defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the claim
that defendant conducted a prohibited medical inquiry under § 12112(d)(2)(A).
950 F. Supp. 162, 167-68 (M.D. La. 1996). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit assumed
that the ADA provided plaintiff with a cause of action and that he had established
a violation of § 12112(d)(2)(A). The court held, however, that “damages liability
under § 12112(d)(2)(A) must be based on something more than a mere violation
of that provision. There must be some cognizable injury in fact of which the
violation is a legal and proximate cause for damages to arise from a single
violation.” 141 F.3d at 562. Because the non-disabled applicant in Armstrong
could not show that the prospective employer’s impermissible medical questions
caused him any injury, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the employer. Likewise, because Plaintiff in this case has
not shown that Defendant’s impermissible medical questions injured him, I would
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant. The ADA
cannot reasonably be construed to protect a job applicant, who is neither disabled
nor perceived to be disabled, from not being hired for a reason wholly unrelated
to any disability or perceived disability. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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