Branson School District Re-82 v. Romer

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
NOV 20 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

BRANSON SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-82,
PRITCHETT SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-3,
SPRINGFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS
DISTRICT RE-4,

and

KANDACE SUE SPURLING and
BROOKE ILENE SPURLING, by and
through their parents, DAVID EARL
SPURLING and LONA SUE SPURLING,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.

ROY ROMER, Governor of the State of
Colorado,
No. 97-1158
and

ROBERT MAILANDER, THOMAS W.
SWANSON, and CHARLES A. VIDAL,
in their official capacities as members of
the Colorado State Board of Land
Commissioners,

Defendants-Appellees,

CITIZENS TO SAVE COLORADO’S
PUBLIC TRUST LANDS, INC.,

Amicus Curiae.
 Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 96-B-2979)

Evan S. Lipstein, of Lipstein & Mortimer, Denver, Colorado (Charles E.
Mortimer Jr., of Lipstein & Mortimer, and John Berry, with him on the briefs), for
the appellants.

Patricia S. Bangert, Director of Legal Policy, Colorado Department of Law (Gale
A. Norton, Cheryl A. Linden, and William E. Thro, Office of the Attorney
General of Colorado, with her on the brief), for the appellees.

David R. Eason, of Berenbaum, Weinshienk & Eason, Denver, Colorado, and
Richard W. Daily, of Powers Phillips, Denver, Colorado, for amicus curiae
CITIZENS TO SAVE COLORADO’S PUBLIC TRUST LANDS, in support of
appellees.

Before ANDERSON, EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

This case presents the question of whether the voters of a state may alter

the management principles guiding the state’s trusteeship of public lands without

violating the terms of a century-old trust established by Congress when the state

entered the Union. Because we find that the recent changes made in the

management of Colorado’s land trust for public schools conform to the trust

restrictions created by Congress in 1875, we hold that “Amendment 16” to the

Colorado Constitution approved by state voters in 1996 does not violate the

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Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution. Therefore, we

affirm.

Background

The origins of this dispute stretch back to the original legislation under

which the Territory of Colorado entered the Union as a state. In 1875, Congress

passed an enabling act that authorized the admission of Colorado upon the

territory’s passage of a state constitution. 1 See Colorado Enabling Act, ch. 139,

18 Stat. 474 (1875). The Enabling Act established that Sections 16 and 36 of

each township 2 in the new state would be “granted to said State for the support of

common schools.” See id. § 7. 3 The Act also established that the two sections

1
In fact, this was Congress’ second enabling act for Colorado after the first
effort failed to gain sufficient voter support during the Civil War and then the
resurrection of the effort became embroiled in the Reconstruction cross-fire
between President Andrew Johnson and the Republican-controlled Congress of
the late 1860s. See Carl Ubbelohde et al., A Colorado History 134-38, (7th ed.
1995). The provision for a school land trust in this first Colorado statehood act in
1864 is less detailed than the provision that ultimately went into effect through
the 1875 enabling act. See Act of Mar. 21, 1864, ch. 37, § 7, 15 Stat. 32, 34.
2
A “township” was a 36-square mile division of land – six miles by six
miles – that was the basic format for land surveying throughout the West. A
“section” was a single square in that 36-square survey.
3
The full text of § 7 of the Act provides:

That sections number sixteen and thirty-six in every
township, and where such sections have been sold or
(continued...)

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“granted for the support of common schools shall be disposed of only at public

sale . . . [with] the proceeds to constitute a permanent school-fund, the interest of

which to be expended in the support of common schools.” Id. § 14.

Within a year of the new enabling act, Colorado’s leaders had convened a

constitutional convention and approved the requisite republican constitution. See

Carl Ubbelohde et al., supra, at 145-48. That first state constitution responded to

the federal government’s grant of lands for common schools by establishing a

“public school fund” that would “consist of the proceeds of such lands as have

heretofore been, or may hereafter be granted to the State by the general

government for educational purposes,” as well as all escheats and any grants to

the State “for educational purposes.” See 1876 Colo. Const., art. IX, § 5. Article

IX of the 1876 Constitution established that this public school fund “shall forever

remain inviolate and intact,” and the interest from the fund “shall be expended in

the maintenance of the schools of the State.” 4 Id., art. IX, § 3. The 1876

3
(...continued)
otherwise disposed of by any act of Congress, other
lands, equivalent thereto, in legal subdivisions of not
more than one quarter-section, and as contiguous as may
be, are hereby granted to said State for the support of
common schools.

Colorado Enabling Act, § 7, 18 Stat. at 475.
4
The question of how the money from the public school fund should be
spent sparked heated debate at the state constitutional convention in 1876, with
(continued...)

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Constitution also created a State Board of Land Commissioners to manage the

federal lands that had been granted under the enabling act. See id., art. IX, §§ 9,

10. Furthermore, the state legislature was directed to ensure that within the

earliest practicable period these land grants “shall be judiciously located and

carefully preserved and held in trust subject to disposal, for the use and benefit of

the respective objects for which said grants of land were made . . . .” See id., art.

IX, § 10.

The State Board of Land Commissioners, like most Western states, initially

pursued an aggressive policy of selling off the school-grant lands both to provide

income for the state’s public schools and as a means to spur settlement in the

state. See Sally K. Fairfax et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at

Conventional Wisdom, 22 Envtl. L. 797, 807 & n.25 (1992) (noting that early in

the history of the management of school trust lands in the West, where land was

otherwise cheaply and widely available, holding and leasing the school trust lands

was not an economically feasible option). However, this policy gradually shifted

to one of holding onto the school lands and renting them to ranchers, farmers, and

other lessees. See id. at 823-24. By the 1990s, nearly 3 million acres out of the

4
(...continued)
Catholic delegates arguing that a portion of the money should be allotted to
parochial schools. See Ubbelohde et al., supra, at 147. The convention, however,
agreed to prohibit any state aid, other than property tax exemptions, for parochial
or other sectarian schools. See 1876 Colo. Const., art. IX, § 7.

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original 4.6 million acres remained intact in the state’s school lands portfolio.

See id. at 833 (figure 1 showing that in 1990, 62% of the state’s original school

land grants remained in state ownership); Mark Obmascik, Use of State Land

Amendment Focus, Denver Post, Oct. 6, 1996, at A1 (indicating that by 1996, the

state still held 3 million acres in school lands, and the public school fund had

reached $260 million in principal).

In the mid-1990s, as the land board’s management policy began to shift

back toward selling some of its more valuable holdings, including a few parcels

regarded by some as environmentally sensitive, Governor Roy Romer and others

championed a plan to overhaul the land trust system in Colorado. See Obmascik,

supra, at A1. Romer and his supporters proposed what became known as

“Amendment 16.”

The 1996 ballot initiative presented three groups of revisions to Article IX

of the Colorado Constitution, the article which deals with the federal

government’s grant of school lands. See Amendment 16, 1997 Colo. Sess. Laws

2399. 5 The first set of revisions set some general parameters for the use of public

school funds; the plaintiffs have included challenges against a few of these

5
The three sections of Amendment 16 are not numbered sequentially.
Instead, the individual numbering of the ballot measure’s sections corresponds to
the numbering of the relevant sections in Article IX of the Colorado Constitution,
i.e., § 3, § 9, and § 10.

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provisions along with the main thrust of their other challenges.

The second set of revisions involves a wholesale scrapping of the old

structure of the three-member paid State Board of Land Commissioners that had

managed the school lands for generations. Instead, under Amendment 16, the

board would be composed of five term-limited members who would serve without

a salary, would have a constitutional protection from personal liability for any

negligence in office, and would be selected on the basis of certain interest-group

constituencies. See id. § 9.

The third section of Amendment 16 contains most of the substantive core of

the ballot measure, and it is this section which has prompted the crux of the

plaintiffs’ challenges. The section wipes out the previous requirement that the

land board manage its land holdings “in such a manner as will secure the

maximum possible amount” for the public school fund. See id. § 10(1). Instead,

the third section requires the new land board to manage its land holdings “in order

to produce reasonable and consistent income over time.” See id.

This section also provides a series of management principles to guide the

land board in its activities. Some of these changes include: a requirement that

the land board establish a permanent 300,000 acre “Stewardship Trust” 6 of land

The actual provisions require at least 295,000 acres be placed in the
6

Stewardship Trust and no more than 300,000 acres. For purposes of simplicity,
(continued...)

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determined “to be valuable primarily to preserve long-term benefits and returns to

the state,” and that such land be held and managed for stewardship, public use or

future disposition by permitting only uses that will “enhance the beauty, natural

values, open space, and wildlife habitat” of that acreage, see id. § 10(1)(b)(I); a

requirement that the board manage its agricultural and natural resource holdings

to promote long-term productivity and value, see id. §§ 10(1)(b)(II) & (III); and a

requirement to allow school districts to lease, purchase or use the school trust’s

lands for new school sites at prices that may not be more than “appraised fair

market value,” see id. § 10(1)(e).

On Nov. 5, 1996, voters approved Amendment 16; the official vote tally

was 708,502 (51.9%) in favor, and 656,095 (48.1%) against. See 1997 Colo.

Laws at 2402.

Members of the coalition who had campaigned against Amendment 16 then

turned to the courts, filing this suit six weeks after the election. The suit was

brought in the name of three rural school districts in Las Animas and Baca

Counties (the “school district plaintiffs”) and two school children from

Washington County (the “individual plaintiffs”), represented by their parents, who

6
(...continued)
we refer to these provisions as the “300,000 acre” Stewardship Trust.

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alleged that they would be affected by Amendment 16. 7 On a motion from the

plaintiffs, the district court entered a temporary restraining order barring

implementation of any of Amendment 16’s provisions pending the results of a

hearing on the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. Following that

hearing, the court dissolved the TRO and issued a preliminary injunction against

only § 9(5), the provision waiving personal liability for land board members.

Following cross-motions for summary judgment and the intervention of “Citizens

to Save Colorado’s Public Trust Lands,” the district court, in a very careful and

thorough opinion, ruled in favor of the defendants, upholding the legality of

Amendment 16. See Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 958 F. Supp. 1501 (D.

Colo. 1997). On March 27, 1997, the court entered its judgment dismissing the

plaintiff’s suit and dissolving the preliminary injunction. This appeal by the

plaintiffs followed.

Discussion

We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s final judgment under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. Because this appeal from a summary judgment disposition

presents purely legal questions concerning the interpretation of both state and

7
The individual plaintiffs were not parties to this suit when the complaint
was first filed. However, the district court later granted a motion from the
individual plaintiffs to intervene and participate in the case as plaintiffs.

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federal constitutional law, we must review the district court’s decision de novo.

See 19 Solid Waste Dept. Mechanics v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068,

1071 (10th Cir. 1998) (“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo.”); Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1323-24, 1326 (10th Cir.

1997) (reviewing legality of Indian tribe’s constitutional amendment de novo).

I. Standing

As this court recently reiterated, the standing of a party to bring suit in

federal court is “not a mere technical hoop through which every plaintiff must

pass, but rather is ‘a part of the basic charter promulgated by the Framers of the

Constitution.’” Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &

State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476 (1982)). In this case, the defendants argue that

both sets of plaintiffs – the school district plaintiffs and the individual plaintiffs –

lack standing, first because the school districts, as political subdivisions of the

state of Colorado, lack the legal power to sue the state, and second because both

the school districts and the schoolchildren have not alleged a sufficient “injury-in-

fact” under the traditional requirements of Article III. We reject both of these

arguments.

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 A. Political subdivision standing

Relying on a line of cases dating back nearly seventy-five years, the

defendants contend that the school district plaintiffs have no right to invoke the

power of the federal courts in this case because the school districts are mere

creatures of their creating state, and as such, federal doctrines of political

subdivision standing prevent them from suing their parent state. We assume that

this argument is properly presented in a case where the school districts have not

sued the state of Colorado in name but rather have sued several state officials in

their official capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989) (holding that a suit against a state official in his representative capacity

is considered a suit against the official’s office, which “is no different from a suit

against the State itself”). Nevertheless, we conclude that a political subdivision

has standing to bring a constitutional claim against its creating state when the

substance of its claim relies on the Supremacy Clause and a putatively controlling

federal law.

It is well-settled that a political subdivision may not bring a federal suit

against its parent state based on rights secured through the Fourteenth

Amendment. See City of Moore, Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry.

Co., 699 F.2d 507, 511-12 (10th Cir. 1983) (rejecting an equal protection

challenge against a state statute because “political subdivisions of a state lack

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standing to challenge the validity of a state statute on Fourteenth Amendment

grounds”); see also United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1455 (11th Cir.

1986); South Macomb Disposal Auth. v. Township of Washington, 790 F.2d 500,

504-05 (6th Cir. 1986); Town of Ball v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d

1049, 1051 n.1 (5th Cir. 1984); Village of Arlington Heights v. Regional Trans.

Auth., 653 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (7th Cir. 1981); City of New York v. Richardson,

473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1973).

All of this case law emanates from two landmark Supreme Court cases in

which the Court struck down constitutional challenges by two cities against their

parent states. See Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36

(1933); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923). In the earlier of those cases,

the Court announced the rule that a state generally is immune to claims by its

subsidiary political subdivisions asserting that the state has violated a

constitutional provision protecting individual liberty: “The power of the State,

unrestrained by the contract clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, over the rights

and property of cities held and used for ‘governmental purposes’ cannot be

questioned. . . . This Court has never held that these subdivisions may invoke

such restraints [based on either the Contract Clause or the Fourteenth

Amendment] upon the power of the State.” Trenton, 262 U.S. at 188. As Justice

Cardozo later explained for the Court, “[a] municipal corporation, created by a

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state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immunities under

the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its

creator.” Williams, 289 U.S. at 40.

Despite the sweeping breadth of Justice Cardozo’s language, both Williams

and Trenton stand only for the limited proposition that a municipality may not

bring a constitutional challenge against its creating state when the constitutional

provision that supplies the basis for the complaint was written to protect

individual rights, as opposed to collective or structural rights. See Williams, 289

U.S. at 40 (involving an equal protection challenge under the Fourteenth

Amendment); Trenton, 262 U.S. at 183 (involving a challenge under the

Impairment of Contracts Clause of Article I and the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment); see also Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1068 (5th

Cir. 1979) (“We think these cases [the Williams/Trenton line of cases] are

substantive interpretations of the constitutional provisions involved; we do not

think they hold that a municipality never has standing to sue the state of which it

is a creature.”). Neither the Williams/Trenton line of cases nor any other

subsequent Supreme Court case has held that a political subdivision is barred

from asserting the structural protections of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI in

a suit against its creating state. Indeed, in a suit involving Arizona’s school lands

trust, the Court found no barrier to the standing of the plaintiff, who was the

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commissioner of the Arizona State Land Department, to sue the State Highway

Department even though the suit was “in form and substance a controversy

between two agencies of the State of Arizona.” See Lassen v. Arizona ex. rel.

Arizona Highway Dep’t, 385 U.S. 458, 459 n.1 (1967). The Court in Lassen

found that the suit was properly within the jurisdiction of the federal courts

because the plaintiff was “a substantially independent state officer” and was

“essentially the trustee of the trust at issue here.” See id.

In this case, the school district plaintiffs are “substantially independent”

from the state of Colorado even though the districts owe their existence as

political subdivision to the state. The districts may hold property in their own

name, enter into contracts, and they have the right to sue and be sued in their own

name. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-32-101 (1998). The districts are led by boards

that are elected independently. See id. § 22-31-105. Most importantly, the school

districts are “essentially” the beneficiaries of the federal trust at issue here. The

Colorado Enabling Act granted more than 4.6 million acres of school lands to the

state of Colorado for the support of the “common schools.” See Colorado

Enabling Act, § 7, 18 Stat. at 475. Today’s public school districts are the direct

political descendants of those 19th Century “common schools.” Thus, the school

districts’ status as political subdivisions does not disentitle them from bringing an

action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce the terms of the Colorado Enabling

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Act merely because the defendants are sued in their official capacities

representing the state that created those subdivisions.

Our conclusion that the school district plaintiffs have the power to bring

their federal claims against the state under the Supremacy Clause and the

Colorado Enabling Act is buttressed by recent case law from the circuits. For

example, in Rogers the Fifth Circuit held that a political subdivision may bring a

claim against its creating state when the claim is based on an assertedly

controlling federal law and where the political subdivision assertedly is a

beneficiary of that federal law. See Rogers, 588 F.2d at 1069 (holding that a

Texas school district had standing to sue Texas state educational authorities over

the state’s management of a school breakfast program regulated by federal law);

see also South Macomb Disposal, 790 F.2d at 504 (acknowledging that “[t]here

may be occasions in which a political subdivision is not prevented, by virtue of its

status as a subdivision of the state, from challenging the constitutionality of state

legislation,” while holding plaintiff lacked standing because present suit

predicated on Fourteenth Amendment).

This understanding of political subdivision standing seems also to have

been at work in this court’s own decision involving a suit between two political

subdivisions in Oklahoma. See Housing Auth. of the Kaw Tribe of Indians v.

City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1991). In Kaw Tribe, we held that a

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local housing authority lacked standing under the rule from Trenton, Williams,

and City of Moore, to bring a Fourteenth Amendment claim against a local

municipality. See Kaw Tribe, 952 F.2d at 1190. On the other hand, we found no

similar barrier to the local housing authority’s standing to sue under the federal

Fair Housing Act. See id. at 1193. As a result, we reversed the district court’s

denial of standing for the Fair Housing Act claim. See id. at 1195, 1196. Implicit

in our decision in Kaw Tribe is the view that the Fair Housing Act, as a federal

statute, trumps any contradictory state law through the operation of the

Supremacy Clause. Thus, Kaw Tribe supports the proposition that we make

explicit today: A political subdivision has standing to sue its political parent on a

Supremacy Clause claim.

The only circuit to bar Supremacy Clause challenges by political

subdivisions against their parent state has been the Ninth Circuit. See Burbank-

Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1363-64

(9th Cir.) (interpreting that circuit’s precedents to hold that “‘political

subdivisions’ of a state lack standing to challenge statutes of the state itself, or

one of its political subdivisions, on ‘constitutional grounds,’” including the

Supremacy Clause), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 173 (1998). 8 We have reviewed the

8
The Second Circuit arguably has also recognized a broad rule prohibiting a
political subdivision from ever suing its creating state. See City of New York,
(continued...)

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line of cases considered by the Ninth Circuit on this issue. See City of South

Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 233-34

(9th Cir. 1980); Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Kirk, 91

F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996), vacated by en banc reh’g, 109 F.3d 634 (9th

Cir. 1997) (en banc); see also City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Reg’l

Planning Agency, 449 U.S. 1039, 1041-42 (1980) (White, J., dissenting from

denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s denial of political

subdivision standing was “inconsistent” with the Court’s holding in Board of

Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)). Nevertheless, we remain persuaded that the

better rule is the one supported by Rogers and Kaw Tribe.

We do not believe that our holding here will lead to the “chaos” asserted by

the defendants. Contrary to the defendants’ argument, mere disagreement by a

political subdivision with the policies of its parent state will not be sufficient to

overcome the traditional barrier to political subdivision standing. Instead, our

holding simply allows a political subdivision to sue its parent state when the suit

alleges a violation by the state of some controlling federal law. The Supremacy

Clause guarantees no less.

8
(...continued)
473 F.2d at 929 (containing language supporting a per se rule against subdivision
standing to sue its creating state in a case involving only constitutional provisions
protecting personal rights, not the Supremacy Clause).

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 B. Injury-in-fact under Article III

In addition to their claim that the school district plaintiffs lack political

subdivision standing, the defendants also contend that both the school districts

and the individual plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate sufficient “injury in fact”

to establish Article III standing. The defendants argue that any potential loss in

revenue that might be suffered by Colorado’s public school trust as a result of

changes wrought by Amendment 16 is purely speculative and would, in any event,

be made up through general appropriations by the Colorado Legislature.

It is well-settled today that the core requirements for showing a “case or

controversy” under Article III are three-fold: A plaintiff must allege (1) an

“injury-in-fact,” (2) a causal connection between the injury and defendant’s

actions, and (3) redressability of the injury. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016-17 (1998); Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193,

1202 (10th Cir. 1998). In order to show an “injury-in-fact,” the plaintiff bears the

burden of ultimately proving “‘an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest

which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.’” Utah, 137 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Bennett v. Spear,

117 S. Ct. 1154, 1163 (1997)).

In this case, we need not wade through the complex question of whether the

potential loss of income from the state land trust as a result of Amendment 16 is a

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sufficiently concrete and imminent injury under Article III. 9 See Branson School

District, 958 F. Supp. at 1508-11. Instead, we conclude that all of the plaintiffs

have suffered another injury that is equally sufficient, if not more so, to meet the

constitutional requirements of Article III.

The essential crux of the plaintiffs’ challenge to Amendment 16 is that the

ballot initiative’s constitutional revisions have injected a series of conflicting

interests into the management of the school lands trust. These new interests –

such as managing the trust lands to enhance and protect “beauty” and other

environmental concerns, see Amendment 16, § 10(1)(C) – allegedly have diverted

the loyalty of the land trust trustees away from the exclusive trust purpose of

supporting the common schools. These allegations state a sufficient Article III

injury because the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of what we hold to be a federal trust

over the school lands, have a legally cognizable interest in the undivided loyalty

of the school lands trustees. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 170(1) (1992)

9
Plaintiffs argue that they have met their injury-in-fact burden by alleging
that Amendment 16 would result in a diminution in funds allocated to the schools
from the trust. Defendant responds that plaintiffs’ claim that schools will receive
less money “is entirely speculative” because school funds lost may be made up
from other sources; however, we agree with the district court that “money lost
from the permanent school-fund is a separate and cognizable injury.” Cf.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A cmt. b (“Payments made or benefits
conferred by other sources . . . do not have the effect of reducing the recovery
against defendant.”). But see ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614-15 (1989)
(plurality opinion written by Justice Kennedy for four Justices).

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(“The trustee is under a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the

beneficiaries.”). As the Restatement commentary makes clear, “In administering

the trust the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries not to be influenced by the

interest of any third person or by motives other than the accomplishment of the

purposes of the trust.” Id. cmt. (q). Therefore, to the extent that plaintiffs allege

that Amendment 16 has divided the loyalty of the school lands trustees away from

the sole focus on the support of the common schools toward more generalized

interests, the plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient actual and particularized injury to

their legal interests. As a result, they have alleged a sufficient “injury-in-fact” for

purposes of Article III standing.

II. Sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment

The defendants next contend that the plaintiffs’ suit is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment’s shield of state sovereign immunity, and that the exception

to the Eleventh Amendment under the Ex parte Young doctrine should not apply.

We conclude, however, that the Ex parte Young doctrine is properly invoked in

this case.

The Eleventh Amendment 10 ensures that a state may raise a defense of

10
The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides:

(continued...)

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sovereign immunity against any suit brought against it in federal court by its own

citizens or by citizens of another state. See Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections v.

Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2052 (1998) (noting that sovereign immunity is in the

nature of an affirmative defense that may be asserted or waived at a state’s

discretion); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-73 (1996) (rejecting the

view that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits arising under federal-

question jurisdiction). Furthermore, when a suit is brought against state officials

in their official capacities, the real party in interest in the case is the state, and the

state may raise the defense of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985). However, a

suit against a state official in his or her official capacity seeking prospective

injunctive relief is not considered a suit against the state for Eleventh Amendment

purposes. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10

(1989) (“Of course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for

injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity

10
(...continued)
The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
subjects of any Foreign State.

U.S. Const. amend. XI.

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actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.’”)

(quoting Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14); ANR Pipeline v. LaFaver, 150 F.3d

1178, 1188 & n.10 (10th Cir. 1998).

Sovereign immunity may be overcome if the state waives the defense or if

the plaintiffs’ federal complaint seeks only prospective injunctive or declaratory

relief against state officials for an ongoing violation of federal law. See Idaho v.

Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 & 2040 (1997). In the latter

situation, the exception first announced in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),

will allow the federal suit for equitable relief to go forward. See Coeur d’Alene,

117 S. Ct. at 2040 (“An allegation of an on-going violation of federal law where

the requested relief is prospective is ordinarily sufficient to invoke the Young

fiction.”).

In this case, the plaintiffs sought only prospective injunctive and

declaratory relief against the implementation of Amendment 16 on grounds that

the ballot measure violated the federal trust created by the Colorado Enabling

Act. In this context, the plaintiffs’ suit falls squarely within the traditional

contours of the Ex parte Young doctrine.

The defendants contend, however, that the plaintiffs’ suit falls outside the

Ex parte Young doctrine in light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Coeur

d’Alene. The defendants argue that the injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs

- 22 -
in this case is not fundamentally different from the kind of relief sought by the

plaintiffs in Coeur d’Alene, and because the Court held that the relief sought in

Coeur d’Alene was beyond the scope of the Ex parte Young doctrine, we

therefore should similarly dismiss the plaintiffs’ suit in this case.

In Coeur d’Alene, the Coeur d’Alene Tribe requested both declaratory and

injunctive relief against Idaho’s state regulation of the banks, beds, and

submerged lands of Lake Coeur d’Alene and its tributaries. See Coeur d’Alene,

117 S. Ct. at 2032. The requested declaratory judgment would have established

the tribe’s “entitlement to the exclusive use and occupancy and the right to quiet

enjoyment of the submerged lands as well as a declaration of the invalidity of all

Idaho statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs or usages which purport to

regulate, authorize, use or affect in any way the submerged lands.” Id. The

tribe’s request for injunctive relief demanded that all of the Idaho officials named

in the suit be prohibited from “regulating, permitting or taking any action in

violation of the Tribe’s rights of exclusive use and occupancy.” Id. The majority

in Coeur d’Alene described these requests as the “functional equivalent” of a

quiet title action, and it held that these requests implicate the state’s “special

sovereignty interests” in ownership and regulation of its submerged lands. Id. at

2040.

In this case, the plaintiffs have requested a judgment declaring that

- 23 -
Amendment 16 is “in violation of Article VI of the United States Constitution.”

The plaintiffs also have requested preliminary and permanent injunctions to

“enjoin enforcement of Amendment 16.”

We do not believe that the plaintiffs’ requested relief here “implicates

special sovereignty interests.” Although a state’s ownership of public lands – in

addition to its ownership of submerged lands – may well fall within the Supreme

Court’s ill-defined category of “special sovereignty interests,” the plaintiffs’

requested relief here would not change the nature of the state’s ownership.

Instead, the requested relief affects only limited aspects of how the state may

manage these public lands. We find it impossible to say that the distinction

between, for example, whether a state must manage its school lands to maximize

revenues as opposed to managing the land to produce consistent income over time

is a distinction that implicates special sovereignty interests. Furthermore, the

plaintiffs’ requested relief cannot seriously be compared to a quiet title action, in

which all or substantially all ownership interests in the lands would be stripped

from the state. The far more accurate analogy for the plaintiffs’ requested relief

is not a quiet title action, but rather the quasi-equitable action for a breach of

trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 199 (1959) (“The beneficiary of a

trust can maintain a suit (a) to compel the trustee to perform his duties as trustee;

(b) to enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust; (c) to compel the

- 24 -
trustee to redress a breach of trust . . . .”); see also Napeahi v. Paty, 921 F.2d 897,

899 & 903 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a suit by native Hawaiians against the

Director of the Department of Land and Natural Resources for the state of Hawaii

alleging an improper abandonment of lands alleged to be part of the state’s public

trust was properly characterized as a breach of trust action). We have no

hesitation in holding that the functional equivalent of a breach of trust action

seeking only prospective equitable relief against state officials falls within the

scope of the Ex parte Young doctrine. Thus, we conclude that the Eleventh

Amendment presents no bar to the plaintiffs’ suit in this case.

III. Creation of a federal trust for Colorado’s school lands

Turning now to the substantive merits of this case, we must address the

threshold issue of whether the Colorado Enabling Act created a binding federal

trust over the school lands granted to Colorado through the Colorado Enabling

Act. Despite the defendant’s arguments to the contrary, we conclude that

Congress did indeed manifest an intent to create a fiduciary relationship for the

state of Colorado when it conveyed the school lands to the state. Furthermore, we

find that the creation of such a trust was within Congress’ powers under the

Constitution. As a result, we hold that these school lands are subject to an

enforceable federal trust.

- 25 -
 A. Manifestation of intent

As the Supreme Court has noted, the question of whether a statehood

statute creates a federal trust requires a case-specific analysis of the particular

state’s enabling statute because the history of each state’s admission to the Union

is unique and Congress seems to have experienced an evolution in its legislative

approach to school land grants. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 289-90 n.18

(1986). For example, early on in the development of school lands jurisprudence,

the Supreme Court interpreted the sparse wording of the land grants for Michigan

and Alabama as creating nothing more than honorary obligations, albeit in the

nature of a “solemn agreement,” which is to say, not a trust. See id.; Alabama v.

Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 173-74 (1914); Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. (18 How.)

173, 181-82 (1856). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has interpreted the

later, more specific land grants to New Mexico and Arizona as creating fiduciary

obligations on the part of the states to manage the lands for the exclusive benefit

of the common schools. See Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep’t,

385 U.S. 458, 460-61 (1967); Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41, 48 (1919). In

our case, Colorado’s admission to the Union under the 1875 enabling act falls

somewhere in between – in both chronology and specificity – the

Michigan/Alabama and New Mexico/Arizona experiences.

Before addressing the particular language of the Colorado Enabling Act, we

- 26 -
set out the basic principles on which our interpretive exercise must rely: A trust

is created when a settlor conveys property to a trustee with a manifest intent to

impose a fiduciary duty on that person requiring that the property be used for a

specific benefit of others. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 2, 17, 23 & §

23 cmt. (a) (1959). That Congress may create a trust through the manifestation of

an intent to create a fiduciary relationship is beyond dispute. See Lassen, 385

U.S. at 460; Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d 855, 857

(10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (adopting the prior panel’s dissent, 728 F.2d 1555,

1563 (10th Cir. 1984) (Seymour, J., dissenting), as the en banc majority opinion);

see also United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 277, 279 (8th Cir. 1917) (reviewing the

language of the New Mexico school lands grant in that state’s enabling statute

and concluding that “[w]ords more clearly designed than those of the act of

Congress to create definite and specific trusts . . . could hardly have been

chosen.”), aff’d, Ervien, 251 U.S. at 48. Congress need not use any particular

form of words in expressing its intent to create a trust, and the absence of the

words “trust” or “trustee” in the conveyance is not determinative of the question

of whether Congress intended to create a trust. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 728

F.2d at 1564 (quoting Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d 1332, 1338 (10th Cir.

1979)). Instead, the creation of a trust depends on whether the relevant statutory

provision contains “an enumeration of duties” which would justify a conclusion

- 27 -
that Congress intended to create a trust relationship. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe,

728 F.2d at 1564; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 23 cmt. a (“immaterial

whether or not the settlor knows that the intended relationship is called a trust”).

With these principles in mind, we believe the Colorado Enabling Act

contains a sufficient enumeration of duties to indicate Congress’s intent to create

a fiduciary relationship between the state of Colorado and its common schools

with respect to the management of the school lands. The principal language of

Congress’ conveyance declares that the school lands “are hereby granted to the

said State for the support of the common schools.” Colorado Enabling Act § 7,

18 Stat. at 475 (emphasis added). This language, standing alone, would not be

sufficient to establish a federal trust because it is no more specific than the

language of the Michigan and Alabama grants, 11 which were found to create only

“honorary” obligation to support the states’ common schools. See Schmidt, 232

U.S. at 173-74; Cooper, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 182. The language of § 7, however,

does not stand alone. The determinative evidence of Congress’ intent to create a

trust is found in § 14 of the 1875 enabling act. In that clause, for the first time in

11
The language of the Michigan and Alabama school land grants used
somewhat similar formulations. For Alabama, Congress conveyed each Section
16 of every township in the new state “to the inhabitants of such township for the
use of schools.” See Schmidt, 232 U.S. at 172. For Michigan, Congress
conveyed each Section 16 in every township “to the State for the use of schools.”
See Cooper, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 179.

- 28 -
any of Congress’ school-lands legislation, Congress created explicit restrictions

on how the school lands could be managed or disposed. See Fairfax et al., supra,

at 821 (noting that the sales restrictions in the Colorado Enabling Act marked a

turning point in the specificity of Congress’ land grants). Congress required the

following of Colorado:

That the two sections of land in each township
herein granted for the support of common schools shall
be disposed of only at public sale and at a price not less
than two dollars and fifty cents per acre, the proceeds to
constitute a permanent school-fund, the interest of which
to be expended in the support of common schools.

Colorado Enabling Act § 14, 18 Stat. at 476. These restrictions enumerate

Colorado’s specific duties in the following ways: Congress has prescribed

(1) how the school lands are to be disposed, (2) at what minimum price, (3) how

the income from these sales is to be held, (4) what may be done with the interest

on that capital holding, and (5) Congress has provided for the permanence of the

benefit of these assets for the common schools. Most importantly, all of these

enumerated restrictions are explicitly imposed to serve Congress’ ultimate goal of

providing a sound financial basis for the “support” of the state’s common schools

in perpetuity. In light of this enumeration, we are confident that Congress

intended to create a fiduciary obligation for the state of Colorado to manage the

school lands in trust for the benefit of the state’s common schools.

Our conclusion is buttressed by the immediate response to Congress’

- 29 -
enabling statute by the Framers of the 1876 Colorado Constitution, which

expressed the understanding of Colorado’s citizens about Congress’ intentions.

The 1876 Constitution provides the following implicit acknowledgment that

Congress had created a trust in the school lands grant:

The general assembly shall, at the earliest practicable
period, provide by law that the several grants of land
made by Congress to the State shall be judiciously
located and carefully preserved and held in trust subject
to disposal, for the use and benefit of the respective
objects for which said grants of land were made . . . .

1876 Colo. Const. art. IX, § 10 (amended 1996) (emphasis added). The

emphasized language in art. IX, § 10 is the traditional verbiage used to indicate

the creation of a trust. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 24 cmt (b)

(Illustration No. 1) (noting that a conveyance using the words “for the use of” or

“for the benefit of” typically indicates an intent to create a trust, absent contrary

indications). By requiring that Colorado’s legislators quickly pass laws to enforce

certain fiduciary obligations for the state, the 1876 Constitution supports the view

that Coloradans perceived Congress’ school land grant as more than a mere

“honorary” obligation, but rather as a legally enforceable fiduciary relationship. 12

12
This understanding was perpetuated in the 1996 language of Amendment
16. For example, Amendment 16 inserted into the Colorado Constitution a
declaration that “[t]he people of the state of Colorado recognize . . . that the state
school lands are an endowment of land assets held in a perpetual, inter-
generational public trust for the support of public schools . . . .” See Amendment
(continued...)

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 B. Constitutionality of creation of a federal trust

In what appears to be a permutation of the defendants’ “equal footing

doctrine” argument below, 13 the defendants now argue that any federal trust

created by Congress through the Colorado Enabling Act was in excess of

Congress’ limited powers under the Admissions Clause and the Property Clause.

We reject these arguments as groundless.

The Admissions Clause of Article IV 14 gives Congress the power to admit

new states to the Union. However, through its specification that the entity to be

12
(...continued)
16, § 10(1)(A), 1997 Colo. Laws at 2401 (emphasis added). Similarly, § 9(6) of
Amendment 16 declares that the new State Board of Land Commissioners “shall
serve as the trustee for the lands granted to the state in public trust by the federal
government . . . .” See id. at 2400 (emphasis added).

13
To the extent defendants seek to raise an “equal footing” argument on
appeal, we reject it for essentially the reasons articulated by the district court
below. See Branson School District, 958 F. Supp. at 1512-14; see also Crow
Tribe v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 990-92 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1221
(1996); State ex rel. Koch v. United States, 47 F.3d 1015, 1018-19 (10th Cir.
1995).
14
The text of the Admissions Clause provides:

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected
within the Jurisdiction of any other States; nor any State
be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or
Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures
of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.

- 31 -
admitted must be a “State,” the clause has been read to require that any newly

admitted state must be “no less or greater, or different in dignity or power, from

those political entities which constitute the Union.” See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.

559, 566 (1911). However, Coyle makes clear that Congress may indeed place

limitations on a state through the admission process if these limitations “are

within the scope of the conceded powers of Congress.” Id. at 568, 574. In other

words, a limitation imposed through the admissions process is valid if Congress

could otherwise impose it on a state that already had been admitted to the Union.

As the Court explained, one example of such a valid limitation would be

“regulations touching the sole care and disposition of the public lands or

reservations” within the state. See id. at 574.

In this case, Congress had the “sole care and disposition” of public land

within the federal territory of Colorado prior to the creation of the state of

Colorado. In making a beneficial grant of the school lands to Colorado, Congress

was doing no more than what the Property Clause of the Constitution allowed,

i.e., “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the

Territory or other Property belonging to the United States. . . .” See U.S. Const.

art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Because Congress could have decided to make this very same

beneficial grant of federal land to Colorado after the admission of the state to the

Union, there is no violation of the Admissions Clause in Congress’ decision to

- 32 -
create the federal school lands trust through the Colorado Enabling Act.

As a final challenge to the constitutionality of Congress’ creation of a

school land trust for Colorado, the defendants also argue that Congress lacked the

power under the Property Clause to create this federal trust because the trust

“invades” the state’s sovereignty. The defendants could provide no authority to

support this proposition, other than to point to cases interpreting the Tenth

Amendment. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376-77 (1997); New

York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992). We find these cases inapposite

in the face of clear language from the Supreme Court that has recognized the very

broad powers of Congress under the Property Clause to use and dispose of federal

property as Congress sees fit. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539

(1976) (“[W]hile the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause

have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that the

power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.”)

(quotation omitted); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,

330 (1936) (“To the extent that the power of disposition is thus expressly

conferred [by the Property Clause], it is manifest that the Tenth Amendment is not

applicable.”).

IV. Validity of Amendment 16 under the Supremacy Clause
and the Colorado Enabling Act

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 We now consider the substantive core of the parties’ dispute, i.e., whether

the various provisions of Amendment 16 violate the Supremacy Clause of Article

VI because of their asserted conflict with the federal trust created by the Colorado

Enabling Act. Because the plaintiffs’ contention on this point presents a facial

challenge to the federal constitutionality of Amendment 16, we must start with the

venerable rule of statutory construction that a statute is presumed to be

constitutional unless shown otherwise. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 643

(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of

course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger

must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be

valid.’” (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987))); Villanueva

v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying presumption of

constitutionality to a state statute in the face of an equal protection challenge).

Although this presumption arises out of the deference courts must pay to the work

of legislatures, we believe the same deference applies to the work of a state’s

citizenry acting through a ballot initiative. Furthermore, in light of this

deferential rule of statutory construction, we may not invalidate Amendment 16 if

there is some “fairly possible” construction that would confirm the measure’s

constitutionality. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762

(1988) (“Court will first determine whether it is fairly possible to interpret the

- 34 -
statute in a manner that renders it constitutionally valid.”). However, as the Court

in Beck acknowledged, “statutory construction may not be pressed ‘to the point of

disingenuous evasion.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96

(1985) (quotation omitted)). 15

A. Scope of the federal trust

In determining whether Amendment 16 violates Colorado’s fiduciary

duties, we must at the outset specify the scope of those duties. In doing so, we

are guided first by the plain language of the enabling act. See Ervien, 251 U.S. at

47-48 (reviewing the particular text of the New Mexico land grant and defining

the scope of New Mexico’s duties with respect to those lands based on the

language in the grant). Furthermore, when the plain language of the enabling act

is ambiguous or silent, we must turn to the statute’s legislative history and the

background principles of trust law. See Lassen, 385 U.S. at 467-68 (looking to

15
The court below, and the plaintiffs themselves, assumed on the basis of
district court precedent that the plaintiffs must prove the unconstitutionality of
Amendment 16 “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Branson School District, 958 F.
Supp. at 1517 (citing Villanueva v. Carere, 873 F. Supp. 434, 447 (D. Colo.
1994), aff’d, 85 F.3d 481). This circuit has never applied such a standard of
proof to a purely legal question of whether a statute is facially unconstitutional.
Cf. Blue Sky Entertainment, Inc. v. Town of Gardiner, 711 F. Supp. 678, 698 n.19
(N.D.N.Y. 1989) (“In essence, the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard is suited
to resolving questions which involve some element of fact. A question of law is
not decided by any standard of decision prescribed for a trier of fact.”).

- 35 -
the “background and legislative history of the Enabling Act” to determine the

scope of Arizona’s trust duties).

Turning to the language of the Colorado Enabling Act, we find three

overriding principles expressed there. First, the sole and exclusive beneficiary of

the school lands trust is to be the “common schools.” See Colorado Enabling Act,

§ 7, 18 Stat. at 475. As the Supreme Court explained in Ervien, this kind of

specific enumeration of the purpose of the federal trust “is necessarily exclusive

of any other purpose.” Ervien, 251 U.S. at 47. As a result, the plain language of

the Enabling Act indicates that the school lands may not be used for any purpose

other than “the support of common schools.” Second, the sole and exclusive

method for disposing of the school lands shall be through a “public sale” with a

certain minimum price. See Colorado Enabling Act, § 14, 18 Stat. at 476. This

provision indicates that when the state chooses to dispose of its school lands, it

must do so in a way that will ensure fair market value of whatever property is

being sold. Finally, the Act makes clear that interest from the fund created by

these land sales is exclusively and “permanently” dedicated to “the support of

common schools.” See Colorado Enabling Act, § 14, 18 Stat. at 476.

The language of the Enabling Act is silent, however, as to whether

Colorado must actually dispose of all of its school lands. Although § 14 speaks

only to procedures for disposal, we do not believe that this exclusive focus means

- 36 -
that Congress meant to strip Colorado of any power to hold the school lands over

time or to obtain a full and fair market value through rents and other uses. See

Fairfax et al., supra, at 821-22 (commenting that the original school land grants in

the early 19th Century apparently required states to hold, rather than sell, the

land, and only with the admission of more arid Western states did Congress begin

to allow sales as well as leases of school lands); see also State ex rel. Koch v.

Barrett, 66 P. 504, 507-08 (Mont. 1901) (holding that the absence of any

authorization for leases, as opposed to sales, in Montana’s school land grant did

not divest the state of the power to lease such lands).

This power to hold rather than sell the school lands was informed by

Congress’ implicit understanding of common law trust doctrines requiring that a

trustee must take steps to preserve the trust property from loss, damage or

diminution in value. 16 See Davies v. Lowrey, 15 Ohio 655, 657 (1846) (“It is [a

trustee’s] duty to manage the trust property with all reasonable diligence, caution,

and care, that it may be rendered most productive, without being exposed to

loss.”); Wyman v. Herard, 59 P. 1009, 1023 (Okla. Terr. 1899) (quoting from the

treatise Perry on Trusts, which was a standard reference in the 1870s, that it is

16
We rely on the common law of trusts to provide a background against
which we may better understand Congress’ meaning with respect to the Colorado
Enabling Act because we have been unable to find – and the parties did not
provide – any useful information on the statute’s legislative history.

- 37 -
“the first duty of a trustee . . . [is] to secure the possession of trust property, and

to protect it from loss and injury”); see also Restatement (First) of Trusts § 176

(duty to preserve trust property). Overarching all of the trustee’s fiduciary duties

was the paramount duty to exercise reasonable prudence and care in the

management of the trust solely for the benefit of the named beneficiary. See

Restatement (First) of Trusts § 174.

B. Specific provisions of Amendment 16

The plaintiffs challenge more than a dozen particular aspects of

Amendment 16 as being in conflict with Colorado’s fiduciary duties to manage

the school lands exclusively for the benefit of the “common schools.” However,

we believe that for each provision there is a “fairly possible” construction that

reads the ballot measure in conformity with Colorado’s trust obligations. As a

result, we do not believe that any provision facially violates the federal trust

created by the Colorado Enabling Act.

1. Establishment of a “sound stewardship” principle - § 10(1)(C)

The philosophical heart of Amendment 16 – and the provision that seems to

have prompted the greatest opposition from the plaintiffs – is the initiative’s

declaration of a principle of “sound stewardship” which should guide the new

State Board of Land Commissioners in its management of the school lands. This

- 38 -
provision declares:

that the economic productivity of all lands held in public trust is
dependent on sound stewardship, including protecting and enhancing
the beauty, natural values, open space and wildlife habitat thereof,
for this and future generations. In recognition of these principles,
the board shall be governed by the standards set forth in this section
10 in the discharge of its fiduciary obligations, in addition to other
laws generally applicable to trustees.

Amendment 16, § 10(1)(C). The plaintiffs contend that this provision injects a

conflict of interest into the state’s fiduciary duties because it will divert the state

from managing the school lands for the exclusive purpose of supporting the

common schools.

Rather than reading this provision as changing the exclusive purpose of the

school lands trust, as the plaintiffs argue, we believe that the “sound stewardship”

principle merely announces a new management approach for the land trust. The

additional requirement to consider beauty, nature, open space, and wildlife habitat

as part of the whole panoply of land management considerations simply indicates

a change in the state’s chosen mechanism for achieving its continuing obligation

to manage the school lands for the support of the common schools. A trustee is

expected to use his or her skill and expertise in managing a trust, and it is

certainly fairly possible for a trustee to conclude that protecting and enhancing

the aesthetic value of a property will increase its long-term economic potential

and productivity. The trust obligation, after all, is unlimited in time and a long-

- 39 -
range vision of how best to preserve the value and productivity of the trust assets

may very well include attention to preserving the beauty and natural values of the

property.

We acknowledge the opposite possibility that the state land board may seek

to manage the school land trust for the exclusive benefit of aesthetic values, for

the benefit of local non-school interests or for the benefit of the state generally, to

the detriment of the state’s fiduciary duty to provide support for the common

schools. However, that factual scenario has not been presented to us in this facial

appeal. Instead, we conclude simply that because it is possible to construe the

“sound stewardship” principle in conformity with the state’s federal trust

obligations to the common schools, we must do so. Thus, we hold that this

provision of Amendment 16 does not conflict with the Colorado Enabling Act.

2. Elimination of the income maximization obligation - § 10(1)

After setting out the “sound stewardship” principle, Amendment 16

provides for the initiative’s crucial change in land management doctrine by

striking out the language from the state’s 1876 constitution that required the state

to manage the school lands “in such a manner as will secure the maximum

possible amount therefor.” Amendment 16, § 10(1). The provision then replaces

this income maximization goal with a new obligation to “produce reasonable and

consistent income over time.” Id. The plaintiffs contend that these changes

- 40 -
directly conflict with the state’s fiduciary obligations.

We disagree because the state’s fiduciary obligations do not include a

specific duty to maximize income under the Enabling Act. The Act provides no

direction regarding when to dispose of land or how to invest the proceeds.

Instead, the state has a duty only to obtain fair market value for the school lands

when the lands are sold and otherwise to manage the lands solely for the benefit

of the common schools. In the absence of explicit duties as to sale of the land

and investment of the proceeds, prevailing trust law at the time of the Enabling

Act required a trustee to “be governed by a sound discretion and good faith.”

Jairus Ware Perry, A Treatise on the law of Trusts and Trustees § 452, at 566 (4th

ed. 1889). The law provided that trustees “must not have speculation in view, but

rather a permanent investment, considering both the probable income and the

probable safety of the capital.” Id. Just as the “sound stewardship” principle did

not reflect a change in the purpose of the trust, the new obligation to produce

“consistent income over time” also is not a change in the purpose of the trust.

Instead, it is merely a new approach to achieving the state’s continuing obligation

to ensure that the school lands support the common schools. We are, in any

event, not able to say facially that a plan to produce reasonable and consistent

income over time is inconsistent with the objective of generating the maximum

possible income. Thus, because it is possible to read this change as being in

- 41 -
harmony with the state’s continuing fiduciary obligations, we hold that requiring

“consistent income over time” does not violate the Colorado Enabling Act.

3. Dedication of a “Stewardship Trust” - § 10(1)(b)(I)

Perhaps the most troubling provision for us – in terms of its

constitutionality – is Amendment 16’s requirement that the state land board must

create a “Stewardship Trust” of 295,000 to 300,000 acres out of the 3 million

acres currently held by the state and must manage this Stewardship Trust in

perpetuity in a manner that will permit “only those uses, not necessarily

precluding existing uses or management practices, that will protect and enhance

the beauty, natural values, open space, and wildlife habitat thereof . . . .”

Amendment 16, § 10(1)(b)(I). Furthermore, this Stewardship Trust apparently is

intended to be a permanent reservation of school trust lands because the provision

also establishes that “specific parcels of land held in the Stewardship Trust may

be removed from the trust only upon the affirmative vote of four members of the

board and upon the designation or exchange of an equal or greater amount of

additional land into said trust.” Id. Thus, through the mechanism of exchanging

parcels of equal or greater size, this restricted-use Stewardship Trust apparently

will never fall below 295,000 to 300,000 acres. 17

In a related, though less troubling, claim plaintiffs argue that § 10(1)(A)
17

of Amendment 16 violates the trust obligations imposed by the Enabling Act by
(continued...)

- 42 -
 In light of these requirements, it is conceivable that at some date in the

future, after the state land board has disposed of all of its other land, there will be

only the 300,000-acre Stewardship Trust remaining in the overall school land

trust. At that point the board would be unable to sell the Stewardship Trust

acreage even if disposing of the property would be the otherwise economically

appropriate course for the benefit of the common schools.

Although we believe it is possible that an ultimate conflict of interest may

some day arrive for the land board, we also recognize that it may not. The

potential conflict of interest is partly a function of whether the land board

ultimately reaches a point where it holds only Stewardship Trust acreage and has

no other acreage with which to make exchanges for more economically valuable

land in the Stewardship Trust. It is also partly a function of whether, at such

point, it is no longer economically prudent to continue to hold the Stewardship

17
(...continued)
prohibiting the state from significantly diminishing the trust’s land assets. The
full text of § 10(1)(A) states: “(1) The people of the state of Colorado recognize
(A) that the state school lands are an endowment of land assets held in a
perpetual, inter-generational public trust for the support of public schools, which
should not be significantly diminished.” Despite plaintiffs argument that the
object of “which should not be significantly diminished” is “the state school
lands,” we agree with the district court that the former phrase modifies “public
trust for the support of public schools.” Accordingly, we read § 10(1)(A) to
prohibit the state from significantly diminishing the public schools’ trust, which
includes other investment assets in addition to land. This obligation comports
with the trust obligations imposed by the Enabling Act .

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Trust land in the Stewardship Trust. In that regard we observe that nothing in

Amendment 16 prevents the trust from realizing an income stream from

Stewardship Trust lands through leases or other arrangements allowing

compatible uses. In any event, we note that it has taken Colorado more than a

century to sell just 40 percent, or roughly 1.6 million acres, of its school lands.

Because it is possible to construe the provisions of the Stewardship Trust as not

imposing a conflict with the state’s fiduciary duties, we must. We therefore hold

that the Stewardship Trust does not violate the Colorado Enabling Act.

4. Management for long-term goals - § 10(1)(b)(II) & § 10(1)(b)(III)

The remaining changes in Colorado’s land management principles for the

school land trust flow logically from the overarching philosophy expressed in

Amendment 16, and we believe they are easily reconciled with the state’s

fiduciary duties to the common schools. For example, § 10(1)(b)(II) requires the

board to include in its agricultural leases “terms, incentives, and lease rates that

will promote sound stewardship and land management practices, long-term

agricultural productivity, and community stability.” The plaintiffs contend that

this provision shifts the exclusive purpose of the land trust from the sole focus of

supporting the common schools to include new purposes such as community

stability. However, we believe that this section more accurately is read as

changing not the purpose of the school land trust, but how it is to be achieved. In

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that context, it is not unreasonable for the trustee to determine that the common

schools will benefit more from a management philosophy that focuses on long-

term agricultural productivity. It is also fairly possible that long-term agricultural

productivity and the economic value of the land will be enhanced if the land

trust’s holdings are managed to protect community stability.

We believe a similar conclusion can be drawn about § 10(1)(b)(III), which

requires the land board to manage its natural resource holdings “in a manner

which will conserve the long-term value of such resources, as well as existing and

future uses, and in accordance with state and local laws and regulations . . . .” It

is within the trustee’s discretion to determine that the best interest of the common

schools would be better served by conserving the land trust’s natural resources for

their long-term value, as opposed to exploiting them over the short term.

Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the last clause of § 10(1)(b)(III),

requiring the land board to conform its management activities to local land use

regulations, and a similar provision in § 10(1)(c) 18 both violate the Colorado

Supreme Court’s decision in People ex rel. Dunbar v. City of Littleton, 515 P.2d

1121 (Colo. 1973). We note first that it appears the holding of Dunbar, involving

the exemption of school trust lands from local property taxes, is inapposite to the

18
The language of § 10(1)(c) requires the land board to “comply with valid
local land use regulations and land use plans.”

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question of whether the school land trust is subject to generally applicable land-

use regulations. The latter issue was upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court in

Colorado State Bd. of Land Comm’rs v. Colorado Mined Land Reclamation Bd.,

809 P.2d 974, 985 (Colo. 1991) (“The [state] constitutional scheme . . . does not

contemplate that the State Land Board can ignore a reasonable legislative

regulation for the purpose of carrying out its constitutional responsibility of

securing ‘the maximum possible amount’ for public lands.”). More importantly,

though, there is no reason to believe that compliance with a generally applicable

land-use regulation will conflict with the state’s fiduciary obligation to manage

the school lands for the benefit of the common schools. Thus, neither the goal of

long-term resource conservation nor compliance with local land-use regulations

rises to a violation of the Colorado Enabling Act.

5. Other land management principles - § 10(1)(a) & § 10(1)(e)

Two other land-management provisions of § 10 have prompted complaints

from the plaintiffs, but in both instances, the provisions are within the state’s

discretion as reasonable principles to serve the overall trust purpose of supporting

the common schools. Thus, we find no violation here of the Colorado Enabling

Act.

First, § 10(1)(a) requires the land board to conduct a kind of impact-

analysis before it approves a development plan involving commercial, residential,

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or industrial use of the school trust lands. 19 The plaintiffs argue that this

provision puts the interests of individual local school districts ahead of the

general interests of all common schools in the state. However, in requiring a

cost-benefit analysis for certain kinds of development plans, Amendment 16 can

be read as furthering the goal of “supporting” the common schools because the

provision ensures that certain kinds of development projects will not undermine

the financial well-being of the school districts.

The other provision, § 10(1)(e), requires the board to give school districts

the opportunity to use school trust lands for school sites, either through leases or

outright purchases, and mandates that the price “shall not exceed the appraised

fair market value.” 20 The plaintiffs contend that by limiting the price for these

19
Section 10(1)(a) provides:

Prior to the lease, sale, or exchange of any lands
for commercial, residential or industrial development,
[the board shall] determine that the income from the
lease, sale, or exchange can reasonably be anticipated to
exceed the fiscal impact of such development on local
school districts and state funding of education from
increased school enrollment associated with such
development.
20
The full text of § 10(1)(e) provides that the board must:

Provide opportunities for the public school districts
within which such [school trust] lands are located to
lease, purchase, or otherwise use such lands or portions
thereof as are necessary for school building sites, at an
(continued...)

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school sites to nothing more than the fair market value, the land trust will not

realize the maximum possible amount for the land. This argument, though, is a

non-sequitur. The maximum possible price that a willing buyer would pay to a

willing seller is in fact the fair market value for a property. Thus, this provision

does not authorize the land board to give any kind of price discount for a school

site. For example, if the fair market value of a school trust parcel is significantly

higher because of its potential use as a commercial site, then there is nothing in

this provision that would allow the land board to sell that parcel for less than that

fair market value. The fact that the parcel ultimately will be used for a school

rather than a commercial facility does not alter the fair market price for the land.

6. Use of trust income - § 3 & § 9(7)

Two other provisions in Amendment 16 deal with how state officials may

use money in the permanent school fund that has been created from the sales of

school trust lands. However, because both of these sections can be read as falling

within the overall trust purpose of supporting the common schools, we find no

violation of the Colorado Enabling Act.

First, §§ 3(1)-(3) authorize the General Assembly to fashion legislation that

20
(...continued)
amount to be determined by the board, which shall not
exceed the appraised fair market value, which amount
may be paid over time.

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will allow the state treasurer to use the funds in the permanent school fund to buy

or guarantee the bonds issued by local school districts or to make direct loans to

the school districts. 21 The plaintiffs contend that in allowing the state to use

money in the school fund in this manner the provision violates the language of the

Colorado Enabling Act that requires the interest from the fund to be used solely

for the support of the common schools. See Colorado Enabling Act, § 14. We

believe, however, that using the proceeds from the permanent school fund to

support the borrowing activities of the school districts does indeed fall within the

scope of the mandate to “support” the common schools. 22

21
The relevant language of § 3 provides:

In order to assist public schools in the state in providing
necessary buildings, land, and equipment, the General
Assembly may adopt laws establishing the terms and
conditions upon which the state treasurer may (1) invest
the fund in bonds of school districts, (2) use all or any
portion of the fund or the interest or other income
thereon to guaranty bonds issued by school districts, or
(3) make loans to school districts.
22
In something of a related argument, the plaintiffs also challenge the
opening provision of § 3, which inserts the language “except as provided in this
Article IX” into the existing language declaring that the permanent school fund
shall remain inviolate and intact. The plaintiffs contend that this change means
that the permanent school fund is no longer “inviolate.” The plaintiffs argue that
this introductory provision establishes an authorization for the other inappropriate
use of interest income from the permanent school fund that they have challenged.
However, because we believe that all of the provisions of Amendment 16 can be
fairly read as preserving the inviolability of the permanent school fund, we find
no conflict in the introductory provision of § 3.

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 Next, the plaintiffs challenge the provision dealing with the use of the

permanent school fund to facilitate land exchanges. See Amendment 16, § 9(7). 23

The plaintiffs contend that in authorizing this approach for non-simultaneous land

exchanges the plain language of this provision would allow the land board to use

the interest income from the proceeds of a land sale toward the purchase of other

land. The plaintiffs contend that such a use of the interest income would violate

the requirement in § 14 of the Colorado Enabling Act that interest income from

the school fund be used for the support of common schools. See Colorado

Enabling Act, § 14. To the extent that accrued interest from a nonsimultaneous

exchange of land is used to acquire replacement lands which are themselves held

in trust for the support of the common schools, it seems to us that such interest is

being used for an approved purpose as defined by § 14 of the Colorado Enabling

Act.

23
Section 9(7) provides:

The board shall have the authority to undertake
non-simultaneous exchanges of land, by directing that
the proceeds from a particular sale or other disposition
be deposited into a separate account to be established by
the state treasurer with the interest thereon to accrue to
such account, and withdrawing therefrom an equal or
lesser amount to be used as the purchase price for other
land to be held and managed as provided in this article,
provided that the purchase of lands to complete such an
exchange shall be made within two years of the initial
sale or other disposition.

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 7. Selection criteria for land board members - § 9(2)

The plaintiffs complain that the selection criteria established in § 9(2) for

the new members of the land board will unavoidably inject a breach of the

trustees’ duty of loyalty because the new members will be explicitly selected

based on constituencies that do not relate to the support of common schools. See

Amendment 16, § 9(2). 24 This argument fails because there is nothing in this

provision that changes the board members’ overarching obligation to manage the

school land trust for the benefit of common schools, regardless of the

constituency with which they previously were associated. Because we may expect

that the land board members will abide by their fiduciary obligations, we need not

assume that there will be division of loyalties based merely on Amendment 16’s

selection criteria. Thus, this provision does not violate the Colorado Enabling

Act.

8. Waiver of personal liability for land board members - § 9(5)

24
Section 9(2) provides:

The governor shall endeavor to appoint members
of the board who reside in different geographic regions
of the state. The board shall be composed of one person
with substantial experience in production agriculture,
one person with substantial experience in public primary
or secondary education, one person with substantial
experience in local government and land use planning,
one person with substantial experience in natural
resource conservation, and one citizen at large.

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 The plaintiffs also complain that the new land board members have been

given a waiver of personal liability for simple negligence with respect to the

management of the land trust, and that this waiver violates a fiduciary duty for the

trustees to be personally liable for any breaches of trust. See Amendment 16,

§ 9(5). 25 This argument, however, confuses the individual land board members

with the state itself. The Colorado Enabling Act imposes fiduciary duties on the

state as a whole, and thus, the trustee for the school land trust is the state of

Colorado. The state has chosen to delegate its management of the trust to the

land board, but it is the state that will remain liable for any breaches of the trust.

Thus, the waiver of personal liability in § 9(5) does not violate the traditional

obligation of a trustee to stand ready to make a beneficiary whole for any

breaches of trust.

9. Miscellaneous provisions

The remainder of the plaintiffs’ challenge involves provisions throughout

Amendment 16 that the plaintiffs contend cannot be severed from the

objectionable provisions. However, because we have not found any provision in

25
Section 9(5) provides:

The individual members of the board shall have no personal
liability for any action or failure to act as long as such action or
failure to act does not involve willful or intentional malfeasance or
gross negligence.

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the initiative that necessarily involves a violation of Colorado’s fiduciary duties,

we find no conflict in these remaining provisions.

Conclusion

In enacting Amendment 16, Colorado’s voters sought to rewrite the

management principles underlying their state’s school land trust, shifting the state

away from its prior focus on short-term profit maximization toward a more

sustainable approach focusing on the long-term yields of the trust lands. We

cannot say as a matter of law that this change in management philosophy

necessarily will lead to a breach of Colorado’s solemn fiduciary obligations

arising out of the federal trust enacted by the Colorado Enabling Act.

Confronting, as we do in this case, a facial challenge which requires us to apply

any “fairly possible” construction of the measure’s constitutionality and thus to

assume the best about Colorado’s future actions, we conclude that Amendment 16

does not violate Colorado’s fiduciary duties. As a result, we find no facial

violation of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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