United States v. Davis

                                                                                F I L E D
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Tenth Circuit
                                        PUBLISH
                                                                                  JUL 8 1999
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                            PATRICK FISHER
                                                                                     Clerk
                                   TENTH CIRCUIT



 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                Plaintiff - Appellee,

           v.                                                 No. 98-3315

 DONALD KENARD DAVIS,

                Defendant - Appellant.


            APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                     FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
                        (D. Ct. No. 92-CR-40037-2)


Submitted on the briefs:   *



Jeannine D. Herron, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.

Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney, and T.G. Luedke, Assistant United
States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.


Before TACHA , McKAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.


TACHA , Circuit Judge.


       *
         After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
       On December 4, 1992, a jury found defendant Donald Kenard Davis guilty

of five drug and firearm offenses. The district court sentenced Davis to 240

months imprisonment. On April 24, 1996, the district court vacated Davis’

firearm convictions. The government subsequently moved to have defendant

resentenced to reflect firearm enhancements under United States Sentencing

Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2D1.1(b)(1). The district court denied the motion on

August 26, 1997, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. We reversed the district court

on the issue of jurisdiction and remanded the case for resentencing.       See United

States v. Davis , 153 F.3d 728, 1998 WL 440462 (10th Cir. July 17, 1998)

(unpublished). On remand, the district court denied defendant’s request for a

base offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. §

3E1.1 and sentenced him to 210 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals the

sentence imposed by the district court, arguing that the district court committed

error by denying him the § 3E1.1 downward adjustment. We affirm.

       We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines

de novo and its factual findings for clear error.   See United States v. Flores , 149

F.3d 1272, 1279 (10th Cir. 1998),      cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 849 (1999). We give

due deference to the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts.

See United States v. Vaziri , 164 F.3d 556, 568 (10th Cir. 1999);      United States v.


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Smith , 131 F.3d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir. 1997),     cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1109, 1321,

1543 (1998).

       Davis concedes that he was not entitled to a reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1 when he was initially sentenced in February of 1993. However, he claims

that by the time of his resentencing on remand in October of 1998, he qualified

for an acceptance of responsibility reduction based on his post-sentencing

conduct, namely, his rehabilitative efforts made during his incarceration. We

need not address whether Davis qualified for the § 3E1.1 reduction at the time of

his resentencing because we hold that a defendant may not utilize post-sentencing

contrition to warrant an acceptance of responsibility reduction at resentencing on

remand if he was ineligible for such a reduction at the time his initial sentence

was imposed. See United States v. Warner , 43 F.3d 1335, 1340 (10th Cir. 1994)

(noting that although resentencing on remand is de novo, “events arising after [the

first sentencing] are not within resentencing reach”);   see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,

commentary, application note 2 (“This adjustment is not intended to apply to a

defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the

essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and

expresses remorse.”). Because defendant concedes his ineligibility for a § 3E1.1

reduction at the time he was originally sentenced and his argument for the

reduction on resentencing rests solely upon post-sentencing conduct, the district


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court did not err by denying his request for a § 3E1.1 reduction. Accordingly, we

AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district court.




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