F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 10 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
DOUGLAS CAMPBELL, RICHARD
HAMILTON, CLYDE HARKINS,
JACK HAWKINS, DANIEL HAYES,
GARY SWING, JEFFREY WRIGHT,
DOUGLAS BRUCE, THE
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
INSTITUTE, AMERICANS FOR
SOUND PUBLIC POLICY, and the
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW FOUNDATION, INC.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 98-1329
VICTORIA BUCKLEY, in her official
capacity as Secretary of State for the
State of Colorado and member of the
Colorado State Initiative and
Referendum Title Board, COLORADO
STATE INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM TITLE BOARD, and
RICHARD WESTFALL and
REBECCA LENNAHAN in their
official capacities as Title Board
members,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 98-K-1022)
Paul Grant, Parker, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Maurice Knaizer, Deputy Attorney General (Ken Salazar, Attorney General;
Barbara McDonnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General; Michael E. McLachlan,
Solicitor General; Christine M. Arguello, Deputy Attorney General, with him on
the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before BRISCOE , REAVLEY *, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
REAVLEY , Senior Circuit Judge.
Eight individuals and three organizations 1
brought this action challenging
the constitutionality of the “title setting” requirements of the State of Colorado’s
*
Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, United States Senior Circuit Judge for the
Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
The three institutional plaintiffs challenge the district court’s holding that
they lacked standing. Because the individual plaintiffs are proponents of past and
present initiatives and have standing, and because all plaintiffs are represented by
the same counsel and jointly raise the same substantive arguments on appeal, we
decline to address the standing issue. In these circumstances there is no need to
address the standing of the institutional plaintiffs, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 721 (1986); Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 319 n.3
(1984), particularly where, as here, these plaintiffs have not obtained relief
different from that of the plaintiffs who do have standing, see General Bldg.
Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 402 n.22. (1982).
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ballot initiative law. The district court, after a bench trial, upheld the
constitutionality of the Colorado scheme. 2
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Colorado Constitution reserves to the people the power to enact laws
and constitutional amendments by initiative, and to reject by referendum laws
passed by the general assembly. 3
An initiative is placed on the ballot after the
proponent secures by petition the required number of signatures by registered
electors. 4
A referendum similarly may be placed on the ballot by circulating a
petition, or may be placed on the ballot by the general assembly. 5
Initiatives and
referenda placed on the ballot and approved by majority vote are not subject to
the governor’s veto power. 6
Colorado has various procedures, set out in its constitution and statutes,
which regulate initiatives. “The Colorado Constitution grants the general
2
Campbell v. Buckley,11 F. Supp.2d 1260 (D. Colo. 1998).
3
See Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(1).
4
For the initiative to be placed on the ballot, the petition must be signed
by registered electors equal in number to at least five percent of the total number
of votes cast for the office of secretary of state in the previous election. See id.
art. V., § 1(2). A “registered elector” is a person legally qualified to vote who
has complied with state registration provisions. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-1-
104(12) & (35) (1999).
5
See Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(3).
6
See id. art V, § 1(4).
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assembly the authority to adopt legislation designed to prevent fraud, mistake, or
other abuses in the petition process.” 7
Appellants challenge the “title setting” requirements of the ballot initiative
procedure. Under these requirements, initiatives must comply with a “single
subject” rule, and are given a title and summary by state officials before the
petition is circulated. Under Art. V., § 1(5.5) of the Colorado Constitution:
No measure shall be proposed by petition containing more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject
shall be embraced in any measure which shall not be expressed in the
title, such measure shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall
not be so expressed. If a measure contains more than one subject,
such that a ballot title cannot be fixed that clearly expresses a single
subject, no title shall be set and the measure shall not be submitted to
the people for adoption or rejection at the polls.
This provision was added to the Colorado Constitution by constitutional
amendment approved by the voters in 1994.
Similar single subject requirements apply to bills and constitutional
amendments proposed by the general assembly, other than general appropriations
bills. 8
American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1096
7
(10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Buckley v.
American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999). We refer to
both decisions as “ACLF.”
See Colo. Const. art. V, § 21 (“No bill, except general appropriation
8
bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title . . . .”); id. art. XIX, § 2(3) (“No measure proposing an
(continued...)
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By statute, the proponent of a ballot initiative must submit a draft of the
initiative petition to the directors of the state legislative council and the office of
legislative legal services for review and comment. 9 The proponent may amend
the petition in response to these comments. 10 “To the extent possible, drafts shall
be worded with simplicity and clarity and so that the effect of the measure will
not be misleading or likely to cause confusion among voters.” 11 The draft is then
submitted to the secretary of state. 12 The “title board,” consisting of the secretary
of state, attorney general, and director of the office of legislative legal services or
the director’s designee, then gives the initiative a “proper fair title,” a submission
clause, and an impartial summary. 13 The petition cannot be circulated for the
required signatures unless these procedures are followed. 14 If the proponent is
8
(...continued)
amendment or amendments to this constitution shall be submitted by the general
assembly to the registered electors of the state containing more than one subject,
which shall be clearly expressed in its title . . . .”).
9
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-40-105(1) (1999).
10
See id. § 1-40-105(2).
11
Id. § 1-40-105(3).
12
See id. § 1-40-105(4).
13
See id. § 1-40-106(1) & (3). The submission clause is “the language
which is attached to the title to form a question which can be answered by ‘yes’ or
‘no.’” Id. § 1-40-102(8).
14
See id. § 1-40-107(4).
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dissatisfied with the title, submission clause, or summary, he may move for
rehearing with the title board, and if rehearing is overruled, he may seek review in
the Colorado Supreme Court. 15
The reasons for the title setting requirements are described by statute:
(d) The Colorado supreme court has held that the constitutional
single-subject requirement for bills was designed to prevent or
inhibit various inappropriate or misleading practices that might
otherwise occur, and the intent of the general assembly in referring to
the people section 1(5.5) of article V and section 2(3) of article XIX
was to protect initiated measures and referred constitutional
amendments from similar practices;
(e) The practices intended by the general assembly to be inhibited by
section 1(5.5) of article V and section 2(3) of article XIX are as
follows: (I) To forbid the treatment of incongruous subjects in the
same measure, especially the practice of putting together in one
measure subjects having no necessary or proper connection, for the
purpose of enlisting in support of the measure the advocates of each
measure, and thus securing the enactment of measures that could not
be carried upon their merits; (II) To prevent surreptitious measures
and apprise the people of the subject of each measure by the title,
that is, to prevent surprise and fraud from being practiced upon
voters. 16
Appellants alleged in their complaint that the statutory scheme, on its face,
violates their federal constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments “to speech, petitioning, political association, due process and
voting.” The complaint also alleged that as applied the single subject requirement
had been used to thwart their efforts to submit legislative and constitutional
15
See id. § 1-40-107(1) & (2).
16
Id. § 1-40-106.5
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changes to the voters. For example, they alleged that their proposed initiatives
for tax reform and selection of judges had been kept off the ballot by opponents
who, in a subjective, arbitrary, and discriminatory manner, found violations of the
single subject requirement. The district court heard testimony at the trial, and
also incorporated testimony previously given at a hearing on appellants’
application for a preliminary injunction.
After considering the arguments of the parties and the evidence, the district
court held that the Colorado initiative procedures challenged by appellants did not
violate federal constitutional standards.
DISCUSSION
Appellants argue that the title setting process abridges their First
Amendment rights. We have recognized that “even though the initiative and
referendum process is not guaranteed by the United States Constitution,
Colorado’s choice to reserve it does not leave the state free to condition its use by
impermissible restraints on First Amendment activity.” 17
The Supreme Court and this court have written extensively on the federal
constitutional requirements placed on states when they regulate the voting
process. As we detail here, precedent requires that our analysis turn in large
17
ACLF , 120 F.3d at 1100.
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measure on whether the regulation at issue is subject to a balancing test or strict
scrutiny.
A. The Balancing Test
The Supreme Court has employed a flexible approach, which we refer to as
the balancing test, in a number of cases involving state regulation of the voting
process. In Anderson v. Celebrezze , 18 the Court struck down a state filing
deadline for independent candidates, but in so doing recognized that
constitutional challenges to a state’s election laws
cannot be resolved by any “litmus-paper test” that will separate valid
from invalid restrictions. Instead, a court must resolve such a
challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary
litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing
judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and
strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in
a position to decide whether the challenged provision is
unconstitutional. 19
In Burdick v. Takushi , 20 a voter challenged a state ban on write-in voting,
on grounds that the ban violated his right to vote under the First and Fourteenth
18
460 U.S. 780 (1983).
19
Id. at 789 (citation omitted).
20
504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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Amendments. In upholding the ban, the Court held that strict scrutiny was not
required, and that instead a balancing test was in order:
Petitioner proceeds from the erroneous assumption that a law that
imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict
scrutiny. . . . Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels
the conclusion that government must play an active role in
structuring elections; as a practical matter, there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest
and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the
democratic processes. . . . Consequently, to subject every voting
regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of States seeking
to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently. . . .
Instead . . . a more flexible standard applies. A court considering a
challenge to a state election law must weigh the character and
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate
against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications
for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff’s rights. . . . [W]hen a state election law provision imposes
only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State’s important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.
. . . Accordingly, we have repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically
neutral regulations that have the effect of channeling expressive
activity at the polls. 21
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party , 22 the Court upheld a state ban
on multiple-party or “fusion” candidacies. Recognizing that “States may, and
inevitably must, enact reasonable regulation of parties, elections, and ballots to
21
Id. at 432-434, 438 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22
520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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reduce election- and campaign-related disorder,” 23
the Court again employed a
flexible, balancing approach to the issue presented:
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and
Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the character
and magnitude of the burden the State’s rule imposes on those rights
against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and
consider the extent to which the State’s concerns make the burden
necessary. Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs’ rights
must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest.
Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State’s
important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. 24
In ACLF , we addressed a constitutional challenge to several procedures of
the then-existing law of Colorado governing ballot initiatives. While, as
discussed below, we struck down several provisions under a strict scrutiny
analysis, we upheld other provisions under a balancing test. We upheld a six-
month window for obtaining the necessary signatures on a petition. 25
We
concluded that this requirement was not subject to strict scrutiny, and upheld it as
“a reasonable, nondiscriminatory ballot access regulation. 26
We similarly upheld
a requirement that circulators sign an affidavit attesting that they have complied
23
Id. at 358.
24
Id. at 358 (citations, internal quotation marks omitted).
25
See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-40-108(1) (1999).
26
See ACLF, 120 F.3d at 1099.
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with Colorado law. 27
We also upheld a requirement that circulators be at least
eighteen years of age, reasoning that the requirement imposed only a temporary
disability that was not subject to exacting scrutiny. 28
B. Strict Scrutiny
In Meyer v. Grant, 29 the Court struck down a criminal provision of the
Colorado initiative law that prohibited proponents from paying petition
circulators. The Court held that the case involved “core political speech” and “a
limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny.” 30 The Court
reasoned that the law reduced “the total quantum of speech on a public issue.” 31
The decision turned on the strict scrutiny the Court employed. Once it adopted
this standard, it struck down the provision because “the burden that Colorado
must overcome to justify this criminal law is well-nigh insurmountable.” 32
In ACLF , we struck down a Colorado requirement that all circulators must
be registered voters. We applied strict scrutiny to this requirement, because its
27
See id. at 1099-1100 (discussing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-40-111(2) (1999)).
28
See id. at 1101 (discussing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 112(1) (1999)).
29
486 U.S. 414 (1988).
30
Id. at 420, 422.
31
Id. at 423.
32
Id. at 425.
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effect was discriminatory, in that it excluded persons who were not registered
voters from participating in core political speech, and because it limited the total
quantity of speech, by limiting “the number of voices to convey the proponent’s
message.” 33
We held, under a strict scrutiny analysis, that the state had failed to
advance a compelling state interest to which the requirement was narrowly
tailored. 34
We also struck down a requirement that circulators wear identification
badges giving their names. We applied strict scrutiny to this requirement, noting
the district court’s finding that the requirement discourages people from serving
as circulators, and concluding that a requirement that stripped the circulator of his
anonymity imposed a “severe” restriction on First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 35 We also struck down requirements that the proponent file certain
disclosures relating to the identities of paid circulators and amounts paid to each
such circulator. Finding such restrictions analogous to the requirement of
identification badges, and citing Buckley v. Valeo , 36 we held that these
restrictions were subject to exacting scrutiny. 37
We noted that, like the
33
ACLF, 120 F.3d at 1100.
34
See id.
35
See id. at 1101-02.
36
424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
37
See ACLF, 120 F.3d at 1104.
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requirement of identification badges, the disclosure requirements chilled
constitutionally protected speech. 38
In ACLF , the state obtained review in the Supreme Court. The Court
affirmed our judgment. 39
The Court concluded “that the Tenth Circuit correctly
separated necessary or proper ballot access controls from restrictions that
unjustifiably inhibit the circulation of ballot-initiative petitions.” 40
C. The Pending Challenge
“No bright line separates permissible election-related regulation from
unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedoms.” 41
In the pending
case, we are persuaded that the balancing test is appropriate. As we read the
decisions described above, the balancing test is a general approach our court and
the Supreme Court have employed in deciding the constitutionality of content-
neutral regulation of the voting process. A balancing test takes account of the
38
See ACLF, 120 F.3d at 1105 (noting that provision requiring the
disclosure of information specific to each paid circulator chilled speech because
“[m]uch like requiring identification badges, compelling the disclosure of the
identities of every paid circulator chills paid circulation, a constitutionally
protected exercise,” and that a second provision requiring detailed monthly
disclosures “chills speech by forcing paid circulators to surrender the anonymity
enjoyed by their volunteer counterparts.”).
39
ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 649 (1999).
40
Id.
41
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 359 (1997).
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Supreme Court’s recognition that, “as a practical matter, there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” 42
Strict or exacting scrutiny has been employed in circumstances not
presented in the pending case. The cases discussed above which applied strict
scrutiny do not lend themselves to a simple synthesis. As we read them, however,
strict scrutiny is applied where the government restricts the overall quantum of
speech available to the election or voting process. More particularly, strict
scrutiny is employed where the quantum of speech is limited due to restrictions on
campaign expenditures, as in Valeo , the available pool of circulators or other
supporters of a candidate or initiative, as in ACLF and Meyer , or the anonymity
of such supporters, as in ACLF , Valeo , and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n . 43 For example, the Court explained in Meyer “that the prohibition
against the use of paid circulators has the inevitable effect of reducing the total
quantum of speech on a public issue.” 44
In Valeo , the Court applied exacting
scrutiny to contribution and expenditure limits, 45
reasoning that “contribution and
42
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
43
514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995).
44
Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423.
45
See Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25, 44-45.
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expenditure limitations impose direct quantity restrictions on political
communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political
parties,” and that “a primary effect of . . . expenditure limitations is to restrict the
quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates.” 46
In our
view, the title setting process appellants challenge cannot be characterized as a
direct limitation on the quantity of speech available to them. If anything,
requiring proponents to pursue separate initiatives on separate subjects might
encourage more speech on each such subject.
Having selected the balancing test, we have little trouble agreeing with the
district court that the single subject and other title setting requirements are
constitutional. Colorado has advanced in this litigation and by statute (quoted
above) valid justifications for these requirements. The summary, single subject
and title requirements serve to prevent voter confusion and promote informed
decisions by narrowing the initiative to a single matter and providing information
on that single matter to the voter. Further, they prevent a provision that would
not otherwise pass from becoming law by “piggybacking” it on a more popular
proposal or concealing it in a long and complex initiative. As with minor and
third parties at issue in Timmons , the state has a valid interest in making sure that
initiatives “granted access to the ballot are bona fide and actually supported, on
46
Id. at 18, 39.
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their own merits, by those who have provided the statutorily required petition or
ballot support.” 47
These justifications are sufficient to pass constitutional muster.
“[T]he State’s asserted regulatory interest need only be sufficiently weighty to
justify the limitation imposed on the [plaintiff’s] rights. Nor do we require
elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State’s asserted
justifications.” 48
“[T]he state’s important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” 49
Colorado’s title
setting requirements are facially neutral and the state has offered reasonable
justification for them.
We also note that in ACLF the Supreme Court stated that “in aid of
efficiency, veracity, or clarity, Colorado has provided for an array of process
measures not contested here by [plaintiff]. These measures prescribe, inter alia , a
single subject per initiative limitation . . . .” 50
While not ruling on the
constitutionality of the single subject provision, the Court did note its apparent
virtue, and explained that “[o]ur judgment is informed by other means Colorado
47
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366.
48
Id. at 364 (citations, internal quotation marks omitted).
49
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
50
ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 649.
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employs to accomplish its regulatory purposes.” 51
The Court also cited, with
apparent approval, Biddulph v. Mortham , 52 as a case “upholding single subject
and unambiguous title requirements for initiative proposals to amend Florida’s
Constitution.” 53
While appellants offered evidence below of difficulties they have
encountered in complying with the single subject requirement, 54
they did not
prove that the state applied the single subject requirement in a manner that
discriminated against proponents on the basis of the content of their initiatives. 55
51
Id. at 642.
52
89 F.3d 1491 (11th Cir. 1996).
53
ACLF, 119 S. Ct. at 642.
54
We note that the district court was not particularly sympathetic to these
difficulties. For example, the court agreed with the state “that the frustration
Plaintiffs Bruce and Wright have experienced at their inability to see Initiative
#30 through the title-setting process is less a function of a system gone awry than
of their refusal, which Plaintiff Bruce candidly acknowledged at trial, to change
the proposal’s language in any significant way during the course of 12
submissions.” Campbell, 11 F. Supp.2d at 1267.
55
Appellants point to language in the district court’s opinion that certain
Colorado Supreme Court cases “provide a substantial basis for Plaintiffs’
trepidation” that these cases “target initiatives based on the unpopularity of their
proponents and their message.” Id. at 1267-68. However, the district court
ultimately found that a “discernible pattern or practice of illicit discrimination”
had not been shown, and that “[t]he single-subject scheme is content-neutral and
Plaintiffs’ claims that it is being discriminatorily applied to them are unsupported
by the evidence.” Id. at 1267, 1269. On this record we cannot say that the
district court’s finding is erroneous.
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While compliance with the single subject requirement may be difficult for some
who wish to offer ballot initiatives, and may to some extent limit their goal of
unfettered participation in the electoral and legislative process, we are satisfied
that the state’s reasons for its procedures are sufficiently weighty to justify the
procedures.
D. Equal Protection
Appellants separately argue that the title setting requirements amount to an
equal protection violation. They contend that even though both the general
assembly and proponents of citizen initiatives are subject to title setting
requirements, the general assembly, through its own conduct and as sanctioned by
the Colorado Supreme Court, has much more leeway than citizens on these
requirements. For example, they contend that legislatively referred measures
cannot be challenged for single subject compliance until after voter approval, 56
and that legislative bills similarly cannot be challenged until after they are passed
into law. In contrast, citizen initiatives are subjected to single subject approval
before the petition can be circulated. They further argue that, by statute, the title
See Polhill v. Buckley, 923 P.2d 119, 120 (Colo. 1996) (holding that
56
Colorado Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review legislative referendum for
compliance with single-subject requirement until approved by voters.)
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setting process for citizen initiatives is supposed to be conducted in the same
manner as the title setting process for general assembly bills. 57
In our view, the alleged differences in the treatment of citizen initiatives
and acts of the general assembly simply do not lend themselves to an equal
protection analysis. “The Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” 58 “The Equal
Protection Clause directs that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike. But so too, the Constitution does not require things which are different in
fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. The initial
discretion to determine what is ‘different’ and what is ‘the same’ resides in the
57
As discussed above, the single subject requirement for citizen initiatives
is found at Colo. Const. Art. V, § 1(5.5). General assembly bills as well as
constitutional amendments proposed by the general assembly and submitted to the
electorate are also subject to a single subject requirement. See Colo. Const. art.
V, § 21 & art. XIX, § 2(3). The general assembly has expressed its intent that
“section 1(5.5) of article V and section 2(3) of article XIX be liberally construed,
so as to avert the practices against which they are aimed and, at the same time, to
preserve and protect the right of initiative and referendum.” Colo. Stat. Ann. § 1-
40-106.5(2) (1999). It has also expressed its intent “that, in setting titles pursuant
to section 1(5.5) of article V, the initiative title setting review board created in
section 1-40-106 should apply judicial decisions construing the constitutional
single-subject requirement for bills and should follow the same rules employed by
the general assembly in considering titles for bills.” Id § 1-40-106.5(3).
58
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985).
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legislatures of the States.” 59 “In order to assert a viable equal protection claim,
plaintiffs must first make a threshold showing that they were treated differently
from others who were similarly situated to them.” 60
Ordinarily the Equal
Protection Clause is applied to claims of class-based discrimination. 61
Citizens who propose legislation through the initiative process and
members of the general assembly who pass bills are not similarly situated classes.
Members of the general assembly must win an election to even serve in that body,
and, unlike initiatives, general assembly bills are subject to veto by the governor.
Before a vote on a bill, it is subject to committee consideration, amendment, and
debate according to the rules of the general assembly. The legislative process and
the initiative process are so fundamentally different that we cannot read the Equal
Protection Clause of the federal Constitution to require the state to afford the
same title setting treatment to these two processes.
AFFIRMED.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citation, brackets, internal
59
quotation marks omitted).
60
Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1312 (10th Cir. 1998).
61
See , e.g. , Plyler , 457 U.S. at 213 (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause
was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and
invidious class-based legislation.”); United States v. Batchelder , 442 U.S. 114,
125 n.9 (1979) (“The Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforcement
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary
classification.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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