F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAY 1 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 98-1465
MIKE MOHAMMAD ALAHMAD,
also known as Mohammad Al-Ahmad,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D. Ct. No. 98-CR-91-Z)
Howard A. Pincus, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. Katz, Federal
Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Office of the Federal Public Defender,
Denver, Colorado, appearing for Defendant-Appellant.
Martha Ann Paluch, Assistant United States Attorney (Thomas L. Strickland,
United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Office of the United States
Attorney, Denver, Colorado, appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before TACHA, HOLLOWAY, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Mike Mohammad Alahmad appeals his conviction under the
International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1204. We
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I.
Christy Farrell gave birth to Brittny Alahmad in 1985. Brittny lived with
Leslie Collins-Pottebaum, Farrell’s mother, for the first seven years of her life.
In 1990, defendant, Brittny’s father, sought visitation rights to Brittny and a
custody dispute ensued. A Colorado state court eventually awarded legal custody
of the child to defendant in 1992 and granted Collins-Pottebaum and Farrell
liberal visitation rights.
Brittny stayed one night a week with Collins-Pottebaum pursuant to the
custody order. On April 23, 1993, however, Brittny did not arrive at Collins-
Pottebaum’s home for a scheduled visit. Collins-Pottebaum learned that
defendant had taken Brittny to Jordan, his native land, for ten days. She
complained to the Colorado court, which, after a hearing, ordered that defendant
not take Brittny from Colorado permanently without leave of the court. After the
hearing, defendant reportedly told Collins-Pottebaum that if she continued to
make trouble he would take Brittny from her permanently. Defendant repeated
this threat on several occasions.
On July 3, 1996, defendant told Collins-Pottebaum that he planned to take
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Brittny to Disneyland for about a week. After several weeks passed without
communication from Brittny or defendant, Collins-Pottebaum persuaded the
manager of defendant’s apartment building to let her into his apartment. Collins-
Pottebaum found the apartment nearly empty. On July 29, defendant phoned
Collins-Pottebaum, telling her that he and Brittny were in Jordan. Thereafter
Collins-Pottebaum and various public authorities were unable to locate either
Brittny or defendant.
In March 1997, the Colorado state court found that defendant had violated
its 1993 order prohibiting the permanent removal of Brittny from the state. The
court issued a new order transferring permanent custody to Collins-Pottebaum.
On suspicion of international parental kidnapping, the FBI issued a warrant for
defendant’s arrest. In February 1998, defendant returned to the United States,
leaving Brittny in Jordan. Federal agents arrested him at O’Hare International
Airport in Chicago.
A federal grand jury indicted defendant under IPKCA for kidnapping.
Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, and the district court denied the
motion. A jury convicted defendant, and defendant filed a timely appeal.
II.
Defendant first argues that the district court misconstrued IPKCA in
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finding that Collins-Pottebaum enjoyed parental rights under the statute. 1 We
review de novo the district court’s statutory interpretation. Beck v. Northern
Natural Gas Co., 170 F.3d 1018, 1023 (10th Cir. 1999).
IPKCA provides that “[w]hoever removes a child from the United States or
retains a child . . . outside the United States with intent to obstruct the lawful
exercise of parental rights shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 3 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a). The act defines “parental rights” as
“right[s] to physical custody of the child - - (A) whether joint or sole (and
includes visiting rights); and (B) whether arising by operation of law, court order,
or legally binding agreement of the parties.” Id. § 1204(b)(2).
At the time that the government prosecuted defendant, Collins-Pottebaum
enjoyed visitation rights under a state court order. The statute clearly categorizes
“visiting rights” as “parental rights.” Thus, the district court properly applied the
statute to defendant.
Defendant next argues that IPKCA as applied to him violates his equal
protection rights. Because defendant raises his equal protection claim for the first
time on appeal, we review the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
under that claim for constitutional plain error. United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d
1
The government prosecuted defendant for obstruction of Collins-
Pottebaum’s parental rights. The indictment did not charge defendant with
violating Farrell’s rights.
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1549, 1558-59 (10th Cir. 1992). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-117(3) (1999) provides
that a “court may not make any order restricting the movement of the child if such
restriction is solely for the purpose of allowing the grandparent the opportunity to
exercise his grandchild visitation rights.” In light of this provision, defendant
argues, he could be prosecuted under IPKCA only because both Brittny’s mother
and grandmother enjoyed visitation rights. However, he claims, a similarly
situated parent who shares visitation rights only with a grandmother could not be
so prosecuted, because § 19-1-117(3) would invalidate any state court order
restricting that parent’s movement of the child.
Even assuming that defendant and a parent who shares visitation rights only
with a grandparent are similarly situated, the government need only “demonstrate
a rational basis for the disparate treatment.” United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d
653, 656 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985)). We find that the state has a rational basis to protect the
shared visitation rights of parents and grandparents more forcefully than the
visitation rights of grandparents alone. The federal government, in its IPKCA
prosecution of defendant, was simply aiding the enforcement of a valid state court
order. The district court therefore committed no plain constitutional error in
failing to dismiss defendant’s indictment on this late-proffered ground.
Defendant’s third argument is that the district court improperly admitted
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into evidence a redacted version of the Colorado court’s 1997 order transferring
custody of Brittny to Collins-Pottebaum. Defendant argues that the order was not
relevant to his intent in July 1996, and alternatively, that any relevance was
outweighed by its likely prejudicial impact. We review a decision to admit
evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1363
(10th Cir. 1997).
Evidence is relevant when it bears any tendency to render a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of an action more or less probable. Fed. R.
Evid. 401. Under this standard, the 1997 order was relevant. Defendant himself
introduced the 1993 order at trial, claiming that he acted within the custody
provisions of that order. The 1997 order, in which the Colorado court determined
that defendant had violated its 1993 order, clearly rendered defendant’s
allegations less probable.
Fed. R. Evid. 403 prohibits the admission of relevant evidence if the danger
of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. Because almost
all evidence will be perceived as prejudicial by one side or the other, “it is
generally thought that the jury can best determine the truth when it has access to
all the relevant admissible evidence.” SEC v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1171 (10th
Cir. 1992).
Defendant argues that the jury gave exaggerated or controlling weight to
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the 1997 order when determining his intentions in 1996. We disagree. Even if
the jury found the 1997 order persuasive, it does not follow that the jury gave too
much weight to the order. Defendant had every opportunity to argue to the
district court that he had in fact complied with the 1993 order.
Furthermore, there was abundant additional evidence from which the jury
could infer defendant’s intentions when he took Brittny from the United States.
This evidence included (1) defendant’s repeated threats to take Brittny
permanently from Collins-Pottebaum; (2) defendant’s false representations to
Collins-Pottebaum about the Disneyland trip; (3) defendant’s empty apartment,
discovered shortly after he took Brittny from the country; and (4) defendant’s
failure to communicate with Collins-Pottebaum apart from his single call from
Jordan.
Finally, defendant claims that the 1997 order constituted inadmissible
hearsay. “Appellate review is particularly deferential where an evidentiary ruling
concerns the admission of alleged hearsay evidence.” Knox, 124 F.3d at 1363.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 802, hearsay evidence that does not meet an exclusion or
exception is generally inadmissible at trial. Hearsay is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801. Defendant maintains that the
1997 order constituted hearsay evidence because the Colorado judge who entered
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the order did not testify at defendant’s federal trial, and the government offered it
to prove that defendant violated the 1993 order. Although we doubt defendant’s
characterization of the 1997 court order, we need not consider the applicability of
the hearsay rule to this case. 2 The jury had more than ample grounds from which
to infer that defendant willfully violated the 1993 order. Thus, any error in
admitting the 1997 order was harmless, and we must therefore disregard it. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”); United States v.
Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1473 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that an error is deemed
harmless “unless it had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in
grave doubt as to whether it had such effect”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
We also deny defendant’s motion to submit a supplemental opening brief.
To the extent that the motion argues issues currently before the Supreme Court,
we find that the arguments have no bearing on this case at this time.
AFFIRMED.
2
Defendant analogizes the 1993 order to two judicial pronouncements
which we found to constitute inadmissible hearsay in United States v.
Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 1991). The statements erroneously
admitted in Zimmerman were (1) an observation made by one judge during a
discovery hearing, and (2) a letter written to the United States Attorney’s Office
by another judge. Both statements were offered not to rebut an affirmative
defense, as was the case here, but as conclusions by the judges that the
defendant’s law firm, and by implication the defendant, was guilty. Such
statements obviously are not on a par with the final order before us.
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