F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAY 30 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4131
EFREN RIOS MOJICA,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 98-CR-596-W)
Submitted on the briefs:
Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney, and Barbara Bearnson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Robert L. Booker and Edward W. McBride, Jr., of Booker & Associates,
Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before KELLY , McKAY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
McKAY , Circuit Judge.
Efren Rios Mojica appeals from a twenty-seven month sentence imposed
for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). He contends that the court erred in
holding as a matter of law that § 2K2.1(b)(2) of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines Manual [hereinafter “U.S.S.G.”] does not apply to his crime. Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse. 1
BACKGROUND
Although the government contested Mr. Mojica’s version of the
circumstances surrounding his conviction, the district court assumed the facts
submitted by Mr. Mojica to be true in arriving at its challenged legal conclusion.
See R. Vol. II (Tr. of June 21, 1999 sentencing hr’g at 4-6, 15 [hereinafter
“Tr.”]). Therefore, the underlying factual predicates for Mr. Mojica’s sentence
are undisputed for purposes of our review. Mr. Mojica was convicted of several
crimes associated with a domestic violence charge in the Utah state courts in
February 1998. After those convictions, he lived with Robert and Naomi Rios,
his brother and niece. In October 1998, Mr. Rios brought home a shotgun he had
borrowed to go turkey hunting. On November 1, 1998, Mr. Mojica had an
argument with Ms. Rios. In anger, she threatened to turn him in to the police for
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
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violation of probation in the domestic violence case because the shotgun was in
the house. Mr. Rios was not at home, so Mr. Mojica decided to immediately
return the gun to its owner, whom he knew. The police arrested Mr. Mojica in the
parking lot of his apartment complex while he was carrying the unloaded shotgun
and fifteen rounds of ammunition in the carrying case.
APPLICABLE LAW
In September 1996, § 922(g) was amended to make individuals who
had committed certain misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence subject to the
restrictions on possession of firearms provided in the Gun Control Act of 1968.
See Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N.
(110 Stat.) 3009-371 to 3009-372. Mr. Mojica pleaded guilty to possession of
a firearm by a restricted person under § 922(g)(9). The applicable Sentencing
Guidelines were amended effective November 1, 1998, to include this new class
of prohibited persons. See U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 578; U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1, comment. (n.6) (defining “prohibited person” as including those
defendants convicted in any court of a misdemeanor domestic violence crime).
Mr. Mojica was sentenced at base offense level 12 pursuant to a two-point
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6) (providing
for application of base level offense 14 for defendant who is a “prohibited
person”). The court denied Mr. Mojica’s request to apply § 2K2.1(b)(2), which
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provides for a reduction to base offense level 6 in those situations in which the
crime of possession is associated solely with lawful sporting or collection
purposes. We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the
Sentencing Guidelines de novo . See United States v. Henry , 164 F.3d 1304, 1310
(10th Cir.), cert. denied , 119 S. Ct. 2381 (1999).
DISCUSSION
Section 2K2.1(b)(2) provides:
If the defendant . . . possessed all ammunition and firearms solely
for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully
discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition,
decrease the offense level determined above to level 6.
Mr. Mojica argued unsuccessfully that he was entitled to a reduction in base
offense level because the shotgun was obtained solely for lawful hunting purposes
and he had not used the shotgun in any other manner or for any other purpose.
The district court noted that there was no claim “that the defendant personally and
independent of his brother had any interest in using the gun for sporting purposes,
[and] that the sole intent of the defendant in returning the gun was simply to
transport the gun out of the house and over to [its owner] . . . because of the
threats of his niece . . . .” Tr. at 6. Because Mr. Mojica “personally was not
going to use the gun either for sporting or collection purposes,” the court
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determined as a matter of law that Mr. Mojica was not entitled to the reduction in
sentence provided by § 2K2.1(b)(2). Id. at 7.
The district court thus limited application of the statutory reduction to those
situations in which the defendant possesses the firearm only for his own lawful
sporting or collection purposes by inserting “defendant’s” before “lawful sporting
or collection purposes” in the guideline. The narrow question before this court
is whether, under the facts that: (1) Mr. Mojica’s constructive possession began
with his brother obtaining and using the shotgun for lawful sporting purposes;
(2) Mr. Mojica never used or intended to use the shotgun for any purpose; and
(3) Mr. Mojica’s only actual possession of the firearm was in attempting to take
it back to its owner, may the court review the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether to apply § 2K2.1(b)(2), or is the court barred from applying
§ 2K2.1(b)(2) by the sole fact that Mr. Mojica never intended to use the shotgun
for sporting purposes.
The guidelines, as criminal statutes, are “given their fair meaning in accord
with the manifest intent of the lawmakers,” United States v. Moore , 423 U.S.
122, 145 (1975) (quotation omitted), without adding or subtracting words from
the statutory language, see 62 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of
Jam v. United States , 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951). We first observe that the
language of § 2K2.1(b)(2) does not expressly limit reduction of a defendant’s
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base level offense to those situations in which possession or transport is related
only to the defendant’s own lawful sporting purposes. Therefore, we endeavor to
determine the Sentencing Commission’s manifest intent in promulgating the
guideline.
The intent of the Sentencing Commission is demonstrated in part through
its commentary. District courts are obliged to follow the explanatory application
notes unless they are plainly erroneous, inconsistent with the guidelines, or
violative of the Constitution or a federal statute. See Stinson v. United States ,
508 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1993). The relevant application note provides that
“lawful sporting purposes or collection” [are] determined by the
surrounding circumstances. . . . Relevant surrounding circumstances
include the number and type of firearms, the amount and type of
ammunition, the location and circumstances of possession and actual
use, the nature of the defendant’s criminal history . . . and the extent
to which possession was restricted by local law.
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (n.10). Although this note does not clarify whose
sporting purpose is relevant to the inquiry, it also does not expressly require that
the defendant have transported or possessed the firearm for his own sporting
purposes. It also does not limit “[r]elevant surrounding circumstances” to only
those facts involving the defendant. Instead, the application note requires the
court to examine the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the
specific circumstances of possession and actual use, rather than relying on
a single factor to preclude application of the guideline.
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The purpose of the “specific offense characteristics” guidelines in
§ 2K2.1(b) is to make punishment proportional to the specific illegal conduct of
a particular defendant, i.e. to punish more benign behavior less drastically on the
basis of the defendant’s “real offense elements” or actual conduct as opposed to
only the “charged offense elements.” See U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A (introduction and
general application principles). The background notes contained in earlier
versions of this particular guideline explained that, before the guidelines were
codified, sentencing variations for gun possession crimes were attributable to the
wide variety of circumstances under which the offenses occurred, and that,
“[a]part from the nature of the defendant’s criminal history, his actual or intended
use of the firearm was probably the most important factor in determining the
sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (backg’d) (1990). As the Eleventh
Circuit has noted, “[t]his background note shows that the Sentencing Commission
recognized that there are a wide variety of circumstances under which the instant
offense may occur and considered the mitigating circumstances of intended
lawful use in formulating the Guidelines.” United States v. Godfrey , 22 F.3d
1048, 1055 n.8 (11th Cir. 1994).
In providing for adjustments based on the specific offense characteristics,
the Commission acted consistently with the principle that “[i]t has been uniform
and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider
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every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the
human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and
punishment to ensue.” Koon v. United States , 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996). Thus,
“the relevant guideline clearly intended to punish innocent possession and use of
a firearm less severely, and improper use more severely.” United States v. Jones ,
158 F.3d 492, 501 (10th Cir. 1998). We do not translate this broad purpose to
mean, however, that § 2K2.1(b)(2) is a “catchall” guideline applicable to all
innocent purposes for possessing a firearm. Clearly, in order to fall within the
scope of the guideline, the defendant’s possession must be related to or
associated with “lawful sporting purposes or collection.”
Under the facts assumed by the district court, Mr. Mojica established that
the shotgun was obtained and used solely for lawful sporting purposes by his
brother but that he obviously had access to the shotgun. See United States v.
Adkins , 196 F.3d 1112, 1117-18 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that convictions under
§922(g) may be for either actual or constructive possession of a firearm and that
constructive possession exists when the defendant knowingly has control over an
object and the premises where the object is found), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 1446
(2000). His acquisition of the shotgun through constructive possession,
therefore, was solely for lawful sporting purposes. He established that he did not
use the unloaded and cased shotgun in a manner inconsistent with those lawful
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sporting purposes during his limited actual possession. He thus showed that his
continued possession while transporting the shotgun from his brother’s house to
the owner’s house was “solely for lawful sporting purposes” of others. Under
these assumed facts, Mr. Mojica’s possession of the firearm constituted a benign
act associated with a lawful sporting purpose meriting consideration of
application of
§ 2K2.1(b)(2).
Our holding is consistent with United States v. Moit , 100 F.3d 605 (8th Cir.
1996), which the district court rejected. In Moit the Eighth Circuit held that a
defendant convicted under § 922 who kept his father’s gun collection at the
defendant’s house should have received the § 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction even though
he was not the collector and the guns were not found in locations consistent with
collection purposes. See id. at 605-06. It expressly rejected the government’s
argument that “one who possesses a gun collection owned by another can never
receive a section 2K2.1(b)(2) decrease.” Id. at 606. In opining that the Moit
opinion was erroneous, the district court stated that the sporting purpose of one
person could not transfer to a prohibited person and thus “insulate” the prohibited
person from guilt. The district court reasoned that § 2K2.1(b)(2) “is an absolute
provision that if you have been convicted of these crimes, you can’t possess that
gun for any reason except . . . sporting and collection purposes . . . .” Tr. at 8-9.
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In so concluding, we believe the court may have confused consideration of
surrounding circumstances related to lawful sporting purposes as a defense to
conviction under § 922(g)(9), which is not permitted, and consideration of those
surrounding circumstances as mitigating factors in determining the appropriate
sentence, which is mandated. Under the application notes, the facts of actual
ownership, possession and use solely for lawful sporting purposes, and the
purpose of Mr. Mojica’s limited possession and intent behind transporting the
shotgun are all proper considerations of “relevant surrounding circumstances.”
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. (n.10); cf. United States v. Prator , 939 F.2d 844, 846
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding, under prior version of § 2K2.1(b)(2), that intended
lawful use is a mitigating factor under this section even if it is irrelevant to the
illegal possession itself) . Thus, the fact that Mr. Mojica transported a shotgun
lawfully used by his brother and its owner solely for sporting purposes did not
“insulate” him from criminal liability for illegal possession, but we hold that it is
a mitigating factor in determining a fair and proper sentence under the appropriate
sentencing guidelines. 2
2
The government cites two Tenth Circuit unpublished orders and judgments
that it argues are similar to the case at bar and in which it argues we “strictly
construed” § 2K2.1(b)(2) to limit its application. Both cases are distinguishable.
In United States v. Tregeagle , No. 91-4080, 1992 WL 33253 (10th Cir. Feb. 18,
1992), the defendant presented no facts showing that the handgun he illegally
possessed and pawned was ever acquired or possessed by anyone for lawful
(continued...)
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The district court’s reading of the guideline preliminarily requires proof
that any possession--constructive or actual--is for a defendant’s own sporting or
collection purposes in order to fall within the ambit of the guideline. Even if we
concluded that this interpretation was a reasonable one, we conclude that it is also
reasonable to interpret this guideline as allowing for a reduction in base level
offense for the benign possession of a firearm used solely for another’s sporting
or collection purposes . Thus, we are at least faced with a facially ambiguous
guideline. See United States v. Wilson , 10 F.3d 734, 736 (10th Cir. 1993)
(stating that rule of lenity is applicable when, in interpreting a facially ambiguous
2
(...continued)
sporting or collection purposes, which is a core requirement under the guideline.
We refused to apply the rule of lenity to make the guideline applicable to all
innocent uses of a handgun because the language limiting its application to
“lawful sporting or collection purposes” is not ambiguous. See id. at **1. We
stated that the defendant’s unique circumstances could have been dealt with
instead by a downward departure. See id. at **2. In United States v. Austin ,
No. 90-2098, 1991 WL 172653 (10th Cir. Sept. 4, 1991), even though the
defendant argued that he was simply transporting a sawed-off shotgun and five
other firearms to his brother for his brother’s collection, the district court held
that it did not make any difference whether the sawed-off shotgun belonged to the
brother or to defendant because the court did not believe defendant’s claim that
the shotgun was intended for use as a sporting weapon or any other legitimate use
as collection. See id. at **2. We upheld the court’s factual finding that
defendant’s possession of the shotgun was not associated with a sporting or
collection purpose as not clearly erroneous. See id. Contrary to the government’s
argument, we made no comment limiting application of the guideline under the
circumstances. Austin exemplifies proper consideration of the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether to apply § 2K2.1(b)(2) in situations in
which the defendant is not the sports enthusiast or collector.
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statute, “after reviewing all available relevant materials, the court is still left with
an ambiguous statute”). The ambiguity is “grievous” because refusing to consider
the guideline as a result of a narrow interpretation results in a significantly higher
base level offense and corresponding sentence and does not address those cases in
which a prohibited person is convicted of only constructive possession of a
firearm. See United States v. Onheiber , 173 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 1999)
(stating that “[t] he rule of lenity . . . applies only in cases where there is a
grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of a provision” )
(quotations omitted); see also United States v. Diaz , 989 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir.
1993) (finding ambiguity because sentencing court could take one of two
approaches to calculate sentence and holding that rule of lenity applies to
sentencing guidelines). We conclude that the rule of lenity requires consideration
of the guideline in situations in which the defendant is not the sports enthusiast or
collector but his possession is solely associated with or related to lawful sporting
or collection purposes (i.e., he or she has not used the firearm in a manner
inconsistent with those lawful purposes), such as in transporting or holding the
firearm for another’s lawful sporting or collection purpose. See United States v.
Martinez , 946 F.2d 100, 102 (9th Cir. 1991) (rule of lenity in criminal context
requires court to infer rationale most favorable to defendant and construe
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guidelines accordingly); United States v. Blackburn , 940 F.2d 107, 109 (4th Cir.
1991) (accord).
Because the government contested Mr. Mojica’s version of the surrounding
circumstances relevant to lawful sporting purposes, we must remand to the district
court for a hearing in which both the government and Mr. Mojica may present
sworn testimony. The court then must make findings and conclude whether
those findings support application of § 2K2.1(b)(2). If § 2K2.1(b)(2) applies,
Mr. Mojica’s base level offense is 6 and should be further reduced by the
two-point reduction the court has already granted for acceptance of responsibility.
See Tr. at 4. At criminal history category V, the guideline range is four to ten
months, but because the range falls within Zone B, the maximum term of
imprisonment would be no more than six months. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table;
U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1, comment. (n.1(b)). Mr. Mojica has apparently been in custody
since his arrest in November 1998. See Tr. at 3. Because Mr. Mojica will have
already served the maximum sentence if he is entitled to application of
§ 2K2.1(b)(2), the district court must expedite his resentencing proceedings.
The sentence of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is
VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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