Mitchell v. City of Moore

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUL 11 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

LYNDELL MITCHELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

v. Nos. 98-6446
99-6101
THE CITY OF MOORE, OKLAHOMA, a 99-6121
Municipal Corporation; MIKE DREA, BRUCE 99-6177
STORM, and GARY TIPPS, all individually,

Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 97-CV-1193-C)

David J. Batton (Michael H. Thompson, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on
the briefs), Norman, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

Ted N. Pool (Sherry Blankenship, and Susan K. Noland of Pool, Blankenship &
Vincent with him on the briefs) of Pool, Blankenship & Vincent, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

Before TACHA, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.

BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
 Captain Lyndell Mitchell, a police officer with the Moore, Oklahoma police

department, sued the City of Moore and three city officials individually, claiming

several adverse employment actions, including paid suspensions and the denial of

a promotion, created various federal and state causes of action. The district court

granted the defendants summary judgment in toto. While this suit was still

pending before the district court, Captain Mitchell’s employment was terminated,

at which time Captain Mitchell’s union forced the City to arbitrate Captain

Mitchell’s removal. The City eventually sought to enjoin the arbitration hearing,

arguing the summary judgment order was res judicata as to the issues in

arbitration. The district court refused to grant the injunction. The district court

also denied the City’s request for attorney fees and granted its full request for

costs in the underlying suit. The current case is actually four appeals, with

Captain Mitchell appealing the grant of summary judgment and the award of

costs, the City appealing the denial of the injunction, and all the defendants

appealing the denial of attorney fees. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Captain Mitchell began his career as a police officer with the City of Moore

in 1974. He attained the rank of Captain in 1991. In December, 1994, his

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superiors appointed Captain Mitchell Administrative Assistant, which qualified

him as the second ranking officer in the police department. During his tenure as a

police officer, Captain Mitchell was an active member of the Fraternal Order of

Police (Union), the exclusive bargaining agent for the police officers employed by

the City of Moore.

The current dispute began in June 1995, when Chief of Police Bruce Storm

(first individual defendant) gave Captain Mitchell a relatively negative

performance evaluation. Chief Storm listed several negatives on the evaluation,

including concerns a private business venture had become Captain Mitchell’s

main focus, concerns about Captain Mitchell’s ability to work with others, and a

lack of initiative on a particular project. In addition, Chief Storm made some

remarks that Captain Mitchell perceived as anti-union, and conceivably formed

the background for his claims that future disciplinary actions were based on anti-

union animus and thus violated his First Amendment rights:

Captain Mitchell has frequently expressed interest in assuming a
more responsible position within the Police Department. However,
rather than acquiring an attitude which would be more in line with an
Officer in an Executive position, he has maintained the attitude of a
Union member being much more concerned about taking advantage
of his benefits, etc. At some point Captain Mitchell must make a
decision whether he truly wants to go up and therefore remove
himself from the umbrella of security of the F.O.P., or to continue
under the protection of the Union. In any event, Captain Mitchell
would be well served to do less complaining and to perform as a

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 Police Executive.

On June 29, 1995, Chief Storm relieved Captain Mitchell of his duties as

second-in-command. On the same day, Chief Storm promoted Gary Tipps (second

individual defendant) from Sergeant to the newly created rank of Major, and

Major Tipps assumed the duties previously performed by Captain Mitchell. Major

Tipps resigned his position as Union president in order to accept the promotion.

Chief Storm stated in his deposition he chose Major Tipps in part as a way of

strengthening his relationship with the Union.

Apparently, Chief Storm’s concern about his relationship with the Union

was well-founded. Prior to Major Tipps’ promotion, the Union had decided to

hold a no-confidence vote on Chief Storm. When then-President Tipps mentioned

the vote to the City Manager, who is responsible for hiring and firing the Chief of

Police and other city employees, the City Manager informed President Tipps such

a vote would have no impact on his decision to retain Chief Storm and the

publicity surrounding the vote would damage the police department’s chances of

obtaining new facilities in an upcoming bond or sales tax election. President

Tipps and other Union leaders decided to postpone the no-confidence vote until

after the bond election. In his deposition testimony, Captain Mitchell pointed to

these events as the seed of a conspiracy between Chief Storm, Major Tipps, and

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the City Manager to promote Tipps in order to prevent the no-confidence vote,

and eventually deprive Captain Mitchell of various rights.

Later in 1995, Chief Storm confidentially hired an undercover police

officer to investigate a local gambling and drug operation. Captain Mitchell

received an inquiry on Friday, October 6, 1995, from a neighboring police

department concerning the undercover officer’s identification card, which had

turned up in the neighboring jurisdiction. Captain Mitchell was not aware of the

undercover operation, so he contacted Chief Storm to find out if the department

had indeed hired an undercover officer. Chief Storm instructed his secretary to

tell Captain Mitchell not to worry about the matter. However, gossip among the

regular officers concerning the “mystery officer” became rampant, and Chief

Storm and Major Tipps began to suspect Captain Mitchell of helping fuel the fire.

The following Monday, based on concern that the undercover operation had been

compromised and that Captain Mitchell criticized his superiors for not informing

him about the operations, Chief Storm and Major Tipps charged Captain Mitchell

with insubordination and breach of confidence and placed him on administrative

leave with pay pending an investigation. In addition, they ordered Captain

Mitchell not to work at his family’s business during regular department business

hours while he remained on suspension. Captain Mitchell admittedly ignored this

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order.

Captain Mitchell claims the paid suspension lasted approximately thirty

days. At the end of the suspension, Chief Storm recommended to the City

Manager Captain Mitchell be suspended without pay for five days, to be served

through the loss of five accrued vacation days. This punishment was ultimately

rescinded, and the vacation days were restored. After Captain Mitchell returned

to work, Major Tipps placed him in a series of what Captain Mitchell described as

demeaning positions for his rank and education. In response, Captain Mitchell

filed his first Notice of Tort Claim with the City, which objected to the

suspension and subsequent assignments, claiming $100,000 in damages.

In July 1996, Sergeant Tipps (he had since been demoted back to Sergeant

from Major) overheard a police dispatcher request an officer to escort Captain

Mitchell’s wife to her car after her restaurant closed. Sergeant Tipps informed

dispatch that pursuant to his understanding of a new policy, on-duty officers were

no longer to take such calls. When Captain Mitchell learned of this incident, he

made a copy of the dispatch tape and provided it to his wife, who then gave the

tape to a city councilman. Chief Storm again placed Captain Mitchell on paid

administrative leave pending the investigation of this incident. Chief Storm

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recommended Captain Mitchell be terminated; however, the City entered into a

settlement agreement with Captain Mitchell placing him on six months

disciplinary probation instead. During this same time-frame, the Union held a

vote of no-confidence on Chief Storm. Chief Storm’s attorney responded to the

charges put forth by the Union in support of the vote by reading a letter to city

council members, which stated in relevant part:

It is regrettable that Capt. Lyndell Mitchell is ostensibly
among the leaders of the FOP who have organized the vote of no
confidence .... Although Chief Storm fully recognizes that Capt.
Mitchell is entitled to his opinions and viewpoints, it makes it
particularly difficult for Chief Storm to operate the department
efficiently when the person on whom he must rely most heavily is
one of his primary protagonists.

Chief Storm ultimately left his position as Chief of Police. Captain

Mitchell applied for the position, as he had done once before when Chief Storm

was chosen. City Manager Mike Drea (third individual defendant) appointed an

officer Captain Mitchell considered less qualified than himself, passing over

Captain Mitchell once again. On August 8, 1997, after instigating the current

litigation in July, Captain Mitchell filed his second Notice of Tort Claim with the

City, pointing to the tape incident and the promotion pass-over as harassing

activity and demanding more than $10,000 in damages. The current lawsuit

followed in close proximity.

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 In his Second Amended Complaint, Captain Mitchell stated seven causes of

action: a § 1983 1 claim against the City; a § 1983 and § 1985 2 claim against the

individual defendants; a cause of action claiming the City and the individual

defendants violated Captain Mitchell’s constitutional right to privacy; and four

state claims, including a claim sounding in negligence and a claim of tortious

breach of contract as to the City, and claims of intentional infliction of emotional

distress and defamation directed at the individual defendants. In a sixteen-page

order, the district court determined Captain Mitchell failed to provide the

1
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....

2
42 U.S.C. § 1985, which is titled “conspiracy to interfere with civil
rights,” and states in relevant part:

[I]n any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more
persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.

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necessary evidentiary support to survive a motion for summary judgment, and

granted the defendants’ summary judgment motions in toto. This timely appeal

followed, and constitutes Case Number 98-6446.

Based on representations made in the lawsuit and tort claims, Captain

Mitchell was eventually terminated. Rather than pursue his termination in the

current suit, Captain Mitchell decided instead to participate in the grievance

procedure provided for under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the

City and the Union. The lawsuit and the arbitration process developed

concurrently. For instance, the City filed its summary judgment motion May 1,

1998, eight days before the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service notified

the arbitration panel of their selection. The district court issued its Order

granting summary judgment October 9, 1998. The arbitration hearing was

originally scheduled for August 1998; however, due to a series of postponements,

the hearing occurred in July 1999. The arbitration panel issued its decision

February 28, 2000, just eight days prior to oral arguments in the current case.

After receiving a favorable ruling on its summary judgment motion, the

City moved for injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing the issue involved in the

arbitration – Captain Mitchell’s termination – was inexorably intertwined with the

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judgment entered by the district court. The City sought to enjoin the arbitration

hearing and a declaration the district court decision was res judicata as to the

arbitration. The district court denied the motion, stating there were issues at stake

in the arbitration not addressed in its earlier order, and the Union, while involved

in the arbitration, was not itself a party to the litigation. The City appeals what is

now Case Number 99-6121.

Finally, after the district court granted the City’s summary judgment

motion, the City moved for costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d)(1), and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.

The district court awarded the City its costs, and Captain Mitchell now appeals

that award in Case Number 99-6177. Conversely, the district court denied the

motion for attorney fees, a decision the City appeals in Case Number 99-6101. In

the interest of judicial economy, a doctrine completely ignored to this point in the

case, we will consolidate these four appeals in this opinion and affirm the district

court in all respects.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the summary judgment aspects of this case de novo and apply

the same legal standard as the district court. See Simms v. Oklahoma, ex rel.,

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Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Services, 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 53 (1999). Summary judgment is proper if the

movant shows “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

“When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Simms,

165 F.3d at 1326.

The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie
demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In so doing, a movant
that will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the
nonmovant's claim. Such a movant may make its prima facie
demonstration simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence
for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim.

If the movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant that
would bear the burden of persuasion at trial may not simply rest upon
its pleadings; the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the
pleadings and set forth specific facts that would be admissible in
evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could
find for the nonmovant. To accomplish this, the facts must be
identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or
specific exhibits incorporated therein. Thus, although our review is
de novo, we conduct that review from the perspective of the district
court at the time it made its ruling, ordinarily limiting our review to
the materials adequately brought to the attention of the district court
by the parties.

Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation

marks and citations omitted). After determining no genuine issue of material fact

exists, we then must examine whether the district court correctly applied the

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substantive law. See Simms, 165 F.3d at 1326.

We review the denial of a permanent injunction for an abuse of discretion.

See Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1555 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 928 (1996). “Under this standard, we accept the

district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and review

application of legal principles de novo.” Id. We review the district court's

decisions to deny attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and award costs under 28

U.S.C. § 1920 for abuse of discretion. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 120 F.3d 1126,

1129 (10th Cir. 1997) (attorney fees); Callicrate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 139

F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir. 1998) (costs).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The District Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment: Case No. 98-6446

1. The Federal Claims

Section 1983 and § 1985 claims share a common element: a plaintiff must

show some deprivation of a federally protected right in order to be successful.

See Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1423 (10th Cir. 1995); Houston v.

Reich, 932 F.2d 883, 890 (10th Cir. 1991). Captain Mitchell claimed the

deprivation in this case came through violations of his due process rights, his free

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speech and free association rights, his right to privacy, and his right to equal

protection. The district court determined Captain Mitchell failed to present

sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment and found there was no

deprivation of a federally protected right. We agree and turn to each claimed

deprivation in turn.

a. Denial of Due Process

[P]rocedural due process ensures that a state will not deprive a
person of life, liberty or property unless fair procedures are used in
making that decision; substantive due process, on the other hand,
guarantees that the state will not deprive a person of those rights for
an arbitrary reason regardless of how fair the procedures are that are
used in making the decision.

Archuleta v. Colorado Dep’t of Institutions, Div. of Youth Services, 936 F.2d 483,

490 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoted in Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249, 1253

(10th Cir. 1998)). Therefore, in order to succeed on his due process claim,

Captain Mitchell needed to establish he had a protected property or liberty interest

in the promotion he was denied, or in continued employment as Captain without

the stigma of a paid suspension. See Hennigh, 155 F.3d at 1253.

The City took a slightly broader view of the potential interest, but still

argued in its summary judgment motion Captain Mitchell could not have a

property or liberty interest in any aspect of his employment because Oklahoma is

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an “at-will” state and no statute or contract altered that traditional relationship.

By highlighting the absence of evidence supporting Captain Mitchell’s case, the

City properly met its burden – as the movant for summary judgment – of

demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 325 (1986). After the City pointed out this deficiency

in Captain Mitchell’s prima facie case, as nonmovant for summary judgment his

burden was to identify specific facts, through affidavits, depositions, or exhibits,

from which a rational trier of fact could find in his favor. See Adler, 144 F.3d at

671. While Captain Mitchell corrects the error somewhat on appeal, his response

to the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment was entirely inadequate. As

the district court pointed out, Captain Mitchell’s response was limited to

conclusory statements and was void of cites to the specific portions of the

Collective Bargaining Agreement, City Charter, Police Rules and Regulations, or

City Personnel and Procedure Manual that might have supported his theory that a

contract existed creating a property or liberty interest in his position. The district

court was not obligated to comb the record in order to make Captain Mitchell’s

arguments for him.

In the Adler case, we stated “[t]he district court has discretion to go beyond

the referenced portions of these materials, but is not required to do so. If the rule

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were otherwise, the workload of the district courts would be insurmountable and

summary judgment would rarely be granted.” Id. at 672 (citations omitted). The

current case illustrates that point well. The argument section of Captain

Mitchell’s response is fourteen pages long, four of which are devoted solely to the

due process argument, and is accompanied by an appendix of over a thousand

pages. Rather than argue on appeal that his response adequately set forth specific

facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact, Captain Mitchell argues the

district court should have given him a chance to correct any inadequacies. This

argument is as specious as his response to the summary judgment motion. No

matter how often they are made to feel the part, our brothers and sisters on the

district court bench should not be cast in the role of stage director of the litigation

drama – forced to prod the actors through rehearsals until the proper performance

is achieved. To do so would not only consume an inordinate amount of time, but

would result in courts abandoning their neutrality and becoming advocates in the

adversarial process. We will not sanction such a transformation.

Captain Mitchell failed to meet his burden of presenting specific facts, by

reference to specific exhibits in the record, to overcome the motion for summary

judgment. “[W]here the burden to present such specific facts ... was not

adequately met below, we will not reverse a district court for failing to uncover

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them itself.” Adler at 672.

b. First Amendment Claims

Captain Mitchell next claims his paid suspensions and inability to obtain

promotions were a direct result of actions he took or statements he made as a

Union member, in violation of his First Amendment rights to free speech and free

association. However, Captain Mitchell’s response to the summary judgment

motions on this issue suffers from the same deficiencies as his due process

claims.

We employ a two-part test when evaluating public employees’ claims of

retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights:

First, one must determine whether the plaintiff's statements can be
fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public
concern. Second, courts must determine whether the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern outweigh the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.

David v. City and County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1355 (10th Cir. 1996)

(quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 858 (1997). In its

summary judgment motion, the City focused on the threshold question and argued

the speech involved in this case was not a matter of public concern, but instead

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related solely to issues of internal personnel disputes. Captain Mitchell’s

response ignored this point, failing to specifically mention even one instance of

speech engaged in by Captain Mitchell that might have led to retaliation. Captain

Mitchell focused instead on his right to associate with the Union. However, the

extent of Captain Mitchell’s argument on this point is limited to the following

conclusory statement: “Plaintiff engaged in union activity. As a direct or

circumstantial result, Plaintiff was publicly humiliated at a council meeting; false

charges leveled upon him; denied promotional opportunities; and ultimately

terminated.” This response is woefully inadequate to survive a summary

judgment motion, especially when Captain Mitchell claims he was passed over for

promotions because of his association with the Union, but acknowledges both

individuals who were hired in his place were past presidents of the Union.

c. Remaining Claims

Finally, Captain Mitchell hoped to find a violation of his federally

protected rights within either the right to privacy or the right to equal protection.

We fail to see what might be accomplished by meticulously pointing out the same

inadequacies in Captain Mitchell’s response in these areas as we have noted in the

due process and First Amendment claims. Suffice it to say the City characterized

Captain Mitchell’s privacy argument as a claim of a “constitutional right to

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moonlight or to work a second job while suspended with pay,” and Captain

Mitchell failed to cite to any evidence in the record, or relevant case law, to

counter that characterization. Nor did Captain Mitchell even so much as direct

the district court to any evidence in the record showing he was actually prevented

from working at his family business or penalized in any way for doing so.

Finally, Captain Mitchell failed to cite to any evidence in the record tending to

show he was treated differently than officers “similarly situated” as required for

an equal protection claim. See Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504,

532 (10th Cir. 1998). Captain Mitchell’s conclusory allegation to the effect that

he believed he was the best-qualified candidate for a job and was passed over

only because he was a Union member is simply not enough to survive summary

judgment.

Captain Mitchell’s response to the defendants’ summary judgment motions

failed to meet his burden to set forth specific evidence demonstrating a genuine

issue of material fact. As such, he failed to show the deprivation of a

fundamental right, and the district court properly granted defendants summary

judgment on the federal claims.

2. The State Claims

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 a. Individual Defendants

Captain Mitchell also raised two tort claims against the individual

defendants, the first for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the

second for defamation. Captain Mitchell conceded in his summary judgment

response that if the individual city and police department officials were acting

within the scope of their employment when they took the actions of which Captain

Mitchell complained, Oklahoma law shields them from tort liability. 3 In their

motions for summary judgment the individual defendants claimed Captain

Mitchell failed to present any evidence their activities occurred outside the scope

of their employment. Captain Mitchell’s only response was to argue this is an

issue of fact usually sent to the jury. Again, Captain Mitchell misunderstands the

role of summary judgment. The whole point of summary judgment is to decide

issues of law when there are no material facts in dispute that need to be decided

by the trier of fact. After the individual defendants showed the evidence

presented pointed exclusively to a finding they were acting within the scope of

3
See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit 51, § 153, which states in relevant part:

The state or a political subdivision shall be liable for loss resulting
from its torts or the torts of its employees acting within the scope of
their employment .... The liability of the state or political
subdivision under this act shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of the state, a political subdivision or employee at common
law or otherwise.

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their employment in making the hiring and discipline decisions complained of

here, Captain Mitchell was obligated to come forward in his response and refer

the district court to specific evidence that could at least make an inference to the

contrary. Captain Mitchell failed to meet that obligation. The district court

correctly determined the individual defendants were immune from the state tort

law claims.

b. The City

Finally, Captain Mitchell sued the City under theories of negligent hiring,

training and retention, and tortious breach of contract. Captain Mitchell argues

the district court erred by granting the City summary judgment on these claims.

We cursorily dispose of these arguments based on our analysis above. First,

Captain Mitchell cannot support a claim for negligent hiring and retention without

some showing the individuals hired and retained participated in wrongful conduct.

Captain Mitchell failed to do so. In addition, as stated during the discussion of

the § 1983 claim, Captain Mitchell did not steer the district court to the specific

portions of the appropriate documents supposedly creating the implied contract

right and therefore cannot survive summary judgment on the tortious breach of

contract claim.

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B. Motion Seeking Injunctive and Declaratory Relief: Case No. 99-6121

After the initiation of the underlying suit in this case, Captain Mitchell was

terminated December 16, 1997 because the City determined statements he made in

his lawsuit and tort claims constituted insubordination. Captain Mitchell elected

to pursue his reinstatement and back pay through the grievance procedure

provided for under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Union and

the City. While the Union demanded arbitration in January, 1998, the City waited

a full year, until after it was successful on its summary judgment motion in the

underlying suit, to ask the district court to enjoin the arbitration proceeding. 4 The

district court denied the City’s motion, finding the judgment in the underlying

case was not res judicata as to the issues involved in arbitration. We agree.

All the parties involved seemed to assume the underlying lawsuit involved

distinct and separate events from Captain Mitchell’s termination. In his response

to the summary judgment motion, Captain Mitchell stated he was pursuing “his

4
The arbitration panel issued its decision, ruling against the City and
reinstating Captain Mitchell, on February 28, 2000, eight days prior to oral
argument in this case. The City subsequently appealed the arbitration decision to
the state district court. The state district court has issued a stay of the arbitration
award pending our decision in this case and further proceedings in the state
courts. While arguably the City’s request for injunction is moot now that the
arbitration panel has issued its decision, we reach the merits of this appeal
because the City also sought declaratory judgment.

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reinstatement and claim for back wages through the arbitration process, any

remaining claims are addressed below and a part of this lawsuit.” The City, in its

reply to Captain Mitchell’s response on summary judgment states:

Plaintiff is now attempting to insert his termination into this cause
even though he states he is not seeking reinstatement or back wages
.... Plaintiff cannot have it both ways. The termination hearing is
pending before an arbitrator as provided in the [Collective
Bargaining Agreement]. He must elect a forum and stick to it, and
Defendants are entitled to notice as to the issues of the case.
Plaintiff did not request to amend his complaint to include
termination in the instant case and anything involving termination
should be denied.

On appeal, the City argues Captain Mitchell’s pleadings, motions, and other

documents submitted to the district court were “replete” with references to his

termination.

While we agree Captain Mitchell referred to his termination in several

documents, it was clearly done as an attempt to create sympathy for his plight,

and not done to insert new issues into the litigation. For instance, in his response

to the summary judgment motion, Captain Mitchell states: “Although Plaintiff’s

claims for reinstatement or back wages are not before the Court as an element of

damages, his termination is properly before this Court as it relates to the entire

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process that Plaintiff endured.” 5 More importantly for our purposes on review,

the district court found its order in the underlying suit was void of consideration

of the issues presented for arbitration, and the Union had an interest in the

arbitration not addressable by the order. Our review is necessarily based on these

findings and not the representations of the parties.

In our Circuit, “[c]laim preclusion 6 requires: (1) a judgment on the merits

in the earlier action; (2) identity of the parties or their privies in both suits; and

(3) identity of the cause of action in both suits.” Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1226. Put

another way, the doctrine of claim preclusion prevents “the parties or their privies

from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in” an earlier action.

Clark v. Haas Group, Inc., 953 F.2d 1235, 1238 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 832 (1992). In this case, we focus on the second and third inquiries, which

we examine in reverse order.

5
We note there is no evidence the district court was in any way impacted
by such “sympathy” arguments. A motion in limine would have been the
appropriate mechanism to prevent presentation of such arguments to the jury had
the case proceeded to trial.

6
“Although the parties use the term ‘res judicata,’ for purposes of clarity,
this court employs the term ‘claim preclusion’ instead.” Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186
F.3d 1222, 1226 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999).

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 We employ the transactional approach of the Restatement (Second) of

Judgments to determine whether the constitutional claims raised in the lawsuit

shared an identity with the termination claims raised in the arbitration. Yapp, 186

F.3d at 1227. Under this test, we preclude claims “arising out of the same

‘transaction, or series of connected transactions’ as a previous suit.” Id. (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)).

What constitutes the same transaction or series of transactions is “to
be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as
whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation,
whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage.”

Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)).

Our case law seems to stand for the proposition that all claims arising from

the same employment relationship constitute the same transaction or series of

transactions for claim preclusion purposes. See Id. at 1228; Clark, 953 F.2d at

1239. However, in Yapp and Clark the facts giving rise to the second lawsuit –

termination in both cases – were in existence at the time the first suit was filed.

See Yapp, 186 F.3d at 1225-26; Clark, 953 F.2d at 1236. That is not the case

here, where Captain Mitchell was terminated after his first suit was filed. 7 While

7
While Captain Mitchell filed a Second Amended Complaint December
17, 1997, one day after he was officially terminated, we have no way of

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we have yet to decide the issue, we agree with those courts holding the doctrine

of claim preclusion does not necessarily bar plaintiffs from litigating claims based

on conduct that occurred after the initial complaint was filed. See Johnson v.

Board of County Comm’rs of Johnson County, Kansas, No. 99-2289-JWL, 1999

WL 1423072, at *3-4 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 1999) (“Because a plaintiff has no

obligation to expand his or her suit in order to add a claim that he or she could

not have asserted at the time the suit was commenced, several circuits have held

that res judicata does not bar a second lawsuit to the extent that suit is based on

acts occurring after the first suit was filed.”) (citing Computer Associates Int’l,

Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.

1106 (1998); Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1992);

Spiegel v. Continental Illinois Nat’l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified

School Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919

(1985)).

Regardless of the outcome of the third inquiry, however, we affirm the

determining whether the complaint was amended to include termination issues
because the defendants did not include Captain Mitchell’s initial complaint in
their appendix.

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district court because the second prong – identity of parties – is not met. On

appeal, the City argues Captain Mitchell and the Union are obviously in privity

with each other and therefore the district court erred in not precluding the

arbitration proceeding. However, we have previously held “the interests of the

union and the individual employee are not always coextensive.” Ryan v. City of

Shawnee, 13 F.3d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1993). See also Alexander v. Gardner-

Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974). In Ryan, we determined an arbitration

of an employee’s grievance did not preclude a subsequent civil rights action, in

part “because the union usually has exclusive control over presentation of the

grievance, [and therefore] the employee’s opportunity to be compensated for a

constitutional deprivation might be lost merely because it was not in the union’s

interest to press his claim vigorously.” Ryan, 13 F.3d at 347 (quotation marks

and citation omitted). We think the same can be said of a union’s interests in a

subsequent arbitration when the employee first pursues a civil rights action.

Therefore, the district court did not err by determining claim preclusion was not

appropriate in this instance and did not abuse its discretion in denying the

injunctive and declaratory relief sought.

C. Attorney Fees: Case No. 99-6101

After the district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary

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judgment, the defendants jointly moved for the award of attorney fees pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1988. While a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is entitled to attorney

fees, see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983), a prevailing defendant

in a civil rights action may recover attorney fees only “if the suit ‘was vexatious,

frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.’” Utah Women’s

Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 136 F.3d 707, 709 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (quoting

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n.2). This is a difficult standard to meet, to the point

that rarely will a case be sufficiently frivolous to justify imposing attorney fees on

the plaintiff. See Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1581 (10th

Cir. 1995). The dismissal of claims at the summary judgment stage does not

automatically meet this stringent standard. See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d

1505, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995).

The district court specifically avoided finding Captain Mitchell brought the

lawsuit for an improper purpose. The district court noted “[t]he Order only

resolved that no legal remedy [was] available to [Captain Mitchell] under the

facts as supported by the evidence.” As noted earlier, the district court

determined Captain Mitchell’s response to the summary judgment motion was

inadequate, but that is an entirely different finding than branding the suit itself

frivolous. We see nothing in this record that requires a holding the district court

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abused its discretion in denying attorney fees, and we affirm.

D. Costs: Case No. 99-6177

Finally, the defendants filed a joint motion for a bill of costs, with a brief

in support. The defendants requested a total of $10,264.13 for deposition costs.

After a hearing, the court clerk reduced the requested deposition costs to

$7,371.53 and taxed the total costs in the amount of $8,492.03. Both sides filed

objections to the award with the district court. The defendants claimed the clerk

improperly reduced the deposition costs by $2,148.70 for depositions not used or

cited in the parties’ motions for summary judgment and confined their objections

to that portion of the clerk’s reduction. Captain Mitchell objected to any award of

costs in this case. The district court denied Captain Mitchell’s motion to disallow

costs and restored the $2,148.70 in deposition costs as requested by the

defendants. Captain Mitchell now appeals, arguing the award of costs was

inappropriate in this case and attacking specific award amounts. We affirm.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 makes the award of costs presumptive:

“costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing

party unless the court otherwise directs.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The general

costs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, permits recovery of deposition costs “necessarily

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obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2), (4). “We have stated that this

definition authorizes recovery of costs with respect to all depositions reasonably

necessary to the litigation of the case.” Furr v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 824

F.2d 1537, 1550 (10th Cir. 1987) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Captain Mitchell attacks the award of costs from a plethora of angles, most

of them confused and all of them unavailing. First, Captain Mitchell argues

imposing costs in this case is simply unfair. He states the presumption in favor of

costs should be relaxed when the prevailing party is the defendant in a civil rights

case, just as it is tougher for a defendant to receive attorney fees under § 1988.

See Sec. III. C., supra. However, Captain Mitchell fails to cite any authority in

support of this argument. The Fourth Circuit recently rejected a similar argument

and allowed costs against a losing plaintiff in a Title VII case. See Cherry v.

Champion Int’l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 1999). We find the Fourth

Circuit’s reasoning persuasive, and uphold the traditional presumption in favor of

awarding costs, regardless of whether the prevailing party is a defendant in a civil

rights case.

Captain Mitchell next argues the costs of the depositions of the individual

defendants in this case were unnecessary for trial. Captain Mitchell makes this

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argument because while he requested the depositions of Chief Storm, Mr. Drea

and Mr. Tipps, he decided not to have the depositions transcribed, to save on his

own costs. Captain Mitchell now objects to the defendants collecting the costs

they incurred in paying for the transcription of their own depositions. This

argument borders on the absurd. Captain Mitchell requested and took these

depositions. He felt they were necessary enough to the litigation to include them

in his appendix to his response to the summary judgment motion in the underlying

case. If the depositions of the three named individual defendants in the case are

not necessary to the litigation, we fail to see how any deposition would qualify as

a recoverable cost. Captain Mitchell’s decision to avoid transcribing the

depositions of the main figures in his own lawsuit should not prevent the

defendants from collecting those costs when they chose a different route. Cf.

Callicrate, 139 F.3d at 1341 (defendants awarded costs of copying plaintiff-

requested depositions of defendants’ employees or representatives).

Last, Captain Mitchell argues depositions not used in defendants’ summary

judgment motions were improperly taxed as costs, and depositions taken prior to

the grant of summary judgment but paid for after the court’s order should be

disallowed. We have previously rejected both arguments. We measure whether

an incurred cost was reasonably necessary under § 1920 “in light of the facts

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known to the parties at the time the expenses were incurred.” Id. at 1340. The

expenses in this case were incurred when the depositions were taken and

transcripts ordered, not when the reporter mailed a bill for services. As for the

unused transcripts, it would be “inequitable to essentially penalize a party who

happens to prevail on a dispositive motion by not awarding costs associated with

that portion of discovery which had no bearing on the dispositive motion, but

which appeared otherwise necessary at the time it was taken for proper

preparation of the case.” Id. In its order on this issue, the district court stated the

depositions were reasonably necessary for trial because when the summary

judgment motion was granted, the discovery period in the case had passed, trial

was imminent, and sworn testimony is used for various reasons at trial. We see

no evidence of an abuse of discretion on behalf of the district court.

Having carefully considered the various arguments made by the parties

involved in these four appeals, we AFFIRM the district court in all respects.

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