United States v. Ramstad

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 2 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-3277
HOWARD LEE RAMSTAD,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 98-CR-40085-DES)

Joseph D. Johnson of the Law Office of Joseph D. Johnson, Chtd., Topeka, Kansas, for
Defendant-Appellant.

Gregory G. Hough, Assistant United States Attorney (Jackie N. Williams, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff, Appellee.

Before BALDOCK, McWILLIAMS, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

A federal grand jury indicted Defendant Howard Lee Ramstad charging him with

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2),
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The

district court sentenced Defendant to 51 months imprisonment and Defendant appeals.

We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and remand for appropriate fact

finding.

I.

In July 1998, Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Brian K. Smith observed

Defendant’s motor home traveling east on Interstate 70, just outside Topeka, Kansas.

Trooper Smith noticed Defendant’s vehicle displayed only one California registration

plate on the rear of the vehicle. Believing that California law required vehicles to display

two registration plates, Trooper Smith ran a check on the registration plate. The

dispatcher informed Trooper Smith that the plate was assigned to a 1964 GMC. Because

Trooper Smith could not determine the make or year of the vehicle, he stopped

Defendant’s vehicle by activating his emergency lights.

Defendant pulled over, exited his motor home, and produced a valid driver’s

license and proof of insurance. Based on his observations of Defendant, Trooper Smith

believed Defendant was extremely nervous. Defendant accompanied Trooper Smith to

his patrol car where he issued Defendant a written warning for failure to display a front

registration plate. Trooper Smith returned Defendant’s documents to him and told him

that was all Trooper Smith had for him. Trooper Smith then asked Defendant if he could

ask him some more questions and Defendant agreed. Next, Trooper Smith asked

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Defendant if he was hauling anything illegal, such as drugs, guns, weapons, or

contraband. Defendant stated that he was not. Trooper Smith asked to take “a quick look

around” Defendant’s vehicle, stating that he “wasn’t going to tear anything up.” When

Defendant agreed, Trooper Smith directed him to stand, along with his passenger, by the

side of the highway, while Trooper Smith entered the motor home.

While searching the bedroom area, Trooper Smith noticed some irregularities: a

recessed area; visible scratches and scrapes on the side walls; and fresh caulking, screws

and trim. Trooper Smith further observed that the speaker grill covers did not cover

speakers, but just covered a small hole with a wire. Trooper Smith examined the speaker

grill covers and unscrewed them.1 Trooper Smith then exited the vehicle and walked to

the rear of the vehicle. He looked up at the back window of the passenger side and

observed a depth discrepancy in unaccounted space of approximately 28 inches to the rear

of the vehicle. At that point, Trooper Smith contacted the Topeka police department and

requested a K-9 narcotics detection dog.

About ten to fifteen minutes later, Officer Larry Falley arrived with his K-9 dog.

Trooper Smith informed Officer Falley that he suspected something was amiss in the rear

of the motor home. The dog alerted to the area where Trooper Smith had observed the

fresh scratches and marks. Trooper Smith directed Defendant to drive the motor home to

1
The record is unclear regarding whether Trooper Smith unscrewed the speaker
covers before or after observing that they did not cover speakers.

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a nearby highway patrol facility. Upon arrival, Trooper Smith removed a panel of the

vehicle and discovered 38 clear plastic-wrapped bundles of marijuana totaling 567.3

pounds.

Based on the foregoing, the Government charged Defendant with possession of

marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Defendant filed

a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence of the marijuana as fruit of an illegal traffic

stop. Defendant argued the traffic stop, made without probable cause or reasonable

suspicion, violated the Fourth Amendment. In addition, Defendant argued the

Government did not prove that he gave consent sufficient to purge the primary taint of the

illegal stop. Finally, Defendant claimed that even if the initial traffic stop was legal, or

Defendant’s subsequent consent purged its illegality, Trooper Smith exceeded the scope

of Defendant’s consent when he unscrewed the speaker covers.

At the conclusion of a suppression hearing, the district court summarily denied

Defendant’s motion to suppress without making any findings of fact. Instead, the district

court merely stated:

As to the motion for an order suppressing illegally obtained evidence, the
motion is denied and overruled. We’re basing our decision primarily on
Tenth Circuit law, which we believe is inconsistent with the position of the
defendant. They want to change that law, we’ll let them do it. I’m not
going to try it for them. So that’s the ruling of the court.

Aplt’s App. at 31.

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 II.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review a district court’s factual

determinations for clear error and ultimate determinations of reasonableness under the

Fourth Amendment de novo. United States v. Patten, 183 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir.

1999). “Factfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate

courts . . . .” Pullman-Standard v. United Steelworkers of Am., 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982)

(internal brackets and quotations omitted). Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e), “[w]here

factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its essential

findings on the record.” A district court need not place all of its findings on the record

provided the essential bases of its decision are apparent. United States v. Toro-Pelaez,

107 F.3d 819, 824 (10th Cir. 1997).

Here, the district court did not make any findings or otherwise explain the basis for

its decision. While remand may be unnecessary where “the proceedings below resulted in

a record of amply sufficient detail and depth from which the determination may be

made,” United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 881-82 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994), we believe

the record below is insufficiently developed regarding the suppression issue.

Accordingly, we remand to the district court for further fact-finding.2

2
We note that where the district court makes no express factual findings, we
normally uphold the district court’s ruling if any reasonable view of the evidence supports
it. United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000). Here, however,
the district court summarily denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, providing no findings
(continued...)

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 On remand, the district court must make specific findings as to whether the

original traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, and if so whether Defendant

subsequently gave consent sufficient to remove the taint of the illegal stop. If a

consensual search follows a Fourth Amendment violation, “the government must prove

both the voluntariness of the consent under the totality of the circumstances and that there

was a break in the causal connection between the illegality and the evidence obtained.”

United States v. McCurdy, 40 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 1994).

If the district court finds either that the traffic stop was legal and Defendant gave

consent or that the stop was illegal but Defendant gave consent sufficient to remove the

taint of the illegal stop, the district court must then make factual findings regarding

whether the scope of Trooper Smith’s search exceeded the scope of Defendant’s consent.

“The scope of a search ‘is limited by the breadth of the consent given.’” United States v.

Chavez-Ceja, No. 98-3031, 1998 WL 654986, at *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 1998)

(unpublished) (quoting United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1537 (10th Cir.1996)).

“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth

Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness–what would the typical reasonable

2
(...continued)
of fact and failing to explain the basis for its decision. See United States v. McCurdy, 40
F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 1994) (remanding to district court for factual findings as to
voluntariness of consent); United States v. Mains, No. 92-4066, 1993 WL 26827, at *1
(10th Cir. Feb. 5, 1993) (unpublished) (remanding to district court for factual findings
regarding alleged consent to search).

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person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.” United

States v. Elliot, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S.

248, 251 (1991)).

We REMAND to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

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United States v. Ramstad, No. 99-3277

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, Dissenting

The majority is properly frustrated by the district court’s failure to make

any findings of fact or even explain the legal basis for its decision to deny

Ramstad’s suppression motion. See Majority Op. at 4-5. It is indeed the district

court’s responsibility to make findings of fact when necessary to resolve a motion

to suppress evidence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e). When the district court

abdicates that responsibility, this court’s task in reviewing the suppression ruling

is made substantially more difficult, and sometimes impossible.

I nonetheless dissent from the Majority insofar as it states that factual

findings are necessary to decide the legality of the initial traffic stop. Judicial

efficiency suggests we decide those issues we can when such decisions will

narrow the district court’s task on remand. See generally Park County Resource

Council v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 617-18 (10th Cir. 1992)

(“[R]emand is not necessary where there is no dispute regarding the underlying

facts and where it is in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency to decide

the matter.”), overruled on other grounds by Village of Los Ranchos De

Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992). The evidence pertinent to

the threshold issue of the lawfulness of the stop is essentially undisputed.

Considering that undisputed evidence and viewing any disputed evidence in a
light most favorable to the government, this court should conclude the traffic stop

violated the Fourth Amendment. Cf. United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270,

1273 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that when the district court fails to make findings

of fact, this court may affirm its ruling on a suppression motion if any reasonable

view of the evidence supports that ruling).

In determining whether an investigatory vehicle stop is permissible under

the Fourth Amendment, this court’s “sole inquiry is whether the particular officer

had a reasonable suspicion that the particular motorist violated any . . . of the

multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.”

United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation

omitted) (emphasis added). For this court to conclude the detention of Ramstad’s

vehicle was constitutionally sound, therefore, we must determine that before

Trooper Smith executed the stop, he had a reasonable suspicion Ramstad had

violated a Kansas traffic or equipment regulation or statute.

At the suppression hearing, Trooper Smith testified that he stopped

Ramstad’s vehicle because he noticed it carried a California license plate only on

the rear and he believed California law required vehicles registered in that state to

also display a license plate in the front. Trooper Smith further testified that

statutory interstate compacts enacted in Kansas and which California had joined

authorized him to enforce California’s license plate requirements. In other words,

2
the government contends Ramstad’s failure to comply with California license

plate requirements constitutes a violation of Kansas law. No reasonable reading

of the interstate compacts or other statutes on which the government relies,

however, supports that contention.

The first interstate compact on which the government relies to justify the

traffic stop is the “Drivers License Compact,” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1212. Contrary

to the government’s interpretation of this statute, the Drivers License Compact

merely obligates the State of Kansas to report violations of Kansas traffic laws

and ordinances committed in Kansas by out-of-state motorists to those motorists’

home states. In no way does this compact render an out-of-state motorists’ non-

compliance with the home state’s license plate requirements a violation of Kansas

law.

The second interstate compact to which the government points is the

“Nonresident Violator Compact,” id. § 8-1219. 1 Like the Drivers License

Compact, the Nonresident Violator Compact has nothing to do with the authority

of Kansas law enforcement officers to enforce license plate requirements of

Ramstad asserts that Trooper Smith was mistaken in his belief that
1

California is a member of the Nonresident Violator Compact. Even if Trooper
Smith was so mistaken, this mistake is irrelevant to our analysis because whether
or not California is a member of the Nonresident Violator Compact, this compact
does not justify the stop of Ramstad’s vehicle.

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foreign states belonging to the compact. Instead, this compact merely prescribes

procedures by which an out-of-state motorist cited for a traffic violation in

Kansas can leave the state without having to post a bond.

Finally, the government contends that the Kansas license plate statute, id. §

8-142, requires out-of-state drivers traveling in Kansas to comply with the license

plate requirements of their home states. Smith even cited this particular Kansas

statute in his written warning to Ramstad. The government, however, fails to

recognize that § 8-142 explicitly applies only to vehicles registered in Kansas.

Section 8-142 provides that one cannot “operate . . . upon a highway . . . any

vehicle . . . which does not have attached thereto and displayed thereon the

license plate or plates assigned thereto by the division.” Id. (emphasis added).

For purposes of this section, “the division” is defined as “[t]he division of

vehicles of the department of revenue.” Id. § 8-126(v). Additionally, “license

plate” means “any plate, tag, token, marker or sign issued . . . for the purpose of

identifying vehicles registered under the provisions of the motor-vehicle

registration laws of this state . . . .” Id. § 8-126a (emphasis added). Ramstad,

therefore, did not violate § 8-142 by driving in Kansas a vehicle registered in

California that did not display two license plates.

In its attempt to justify the stop, the government has failed to point to any

Kansas statute or regulation which Ramstad violated. Indeed, the Kansas statutes

4
which do grant Trooper Smith authority to enforce the law expressly limit that

authority to “enforcement of the traffic and other laws of this state relating to

highways, vehicles[,] and drivers of vehicles.” Id. § 74-2105(a) (emphasis

added); see also id. § 74-2108 (vesting in highway patrol troopers the “power and

authority of peace, police[,] and law enforcement officers”); id. § 74-5602(e)

(defining police officer’s duties as “the prevention or detection of crime and the

enforcement of the criminal or traffic laws of this state or any municipality

thereof” (emphasis added)).

The question remaining, therefore, is whether the vehicle stop was

nonetheless constitutional because it was premised on Trooper Smith’s mistaken

view of Kansas law such that he believed Ramstad had committed a Kansas traffic

violation. Recently, the Fifth Circuit rejected the government’s argument that

although a detained motorist had not actually violated any law, the evidence

seized should be admissible under a good faith exception because the officer had

a good faith but incorrect belief that a broken taillight on the detained vehicle

constituted a violation of a Texas statute. See United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178

F.3d 282, 287-89 (5th Cir. 1999). The Lopez-Valdez court reasoned, “[I]f officers

are allowed to stop vehicles based upon their subjective belief that traffic laws

have been violated even where no such violation has, in fact, occurred, the

potential for abuse of traffic infractions as pretext for effecting stops seems

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boundless and the costs to privacy rights excessive.” Id. at 289. Similarly, the

Ninth Circuit recently held that an officer violated a motorist’s Fourth

Amendment rights when he stopped the motorist in the absence of a traffic

violation, even though the officer’s mistaken view of the law led him to believe a

traffic infraction had occurred. See United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101,

1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

This court has stated “that the Fourth Amendment does not invalidate

warrantless searches based on a reasonable mistake of fact, as distinguished from

a reasonable mistake of law.” United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 865

(10th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). It thus appears our

precedent is in line with the position of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that the

failure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing the law is

not objectively reasonable. That is particularly true in this case when no

reasonable person could read the statutes on which Trooper Smith and the

government rely as authorizing a Kansas officer to enforce California license

plate requirements. Because Trooper Smith lacked a reasonable suspicion that

Ramstad had violated any Kansas traffic regulation or statute, the investigatory

detention of Ramstad’s vehicle ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment.

Having reached that conclusion, I would remand for findings on the two

remaining issues: (1) whether Ramstad’s consent to search was sufficiently

6
attenuated from the illegal detention to render his consent voluntary in fact; and

(2) whether the search ultimately conducted remained within the scope of

Ramstad’s consent. To this end, the district court on remand should make

findings not only regarding the voluntariness and scope of Ramstad’s consent, but

also concerning the following factors which are relevant to the attenuation and

thus voluntariness determination: whether Trooper Smith informed Ramstad that

he was free to go or that he could refuse consent; the amount of time between the

illegal detention and the consent; the presence and extent of intervening

circumstances between the illegal stop and the consent; and the purpose and

flagrancy of Trooper Smith’s misconduct. See generally Brown v. Illinois, 433

U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975); United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir.

1996).

In all other respects, I concur with the Majority’s remand.

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